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EXHIBITS LIST

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT:
Reporter’s Transcript taken October 26, 2016, will be lodged with the Supreme Court.
Claimant's Exhibits:
I. Prior to October 14, 2001, date of accident:
1. Records of Glenns Ferry Medical Center for the Period October 11, 1985 to October 13,
2001
II. Following October 14, 2001, date of accident to October 5, 2009:
2. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C.
a. Report of October 11, 2012
3. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
a. Pharmaceutical Data
III. Following October 6, 2009, date of accident to August 27, 2013:
4. Records of Emergency Department, Elmore Memorial Hospital
5. Records of D. Peter Reedy, M.D.
a. Report to Berry, dated August 23, 2010
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated June 17, 2010
b. Report to Berry, dated December 10, 2011
c. Report to Berry, dated December 12, 2012
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated November 20, 2012
d. Report to Berry, dated November 2, 2015
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated October 28, 2015
e. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 7, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Reedy, dated December
17, 2015
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f. Report to Berry, dated January 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated January 5, 2016
6. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
a. Completed Questionnaire by Vernon McCready, PA-C, dated January 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence to PA-C McCready, from Berry, dated November 5,
2015
(2) Correspondence to PA-C McCready, from Berry, dated December 14,
2015
(3) Correspondence to PA-C McCready, from Berry, dated January 6, 2016
7. Records of Mountain Home Physical Therapy:
8. Records of Orthopedic Associates/Drs. Schweiger, Hessing and Clawson
9. Records of Richard Hammond, M.D./Neurology of Twin Falls
10. Records of Michael Hajjar, M.D.
a. Report to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund, dated November 14, 2012
b. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 27, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Hajjar, dated January 6,
2016
c. Report to Berry, dated February 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence to Dr. Hajjar from Berry, dated February 4, 2016,
without attachments
11. Diagnostic Procedure
IV. Following August 28, 2013 date of accident
12. Records of Nampa Medical
13. Records of Miers Johnson III, M.D./St. Alphonsus Medical Group
a. Mountain Home Physical Therapy
14. Records of Howard Shoemaker, M.D.
15. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C.
16. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
EXHIBITS LIST – (MARIO AYALA 46186-2018) - ii

17. Records of Paul Montalbano, M.D.
a. Report dated July 8, 2015
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Berry, dated June 22, 2015
18. Records of Mark J. Harris, M.D./Idaho Physical Medicine
19. Diagnostic Procedures
V. IME Reports
20. Mark J. Harris, M.D.
a. July 31, 2010 review of records
b. August 2, 2010 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated July 26, 2010
(2) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition, p. 27
c. August 3, 2010 report
d. August 15, 2011 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated June 27, 2011
e. September 21, 2012 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated August 30, 2012
f. October 18, 2012 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated October 15, 2012
(a) Letter to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund from Berry, dated
October 4, 2012
21. Paul Montalbano, M.D.
a. Letter to Attorney Paul Augustine, dated April 26, 2013
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated April 2, 2013
b. Report dated October 8, 2015 to Attorney Augustine
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated September 30,
2015
c. Report dates October 3, 2016 to Attorney Augustine
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated September 27,
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2016
22. Stanley Water, M.D.
23. Wright Physical Therapy FCE Report dated September 25, 2015
a. Letter to Wright Physical Therapy from Berry, dated September 2, 2015
24. Dictation of Richard Hammond, M.D., dated August 1, 2016 and October 5, 2016
a. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, fated June 22, 2016
b. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 1, 2016
c. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 21, 2016
d. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated October 11, 2016
VI. Medical Itemization re low back/lumbar presentment
NON-MEDICAL EXHIBITS:
25. First Reports of Injuries
a. October 14, 2001 date of accident
b. October 6, 2009 date of accident
(1) Claimant Contacts dated November 20, 2009, December 21, 2009; and
June 7, 2010
(2) Policyholder Contact dated November 20, 2009
c. August 28, 2013 date of accident
26. Idaho Vehicle Collision Report re October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident
a. Photographs by investigating officer
27. ICRD Reports
28. State Insurance Fund Title 72 Benefits paid Summary
a. Regarding the October 14, 2001 date of accident
b. Regarding the October 6, 2009 date of accident
(1) Permanent partial impairment conceded by Defendants
c. Regarding the August 28, 2013 date of accident
29. Copes of Correspondences
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a. Letter to State Insurance Fund/Mr. Martin from Berry dated December 14, 2011
b. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated March 7, 2012
c. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated March 12, 2012
d. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated October 15, 2012
e. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated November 14, 2012
f. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated December 17, 2012
g. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 4, 2013
h. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 27, 2013
i. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated May 6, 2013
j. Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated May 29, 2013
k. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated January 13, 2016
l. Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated February 16, 2016
m. Letter to Mr. Ayala from Mr. Robert Meyers, dated December 3, 2014
n. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated August 22, 2016
o. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated October 11, 2016
30. Defendants’ Response to Discovery
a. Defendants’ Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants, dated January 24, 2014
(1) Defendants’ Answers to Continued Interrogatories, dated January 5, 2016
(a) Defendants’ Supplemental Answers to Continued Interrogatories
to Defendants, dated February 2, 2016
(2) Defendants’ Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants,
dates February 2, 2016
b. Defendants’ Response to Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants,
dated January 24, 2014, (excerpts)
(1) Defendants’ Answers to Continued Requests for Production of
Documents to Defendants, dated January 5, 2016
c. Defendants’ Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants re: August 28, 2013,
Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013-024075, dated January 5, 2016
d. Defendants’ Answers to Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants re:
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August 28, 2013, Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013-024075, dated January 5, 2016
e. Defendants’ Supplemental Answers to Claimant’s Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Defendants, dated October 11, 2016
f. State Insurance Fund’s Claims File (excerpts) as attached to Defendants’ Notice of
Compliance with Order Granting Motion to Compel, dated August 18, 2016
31. Claimant’s Response to Discovery
a. Claimant’s Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013 regarding I.C. No.
2001-520958
b. Claimant’s Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013 regarding I.C. No.
2009-029533
c. Claimant’s Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories dated January 11, 2016
regarding I.C. Nos. 2001-520958; 2009-029533; and, 2013-024075
(1) Claimant’s Second Supplemental Answers to Defendants’ First set of
Interrogatories to Claimant, dated September 22, 2016 (Re: I.C. Nos.
2001-520958; 2009-029533; and, 2013-024075)
d. Claimant’s Answers to Defendants’ Second Set of Interrogatories to Claimant,
dated September 19, 2016
32. Vocational Report of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., dated February 2, 2016
a. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated December 16, 2015
b. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated February 5, 2016
c. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated September 28, 2016
33. Transcript of Deposition of Claimant, taken November 10, 2015, (to be produced at
hearing)
Defendants' Exhibits:
1. Records from Paul J. Montalbano, M.D.
2. Records from Michael V. Hajjar, M.D.
3. D. Petere Reedy, M.D. Concurrence with IME
4. Howard W. Shoemaker, M.D. Letter dated 2-04-16
5. Paid Cost Summary
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6. Claimant’s Answers to Defendants’ Discovery
7. Claimant’s Tax Returns
8. ICRD Records
9. Bill Jordan’s Employability Report
10. Deposition Transcript of Claimant taken on November 10, 2015
Depositions:
1. Deposition of Claimant taken on November 10, 2015 (see Defendants’ Exhibit 10)
2. Deposition of Richard John Hammond, M.D., taken December 16, 2016
3. Deposition of Paul J. Montalbano, M.D., taken April 26, 2017
4. Deposition of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., taken June 20, 2017
5. Deposition of William C. Jordan, taken June 20, 2017
Additional Documents:
1. Commission’s Letter to Parties Re: Possible Reassignment to Commissioners, dated January
3, 2018
2. Letter from L. Clyel Berry Re: Requesting Referee Powers, not Commissioners, write the
final decision, filed January 11, 2018
3. Claimant’s Post-Hearing Opening Brief, filed September 29, 2017
4. Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief, filed October 23, 2017
5. Claimant’s Post-Hearing Reply Brief, filed November 2, 2017
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Claimant's Name & Address

Mario Ayala
47456 St. Hwy 78
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Employer's Name & Address
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc.

3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT
Claimant's Attorney's Name & Address
L. Clyel Berry
Attorney at Law
P.O.Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier's
(Not Adjustor's) Name & Address

Idaho State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 990004
Boise, ID 83799

Date of Injury/Manifestation of Occupational Disease
10/6/09
When Injured, Claimant was Earning an Average
State ofidaho Countv of Elmore
Weeklv Warre of�
nursuant to LC. S72-419.
Describe How Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (What Happened)
Claimant was involved in a single-vehicle motor vehicle accident, during the course of his �mployment.
Nature of Medical Problems Alleged As a Result of Accident or Occupational Disease
··--;
1. Cervical injury with radiculopathy into the left upper extremity;
-~~:.·~;~)
Ja,f '
2. Left shoulder/upper extremity injuries;
r·- c ':t
~- -. ,-,·1
_...
03. Right upper extremity injuries;
-·~r
·
~
4. Lumbar spine injury with radiculopathy.
·<; i~'

I
State & County in Which Injury Occurred

f

:,

:.
.. )
What Workers' Compensation Benefits are You Claiming at This Time?
';:,
L Continuation/reinstatement of medical benefits, generally, and specifically regarcling Cl)limant's lumbar
spine/low back; and,
2. Fees, pursuant to I.C. §72-804
)

Date on Which Notice of Injury was Given to Employer
To Whom You Gave Notice
10/6/09
Robert Meyers
How Notice Was Given: (X) Oral (X) Subsequent Written ( ) Other, Please Specify
Issue or Issues Involved:
I. Whether Claimant's current need for medical care, generally, and specifically involving Claimant's low
back/lumbar spine, as recommended by Drs. Reedy and/or Hajjar, is causally related to or resultant of the
October 6, 2009, accident and injury at issue herein, to any extent, such that responsibility for the same rests
with or npon Defendants herein.
2. Upon date that Claimant achieves medical stability/maximum medical improvement, whether and to what
extent Claimant presents with permanent impairment;
3. Whether, at the time of maximum medical improvement/clinical stability, Claimant will present with
permanent disability in excess of impairment, specifically to encompass whether Claimant presents as totally
and pemmnently disabled pursuant to theories of odd-lot, or otherwise;
4. Whether any of Claimant's permanent impairment and/or permanent disability in excess of impairment is by
reason of causes or conditions preexisting the October 6, 2009, injury at issue herein; and,
5. Whether, as oftl1e date of any hearing herein, Defendants have responsibility for Claimant's fees, pursuant to
LC. § 72-804.
Do You Believe This Claim Presents a New Question of Law Or a Complicated Set of Facts? ( )Yes (X) No
If so Please state why.
Noticc�£::omplaints_against the !nduslrial S1wcial fndemni/v Fund must be in. accordance with Idaho Code § 72-334 !!ljg_
filed on fonn l.C. I 002
Complaint - Page l
1

Physicians Who Treated Claima nt (Name & Address)
ER staff, Elmore Memorial Hospital, Mountain Home, Idaho; Physicians
and/or staff associated with Glenns Ferry
Medical Center; Richard Hammond, M.D., care of St. Luke's Clinic Neurolo
gy of Twin Falls, Twin Falls, Idaho; Michael
Hajjar, M.D., Boise, Idaho; Gregory Schweiger, M.D., Boise, Idaho; Mark Clawso
n, M.D., Boise, Idaho; Jeffrey Hessing,
M.D., Boise, Idaho; and, D. Peter Reedy, M.D., Boise, Idaho;
What Medical Costs Have You Incurred To Date?
What Medical Costs Has Your Employ er Paid? If any? $_ _ _ What Medica
l Costs Have You Paid, If any? $_ __
IAM INTERESTED IN MEDIA TING THIS CLAIM ,IF THE OTHER PARTIE
S AGREE . ( ) Yes ( ) No
Date

Please answer the set of questions immediately below only i

Name and Social Security Numbe r
of party filing Complaint

Date of Death

Was filing party dependent on deceased?

Yes

Did filing party live with deceased at time of accident?

No

Yes

No

CLAIMANT MUST COMP LETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED

MEDICAL RELEASE FORM

CERT IFICA TE OF SERVI CE
I hereby certify that on the /1it'ua y of
correct copy of the foregoi ng Compl aint upon:

Emplo yer's Name & Addre ss
Robett J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301
Via:

A/4v.t.mb.t.,,- , 2012, I caused to be served a true and
Surety 's Name & Addre ss
Idaho State Insuran ce Fund
P.O. Box 990004
Boise, ID 83 799

( ) Person al Service of Proces s
Via:
(X) Regula r U.S. Mail
( ) I have not served a copy of the Comp

( ) Person al Service of Process
(X) Regula r U.S. Mail

NOTICE! An employer or Insuran ce Compan y served with a Complaint must
file an Answer on Form LC. I 003 with the
Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on
the certificate of mailing to avoid default. Jf
no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!

Furthe r information may be obtain ed from: Indust rial Comm ission, Judicia
l Divisio n, 317 Main Street,
Boise, Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-60 00.
Complaint - Page 2
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INDUST RIAL COMMI SSION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

Patient Name: -'-3M'-;a...,r'-lir.occ--A~y~a~l~a_ _ _ _ _ __
Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Phone Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(Provider Use Only)
Medical Record Number: _ _ _ __
( ) Pick Up Copies ( ) Fax Copies
( ) Mail Copies
ID Confirmed by: _ _ _ _ _ __

AUTHOR IZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name- must be specific for each provider
To: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------------Insurance Company /Third Party Administrator/Self-Insured Emp/oyer!ISIF, their attorneys
or patient's attorney

I hereby authorize

---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --

Street Address

City

State

Zip Code

Purpose or need for data:
(e.g. Workers' Compensation Claim)
Informat ion to be disclosed:
Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:
( )
Discharge Summary
( )
History & Physical Exam
( )
Consultation Reports
( )
Operative Reports
( )
Lab
( )
Pathology
( )
Radiology Reports
( )
Entire Record
( )
Other: S p e c i f y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----------I understa nd that the disclosure may include informat ion relating to (check if applicable
):
( )
AIDS or HIV
( )
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
( )
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal
Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the
information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by
the federal regulations. I understand that
this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except
that revoking the authorization \Von 't
apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that
the provider will not condition treatment,
payment, emolhnent, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless
otherwise revoked, this authorization will
expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers,
copy service contractor, and physicians
are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above
information to the extent indicated and
authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below
authorizes release of all infomiation
specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed
to the privacy officer of the Provider
specified above.

Signatur e of Patient

Date

Legal Represen tative & Relations hip to Patient/A uthority to Act Date

Title

Date
3
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161008 (Rov. H/0•

I.C. N0 . _--=20=0=9·-=-02=9=53=3'--_

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
INJURY DATE._ __,_10=/0:...:4=/2=00=9_ __

_x_
_

The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by
stating:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY• S NAME AND ADDRESS

M~rloAyala
47456 State Hwy 78
Mountain Home, ID 83647

L. Clyel Berry
Attorney at Law
PO Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

WORKERS• COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR• S) NAME
AND ADDRESS

Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000

State Insurance Fund
P. o. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83n0-0044

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME
AND ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

Paul J. Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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X
X
X

1. That the accident alleged In the Complaint actually occurfa;d on or~'.'bout the time claimed.
..
2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

X
NA

X
X

X

'

:iC)
'.."

NA

.

-

IT IS: (Check One)
Admitted

'

3, That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused by an accident arising out of
and In the course of Claimant• s employment.
5, That, If an occupational disease Is alleged, manifestation of such disease Is or was due to
the nature of \he employment In which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment.
6. That notice of the accident causing the Injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was
given to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60
days of the manifestation of such occupational disease.
7. That the rate of wages claimed Is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage
pursuant to Idaho Code,§ 72-419: $461.64
8. That the alleged employer was Insured or permissibly self-Insured under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act,

12. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
Nona,
Answer? Pagel of2

4

11, State with specificity what matters are In dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses,
1.
2.
3.

Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specially admitted herein.
Defendants deny that claimant's lumbar symptoms or any injury to his lumbar spine was caused by his 10/04/09 Industrial accident.
Claimant is not entitled to any additional impairment other than what has already been paid.

Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A
copy of your Answer must be malled to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by
regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process, Unless you deny liability, you should pay Immediately the
compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid, Payments due should not be withheld because a
Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D,, Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be flied on Form I.C. 1002.
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

X YES

- NO

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.
NO,
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

Dated

PPD

TTD

Medical

$16,741.00

$14,268.76

$93,069.17

Signature of Defendant or Altorney

t

Docembe6 2012

i
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J
J

i
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PLEASE COMPLETE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

f j.,,.

• .1

I hereby certify that on the

lP day of December, 2012 I caused to be seNed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER upon;

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Mario Ayala
c/o L. Clyel Berry

EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S
NAME AND ADDRESS

INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
(If appllooblo)

State Insurance Fund

PO Box 302

1216 W. State Street
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

Boise, ID 83720

Via:

Via:

_

personal service of process

tJ regular U.S. Mall

_

personal service of process

regular u.s.jvlaiJ

//

Via:

_

personal service of process

_

regular U.S. Malt

() \

I L,X,>- .J
Answer-Pago 2 of 2

Signature\

:)
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L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATIORNEX AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX302
Thin Falls, JD 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962
F,·1x Number: 208/734-9963
IdU10 State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

1.C. No. 2001-520958

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR ORDER
OF CONSOLIDATION
_,_,
,_,._,

I

_J

)

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No. 2009-029533

MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION - 1
6

COMES NOW Claimant, in the above-referenced matters, causes and
claims, pursuant to Rule 3 (B) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, and
hereby moves and petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for its Order of
Consolidation, consolidating the above-referenced claims and actions for all further
purposes herein.
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reason that
Claimant's injuries alleged and set-forth within ihe above-referenced actions may
have resulted, either in whole or in part, by either the occurrence described within
and giving rise to Claimant's cause asserted by and within his Complaint filed in
IC No. 2001-520958; I.C. No. 2009-029533; or, by reason of the combination
thereof, and/or that Defendants may have "common" defenses thereto, such that
there are common issues presented by and within each of the above-captioned
actions by reason of which the respective liability of Defendants therein cannot be
determined except upon consolidation within a single proceeding.
DATED this

_Ip__ day of May, 2013.

MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION - 2
7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

•
·l hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the _(9_ day of May, 2013, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise. ID 83701

MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION. 3
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2009-029533
2001-520958

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE

V.

Employer,
and

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Pursuant to the Motion to Consolidate filed by Claimant's counsel on May 7, 2013,
the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that those claims
presently pending before the Commission known as IC Numbers 2009-029533 and
2001-520958 are consolidated into a single proceeding. Future pleadings require reference
to the two IC numbers listed above, but only a single document need be filed with the
Commission.

~

DATED this~ day of May, 2013.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Michael E. Powers, Referee

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 1
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ATTES!:

,4jl(IJJ(J

~,

..·

·. .

. / ~ •.

Assistant Cornm'ssion Secn;tary
,·

·• . .·. . ,t);
\

,',

II•/.\ •

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-th

I hereby certify that on the &I./ day of May, 2013, a true and c01Tect copy of the
foregoing ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE was served by regular United States mail upon each
of the following persons:
L CL YEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

ge

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 2
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i

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELORATIAW
P.O. BOX 302 .
Twm Falls, HJ 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962

Fax Number: 208/73,f,..9963
Idaho State Bar No, 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARIO A VALA,
Claimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1.C. No. 2001-520958
I.C. No. 2009-029533

MOTION FOR ORDER
OF CONSOLIDATION

)

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No. 2013-024075

'J
'

f{i
i

';

/ 1l

I'.)

n
:n

COMES NOW Claimant, in the above-referenced matters, causes and
claims, pursuant to Rule 3 (B) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, and
MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION -1
11

hereby moves and petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for its Order of
Consolidation, consolidating the above-referenced claims and actions for all further
purposes herein.
Claimant advises that, pursuant to that Order to Consolidate, dated
May 24, 2013, I.C. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2001-520958 were consolidated. Thusly,
the instant Motion seeks to consolidate I.C. No. 2013-024075 into those
proceedings, such that the three claims/actions are consolidated into a single
proceeding.
In support of the instant Motion, Claimant notes that both the employer
and the employer's surety is "common" as among and between each of the three
claims. Further, Defendants may have "common" defenses thereto, such that there
are common issues presented by and within each of the above-captioned actions by
reason of which the respective liability of Defendants together with the entitlement
of Claimant to workers' compensation benefits cannot be determined except upon
consolidation of said claims within a single proceeding.
DATED this

_/_L_ day of March, 2014.

L. Clyel Berry
Attorney for Claimant

MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the -1J_ day of March, 2014, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION -3
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

v.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

i) t)
(., ( j

Surety,
Defendants.
Pursuant to the Motion to Consolidate filed by Claimant's counsel on March 12,
2014, the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that those claims
presently pending before the Commission known as IC Numbers 2009-029533,
2001-520958, and 2013-024075 are consolidated into a single proceeding.

Future

pleadings require reference to the three IC numbers listed above, but only a single
document need be filed tfiith the Commission.
DATED this ,98

day of March, 2014.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

tb_

I hereby ce1iify that on the '98
day of March, 2014, a ttue and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE was served by regular United States mail upon each
of the following persons:
L CL YEL BERRY
POBOX302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

go
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L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX 302
Twm Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telep/Jone: 208/734-9962
Fax Number. 208/734-9963

IdahoStateBarNo. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARIO AYALA,

)
)
Claimant,

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I.C. No. 2009-029533
I.C. No. 2001-520958
I.C. No. 2013-024075

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO
ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO
SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE
RE-SETTING OF HEARING;
AND, FOR SANCTIONS,
SPECIFICALLY:--:TO
. ,~_
ENCOMPASS FEES
-L::_
,::y,
C0
__,

"~

r:;?
Claimant herein, Mr. Mario Ayala, by and through his counsel of
V)

record hereby moves the Commission for its Order enforcing the parties' specific
agreement/settlement of February 17, 2016.
Relevant facts herein are clear and simple. Defendants, by and
through Attorney Augustine, requested that Mr. Ayala submit his demand for
settlement, by correspondence to counsel dated February 9, 2016. Hearing was set
for February 18, 2016. Defendants were aware that Claimant had fully prepared for
hearing.

Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure had been mailed to Mr. Augustine upon

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO
ENCOMPASS FEES - 1
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February 5.

As requested by Defendants, Mr. Ayala's settlement demand was

faxed to Mr. Augustine by counsel's correspondence of February 9, 2016. That
proposal was specific that, "... any settlement of this matter would require
reservation of prospective/future medical benefits or the submission of a set-aside
proposal to Medicare." It was further provided that the settlement proposal was only
open to the point of hearing. Thereafter, this matter was negotiated by and through
a series of telephone conversations between Mr. Augustine and counsel.
Upon February 17, 2016, exactly one day prior to hearing herein, the
parties reached settlement during and within a telephone conversation between Mr.
Augustine and counsel, which was specific as to new monies to be paid; and, that
"[m]edicals are reserved from the settlement, both past and prospective." These
terms of the settlement were confirmed by counsel's fax to Mr. Augustine of
February 17, 2016.

By reason of the parties' agreement, Mr. Augustine's office

advised the Commission on February 17, 2016, " ... that the parties have reached
settlement in the above referenced matter. Accordingly the hearing on calendar for
February 18, 2016 should be vacated."

Pursuant to that representation, the

Commission entered its Order Vacating Hearing dated and filed February 17, 2016.
Counsel received his license to practice law in this state upon April 12,
1976. Thereafter, during and throughout the following forty years to current date,
counsel's practice has emphasized the representation of Title 72 claimants and, to
lesser extent, injured individuals in civil matters.

During this period counsel has

represented Title 72 claimants in matters in which State Insurance Fund was the

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO
ENCOMPASS FEES - 2
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responsible surety, in multiple and numerous occasions. Throughout this period of
time counsel had never been involved in a claim against the Fund wherein the Fund
had, through its attorney, agreed to specific terms of a settlement and thereafter
refused to follow-through with the same.

Counsel had absolutely no reason to

suspect otherwise in the instant matter.
Following the February 17, 2016, settlement of this matter, affiant
advised Mr. Ayala, that the Fund would then prepare the formal Agreement which
would be executed by the parties and submitted to the Commission for review and
approval.

Upon approval, the Fund would then issue settlement monies, which

could be anticipated within approximately six weeks of February 17, 2016, absent
question or concerns by the Commission upon review of the Agreement.
In due course, the Fund did prepare a proposed Lump Sum
Agreement.

However,

with

the

exception

of the

amount of the

new

monies/consideration for settlement, the Fund refused and is continuing to refuse to
conform the Agreement to the specific negotiated-for terms of settlement reached
upon February 17, 2016, being that "[m]edicals are reserved from the settlement,
both past and prospective."
During the negotiations which culminated in the February 17, 2016,
settlement, it was emphasized by counsel to Mr. Augustine that the reservation of
medicals was absolutely required, both to protect Mr. Ayala from the potential
subrogation claims of his non-industrial health insurers; and, to protect Mr. Ayala
and his counsel, prospectively, from the risk that Mr. Ayala would require medical

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO
ENCOMPASS FEES - 3
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treatment related to his low back, potentially to encompass multi-level fusion,
following his 65th birthday the expenses for which would be submitted to Medicare,
such that Medicare would have potential cause against Mr. Ayala and counsel.
These terms were clearly expressed and agreed to by Mr. Augustine upon behalf of
Defendants herein. Absolutely, there would not have been any settlement upon
February 17, 2016, and this matter would have proceeded with and through hearing
the next day, being February 18, 2016, but for Mr. Augustine advising of the
acceptance of these terms.
Most disturbing is certain of Mr. Augustine's correspondence to
counsel of April 18, 2016, wherein he states that,
I disagree with (counsel's) characterization of our
'agreement' reached in February 17, 2016. The only
enforceable 'agreement' is a lump sum signed by all the
parties. Since we have not been able to reach an
'agreement' with regard to the language of the lump
sum, we do not have an enforceable 'agreement.'
Clearly, Mr. Augustine was noting I.C. §§ 72-404 and/or 711.

However, the first

inquiry must be pursuant to I.C. § 72-711. It there states "[i]f the employer and the
afflicted employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this law, a
memorandum of the agreement shall be filed with the Commission, .... "

Very

clearly, an "agreement" was reached by the parties herein upon February 17, 2016.
The terms of the agreement were simple and clear. That agreement was indeed
characterized as a "settlement" by Attorney Augustine's office in correspondence to
the Commission of February 17, 2016. That being the case, pursuant to I.C. § 72711, it is thereafter required that, " ... a memorandum of the agreement shall be filed
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO
ENCOMPASS FEES - 4
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with the Commission." (Emphasis added.) It is the obligation of the Fund in this
matter to take reasonable steps to comply with this mandate, by submitting a
memorandum of the agreement to be filed with the Commission.

Defendants'

argument should only prevail if the Commission concludes that, upon consideration
of counsel's correspondence to Mr. Augustine of February 17, 2016, and Attorney
Augustine advising the Commission upon that date that the parties had reached a
"settlement," the parties did not reach an "agreement." Otherwise, the Fund should
be required to submit a memorandum/Lump Sum Agreement conforming to the
terms of that settlement. Any other result would open the doors to exactly that
which this Commission should not and can not allow, being the exact result sought
to be achieved by the Fund and its attorney in the instant matter, that at a point in
time at which it would be impossible to prepare and submit a formal Lump Sum
Agreement to the Commission prior to hearing, for Title 72 defendants to make any
and all representations to a claimant necessary for that claimant to agree to
"settlement," and to vacate hearing, only thereafter to be faced, as in the instant
matter, with the surety and the surety's counsel refusing to abide by the terms of the
settlement after the hearing had been vacated.
In the recent matter of Salinas v. Bridgeview Estates and Old
Republic Insurance Company, I.C. 2011-014120, filed March 4, 2016, the

Commission commented upon what it demanded regarding the attorney's behavior
in Title 72 matters. There, the Commission determined that,
... the 'no-holds-barred' mentality which is often a part of
civil litigation has no place in workers' compensation
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO
ENCOMPASS FEES - 5
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proceedings. Unlike civil litigation, which is truly an
adversarial-based process, the goal of workers'
compensation-to provide an injured employee with those
statutory benefits to which the worker is entitled-should
be shared by all parties. While honest differences of
opinion may well exist when seeking to determine
benefit entitlement, attempting to gain an advantage
through gamesmanship, hyper-technical application of
the procedural rules, subterfuge, harassment in any
form, production delay, and similar tactics, will not be
tolerated.
The Commission then determined that JRP 16 is broad enough to sanction such
abusive conduct and noted that I.C. § 72-715 addresses misbehavior and
obstruction of the hearing process and provides penalties therefor. I.C. § 72-708
provides that process and procedure under and pursuant to Title 72, Idaho Code,
" ... shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be and as far as possible in
accordance with the rules of equity." Such is echoed by reference to Rule 1A, JRP,
and notes that, " ... the Commission shall make such order, ruling or award as it
determines is reasonable and just."
Also pertinent to the instant controversy is JRP 3E, regarding filing of
"other paper(s) of a party represented by an attorney." Although the February 17,
2016, correspondence to the Commission from Mr. Augustine's office was signed
by Mr. Augustine's Legal Assistant, it is clear that the same was under Mr.
Augustine's directive. As such, that correspondence, advising the Commission of
the "settlement" of the parties and that hearing scheduled for the following day
should be vacated, was required to have been made " ... with sufficient grounds to
support it, and that it is not submitted for delay or any other improper purpose."

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO
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Irrespective of the above-referenced theories, Rules and/or statutes, it
is undeniable but that the "settlement" referenced by Attorney Augustine's February
17, correspondence to the Commission, which was specific as to the condition that
"medicals are reserved from the settlement, both past and prospective," was
intended by Defendants to be relied upon by Mr. Ayala and his counsel in agreeing
that the hearing, scheduled for the following day, be vacated. Most certainly, the
doctrine of quasi-estoppal should now preclude Defendants from asserting that the
"settlement" referenced within Mr. Augustine's office's February 17 correspondence
to the Commission is not enforceable, as it was not reduced to writing and signed
by

the

parties,

which

position

is

inconsistent

with

Defendants'

prior

position/representation to both Claimant/Claimant's counsel and to this Commission
of February 17, 2016. Quasi estoppal applies when:
(1) the offending party took a different position than his
or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending
party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to
the other party; (b) the other party was induced to
change positions; or, (c) it would be unconscionable to
permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent
position from one he or she has already derived a
benefit or acquiesced in.

Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893, 900-901
(2014).

Remarkably, Mr. Augustine was counsel for respondent ISIF, in that

matter.
As of instant date, as above-noted, Mr. Ayala has been deprived the
benefit of the agreement made with Defendants upon February 17, 2016, and will
continue to be so deprived until the resolution of this matter. Counsel has been
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RE-SETTING OF HEARING; AND, FOR SANCTIONS, SPECIFICALLY TO
ENCOMPASS FEES - 7
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required to expend his office's resources in an effort to resolve this matter with
Defendants and thereafter in bringing this controversy to the attention of the
Commission.

If the Commission fails to grant the instant Motion by requiring

Defendants to conform to the specific terms of the "settlement" reached on February
17, 2016, such that this matter is re-set, it must be noted that Defendants had
absolute knowledge that counsel was in the process of closing his office by
Claimant's earlier Motion to Vacate and Advance Date of Hearing, and thusly will be
required to maintain his office and staff for the period required to proceed with and
through hearing herein; the parties' post-depositions; and, post-hearing briefing, at a
cost and/or expense which may well result in counsel's representation of Claimant
being a net economic loss to counsel and his office.
Alternatively, if the Commission determines that Defendants are
neither bound by the February 17, 2016, agreemenUsettlement, or otherwise are
estopped from asserting that the same is not enforceable, Claimant respectfully
petitions the Commission that this matter be immediately re-set for hearing, to
minimize the prejudice in economic consequences suffered by Claimant and
counsel by reason of Defendants' conduct herein.
Claimant and his counsel further respectfully petition the Commission
for its Order imposing sanctions against Defendants by reason of Defendants'
above-referenced and described conduct, with said sanctions to encompass
Claimant's counsel's fees, at his hourly rate, for his recorded time from and
following February 17, 2016, to the date of either the resolution of this matter or the

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
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date that Claimant's Title 72 claim proceeds to hearing, which time has been
exhausted solely by reason of Defendants' wrongful conduct herein; and, the
reimbursement of counsel of the "hard" costs and overhead in keeping counsel's
office open, maintained and staffed to the conclusion of any post-hearing briefing of
the parties from and following June 1, 2016, the date at and by which it had been
counsel's intent to vacate his offices.
DATED this

o2 /

day of April, 2016.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the/21_ day of April, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

L. Clyel

CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AGREEMENT TO SETTLE; ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
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D ORIGINAL
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014

lOlb HAY -3 p 3: 30
RECEIVED
INDUSTfllt,L COMMIS~IOII

Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO
ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel ofrecord, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law
Offices, PLLC, hereby oppose potiions of Claimant's Motion dated April 21, 2016. Specifically,
Defendants' oppose the Claimant's Motion to Enforce the "alleged" agreement referenced by
Claimant's counsel in his February 17, 2016 con-espondence and Claimant's Motion for

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS - I
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Sanctions to include attorneys' fees. As discussed in greater detail below, Defendants' do not
oppose Claimant's Motion for a hearing on the merits of this matter.
The crux of the Claimant's refusal to sign the proposed lump sum is his counsel's
concern over potential subrogation claims for low back treatment billed to his insurer and
Medicare issues for which Mr. Berry requested a hold harmless provision. Secondly,
Defendants' counsel never made representations to Mr. BetTy that the Defendants' would carve
out past unbilled medicals from the agreement or that the Defendants would not dispute future
liability for low back treatment. Third, Defendants' agree to a hearing on the merits of the case.
Claimant is still employed by his time of injury employer and thus has not suffered any prejudice.
Lastly, there is no proof of any affirmative representations by Defendants' counsel to "reserve"
past medicals or hold Mr. Berry harmless from any Medicare claims in the future for continued
denial low back claims (other than his self-serving written letter of February 17, 2016). As a
result his request for sanctions should be denied.
On February 1, 2016 Defendants' requested that the Claimant submit a settlement
proposal, in part because the Fund had not received any claims for medical expenses after
October 2014 from any of the Claimant's providers. On February 9, 2016 Defendants' reiterated
their request for a settlement demand. Later that day, Claimant's counsel provided Defendants
with a settlement demand, including a statement requiring a reservation of any future medical
benefits or the submission of a set aside proposal to Medicare. Consistent with the State
Insurance Fund's practice to keep future medicals open as long as they have been accepted and
not been disputed by the Fund, no Medicare set aside would be required. Notably Mr. Berry did
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS - 2
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not request reservation of past medicals as he now contends.
Two days before the hearing, Februaiy 16, 2016, Defendants' counsel corresponded with
Claimant's counsel to inform him of the following: (I) that the policy holder could not appeai·
live due to kidney dialysis and (2) relaying a settlement offer. In this letter Defendants
specifically informed Claimant and Claimant's counsel that the medicals would remain open "but
denied on the low back based upon the opinions of his treating physicians and the fact that they
billed his private health insurance rather than the State Insurance Fund." See Ex. 3.
Shortly after receipt of this letter, both counsel negotiated a settlement figure. The
settlement was designed to compensate Claimant for his alleged disability, close out any and all
claims but left medicals open (disputed on the low back) because of the Claimant's Medicare
eligibility consistent with prior correspondence. Apparently Claimant's counsel had a different
understanding of the State Insurance Fund's offer regarding future medicals. But this was
unknown to Defendants' counsel as his office informed the Commission at approximately 1:38
p.m. on February 17, 2016 that the case had settled based upon his conversation with Claimant's
counsel.
Later that day, unbeknownst to Defendants' counsel, Claimant's counsel sent a letter to
Defendants' counsel which was faxed at 4:23 p.m. This correspondence reiterated the settlement
amount and misstated that all medicals were reserved from the settlement both past and
prospective. Rather, as indicated in Claimant's original demand only prospective medicals were
to remain open but denied for future low back treatment. In Mr. Berry's correspondence of
Februaiy 17, 2016 (which was received after the Commission was notified of the settlement), he
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acknowledges that the Fund disputes any responsibility for Claimant's low back injury since
October 2014 when his treating physicians stopped billing the Fund and began billing the
Claimant's private health insurer. Then, for his own reasons, he added a concern over
subrogation rights which was not previously expressed and never agreed to by Defendant when
they made their settlement offer. Apparently Mr. Berry became concerned over the potential
subrogation rights of the health insurers that were billed by Claimant's treating physician for his
low back. It was not until 4:23 p.m. on the eve of hearing after the Commission had been
notified of the settlement that the issue of subrogation was raised by Claimant's counsel.
Moreover, Mr. Berry's letter was not received by defense counsel until the following day,
February 18, 2016 due to its late receipt after counsel's assistant and counsel went home.
Defendants never agreed to carve out of the settlement the subrogation rights of the
Claimant's health insurer for his low back treatment which the Claimant's own treating physician
indicated were not related to his original industrial accident. See Ex. 2. This is one of the major
reasons Claimant's counsel has not agreed to the settlement agreement. In subsequent
discussions designed to alleviate Mr. Berry's concerns over the subrogation rights of Claimant's
health insurers, Defendants' counsel discovered that one of the health insurers had waived its
subrogation rights and, tln·ough defense counsel's efforts the other health insurer (Select Health)
agreed to waive its subrogation rights once it received correspondence from Dr. Montalbano
(Claimant's treating physician) opining that Claimant's treatment after October 2014 was
unrelated to his original industrial accident.
Shortly thereafter Defendants' counsel amended the lump sum agreement to reflect that
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND FOR SANCTIONS - 4
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the State Insurance Fund was denying any past or future medical benefits/claims related to the
Claimant's low back condition based upon Dr. Montalbano's opinion. At the time Defendants'
counsel indicated to Mr. Beny that the Fund would not agree to a "hold harmless" language in
the settlement agreement as Mr. Beny requested with regard to the subrogation claims and
prospective Medicare claims involving Claimant's low back. Ex. 6.
There is no basis for the Claimant's claims that Defendants should be estopped from
denying the "agreement" which the Claimant alleges was reached on the day before the hearing
in his late afternoon con-espondence of February 17, 2016. First, this self-serving
con-espondence did not accurately reflect the understanding and agreement of the parties,
specifically with respect to Claimant's medical bills both past and future for his low baack.
Second, Defendants never made a representation to Claimant in writing or verbally that they
would protect Claimant and his counsel from any subrogation claims relating to his low back
condition or any future claims related to his low back that may be billed through Medicare. As a
result there are no representations upon which an estoppel claim can be based. Third, the
Claimant has not been prejudiced in any way by the failure of the parties to reach an agreement.
Claimant is still gainfully employed by his time of injury employer. Claimant is not foreclosed
from having a hearing on the merits of his claim. In fact, Defendants' counsel indicated to Mr.
Beny and that if a hold harmless was a deal killer the Fund was prepared to go to hearing on the
merits of the case. Ex. 6. Defendants are currently prepared to go to hearing on the merits of the
case. As a result there is no prejudice to the Claimant and the application of estoppel is not
wanted.
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Since the Claimant and Defendants' have not signed a lump sum agreement approved by
the Commission, there is no enforceable settlement agreement between the parties. The
Commission cannot force the Defendants' to protect Mr. Beny as he would like because they
will not agree to it. In Backes v. Depe11dable Fabricatio11, IC 2007-016312, the defendant/surety
attempted to enforce a settlement agreement which was in writing but not signed by the claimant.
Since the claimant did not sign the agreement, the Commission would not enforce the
settlement. As opposed to this case, Backes the parties had agreed to the terms of the agreement
but the claimant refused to sign. The Commission denied the Motion, stating:
"A comi cannot make a contract for the patiies which the parties themselves
have not agreed upon. Green v. Beaver State Contractors, Inc., 93
Idaho 741,743,472 P.2d 307,309 (1970); Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171,
175, 174 P. 2d 202,206 (1946). Similarly, the Commission cannot overstep
its authority by attempting to enforce a settlement offer that has not been
accepted by the Claimant or yet approved by the Commission. . . . Until a
settlement offer is signed by all the parties, it remains merely an offer ... the
Commission cannot enforce an action that does not yet exist by agreement of
the parties." (See attached Order)
Therefore, since the Claimant refused to sign the proposed lump sum drafted by Defendants, the
Commission cannot enforce the agreement or the Claimant's counsel's understanding of the
alleged agreement reflected in his February 17, 2016 correspondence.
Finally, Claimant's argument that he is entitled to attorneys' fees or sanctions is
unwarranted and not supported by Idaho Code § 72-804 or law. First, this whole dispute has
been about protecting Mr. Berry. Mr. Berry has requested a hold harmless regarding the
subrogation claims and future Medicare claims related to the Claimant's low back condition for
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his own reasons not to protect the Claimant. It has always been the State Insurance Fund's
contention to close the entire claim of the Claimant with the medicals left open on those injuries
which his treating doctors believe are related to his 2009 accident. Since the Claimant's treating
physician acknowledged that Claimant's current low back condition is unrelated to his industrial
accident in 2009 and stopped billing the State Insurance Fund for said treatment in 2014, there
would be no reason why the State Insurance Fund would suddenly agree to either litigate or pay
those benefits. Since the Claimant will now have his day in Court, Claimant is not entitled to
attorneys' fees for his counsel's misunderstanding of the terms of the agreement and his pursuit
of a hold harmless which was never agreed to by the parties.
DATED this

)M

day of May, 2016.
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

ustine - Of the Fitm
r Employer/Surety
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J/:_

dayofMay, 2016, I caused to be served a true copy
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITON TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE AND
FOR SANCTIONS, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
L. Clyel Berry
PO Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

f__u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
_Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOEL BACKES,

IC 2007-016312
Claimant,

v.
DEPENDABLE FABRICATION, INC.,

ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

Employer,
and

Fl LED

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

JUN 18 2015
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

The above-captioned case went to hearing on November 29, 2013. The parties presented
evidence and the case was continued for the taking of post-hearing depositions and briefing. No
post-hearing depositions or briefing occurred. In February 2014, the parties agreed to settle the
case for a lump sum.

Defendants prepared and forwarded the settlement documents to

Claimant's counsel, who reviewed and approved them.

Despite discussing the settlement

documents with his counsel, Claimant did not sign the proposed settlement documents. Claimant
then left the state and has not responded to repeated communication attempts from com1scl. On
November 4, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Claimant's counsel opposed the
dismissal or the claim, stating the lack of legal or equitable reason to dismiss. A telephone
conference was held on March 2, 2015 with counsel for the parties.

On March 9, 2015,

Defendants filed a Motion to Enforce Acceptance of Settlement. On March 30, 2015, Claimant's
counsel filed an Affidavit responding to the Motion to Enforce, detailing his conversation with
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Claimant regarding the lump sum offer before Claimant left the state and subsequent attempts to
contact Claimant to accept the lump sum offer. On April 8, 2015, Referee Alan Taylor filed an
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Order to Show Cause relating to the abovecaptioned case.

Neither party responded to this Order with briefing regarding Defendant's

Motion to Enforce Acceptance of Settlement.
A Court cannot make a contract for the patties which the parties themselves have not
agreed upon. Green v. Beaver State Contractors, Inc., 93 Idaho 741, 743, 472 P.2d 307, 309
(1970); Brothers v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 175, 174 P.2d 202, 206 (1946).

Similarly, the

Commission cannot overstep its authority by attempting to enforce a settlement offer that has not
been accepted by the Claimant or yet approved by the Commission. Absent Claimant's assent to
the terms of settlement, we have no way of ascertaining whether it is in his best interests. See
Idaho Code § 72-404. Until a settlement offer is signed by all the patties, it remains merely an
offer. Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding this case and the desire of the involved
attorneys to bring it to a close, the Commission cannot enforce an action that does not yet exist
by agreement of the patties. The Commission therefore DENIES the Defendant's Motion to
Enforce Acceptance of Settlement. IT rs SO ORDERED.
DATED this

lag-th day of T l,(;V

2015.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

R.D. Maynard, Cha'an

•
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Thomas P, Baskin, Commissioner

ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

{i_~y

<.J1J,.,t.l' ,

I hereby ce11ify that on the
of
20 I 5, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following;
STARR KELSO
PO BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

ka
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
IC 2009-029533
IC 2001-520958
IC 2013-024075

Claimant,

v.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

On April 25, 2016, Claimant filed a Motion to Enforce Agreement to Settle; Alternative
Motion for Immediate Re-Setting of Hearing; and, For Sanctions, Specifically to Encompass
Fees. With this motion, Claimant asks that the Commission enforce the "agreement/settlement"
that the pai1ies verbally entered on February 17, 2016. In the alternative, he asks that the case be
re-set for hearing.
The above-captioned case was scheduled to go to hearing on February 18, 2016.
Immediately prior to hearing, the pai1ies purp011edly reached a verbal understanding for
settlement of the case. Defendant's counsel promptly notified the Commission that a settlement
had been reached and that the hearing set for the following day should be vacated.

The

Commission vacated the hearing accordingly. Later that day, Claimant's counsel faxed a letter
to Defendant's counsel reiterating what he believed the settlement agreement to entail.
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According to Defendant's counsel, this correspondence misstated the agreement. Subsequently,
the parties have been unable to agree upon the specific terms of the agreement and no settlement
has actually been signed.
A lump sum settlement agreement becomes a final decision when approved by the
Commission. Idaho Code §72-404; Davidson v. H.H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196
(1986). The Commission will approve a settlement only when it appears that the settlement is in
the best interests of the parties. A Court cannot make a contract for the paiiies which the parties
themselves have not agreed upon. Green v. Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 175, 174 P.2d 202,206 (1946).
From the voluminous filings submitted in suppmi of and in opposition to the motion to enforce,
we conclude that while the parties may have thought they had reached agreement, they did not,
in fact, have a shared understanding of the terms of settlement. We will not enforce a settlement
where there is no meeting of the minds. Simply, there is no agreement to enforce, much less an
agreement which is in the best interests of the patiies. Since there is no agreement, Claimant's
motion to enforce agreement to settle is DENIED.
In the alternative, Claimant asks that the matter be re-set for hearing. Since the paiiies
are in obvious disagreement regarding the settlement of this case and neither pai'ly has an
objection to re-setting this matter for heai-ing, Claimant's motion to re-set for hearing is
GRANTED.
Finally, Claimant asks that the Commission impose sanctions, specifically, attorney fees,
against Defendants for their conduct in refusing to honor the verbal agreement entered on
February 17, 2016. Idaho Code§ 72-804 provides that if an employer contested a claim without
reasonable ground, or neglected or refused within a reasonable time after receipt of a written
claim for compensation to pay to the injured employee, the employer shall pay reasonable
ORDER ON CLAIMAN'TS MOTION TO ENFORCE - 2
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attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this law. The plain language of Idaho
Code § 72-804 requires that an award of attorney fees be assessed when the Commission
determines defendants have unreasonably denied benefits.

Bradley v. Washington Group

International, 141 Idaho 655, 659, 115 P.3d 746, 750 (2005). Claimant's request for attorney
fees at this time is premature. Since the delay in this case is due to the parties inability to reach a
settlement in the matter, and the case will be re-set for hearing, Claimant's request for attorney
fees should be addressed at that time.

Therefore, Claimant's motion for sanctions is

DISMISSED.
Accordingly, Claimant request for enforcement is DENIED, Claimant's motion to reset
for hearing is GRANTED and Claimant's motion for sanctions is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 7{:'1. day of

'.Jv//h../

, 2016,
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-Ji!}

I hereby certify that on
day of C[L1/l,-Lt , 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE was served by regular
United States Mail upon each of the following:
L. CLYEL BERRY
POBOX302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701
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}

L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX302
Thw Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/784-9962
Fax Number: 208/734-9963

Idaho Sta.te Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2001-520958
1.C. No. 2013-024075

CLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR ADDITION OF ISSUE
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COMES NOW Claimant by and through counsel of record herein and
hereby requests that hearing herein, set for October 26, 2016, encompass an issue
not set-forth by that Notice of Hearing filed July 19, 2016, or requested by or within
Claimant's Request for Calendaring, dated September 2, 2015, or Defendants'
Response to Request for Calendaring, dated September 20, 2015, as follows:
Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition
and/or presentment is causally related to or resultant of the industrial
accidents/occurrences forming the basis of the instant consolidated
proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present at maximum medical
improvement related to said low back presentment; and, that
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR ADDITION OF ISSUE - 1
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additional medical care, treatment and/or services are reasonably
required

by reason

of said

low back presentment, that the

Commission reserve jurisdiction herein upon the issues of Claimant's
entitlement to permanent impairment and permanent disability,
inclusive

of

odd-lot

status,

with

said

issues

to

be

considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably
required medical care and achieving maximum medical improvement.
In support of the instant Motion, counsel notes that the industrial
occurrences which Claimant alleges his low back presentment is causally related to
or resultant of occurred greater than five years ago, such that absent the
Commission's reservation of jurisdiction Claimant would be precluded from
asserting entitlement to either additional permanent impairment or disability,
following the Commission's decision in the instant consolidated proceeding.
DATED this~ day of August, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the lk_ day of August, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

u
L. Clyel
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
IC 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

Claimant,

v.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ADDITION OF ISSUE

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

Claimant's Motion for Addition of Issue was filed August 23, 2016. No response having
been received and good cause appearing therefor,
The Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that Claimant's motion
is GRANTED. The hearing currently scheduled on October 26, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., for one day,
City of Twin Falls, will include the following issue:
Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition
and/or presentment is causally related to or resultant of the industrial
accidents/occurrences forming the basis of the instant consolidated
proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present if rrraximum
medical
~-...........,,
improvement related to said low back presentment; and, thaf"additional
medical care, treatment and/or services are reasonably required by reason of
said low back presentment, that the Commission reserve jurisdiction herein
upon the issues of Claimant's entitlement to permanent impairment and
permanent disability, inclusive of odd-lot status, with said issues to be
considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably required
medical care and achieving maximum medical improvement.
DATED this 1:L_ day of September, 2016.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

·1duUuti£~
IJ»t¾"
Michael E. Powhs, Referee
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ATTEST:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the /
day of September, 20 I 6, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTIO"'-1 FOR ADDITION OF ISSUE was served by regular
United States Mail upon each of the following persons:
L CLYEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701
!£.-mailed to Dean Willis

go

0' -~

/;,~,.__,_,_,_
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ORIGINAL
PAUL J, AUGUSTINE ISB 4608
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014
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Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRJAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARJO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

DEFENDANTS'RULEl0
DISCLOSURE

Employer,
and
STA TE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendants Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. and State Insurance Fund, by and through their
attorney of record, Paul J. Augustine, of the firm Augustine Law Offices PLLC, and pursuant to Rule

10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, hereby notifies the Industrial Commission that it
has served upon all other parties hereto complete, legible and accurate copies of all exhibits to be
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offered into evidence at the hearing of the above-entitled matter. Said hearing is presently scheduled
to begin at I 0:00 a.m. on October 26, 2016.
The exhibits Defendants intend to offer at the Hearing are attached hereto.
Exhibit "I"

Records from Paul J. Montalbano, M.D.

Exhibit "2"

Records from Michael V. Hajjar, M.D.

Exhibit "3"

D. Peter Reedy, M.D. Concurrence with IME

Exhibit "4"

Howard W. Shoemaker, M.D. Letter dated 2-04-16

Exhibit "5"

Paid Cost Summary

Exhibit "6"

Claimant's Answers to Defendants' Discove1y

Exhibit "7"

Claimant's Tax Returns

Exhibit "8"

ICRD Records

Exhibit "9"

Bill Jordan's Employability Repmi

Exhibit "IO" Deposition Transcript of Claimant taken on November 10, 2015 (the
Original will be filed with the Industrial Commission)
In addition, Defendants reserve the right to introduce any exhibit(s) offered by any other party and any answer:
the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law,
Defendants hereby notify the Industrial Commission that they intend to call the following
witnesses at the hearing set for 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2016.
I)

Jodi Scheiferstein (via telephone)

2)

Robe1i J. Meyers

3)

Morgan Meyers
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DATED this ~ a y of October, 2016.
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorneys

r Employer/Surety

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/~1"

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2016, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' RULE 10 DISCLOSURE, by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:

L. Clyel Berry
PO Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

¼_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
~Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant
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L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962
Fax Nwnber: 208/734-9963

Idaho SUJ.te Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARIO AYALA,

)
)
Claimant,

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

)

1.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2001-520958
I.C. No. 2013-024075

)
)
)
)
)
)

CLAIMANT'S RULE 10
DISCLOSURE .

)

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

( /C

111

I.·,.
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I

' / ·'
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COMES NOW Claimant, Mario Ayala, through counsel of record
herein and pursuant to Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure and
hereby discloses Exhibits and Witnesses which Claimant may offer into evidence
upon behalf of Claimant at the hearing of this matter, as follows:

MEDICAL EXHIBITS:
I.

Prior to Ostober 14, 2001, date of accident
1. Records of Glenns Ferry Medical Center for the period October 11,
1985 to October 13, 2001
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II. Following October 14, 2001, date of accident to October 5, 2009
2. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C.
a. Report of October 11, 2012
3. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
a. Pharmaceutical Data
111. Following the October 6, 2009, date of accident to August 27, 2013
4. Records of Emergency Department, Elmore Memorial Hospital
5. Records of D. Peter Reedy, M.D.
a. Report to Berry, dated August 23, 2010
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated June 17, 2010
b. Report to Berry, dated December 10, 2011
c. Report to Berry, dated December 12, 2012
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated November 20,
2012
d. Report to Berry, dated November 2, 2015
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated October 28,
2015
e. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 7, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Reedy, dated
December 17, 2015
f.

Report to Berry, dated January 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Berry to Dr. Reedy, dated January 5,
2016

Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure - 2
49

6. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
a. Completed Questionnaire by Vernon Mccready, PA-C, dated
January 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence to PA-C
November 5, 2015

Mccready, from

Berry, dated

(2) Correspondence to PA-C
December 14, 2015

Mccready,

Berry,

from

dated

(3) Correspondence to PA-C Mccready, from Berry, dated January
5,2016
7. Records of Mountain Home Physical Therapy
8. Records of Orthopedic Associates/Ors. Schweiger, Hessing and
Clawson
9. Records of Richard Hammond, M.D./Neurology of Twin Falls
10. Records of Michael Hajjar, M.D.
a. Report to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund, dated November 14,
2012
b. Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 27, 2016
(1) Correspondence from Attorney Augustine to Dr. Hajjar, dated
January 6, 2016
c. Report to Berry, dated February 19, 2016
(1) Correspondence to Dr. Hajjar from Berry, dated February 4,
2016, without attachments
11. Diagnostic Procedures
IV. Following August 28, 2013 date of accident
12. Records of Nampa Medical

Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure - 3
50

13. Records of Miers Johnson Ill, M.D./St. Alphonsus Medical Group
a. Mountain Home Physical Therapy
14. Records of Howard Shoemaker, M.D.
15. Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C.
16. Records of Glenns Ferry Health Center
17. Records of Paul Montalbano, M.D.
a. Report dated July 8, 2015
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Berry, dated June 22, 2015
18. Records of Mark J. Harris, M.D./ldaho Physical Medicine
19. Diagnostic Procedures

V. IME Reports
20. Mark J. Harris, M.D.
a. July31,2010reviewofrecords
b. August 2, 2010 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated July 26,
2010
(2) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth
Edition, p. 27
c. August 3, 2010 report
d. August 15, 2011 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated June 27,
2011
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e. September 21, 2012 report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated August
30,2012
f.

October 18, 2012, report
(1) Letter to Dr. Harris from State Insurance Fund, dated October
15,2012
(a) Letter to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund from Berry,
dated October 4, 2012

21. Paul Montalbano, M.D.
a. Letter to Attorney Paul Augustine, dated April 26, 2013
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated April
2,2013
b. Report dated October 8, 2015 to Attorney Augustine
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated
September 30, 2015
c. Report dated October 3, 2016 to Attorney Augustine
(1) Letter to Dr. Montalbano from Attorney Augustine, dated
September 27, 2016
22. Stanley Waters, M.D.
23. Wright Physical Therapy FCE Report dated September 25, 2015
a. Letter to Wright Physical Therapy from Berry, dated September 2,
2015
24. Dictation of Richard Hammond, M.D., dated August 1, 2016
a. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated June 22, 2016
b. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 1, 2016
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c. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated July 21, 2016
d. Letter to Dr. Hammond from Berry, dated October 11, 2016
VI. Medical Itemization re low back/lumbar presentment
NON-MEDICAL EXHIBITS:

25. First Reports of Injuries
a. October 14, 2001 date of accident
b. October 6, 2009 date of accident
(1) Claimant Contacts dated November 20, 2009, December 21,
2009;and,June7,2010
(2) Policyholder Contact dated November 20, 2009
c. August 28, 2013 date of accident
26. Idaho Vehicle Collision Report re October 6, 2009, motor vehicle
accident
a. Photographs by investigating officer
27. ICRD Records
28.State Insurance Fund Title 72 Benefits Paid Summary
a. Regarding the October 14, 2001 date of accident
b. Regarding the October 6, 2009 date of accident
(1) Permanent partial impairment conceded by Defendants
c. Regarding the August 28, 2013 date of accident
29. Copies of Correspondences
a. Letter to State Insurance Fund/Mr. Martin from Berry dated
December 14, 2011
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b. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated March 7, 2012
c. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated March 12, 2012
d. Letter to Mr. Martin from Berry, dated October 15, 2012
e. Letter from Mr. Martin to Berry, dated November 14, 2012
f.

Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated December 17, 2012

g. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 4, 2013
h. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated March 27, 2013
i.

Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated May 6, 2013

j.

Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated May 29, 2013

k. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated January 13, 2016

I.

Letter from Attorney Augustine to Berry, dated February 16, 2016

m. Letter to Mr. Ayala from Mr. Robert Meyers, dated December 3,
2014
n. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated August 22, 2016
o. Letter to Attorney Augustine from Berry, dated October 11, 2016
30. Defendants' Response to Discovery
a. Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants, dated
January 24, 2014
(1) Defendants' Answers to Continued
January 5, 2016

Interrogatories, dated

(a) Defendants'
Supplemental
Answers
to
Continued
Interrogatories to Defendants, dated February 2, 2016
(2) Defendants' Supplemental Answers
Defendants, dated February 2, 2016

to

Interrogatories to
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b. Defendants' Response to Requests for Production of Documents
to Defendants, dated January 24, 2014, (excerpts)
(1) Defendants' Answers to Continued Requests for Production of
Documents to Defendants, dated January 5, 2016
c. Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories to Defendants re: August
28, 2013, Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013-024075, dated January 5,
2016
d. Defendants' Answers to Requests for Production of Documents to
Defendants re: August 28, 2013, Accident at Issue in I.C. 2013024075, dated January 5, 2016
e. Defendants' Supplemental Answers to Claimant's Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendants, dated
October 11, 2016
f.

State Insurance Fund's Claims File (excerpts) as attached to
Defendants' Notice of Compliance with Order Granting Motion to
Compel, dated August 18, 2016

31. Claimant's Response to Discovery
a. Claimant's Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013
regarding I.C. No. 2001-520958
b. Claimant's Answers to Interrogatories dated October 7, 2013
regarding I.C. No. 2009-029533
c. Claimant's Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated
January 11, 2016, regarding I.C. Nos. 2001-520958; 2009-029533;
and, 2013-024075
(1) Claimant's Second Supplemental Answers to Defendants' First
Set of Interrogatories to Claimant, dated September 22, 2016
(Re: I.C. Nos. 2001-520958; 2009-029533; and, 2013-024075)
d. Claimant's Answers to Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories
to Claimant, dated September 19, 2016
32. Vocational Report of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., dated February 2, 2016
a. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated December 16, 2015
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b. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated February 5, 2016
c. Letter to Dr. Collins from Berry, dated September 28, 2016
33. Transcript of Deposition of Claimant, taken November 10, 2015, (to be
produced at hearing)
DISCLOSURE OF PROBABLE WITNESSES:

1. Claimant, Mario Ayala.
2. PA-C Vernon Mccready, of Nampa, Idaho, to be taken by posthearing deposition.
3. Drs. Schweiger, Hessing and Clawson, care of Orthopedic Associates,
of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing deposition.
4. Michael Hajjar, M.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing
deposition.
5. D. Peter Reedy, M.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing
deposition.
6. Miers Johnson, Ill, M.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing
deposition.
7. Bryan Wright DPT, care of Wright Physical Therapy, of Twin Falls,
Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing deposition.
8. Richard Hammond, M.D., care of St. Luke's Clinic - Neurology of Twin
Falls, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing deposition.
9. Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., of Boise, Idaho, to be taken by post-hearing
deposition.
DATED this

jJ_ day of October, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the 13th day of October, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document, by
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the
following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

V.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

ORDER REGARDING HEARING
EXHIBITS

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

Referee Michael E. Powers conducted a hearing in Twin Falls on October
26, 2016.

At hearing, the Referee reserved ruling of certain of Claimant's proposed

exhibits.

After having had the opportunity to review the hearing transcript and

comments of counsel, the following exhibits are hereby admitted into the record:

Claimant's Exhibits:

►

20 and 21

►

20B 1 and 2

►

E-1 and F-1 and F-l(a)

►
►

3-A
29-L

►

20 B-2

►

695 E-H
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Recognizing that there was some confusion regarding the admission/nonadmission of exhibits at hearing, the Referee invites the parties to timely inform the
Commission if there are any further additions, modifications, or anything else of
significance regarding this order.

ot/,J

DATED this~·- day of November, 2016.
INDUSTRIAL CO MISSION

ATTEST: .

'

,;,

-d'}rvq 1'1i,ei102W'y _,.· . 1,.

Assistant Comis~iop: Secpetary

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/g ·-J!J.

I hereby certify that on the
day of November, 2016, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS was served by
regular United States Mail upon each of the following persons:
L CL YEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

,,

<?/••• w,~ .•. ,.
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/
)

L. CLYEL BERRY, C;l-IARTERED
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O.BOX302
Tif'in Fa.is, ID 83303-0302
Telephone: 208/734-9962
Fax Number: 208/733-3619
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2013-024075

)

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR CLARIFICATION OF
ORDER REGARDING
HEARING EXHIBITS

,· 1°1

COMES NOW Claimant by and through counsel of recofd anclhereby
respectfully requests that the Commission clarify its November 18, 2016, Order
Regarding Hearing Exhibits.

Said Order determined that certain of Claimant's

proposed exhibits \Vere admitted into the recoid 1 as fo!lo\ivs:
"20 and 21
20B1 and 2
E-1 and F-1 and F-1 (a)
3-A
29-L

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER REGARDING HEARING
EXHIBITS-1
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20B-2
695 E-H"
Comparing the Commission's November 18, 2016, Order with the
October 26, 2016, Hearing Transcript, at page 8, L. 12 through page 18, L. 10
together with Claimant's Rule 10 Exhibits, Claimant wishes to confirm that the
following of Claimant's Exhibits are admitted of record herein:
Exhibit 2 and 2.a.
Exhibit 3, commencing with page 116, being the Encounter Report, for
September 14, 2007, and Exhibit 3.a.
Exhibits 4-VI
Exhibits 25.b. through 27
Exhibit 28.b. through 33
Conversely, the only exhibits within Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure not
admitted are as follows:
Exhibit 1
Exhibit 3, from and including page 46 through and including page 115 - .
Exhibit 25.a.
Exhibit 28.a.
DATED this~ day of November, 2016.

L. Clyel erry
Attorney for Claimant
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EXHIBITS-2
61

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and
that on the
day of November, 2016, I served a copy of the foregoing document
by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:

R

Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

L.
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To:

2016-12-30 19:06:04 (GMT)

Page 2 of 4

1-20,8-947-0014 From: ALlgLJstine Law Offices PLLC

PAUL ,I. AUGUSTINE ]SB 4608
AUGUSTIN!,.LAW ()Fl'ICES, f'LLC

1004 W. Fort Sttcc1
Post Office Box 1521

Bois~, ID 8370 I
Telephone: (208) 167-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014
Attorneys for Employe!'/Surety

BEFORE THE [NDUSTRI,\ f, COMMlSS!ON OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,

JC No. 2009-029533
Claimalll,

2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.
ROBE.RT J. iVIEYERS FARMS., INC.,.
Employer,

l)EJ1'ENOANTS' RESPONSE TO
CLAIMANTA'S MOTION F'OR
CLAR1FlCATION OF ORDER
REGARDlNG HEARING EXHIBITS

F

and

D

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surely,
Defondanls.

Defondm1t~. l:,y and through their coun.sd of record, Paul J. Augustine ofAugustine Law
Offices, PLLC. hereby Responds to Claimant's Motion for Clarificntion of Order Regarding
Hearing Exhib.its 4S follows:
I.

Defendants agree with Claim~nt's motion that Exhibits 2 and 2.a., Exhibit 3

DEFENDANTS' R!'SPONSE TO Cl,AIMANT'S M~JTION FOK CLARlFICATION OF ORDER RFGARfl!NG
HEARING EXHIBITS - I
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c'ownwncing on page 1.16, Exhibit 3,11., Exhibits 4-VL E'xbibit.s 25.b. through 27 and Exhibit
28.b, through 33 sho1ild all be.admitted. Additiomilly, Dcfondi111ts contend 1hal Exhibit 3 from
page 48 through pt1gc 1 15 should also .be ndmitted as DefrndMts did ncli object the admission of
these-re~ord$ nndrequt:sted that all of' Claimant's .Exhibits other than which Defendants did not

,1hject 10 be admitted.

PATED ihis 1;,;:.!'(foy of December, 2016.
AU(JlJST!NE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Paul J. Aq ,stine - Ofthe Fim1

,u . . ..

Attorncvs

r Ernployer/Surety
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CERTIFICATE OF SJ;RVICE
lHEREBYCERTIFY that on the!i,f:, dayofDecen1ber, 2016, J caused to b.e served a true
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANfS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATJON OF ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBJTS, by the method indicated
below, and addresBed.to each of the following:
L Clyel Berry
STGPHAN, K \I ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR

P OBox 83
Twip.FaJ.ls,ID 83303-008.,

-~--U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
!land Delivered

~--Overnight M,1il
~Telecopy

Atrnrney.fbr Claimant

tine
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
'
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone; 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: sks&t@ldaho-law.com
Ayala/Mot-for-Clarification-Obj/mek
Attorney for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,

I.C. No. 2009-029533
I.C. No. 2013-024075

Plaintiff,

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION
TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
Claimant, by and through counsel of record, hereby objects and replies to
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing
Exhibits, as follows:

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS - 1
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: sks&t@idaho-law.com
Ayala/Mot-for-Clarification-Obj/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,

LC. No. 2009-029533
LC. No. 2013-024075

Plaintiff,

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION
TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
Claimant, by and through counsel of record, hereby objects and replies to
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing
Exhibits, as follows:

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
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OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE

Claimant's Motion for Clarification was dated and bears a Certificate of
Service of November 22, 2016. Rule 3F2 provides a period of fourteen (14) days from the
filing of a Motion for the opposing party to file_ a response. Defendants' Response to
Claimant's Motion was dated December 30, 2016, filed thirty-eight (38) days following the
filing of Claimant's Motion for Clarification, and is thusly untimely by a period of twenty-four
(24) days, without excuse, explanation or justification by Defendants. Upon said basis,
Claimant respectfully petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission to strike the same
as being untimely.
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE

Should the Commission fail to grant Claimant's Motion to Strike Defendants'
Response, Claimant notes that Defendants concur with Claimant's Motion for Clarification
in all respects excepting pages 48 through 115 within Claimant's Exhibit 3, which
Defendants wish admitted. Defendants' request is based upon the argument that,
... Defendants did not object the admission of these records
and request that all of Claimant's Exhibits other than which
Defendants did not object to be admitted.
In the instant matter, it is clear that there was no agreement by and between
the parties for the admission of any "joint exhibit or exhibits."

In fact, comparing

Defendants' Rule 1O Disclosure to Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure, it is seen that there was
significant overlap and/or duplication as between the proposed exhibits to be offered by
Defendants and those instruments and/or records within Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure.
Such overlap and/or duplication of exhibits was the subject of the colloquy between
counsel and Referee Powers within the Transcript of Hearing, commencing at line 16 on

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS - 2
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page 31 through page 32, line 14. Simply stated, Defendants could have offered any
exhibit which they wished to be admitted of record in these proceedings by complying with
Rule 10, JRPP.

Defendants were and are withouJ basis in seeking the admission of

record of any of the documents and/or records identified within Clamant's Rule 10
Disclosure. Specifically, referencing the language set-forth within Claimant's Disclosure
at page 1 thereof, it is provided that,
Claimant, Mario Ayala, through counsel of record and pursuant
to Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure
hereby discloses Exhibits and Witnesses which Claimant may
offer into evidence upon behalf of Claimant at the hearing of
this matter, ...
Most certainly, there was no affirmation, promise, representation or otherwise
upon behalf of Claimant that each of the instruments and/or records set-forth within
Claimant's Disclosure would be offered into evidence by Claimant at hearing.
In fact, Claimant did not offer into evidence that portion of Exhibit 3, from
page 48 through page 115 thereof. As that portion of Exhibit 3 was not offered into
evidence by Claimant, there was no reason for Defendants to object to the admission of
the same.

Claimant did offer into evidence that portion of Exhibit 3, commencing with

page 116, being Claimant's presentment to Glenns Ferry Health Center on September 14,
2007, greater than two (2) years prior to the October 6, 2009, accident at issue in these
proceedings.
Prior to the commencement of the October 26, 2016, hearing, Claimant
withdrew the October 14, 2001, claim which had been part and parcel of these
consolidated proceedings, leaving at issue the 2009 and 2013 claims. The portion of
Claimant's Exhibit 3 withdrawn and not offered into evidence by Claimant relates to a
myriad of medical presentments by Claimant for the period December 4, 2001 through May
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS - 3
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21, 2007, and was disclosed by Claimant as potential exhibits prior in time to the decision
to withdraw the 2001 claim from these proceedings. Even were these records relevant to
the 2009 or 2013 claims, Defendants are without basis to argue for the admission of any
portion of Claimant's Exhibits not offered into evidence by Claimant.
As noted by Rule 10F, JRPP, "[t]he filing of a document ... does not signify
its admission in evidence, .... " In summary, there was no agreement by and between
Claimant and Defendants that any of the documents and/or instruments identified within
Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure would, in fact, be offered into evidence at hearing. Rather,
the Disclosure clearly stated that the identified documents, records and/or instruments
were those " ... which Claimant may offer into evidence ... at the hearing of this matter, .... "
Clearly Defendants did not rely upon Claimant's Rule 10 Disclosure, to any extent, as
evidenced by the extent of the overlap and/or duplication as between Claimant's and
Defendants' Disclosures. Allowing Defendants to "bootstrap" records and/or documents
into the record in this manner is believed to be without precedent; most certainly conflicts
with Rule 10, JRPP; and, should not be allowed.
Dated this

2_ day of January, 2017.
STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR

1/1

By_.... ....\,... ,D,~.c ::_~..L .---+-- -L. Clyel Be[
Attorney for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by facsimile to
the
the following:

1.2_

Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Fax No.: (208) 947-0014

\
L. Clyel B

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION; MOTION TO STRIKE; AND, REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS - 5

71

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

v.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION
TO STRIKE;
AMENDED ORDER REGARDING
HEARING EXHIBITS

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

On November 23, 2016, Claimant filed a Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding
Hearing Exhibits.

Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order

Regarding Hearing Exhibits was filed December 30, 2016.
On January 3, 201 7, Claimant filed an Objection; Motion to Strike, and Reply to
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing
Exhibits.
With regard to Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike, the motion is GRANTED.
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing
Exhibits was untimely.

No request for extension was received prior to the date that

Defendant's response was due.
With regard to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing
Exhibits, the motion is GRANTED, and the following exhibits are admitted:

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE; AMENDED ORDER REGARDING
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•

I

Claimant's Exhibits:
►

Exhibit 2 and 2.a.

►

Exhibit 3, commencing with page 116, and Exhibit 3.a.

►

Exhibits 4-VI

►

Exhibits 25.b. through 27

►

Exhibit 28.b. through 33

DATED this

day of January, 2017.
INDUSTRIAL ~<f1MISS_;ON

~~~~
Michael E. Powers, Referee
ATTEST·

• ··· . ···

. c'1unc1· (.1/fJ1\ fw,ci

;

Assistant Commission Sec,r~tai'y
.

\/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /0-/i.Lday of January, 2017, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE; AMENDED ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS was served by regular United States Mail upon each of
the following persons:
L CL YEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

ge

o/, •• If,~ .•• ,.
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OlUGINAL
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014
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Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
CLAIMANT A'S MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law
Offices, PLLC, hereby Responds to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding
Hearing Exhibits as follows:
1.

Defendants agree with Claimant's motion that Exhibits 2 and 2.a., Exhibit 3

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER REGARDING
HEARING EXHIBITS - I
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commencing on page 116, Exhibit 3.a., Exhibits 4-VI, Exhibits 25.b. through 27 and Exhibit
28.b. through 33 should all be admitted. Additionally, Defendants contend that Exhibit 3 from
page 48 through page 115 should also be admitted as Defendants did not object the admission of
these records and requested that all of Claimant's Exhibits other than which Defendants did not
object to be admitted.
DATED this ;-;,-l"day of December, 2016.
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Attorneys

stine - Of the Firm
r Employer/Surety
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of December, 2016, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS, by the method indicated
below, and addressed to each of the following:
L. Clyel Berry
STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR

PO Box 83
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083

_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Ovemight Mail
~Telecopy

Attorney.for Claimant
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: sks&t@idaho-law.com
Ayala/MOT-LRR-RH/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

1.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2013-024075
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR, LEAVE:
TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR; ~ECALL
RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M:D .

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
Comes now Claimant, by and through counsel of record herein, and hereby
petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for leave allowing Claimant to recall and/or
re-examine Richard J. Hammond, M.D., in the instant proceedings. The instant Motion is
made for the reasons and upon the grounds as set-forth within the Affidavit of Richard J.
77
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Hammond, M.D. and/or the Affidavit of Claimant's counsel, Clyel Berry, of even date
herewith.
Central to the instant Motion is the fact that Claimant's medical expert, Dr.
Richard Hammond, a board-certified neurologist, had been provided with basically all of
Claimant's medical records for the period commencing approximately two years prior to his
October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident through the date of the hearing herein, inclusive
of several disks containing and/or setting-forth the actual diagnostic studies involving Mr.
Ayala's low back, generally, and specific to the L3-4, L4-5 and L5-S1 levels. That prior to
his deposition, Dr. Hammond had personally reviewed all of the medical records submitted
to him with the exception of the disks having the diagnostic studies, which Dr. Hammond
had been unable to open. Unfortunately, Dr. Hammond had not advised counsel of his
lack of success in opening these disks prior to the taking of his deposition. Otherwise,
Berry would have vacated and re-set Dr. Hammond's deposition, to afford Dr. Hammond
sufficient time to resolve the difficulty with the disks and/or to obtain duplicate disks of said
diagnostic studies for Dr. Hammond's pre-deposition review.
Although Dr. Hammond did personally review the radiologists' respective
reports concerning the diagnostic studies contained within the disks, to the extent that the
Commission may find it significant that Dr. Hammond did not review the actual film of the
diagnostic studies, such that Mr. Ayala and his claim may be prejudiced thereby, Claimant
respectfully requests leave to recall Dr. Hammond as witness in these proceedings so as
to allow Dr. Hammond to testify regarding the various diagnostic studies above-referenced
together with the significance thereof upon Dr. Hammond's opinion and testimony upon the
issues of the causal relation of Mr. Ayala's low back presentment from and following the

J.
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October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident and current need of medical treatment related
thereto, inclusive of surgery, to said October 6, 2009, accident.
In effect, the instant Motion is analogous to a motion made pursuant to I.C.
§ 72-719(3), to correct the potential of Mr. Ayala suffering manifest injustice to the extent

that his pending claims may be adversely affected by Dr. Hammond's difficulty in opening
the disks setting-forth the referenced diagnostic studies and/or by the lack of knowledge
by Berry of said fact, such that Dr. Hammond's post-hearing deposition could be vacated,
to be re-set following Dr. Hammond's personal review of said diagnostic studies.
In the consideration of the instant Motion, it must be noted that Defendants
will not suffer bias or prejudice upon the Commission's granting the same, as Defendants'
counsel, Mr. Augustine, participated in Dr. Hammond's deposition via telephonic
conference call such that Mr. Augustine would not be required to duplicate efforts or
resources exhausted in traveling from Boise to Twin Falls and return for the deposition.
Upon the granting of the instant Motion, Dr. Hammond's continued testimony would be
limited to the correction of hours/time spent in records review and his examination of Mr.
Ayala; and, his personal review of the disks of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, inclusive of
the significance thereof upon the issues of causal relation, etiology of Mr. Ayala's low back
and related symptomatology, and need for further medical care/treatment related thereto.
DATED This~ day of January, 2017.

J.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
the D_ day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTI NE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry- ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: sks&t@idaho-law.com
Ayala/AFF-RH/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

I.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2013-024075

MARIO AYALA,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J.
HAMMOND, M.D.

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Twin Falls.

)
) ss.
)

COMES NOW Richard J. Hammond, M.D. and, being first duly sworn on
oath, deposes and states as follows:
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1.

That affiant is a board-certified neurologist, who has been licensed to
practice medicine by and within the State of Idaho continuously for the
past twenty-five (25) years, during and within which period of time
affiant's practice encompassed general neurology, specifically
including the diagnosis and treatment of diseases and/or injuries of
and to the brain, spinal cord, nerves, musculature, and the spine,
inclusive of related symptomatology.

2.

Upon an infrequent basis, affiant reviews a non-patient's medical
records and conducts neurological examination upon the individual in
what is commonly referenced as an "independent medical
examination." Recently, affiant reviewed pertinent medical records
and conducted two neurological examinations upon Mr. Mario Ayala
at the request of Mr. Ayala's legal counsel, Clyel Berry, related to Mr.
Ayala's pending Idaho workers' compensation claims related to
accidents occurring on or about October 6, 2009, and August 28,
2013.

3.

The medical and related data/records provided affiant by Clyel Berry
relative to Mr. Ayala's pending industrial claims are identified as
follows:
a.

Records from Glenns Ferry Health Center for the period
September 14, 2007, through October 5, 2009.

b.

First Report of Injury dated November 17, 2009.

c.

Records of Jeffrey F. Kieffer, D.C.
(1)

d.

Notation of Dr. Kieffer dated October 11, 2012.

Records of Emergency Department, Elmore Memorial Hospital,
82
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following the October 6, 2009, accident.
e.

Records of Dr. Reedy inclusive of his correspondence to T.J.
Martin, with the Fund, dated January 8, 2010; and, his reports
to Clyel Berry dated August 23, 201 O; December 10, 2011;
December 12, 2012; November 2, 2015; and, January 19,
2016 together with Dr. Reedy's report to Attorney Augustine of
January 7, 2016.

f.

The completed Questionnaire of PA-C McCreedy, dated
January 19, 2016.

g.

Records of Orthopedic Associates/Ors. Schweiger, Hessing
and Clawson.

h.

Records of Michael Hajjar, M.D.
(1)

Report to T.J. Martin, State Insurance Fund, of
November 14, 2012.

(2)

Report to Attorney Augustine, dated January 27, 2016.

(3)

Report to Attorney Berry, dated February 19, 2016.

Reports upon diagnostic procedures, as follows:
(1)

November 20, 2009, MRI of the cervical spine without
contrast.

(2)

February 15, 2010, SP cervical myelogram.

(3)

February 15, 2010, x-rays of the cervical spine.

(4)

February 15, 2010, CT myelogram of the cervical spine.

(5)

February 15, 2010, MRI of the brain, without contrast.

(6)

May 20, 2010, post-op x-rays of the cervical spine.

(7)

August 23, 2010, MRI of the left shoulder without
contrast.

(8)

May 23, 2011, cervical MRI both with and without
contrast.

(9)

January 16, 2012, lumbar MRI without contrast.

(10)

April 3, 2012, lumbar myelogram.
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j.

(11)

April 3, 2012, x-rays of the lumbar spine.

(12)

April 3, 2012, CT myelogram of the lumbar spine.

(13)

October 22, 2014, lumbar spine x-rays.

(14)

October 31, 2014, lumbar spine CT with contrast.

(15)

October 31, 2014, lumbar myelogram.

(16)

March 20, 2015, NM bone scan with SPECT.

Records of Miers Johnson Ill, M.D./St. Alphonsus Medical
Group
(1)

k.

IME report of Howard Shoemaker, M.D., dated October
6, 2014.

Records of Paul Montalbano, M.D.
(1)

Report to Berry dated July 8, 2015.

I.

Operative Report, Mark Harris, M.D., for April 30, 2015,
bilateral L4-5 facet injections.

m.

IME reports:
(1)

Mark J. Harris, M.D.,
(a)

July 31, 2010 review of records

(b)

August 2, 2010 report

(c)

August 3, 2010 report

(d)

August 15, 2011 report

(e)

September 21, 2012 report

(f)

October 18, 2012, report

(2)

Paul Montalbano, M.D.: Report to Attorney Augustine
of October 8, 2015

(3)

FCE report from Wright Physical Therapy, dated
September 25, 2015
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n.

4.

Disks of diagnostic imaging studies related to:
(1)

November 20, 2009, MRI of the cervical spine without
contrast.

(2)

February 15, 2010, SP cervical myelogram.

(3)

February 15, 2010, x-rays of the cervical spine.

(4)

February 15, 2010, CT myelogram of the cervical spine.

(5)

February 15, 2010, MRI of the brain, without contrast.

(6)

August 23, 2010, MRI of the left shoulder without
contrast.

(7)

May 23, 2011, cervical MRI both with and without
contrast.

(8)

January 16, 2012, lumbar MRI without contrast.

(9)

April 3, 2012, lumbar myelogram.

(10)

April 3, 2012, x-rays of the lumbar spine.

(11)

April 3, 2012, CT myelogram of the lumbar spine.

(12)

May 20, 2010, cervical spine x-ray.

That affiant's deposition was taken in Mr. Ayala's pending industrial
claims by Clyel Berry upon December 16, 2016.

Prior to said

deposition, affiant had reviewed the entirety of the medical and
related data which he had been provided by Clyel Berry excepting the
disks containing the diagnostic imaging studies, which affiant had
attempted to review but had been unsuccessful in opening said disks
and/or the contents thereof upon multiple occasions, with the
exception of certain of Mr. Ayala's plain film x-rays.
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5.

That affiant had not advised Clyel Berry of his lack of success in
reviewing the disks containing Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies prior to

,,,-~,~•-··• .cc"'•'·""

the taking of affiant's December 16, 2016, deposition.
6.

That following affiant's December 16, 2016, deposition, affiant
received an inquiry from Clyel Berry regarding two topics, being the
hours/time spent by affiant in his review of Mr. Ayala's abovereferenced records and in his two examinations of Mr. Ayala during
the course of affiant's independent medical examination of Mr. Ayala;
and, requesting that affiant confirm whether and to what extent affiant
had personally reviewed Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies/results which
were within the above-referenced disks. Upon receipt of said inquiry,
affiant again attempted to open the disks setting-forth and containing
Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, and was successful in doing so.

7.

That upon affiant's personal review of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic
studies/the results of said diagnostic studies set forth within the
above-referenced disks, such review does not change affiant's
opinions, conclusions or deposition testimony, that prior to the
October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident, Mr. Ayala did not present
with significant condition or injury of, to or involving his low back,
specifically involving the L3-4, L4-5, and/or L5-S1 levels; that Mr.
Ayala's manifestation of symptomatology related to his low back from
and following the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident was and
remains causally related to and resultant of said motor vehicle
accident; and, that Mr. Ayala currently presents as requiring referral
86
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to a neurosurgeon for probable surgical procedures in treatment of
injuries and/or presentments causally related to and resultant of said
October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident. Rather, said diagnostic

'
studi~s are such so as to reinforce and strengthen affiant's opinions
and deposition testimony In that regard.
!

8.

That t,he instant affidavit is made upon matters regarding which affiant
would be competent to testify In the Instant proceedings.

DATED thls21 -- day of January, 2017.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

f l day of January, 2017.

'

Notary Public for Id
Residingat: _ _.....1-.....L=-,;;;=::::--_;__
My Commission Expires: _ _,_--'---1,'---"t\\=1-b:._..

GINA BEACH
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE Of IDAHO

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
September 15, 2020
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ti<)
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
the,d_L day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: sks&t@idaho-law.com
Ayala/MOT-LRR-RH-AFF /mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2013-024075

MARIO AYALA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

AFFIDAVIT OF L. CLYEL BERRY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR
RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND,
M.D.

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Twin Falls.

)
) ss.
)

COMES NOW L. Clyel Berry and, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and states as follows:
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1.

That your affiant is an. attorney duly licensed to practice law by and
within the State of Idaho, and is counsel of record for Claimant, Mario
Ayala, herein.

Further, affiant hereby makes representations as to

facts and matters regarding which he would be competent to testify
before the Commission in these proceedings.
2.

That affiant did, upon behalf of Claimant herein, retain Dr. Richard
Hammond, a board-certified neurologist, for the purpose of
conducting a medical records review and neurological examination
upon Claimant, and to thereafter give opinions in this matter. Affiant's
correspondences to Dr. Hammond together with the identification and
description of records submitted to Dr. Hammond for review are of
record as Cl's Ex. 24.a-d. Encompassed within the records and/or
matters submitted to Dr. Hammond for review were reports upon
diagnostic procedures identified in paragraph "9" at Cl's Ex. p. 659q;
and, diagnostic imaging disks for the procedures identified and setforth as "a-k" at Cl's. Ex. p. 659t, together with the diagnostic imaging
disk identified at Cl's. Ex. p. 659v.

3.

Following records review and examinations of Mr. Ayala, Dr.
Hammond authored two reports, dated August 1 and October 5, 2016,
collectively of record as Cl's. Ex. 24. Following hearing in this matter,
affiant scheduled Dr. Hammond's post-hearing deposition which was
taken upon December 16, 2016. At the conclusion of that deposition,
rather than have Dr. Hammond read and sign the deposition
transcript, it was set-forth that counsel for the parties would read the
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transcript of the deposition, " ... and ifwe have questions, then we can
approach (Dr. Hammond) to see whether or not (his) responses were
by reason of error or mistake or misunderstanding of questions."
HammondDepo., p.130, LL.1-8.
4.

Upon affiant's review of the transcript of Dr. Hammond's deposition,
affiant approached Dr. Hammond regarding two topics, being the
accuracy of Dr. Hammond's estimate of time involved in his records
review and examinations upon Mr. Ayala; and, whether and to what
extent Dr. Hammond had reviewed the actual diagnostic imaging
disks which he had been provided. Responsive to this inquiry, affiant
was advised by Dr. Hammond that he had underestimated the actual
hours involved in his records review and examinations upon Mr.
Ayala; and, potentially of greater significance, that prior to his
deposition Dr. Hammond had attempted to "open" the diagnostic
imaging disks but had not been successful until following the taking
of his deposition. Thusly, certain of Dr. Hammond's testimony and
opinions were based upon the radiology reports flowing from the
diagnostic studies as opposed to his personal review of the actual
film/disks.

5.

That affiant had not been made aware and was without knowledge of
Dr. Hammond's inability to open and review the diagnostic studies
upon the imaging disks submitted to him prior to Dr. Hammond's
deposition.

Had affiant been made aware or otherwise had

knowledge of this fact, affiant would have facilitated Dr. Hammond's
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personal review of the actual diagnostic studies set-forth upon the
imaging disks by confirming that the difficulty experienced by Dr.
Hammond had been resolved, or by affiant ordering additional copies
of said disks for Dr. Hammond's review prior to his deposition, even
if the same resulted in the deposition as scheduled being vacated and
re-set.
6.

Upon affiant receiving Dr. Hammond's confirmation that he had been
unsuccessful in his attempts to review the diagnostic studies set-forth
upon the imaging disks, affiant contacted Defendants' counsel, Mr.
Paul Augustine, and inquired whether Mr. Augustine/Defendants
would stipulate to Dr. Hammond's deposition to being re-opened to
allow Dr. Hammond to testify regarding his personal review of Mr.
Ayala's diagnostic studies, by correspondence dated January 25,
2017. By Mr. Augustine's correspondence to affiant dated January
26, 2017, Mr. Augustine advised that Defendants would not agree to
stipulate to re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition, whereupon affiant
prepared the instant Motion.

7.

It is not believed that allowing Dr. Hammond's deposition to be reopened would result in prejudice to Defendants in that Defendants'
counsel's participation in Dr. Hammond's original deposition was by
telephonic conference call, such that no travel or related expenses
were incurred by Defendants or their counsel. Should Defendants/Mr.
Augustine so choose, Defendants' participation in the continuance of
Dr. Hammond's deposition could also be via telephonic conference
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call. Dr. Hammond's testimony will be no different than had he have
been successful in opening the imaging disks prior to his deposition,
or had advised affiant of his inability to open said disks, such that
affiant would have ensured that Dr. Hammond's deposition would not
have been taken until after his personal review of the diagnostic
imaging studies.

During a telephone conversation between Dr.

Hammond and affiant, Dr. Hammond advised that upon personal
review of the diagnostic imaging studies, Dr. Hammond's deposition
testimony and opinions would not change, with the exception that his
personal review of the diagnostic imaging studies strengthened the
basis for those opinions and testimony, such that there is potential
that Mr. Ayala's claim related to his low back presentment may be
compromised and/or prejudiced should the instant Motion be denied.
Dated this o?'f day of January, 2017.

L. Clyel erry
Attorney for Claimant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~day of January, 2017.

I

.

l,1ELODY E KREFT
Notary Public
State of Idaho

-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
the fl_ day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: sks&t@idaho-law.com
Ayala/MOT-EO-MFC/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,

1.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2013-024075

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR
ENTRY OF ORDER UPON
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER
REGARDING HEARING EXHIBITS,
INCLUSIVE OF CLAIMANT'S
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO
STRIKE DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant, Mario Ayala, by and through counsel of record and
hereby respectfully requests that the Idaho State Industrial Commission enter it/! qrq~~ .
C"

f L i'"

tt
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upon Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding Hearing Exhibits, dated
November 22, 2016, inclusive of Claimant's Objection and Motion to Strike Defendants'
Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification, made within Claimant's Reply to
Defendants' Response, dated January 3, 2017.
Summarized, the issue regarding the admission and/or withdrawal of certain
of Claimant's exhibits is limited to Cl's Ex. 3, at pages 48-115, being a portion of Claimant's
medical records maintained by Glenns Ferry Health Center for the period December 4,
2001, approximately 8 years prior to the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle accident at issue
herein, to May 21, 2007, approximately 28 months prior to said motor vehicle accident,
withdrawn by Claimant as part and parcel of Claimant's withdrawal of the October 14,
2001, claim which had been encompassed within these consolidated proceedings.
Although it is not Claimant's intent to re-state or argue matters set-forth within
Claimant's Motion for Clarification; his reply to Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion
for Clarification; or, the Affidavit of Berry in Support of Motion, which Claimant respectfully
requests the Commission to re-visit, Claimant must again note that Defendants' Response
to Claimant's Motion was not filed for a period of 38 days following the filing of Claimant's
Motion for Clarification, being 24 days after the period of any response by Defendants to
said Motion had ended, pursuant to JRPP 3F2. This long overdue "after thought" filing by
Defendants was the subject of Claimant's Motion to Strike and should not be rewarded by
the Commission.
The instant Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons that the
parties are currently proceeding with and through their respective post-hearing medical

CLAIMANT'S REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF ORDER UPON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
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depositions such that it becomes important for the parties to have firm knowledge as to
what is or is not of record herein.
DATED This

_j_ day of February, 2017.
STEPHAN, KVANVIG,

JONE & TRAINOR

By_ _-'-,L_.J=_ _ i . _ _ - 1 - - - - - - L. Clyel Ber
Attorneys for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
the_/_ day of February, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014

RECEIVED
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Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.
DATED JANUARY 27, 2017

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law
Offices, PLLC, hereby move the Commission for an Order striking the Affidavit of Richard J.
Hammond, M.D. purportedly submitted in support of Claimant's Motion for Leave to Re-Examine
and/or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D. The basis of this motion is that Dr. Hanunond's affidavit

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D. DATED
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contains opinion testimony which was given after his completed deposition and constitutes an
attempt by Claimant and his counsel to present additional opinion testimony following his post
hearing deposition. As such, the opinion testimony stated by Dr. Hammond in his affidavit is not
evidence and violates Rules 10.E. and 10.F. of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure.
In his Affidavit, Dr. Hammond admits that he only reviewed CDs of the Claimant's imaging
studies after his deposition. He then stated in his affidavit that based upon his review of these films
his opinions regarding causation provided in his deposition have not changed. Rule 10.E. of the
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Industrial Commission clearly states "that evidence
presented by post hearing depositions shall be evidence known or available to the party at the time of
the hearing and shall not include evidence developed, manufactured or discovered following the
hearing." In this particular case, Dr. Hammond gave an opinion in his deposition and is attempting
now to supplement this opinion in an affidavit which was made in support of a motion to reopen his
deposition. The Claimant's Motion to Reopen Dr. Hammond's deposition (his only retained expert)
was made after Claimant's counsel and Dr. Hammond realized the shortcomings in his deposition.

In attempt to circumvent the Rules of the Practice and Procedure of the Industrial Commission, Dr.
Hammond has given a second opinion which was not presented in his deposition. As a result, Dr.
Hammond's affidavit containing this opinion should be stricken from the record and not accepted as
evidence in this hearing.
DATED this

lb

faayofFebruary,2017
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AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By------'-----~----+\--------Paul J. Augu ·ne - Of the Firm
Attorneys fo mployer/Surety

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lo+'- day of February, 2017, I caused to be served a true
copy oftheforegoingDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J.
HAMMOND, M.D. DATED JANUARY 27, 2017, by the method indicated below, and addressed to
each of the following:
L. Clyel Berry
PO Box 83
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083

Lu.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
__Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant
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AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. F01t Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
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flECEIVED
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Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR
RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND,
M.D.

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law
Offices, PLLC, hereby oppose Claimant's Motion on the grounds that (I) reopening Dr. Hammond's
deposition is contrary to Rule 10.E. of Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure; (2) reopening Dr.
Hammond's deposition would prejudice Defendants and Defendants' counsel; and (3) since Dr.

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR
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Hammond is Claimant's own retained expert, any mistakes or shortcomings in his testimony should
not be con-ected by reopening his deposition.
Claimant seeks to reopen and re-examine Dr. Hammond on the grounds that Dr. Hammond
allegedly had difficulty opening the disc containing Claimant's imaging studies. Claimant maintains
it would be a "manifest injustice" ifhe were not able to reopen Dr. Hammond's deposition in light of
Dr. Hammond's failure to review the images.
There are several reasons why the Commission should deny Claimant's request to reopen and
re-examine Dr. Hammond. First, the Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure very
clearly indicate that the Claimant is entitled to one post hearing deposition of each expe1t for the
purpose of perpetuating his or her testimony. In this particular case, Dr. Hammond was specifically
retained for purposes of litigation by Claimant's counsel. Claimant's counsel noticed several post
hearing depositions including the depositions ofDrs. Hammond, Hajjar, Reedy and Wright. The first
deposition taken was of Dr. Hammond. The deposition was taken on December 16, 2016. It
commenced at 2:25 p.m. and lasted until 5:36 p.m., over three hours. Prior to the deposition there
was a snow storm which prohibited Defendants' counsel from attending the deposition in person. As
a result Defendants' counsel had to attend the deposition by telephone. This is the first time
Defendants' counsel has attended a post hearing deposition of the Claimant's expe1t by telephone in
over twenty four years of practice.
The deposition resembled a ping pong match. Claimant's counsel examined Dr. Hammond
and then conducted four additional redirect examinations of Dr. Hammond after cross examination
by Defendants' counsel. For Claimant's counsel to argue that additional information is needed from
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR
RECALL RJCHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D. - 2
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Dr. Hammond by way of second deposition or reopening of the original deposition is disingenuous.
Further proof is that following Dr. Hammond's deposition, Claimant's counsel vacated all additional
depositions of medical providers in this case. Obviously said decision was made after reviewing Dr.
Hammond's deposition and concluding that Dr. Hammond's testimony was sufficient to establish
their claim of causation in this case.
At the close of Dr. Hammond's deposition he was given the opportunity to review and sign
his deposition transcript. Claimant's counsel on his own represented that in lieu of reading and
signing that he could make corrections to the words attributed to him in his deposition if counsel
found issues with the deposition transcript. It was never stipulated or agreed by Defendants' counsel
that upon review of the deposition the parties could reopen his deposition to take additional
testimony if the basis of his testimony was insufficient.
Since Dr. Hammond was a retained expert paid for by Claimant's counsel, it was incumbent
on Claimant's counsel and Dr. Hammond to be adequately prepared for deposition. IfDr. Hammond
could not personally review the imaging films that were provided to him by Claimant's counsel prior
to his deposition, he easily should have been in contact with Claimant's counsel to inform him of this
fact. Regardless, it appears from the basis of the documents which Claimant filed in suppmi of his
motion that Dr. Hammond's failure to review the CDs does not materially affect his opinions given
in the deposition. Of course, Dr. Hammond over the course of three hours had ample opportunity to
,..,,._,-,._.,,-... -~ --'~'°"'~"-"•'""·'

.

provide numerous opinions beyond that which were expressed in his original medical repmis in this
case.
This is the second attempt in the span of two weeks by Claimant's counsel to attempt to
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reopen a case to conect flaws in the presentment of his case. The other case is Hartgrave v. City of
Twin Falls and SIF. There is no basis in the Commission's rules or the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure as adopted by the Idaho Industrial Commission to reopen the post hearing deposition of an
expert to provide additional information or additional opinions or to clarify the opinions given in the
deposition. In review of the Commission's decisions demonstrate that Dr. Hannnond has been
retained numerous times by Claimant's counsel to provide expert opinions in lieu of opinions from
treating physicians. Since he is a commonly hired expert retained by Claimant's counsel any
shortcomings in his preparation or in the opinions that he gave in his post hearing deposition cannot
now be corrected by claiming ignorance or lack of preparation.
Finally, if the Commission is inclined to bend the rules to allow Dr. Hammond to be redeposed, Claimant should be required to pay the attorneys' fees and costs of Defendants' counsel in
personally attending the deposition.

Contrary to Claimant's counsel's representations in his

Affidavit in Support of Claimant's Motion, defense counsel needs to be present because Dr.
Hammond will be reviewing films and it will be critically important for Defendants' counsel to
personally observe Dr. Hammond's review of the films and what he believes are important aspects of
the films so that Defendants' expert, Dr. Montalbano, is adequately apprised of Dr. Hammond 's
opinion and the basis of said opinion prior to his deposition.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' respectfully request that the Commission deny
Claimant's Motion to Re-Examine and/or Reopen the deposition of Dr. Hammond.

. (n-1--

DATED this-~ day of February, 2017
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AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By_----1-----'-'---1\----------Paul J. Aug stine - Of the Film
Attorneys
Employer/Surety

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the V,S-- day of February, 2017, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D., by the method indicated
below, and addressed to each of the following:
L. Clyel Berry
PO Box 83
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083

_t'.l_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
_Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant

ustine
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Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J.
AUGUSTINE IN OPPOSITION TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR
RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND,
M.D.

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
/

Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
)
County of ADA
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

The undersigned affiant is the attorney of record for the Defendants in this

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. AUGUSTINE IN OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE106
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case. As such, all facts are based upon the affiant' s personal knowledge.
2.

The Claimant scheduled numerous post hearing depositions in this case. These

included the depositions of Dr. Richard Hammond, Dr. Michael Hajjar, Dr. Peter Reedy and Dr.
Brian Wright.
3.

The paities agreed to take all of the medical expett opinions prior to deposing their

vocational experts.
4.

Dr. Hammon d's deposition was taken on December 16, 2016 in Twin Falls, Idaho.

During the day there was a significant snowstonn/ice storm which made travel from my office in
Boise to Dr. Hammon d's office in Twin Falls extremely difficult and dangerous. As such, rather
than unnecessarily postponing the deposition, I notified Claimant's counsel and Dr. Hammon d's
office that I would appear by telephone. An-angements were made to call into Dr. Hammon d's office
to call in by telephone to paiticipate in his deposition.
5.

This was the first time in my twenty five years of practice that I have agreed to attend

a post hearing deposition of an opposing party's expe1t by telephone rather than in person. The only
reason I decided to attend by telephone was due to significant and developing weather conditions
which made travel treacherous. I did not want to prejudice the Claimant by postponing the
deposition because he had noticed several other depositions of treating physicians.
6.

The deposition commenced at 2:25 p.m.

Following Claimant 's counsel direct

examination and my cross examination, Claimant's counsel conducted four additional redirect
exaininations of Dr. Hammond. As a result, the deposition lasted over three hours and continued
until 5:36 p.m. During that time neither Claimant's counsel nor Dr. Hammond indicated that his
TO REAFFIDAV IT OF PAULJ. AUGUSTI NE IN OPPOSITION TO CLAIMAN T'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D. - 2
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inability to review the CDs or open the CDs of Claimant's imaging studies had any detrimental effect
on his ability to testify to various opinions. At the end of the deposition, Claimant's counsel noted
that in lieu of reading and signing his deposition, that the parties could review the deposition
transcript and contact him if there were any corrections that needed to be made. I never agreed to
allow Claimant's counsel to review Dr. Hammond's deposition and reopen the deposition ifhe felt
that Dr. Hammond's testimony lacked foundation or was incomplete. Rather, the sole purpose of
Mr. Beny' s representation was to allow the attorneys to review the deposition transcript and suggest
any corrections to the words attributed to Dr. Hammond, if necessaiy.
7.

If the Commission allows Claimant to reopen Dr. Hammond's deposition, then I will

need to be physically present at the deposition because it is my understanding that the deposition will
require Dr. Hammond to review the actual imaging studies of the Claimant and he will demonstrate
how these imaging studies allegedly support his opinion. I will need to observe Dr. Hammond's
references to the actual films pointing out these alleged issues so that I can explain the basis of his
opinions to Dr. Montalbano, who is expected to testify on behalf of Defendants. As a result, it would
greatly prejudice Defendants if I were to attend any reopening of Dr. Hammond's deposition by
telephone.
8.

I believe that if the deposition is reopened Claimant's counsel should be required to

pay my fees and travel costs associated with attending Dr. Hammond's reopening of his deposition
and/or re-examination. The basis for this request would be Rule 16 for Claimant's violation of Rule
10.E.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
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DATED this

lol-' day of February, 2017

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/0

~day of February, 2017.

~ 12~
p,c,A...-t!)

Notmy Public for ldaho
,
..,,
/
Residing at ~
7
Commissionexpires ~
cJ...::J-. z.dt1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ~ day of February, 2017, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. AUGUSTINE IN OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.,
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

L. Clyel Beny
PO Box 83
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083

LU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
_Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant

Paul J. Au ustine
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: sks&t@idaho-law.com
Ayala/MOT-LRR-RH-REPLY/mek
Attorney for Claimant
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INOUSTfllAL COMMISSION

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,

I.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2013-024075

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL
RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.;
AND, RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.,
DATED JANUARY 27, 2017

Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel of record, L. Clyel Berry,
and hereby replies/responds to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Motion for Leave to

CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D.; and Defendants' Motion to Strike
the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D., dated January 27, 2017.
Claimant seeks leave to re-examine and/or recall Dr. Richard Hammond in
the instant matter. From Defendants' Opposition, Defendants' objections are upon the
grounds that:
(1)

Reopening Dr. Hammond's deposition is contrary to Rule 10.E. of the Judicial
Rules of Practice and Procedure:

Reviewing J.R.P.P. 10.E., the only possible section thereof relevant to the
instant issue is set-forth within subsection 4. There, it is stated that,
[u]nless the Commission, for good cause shown, shall
otherwise order ... , the evidence presented by post-hearing
deposition shall be evidence known by or available to the party
at the time of the hearing and shall not include evidence
developed, manufactured, or discovered following the hearing.
Experts testifying post-hearing may base an opinion on
exhibits and evidence admitted at hearing as well as on expert
testimony developed in post-hearing depositions.
Rule 10.E.4., J.R.P.P., does not apply to the instant dispute. The CD disks
containing the diagnostic film currently at issue come within "... evidence known by or
available to the party at the time of hearing .... " As such, had Dr. Hammond been able to
"open" the disks prior to his deposition, he most certainly would have been able to testify
regarding his review of the same.
Further, even if re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition to allow his testimony
upon review of the diagnostic film came within the Rule, upon a showing of good cause,
the Commission could most certainly allow the same.
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Defendants assert that Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules" ... very clearly indicates
e
that the Claimant is entitled to one post-hearing deposition of each expert for the purpos
of perpetuating his or her testimony."

Having read Rule 10 upon multiple occasions,

in this
counsel is unable to identify the basis or source supporting Defendants' position
regard.

Claimant attaches a true and correct copy of his Notice of Post-Hearing

2016,
Deposition to Perpetuate Testimony of Richard Hammond, M. D., dated October 11,
ion
as Exhibit "A" hereto. As is clearly stated therein, said Notice provided that the deposit
ing
would be "... commencing on Friday, December 16, 2016, at 3:00 p.m., and continu
the
thereafter.... " Had Dr. Hammond advised counsel that he had been unable to open
the
disks setting-forth Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies during the course of his deposition,
to the
deposition would have, in fact, been continued to allow Dr. Hammond to do so prior
conclusion of that deposition.
(2)

Re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition would prejudice Defendants and
Defendants' counsel:
Defendants/Defendants' counsel overreach. It must be realized that from the

that
conclusion of Dr. Hammond's December 16, 2016, deposition to the point in time
counsel approached Defendants' attorney, Mr. Augustine, to advise that Dr. Hammo

nd had

not one
been unable to open the CDs containing Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, absolutely
noticed
thing in the instant matter had changed. Defendants had not taken any of their
be repost-hearing depositions. Simply stated, allowing Dr. Hammond's deposition to
l than
opened would result in no greater prejudice to Defendants or Defendants' counse
had Dr. Hammond been successful in opening the disks setting forth the diagnostic

studies

N
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prior to his deposition, and testified concerning the same during the course of that
deposition.
In fact, taking Defendants' counsel at his word, in reviewing Defendants'
Opposition as well as Mr. Augustine's Affidavit in Opposition, allowing Claimant to re-open
Dr. Hammond's deposition is actually seen to be fortuitous to Defendants. Mr. Augustine
argues that upon December 16, 2016, the date of Dr. Hammond's deposition, " ... there was
a significant snow storm/ice storm which made travel from (Mr. Augustine's) office in Boise
to Dr. Hammond's office in Twin Falls extremely difficult and dangerous." Augustine
Affidavit, paragraph 4. Mr. Augustine then argues that,
[i]fthe Commission allows Claimantto reopen Dr. Hammond's
deposition, then (Mr. Augustine) will need to be physically
present at the deposition because it is (Mr. Augustine's)
understanding that the deposition will require Dr. Hammond to
review the actual imaging studies of the Claimant and he will
demonstrate how these imaging studies allegedly support his
opinion. (Mr. Augustine) will need to observe Dr. Hammond's
references to the actual films pointing out these alleged issues
so that (Mr. Augustine) can explain the basis of his opinions to
Dr. Montalbano, who is expected to testify on behalf of
Defendants. As a result, it would greatly prejudice Defendants
if (Mr. Augustine) were to attend any re-opening of Dr.
Hammond's deposition by telephone.
Thusly, it is seen that any prejudice to Defendants would have been realized
and suffered had Dr. Hammond been able to open the diagnostic disks prior to his
December 16, 2016, deposition and testified thereasto, as Mr. Augustine did not personally
attend the same.
Defendants' counsel stresses that Dr. Hammond's deposition" ... was the first
time in (Mr. Augustine's) 25 years of practice that (he) had agreed to attend a post-hearing
deposition of an opposing party's expert by telephone rather than in person." Obviously,
CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.;
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Ayala's
allowing Claimant to re-call Dr. Hammond regarding his personal review of Mr.
the
diagnostic studies will enable Defendants' counsel to be personally present during
s is
course of Dr. Hammond's testimony regarding the same, which Mr. Augustine stresse
ns he
required. Again taking Mr. Augustine at his word, but for adverse weather conditio
He
would have personally attended Dr. Hammond's deposition as originally scheduled.
ny
advises that it would have "greatly prejudiced" Defendants had Dr. Hammond's testimo
upon personal review of those diagnostic studies been during Mr. Augustine's particip

ation

in that deposition by telephone.
Most certainly, Claimant and counsel could understand had Mr. Augustine
nd's
personally traveled from Boise to Twin Falls to attend and participate in Dr. Hammo
to
deposition, to then be faced with duplication of time in being required to again travel
not the
Twin Falls if Dr. Hammond's deposition were allowed to be re-opened. Such is
case.
General Observation and Argument

This is not an instance where Dr. Hammond's deposition was taken upon
ant's
behalf of Claimant and then, after that deposition was concluded, Claimant/Claim
new or
counsel attempted to "bolster" Dr. Hammond's testimony by then submitting
to Readditional data to Dr. Hammond for review in conjunction with a Motion for Leave
d
Open. Rather, the record is clear that Dr. Hammond was provided with disks obtaine
prior to
from Mr. Ayala's medical providers which contained Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies
sful in
his December 16, 2016, deposition. Unfortunately, Dr. Hammond was not succes
to the
his attempts to open those disks to personally review those diagnostic studies prior
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taking of his deposition. Further, Dr. Hammond did not advise Claimant or his counsel of
that fact until after his deposition had been concluded.
Defendants appear to over look the fact that the instant proceedings are not
about Dr. Hammond or Claimant's counsel. Rather, these proceedings are, simply and
surely, to provide that " ... sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families ... "
promised by I.C. § 72-201. In construing the statute, Idaho's Supreme Court has held that
"...the humane purposes which (Title 72) seeks to serve leave no room for narrow,
technical construction." Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977).
Ironically and incredulously, Defendants' counsel characterizes Claimant's
Motion for Leave as an attempt to" ... bend the rules." Quite the contrary. Mr. Ayala's claim
presents, just as each and every Title 72 claim presents, with " ... the primary purpose ...
being the attainme nt of justice in each individual case." Hagler v. Micron Technology,

Inc., 118 Idaho 596, 798 P .2d 55 (1990). In Title 72 proceedings, strict rules of procedure
are not required to be followed, and it is the duty of the Commission to conduct its
proceedings so as to promote justice and not to pervert the same. Feuling v. Farmer's

Co-Op Ditch Co., 54 Idaho 326, 31 P.2d 683 (1934). Clearly, "... process and procedure
under (Title 72) shall be ... as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity." I.C.
§ 72-708.
Somewh at inconsistently, Mr. Augustine argues that, " ... it would greatly
prejudice Defendants if (he) were to attend ... Dr. Hammon d's deposition by telephone,"
should Dr. Hammon d's deposition be re-opened. Ironically, Mr. Augustine is now seen to
be complaining, loudly, that Dr. Hammon d's deposition may be re-opened to allow Dr.
CLAIMA NT'S REPLY TO DEFEND ANTS' OPPOSI TION TO CLAIMA NT'S MOTION
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Hammond to testify regarding his personal review of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, when
Mr. Augustine could be personally present during the course thereof.
Re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition would not result in any greater
prejudice to Defendants than had Dr. Hammond been able to open the disks of Mr. Ayala's
diagnostic studies prior to the taking of his deposition. In fact, accepting the argument of
Defendants, Defendants are actually benefitted by Dr. Hammond being unable to open
the disks of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic studies, thereby facilitating Mr. Augustine's personal
attendance at and participation in Dr. Hammond's deposition pertaining to the same upon
Claimant's Motion being granted.
Defendants' objection to re-opening Dr. Hammond's deposition represents
nothing more or less than "gamesmanship." In this regard, Mr. Augustine makes three
representations to the Commission which need to be addressed. First, Mr. Augustine
represented that, "[p]rior to (Dr. Hammond's) deposition there was a snow storm which
prohibited Defendants' counsel from attending the deposition in person." Mr. Augustine
was not "prohibited" from attending Dr. Hammond's deposition in person. The roadways
between Boise and Twin Falls, where the deposition was held, were not closed. In fact,
the court reporter for Dr. Hammond's deposition was Mr. Jeff LaMar, with M&M Court
Reporting Services, who drove to Twin Falls from Boise the day of the deposition. Counsel
affixes a true and correct copy of the cover page of/for Dr. Hammond's December 16,
2016, deposition transcript noting/identifying the court reporter, upon which counsel affixed
Mr. LaMar's business card, as Exhibit "B." Rather, upon the final question being asked
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Dr. Hammond and Dr. Hammond responding thereto, Mr. Augustine advised that he was
rushed, as his daughter was in the hospital in Boise.
Secondly, Mr. Augustine represented to the Commission that
"... following Dr. Hammond's deposition, Claimant's counsel
vacated all additional depositions of medical providers in this
case. Obviously said decision was made after reviewing Dr.
Hammond's deposition and concluding that Dr. Hammond's
testimony was sufficient to establish their claim of causation in
this case."
This representation is abjectly false.

Counsel affixes a true and correct copy of

correspondence to counsel from M&M Court Reporting Service, dated December 28, 2016,
which was the "cover" to counsel being provided with the transcript of Dr. Hammond's
deposition, as Exhibit "C". By correspondence to Mr. Augustine dated December 20.2016,
counsel advised Mr. Augustine that he would not be taking the post-hearing depositions
of other medical providers and that said correspondence constituted the notice thereof
required by Rule 10E2, providing Defendants opportunity to object to those depositions
being vacated. Claimant's formal Notice vacating those depositions bear a Certificate of
Mailing of December 29, 2016, being one day prior to counsel's receipt of the transcript of
Dr. Hammond's deposition.
Thirdly, Mr. Augustine states that, "[i]n review of the Commission's decisions
demonstrate that Dr. Hammond has been retained numerous times by Claimant's counsel
to provide expert opinions in lieu of opinions from treating physicians." (Emphasis added).
In considering this representation by Mr. Augustine, counsel also reviewed the Commission
website, and found that counsel had retained Dr. Hammond upon four occasions, in
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Walker; Naveros; Lindsey; and, the instant matter. Of course, in the instant matter, prior

to Dr. Hammond being retained by counsel, Dr. Hammond presented as one of Mr.
Ayala's treating physicians with respect to the industrial accidents at issue. Thusly, there
are three occasions where counsel retained Dr. Hammond where Dr. Hammond was not
a treating physician. In Dr. Hammond's deposition he testified that for the past 25 years
he had been in practice in Twin Falls as a board-certified neurologist. Thusly, counsel had
retained Dr. Hammond prior to the instant matter at an average of once every 8.3 years.
It is respectfully suggested that if Mr. Augustine wishes to paint a picture, the image should
accurately portray the subject.
Mr. Augustine next argues that if Dr. Hammond's deposition " ... is reopened
Claimant's counsel should be required to pay (Mr. Augustine's) fees and travel costs
associated with his attending the same, " ... for Claimant's violation of Rule 10E." First,
there was no violation of Rule 10E by either Claimant or his counsel. Secondly, Mr.
Augustine was content to participate in Dr. Hammond's original deposition by telephone.
Most certainly, Mr. Augustine could choose to participate in any re-opening of Dr.
Hammond's deposition in the same manner, and would not be required to incur or exhaust
costs or fees in traveling from Boise to Twin Falls and return. Counsel is hard-pressed to
understand Mr. Augustine's argument that he should be required to pay for Mr. Augustine's
travel to be personally present during Dr. Hammond's testimony regarding his personal
review of Mr. Ayala's diagnostic film, when Mr. Augustine clearly stated that it was the
utmost of importance that he be personally present during Dr. Hammond's testimony and
that he would have traveled to Twin Falls for Dr. Hammond's deposition but was precluded
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from doing so by inclement weather. If Dr. Hammond's deposition is re-opened, Mr.
Augustine will be required to do nothing more than that which he advised he would have
done. There will be no duplication of time, costs or fees suffered by either Mr. Augustine
or his clients. Further, referencing Rule 16, it is seen that sanctions are reserved for
" ... violation or abuse of (the Commission's) rules or procedures." The instant matter
presents without any such violation.
DATED This

if

day of February, 2017.
STEPHA N,KVAN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
the _1/r}__ day of February, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing
a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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L. CLYEL BERRY; CHART ERED
AITORN EY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
P.O. BOX 302
Twin Falls, JD 83303-0302

Telephone: 208/734-9962
Fax Number: 208/734-9963
Idaho State Bar No. 1897

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

)
)
)
)

1.C. No. 2009-029533
I.C. No. 2001-520958
1.C. No. 2013-024075

)

VS.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF POST-HEARING
DEPOSITION TO PERPETUATE
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD
HAMMOND, M.D.

Notice of Post-Hearing Deposition for Perpetuation of Testimony of Richard
Hammond, M.D.
TO:

DEFENDANTS and their counsel of record:
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Claimant will take testimony

on oral examination of Richard Hammond, M.D., before a Court Reporter and
Notary Public with the firm of M & M Court Reporting commencing on Friday,
December 16, 2016, at 3:00 p.m., and continuing thereafter from day to day until
such time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices of Richard
C,
Hammond, M.D., St. Luke's Clinic Neurology, 738 North College Road, Suite
nd, M.D. - 1
Notice of Post-He aring Deposit ion to Perpetuate Testimo ny of Richard Hammo
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r and take such
Twin Falls, Idaho, at which time and place you are notified to appea
part in the examination as you may deem proper.
er
This deposition will be taken pursuant to Rule 1OE, JRPP togeth
said deponent
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and is taken in lieu of having
appear at hearing.
DATED this

/ (

day of October, 2016.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

and
I '1ereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho
ent
docum
ing
forego
that on the _J_[_ day of October, 2016, I served a copy of the
postage prepaid,
by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail,
addressed to the following:
Richard Hammond, M.D.
St. Luke's Clinic Neurology
738 North College Road, Suite C
Twin Falls, ID 83301
M&M Court Reporting Services
P.O. Box 2636
Boise, ID 83701-2636
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

of Richar d Hamm ond, M.D. - 2
Notice of Post-H earing Depos ition to Perpet uate Testim ony
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1

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

}

MARIO AYALA,

)

Claim ant,
vs.

)

I. C. Case ·Nos.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC., .

)

2009~ 02953 3

Empl oyer,

)

2001- 52095 .8

)

2013- 02407 5

and

)

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Sure ty,

)

Defe ndan ts.

)

Ill

)

POST-HEARING DEPO SITIO N OF RICHARD JOHN HAMMOND, M.D.
DECEMBER 16, 2016

REPO RTED .BY:
JEFF LaMAR, C.S.R . No. 640

Ki:rdfonce in Cm1rf lfr11orli11g SinrP 1970

Nota ry Publ ic
JEFF LaMAR, owner
Idaho CSR No. 640
208-345-9611 v.
208-345 -8800 f.
SOUTH ERN

·1 -aoo-234 -9611

.

.·
Court
Rep~rting
Service

SinCe 1970
Register ed Profes,si onal Reporter s

• POCATEL LO_..· ID
208-233- -081 o

,
• BOISE, ID
208-345 -9611

• i:e•-~:.e~~g6

ID

■

jeffl@m-mservice.com

WWW.!DAHOCOURTREPORTING.COM

ONTARI O, OR

641-881, -1700

· • ~t'J~s~l-~~49
www~i dah0c8 urt~~p 0'
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December 28, 2016

L. Clyel Berry

Boise, Idaho
US Bank Plaza
LOI S Capitol Blvd, Ste 503
P.O. Box 2636 83701-2636
208 345-9611
208 345-8800 (fax)
cour1reporters@m•mservice.com

ivww.idahocourtreporting.com

SOUTHERN OFFICES
1 800 234-9611
208 345-8800 (fax)

Twin Falls, Idaho
208 734-1700

Pocatello, Idaho

L. Cly el Berry, Chtd.
Magic Valley Bank Building
P.O. Box 302
Twin Falls ID 83303-0302

I,

RE: Ayala v, Robert J. Meyers Farms
Case No. IC 09-029533; 01-520958; 13-024075 (Industrial Commission)
Deponent: Richard J. Hammond, MD
Taken on 12/16/2016
M & M Job No. 44105B4

Dear Mr. Berry:
Enclosed is your copy of the above-named witness's testimony, along with
the original transcript.

208 233-0816

Hailey, Idaho
208 578-1049

The original transcript is being forwarded to you as the deponent has
waived reading and signing of this transcript.

NORTHERN OFFICES
1 800 879-1700
208-765-8097 (fax)

Very truly yours,

Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
208 879-1700

Spokaue, Washington

M & M Court Reporting Service

509 455-4515

cc:

Paul J. Augustine
File
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IC 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

v.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and

ORDER DENYING CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RE-EXAMINE
AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J.
HAMMOND, M.D.;
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT
OF RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.,
DATED JANUARY 27, 2017

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

On January 30, 2017, Claimant filed his Motion for Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall
Richard J. Hammond, M.D., with Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in support of and Affidavit of
Richard J. Hammond, M.D.
On February 10, 2017, Defendants filed their Opposition to Claimant's Motion for
Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D.; Affidavit of Paul J.
Augustine in Opposition to Claimant's Motion for Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard
J. Hammond, M.D.; and Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond,
M.D. Dated January 27, 2017.
On February 17, 2017, Claimant' filed a Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's
Motion for Leave to Re-Examine And/Or Recall Richard J. Hammond, M.D.; And; Response
to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D. Dated January
27, 2017.
After reviewing the pleadings of the parties, the Referee finds that Claimant had ample
opportunity to examine Dr. Hammond regarding his review of materials, including a CD
containing diagnostic films.

Dr. Hammond could have, but did not, testify regarding his

inability to open that CD at or before his deposition, which lasted about 3 hours.
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The Referee is led to understand that Dr. Hammond would not change his deposition
testimony based on his review of the CD once he was able to open the same. Therefore, the
re-opening of the record to allow for further deposition of Dr. Hammond would be a waste of
judicial resources, counsels' time and energy and in violation of Rule 10, JRP.
Therefore Claimant's Motion for Leave to Re-Examine and/or Recall Richard J.
Hammond, M.D., is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D. is
stricken, as such is irrelevant in that his review of the CD would not change his opinion and is
also a violation of JRP Rule 10(E).
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard J. Hammond, M.D.
Dated January 27, 2017 is GRANTED.

it,

DATED this le:_ day of March, 2017.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

='P/t,Wr_µ)f/?~

1._i' •·, [',;: ;' l /1)

''-

Michael E. Powers, Referee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

+Ji

I hereby certify that on the 6
day of March, 2017, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR LEA VE TO RE-EXAMINE
AND/OR RECALL RICHARD J. HAMMOND, M.D.; ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD J.
HAMMOND, M.D., DATED JANUARY 27, 2017 was served by regular United States Mail
upon each of the following persons:
L CL YEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701
go
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2001-520958
2009-029533
2013-024075

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

v.

Employer,
and

FI l E
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

09

Surety,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

This matter came before the Industrial Commission for hearing on October 26, 2016.
Appearing for Mario Ayala (Claimant) was L. Clyel Berry, Esq. Appearing for Defendants
Robe1i J. Meyers Farms, Inc. (Employer) and its worker's compensation surety, the State
Insurance Fund (Surety), was Paul Augustine, Esq. The testimony of Claimant and Morgan
Meyers was adduced at hearing. The testimony of William Jordan, Nancy Collins, PhD, Paul
Montalbano, M.D., and Richard Hammond, M.D., was taken by way of post-hearing deposition.
At hearing, Defendants' Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted into evidence. Claimant identified
proposed Exhibits 1 through 33, but withdrew Exhibit 1, and pages 46 through 115 (inclusive) of
Exhibit 3, Exhibit 25(a), and Exhibit 28(a). 1 Pursuant to Commission Orders of November 18,

1

Pages 46-115 of Exhibit 3 consists of records from GFHC, and cover visits from 2004-2007. These records contain
certain references to pre-injury low back/SI joint pain, and were reviewed by William Jordan and relied upon by
Mark Han-is, M.D., (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 601, 629). Claimant's counsel referenced some of these records in his
November 5, 2015 letter to Vernon Mccready, PA-C. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 349).These records are also implicit in
Claimant's acknowledgement that he suffered from episodic bouts of low back pain in the years preceding the 2009
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2016 and January 10, 2017, the balance of Claimant's proposed exhibits are admitted into
evidence.
Per the Commission's Orders of July 19, 2016 and September 14, 2016, the following
matters are at issue:
1.

Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or

disease or cause not work-related;
2.

Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as

provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof;
3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability

(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof;
4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits, and

the extent thereof;
5.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) in excess of

permanent impainnent, and the extent thereof;
6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot

doctrine, or otherwise;
7.

Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-

406 is appropriate; and,
8.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's

unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.

accident (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 635). It seems preferable to consider the original of these notes rather than rely on
second hand synopses. Therefore, and notwithstanding the Commission's previous accession to Claimant's proposal
to withdraw these Exhibits, these portions of Exhibit 3 are considered in this decision. However, exclusion of these
records would not change any aspect of the Commission's decision; as noted, there is other evidence ofrecord
which establishes that Claimant did have some pre-injury low back symptoms.
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9.

Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition and/or

presentment is casually related to or resultant of the industrial accidents/occurrences forming the
basis of the instant consolidated proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present at maximum
medical improvement related to said low back presentment; and that additional medical care,
treatment and/or services are reasonably required by reason of said low back presentment, that
the Commission reserve jurisdiction herein upon the issues of Claimant's entitlement to
permanent impairment and permanent disability, inclusive of odd-lot states, with said issues to
be considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably required medical care and
achieving maximum medical improvement.
This matter was calendared for hearing following the consolidation of three claims; an
accident of October 14, 2001 involving an injury to Claimant's back, an accident of October 6,
2009 involving multiple injuries to Claimant, and an accident of August 28, 2013 involving
injuries to Claimant's right knee. At hearing, Claimant signified his intention to withdraw from
consideration in the cun-ent proceeding, the October 14, 2001 claim. Accordingly, this matter is
before the Industrial Commission for consideration of the October 6, 2009 and August 28, 2013
accidents only.
At hearing, the parties expressed their agreement that Claimant suffered a compensable
injury to his right knee as a consequence of the August 28, 2013 accident, which injury
eventually resulted in the need for a total knee arthroplasty. Similarly, the parties agreed that as
a consequence of the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident, Claimant suffered injuries to his
neck, left shoulder, and left elbow. Claimant has undergone surgical treatment for each of these
injuries. Defendants have accepted responsibility for related medical care, income benefits owed
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to Claimant during his period of recovery, and impairment attributable to the neck, shoulder,
elbow, and knee.
Claimant contends that the evidence demonstrates that his low back condition is causally
related to the 2009 motor vehicle accident, and that he is entitled to medical and income benefits
related to that injury. Claimant asserts that should the Commission determine that Claimant's
low back condition is causally related to the 2009 accident, it is inappropriate to consider
Claimant's claim for disability at this juncture; Claimant requires further medical treatment for
his low back and the Commission should retain jurisdiction over this case pending such
treatment. In the alternative, Claimant contends that if the Commission determines that
Claimant's low back condition is not a compensable consequence of the 2009 motor vehicle
accident, Claimant is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled as a result of those injuries
which the parties acknowledge to be causally related to the accidents of 2009 and 2013. In this
regard, Claimant contends that the FCE performed by PT Wright best delineates the
limitations/restrictions referable to Claimant's injuries, and as demonstrated by the testimony of
Dr. Collins, these limitations/restrictions leave Claimant totally and permanently disabled.
Defendants dispute that the October 9, 2009 industrial accident caused anything more
than a temporary aggravation of Claimant's documented pre-existing degenerative artlu·itis of the
lumbar spine, and that to the extent Claimant may require further medical treatment for his low
back, those consequences of Claimant's low back condition are entirely referable to Claimant's
pre-existing low back condition and/or the natural progression of that condition unrelated to the
October 9, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Defendants contend that PT Wright's FCE is flawed,
and that the assertion of total and permanent disability is denigrated by the fact that Claimant has
been continuously employed in his time-of-injury job since the 2009 accident.
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contend that the evidence demonstrates that Claimant has a fund of essential skills which
continue to make him a valuable employee and that he does not enjoy continued employment by
virtue of his own superhuman effort or the Employer's sympathy. In view of Claimant's ongoing
successful employment at his time-of-injury job, and the fact that no physician has authored
limitations/restrictions for Claimant, Defendants contend that Claimant has failed to prove
entitlement to disability in excess of impairment paid to date.
This matter was originally heard by Referee Powers. At the time this matter came under
advisement, on November 3, 2017, the assigned Referee faced a significant case backlog that
would result in a delay of this decision. In an effort to minimize the anticipated delay, the
Commission contacted the parties to suggest that the case be decided on the record by the
Commission. The parties responded, stating that due to observational credibility issues relating to
Claimant's presentation at hearing, they preferred to have the case decided by the Referee who
observed Claimant at hearing. However, as developed infra, the outcome in this case does not
depend on an assessment of whether Claimant appeared to testify credibly at hearing. It does, to
some extent, depend on a comparison of Claimant's testimony, with other evidence of record.
While we are sensitive to the desires of the parties, our obligation to manage our docket to
promote timely decisions supports assignment of this matter to the Commission.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Claimant was

. At the time of hearing, he was

Claimant was born in Mexico and attended school there for three years. He moved to the
United States in 1974 and became a U.S. Citizen in 1992. He spoke no English when he moved
to the United States. Claimant has pursued no formal education in the United States. He learned
English on his own, and has good conversational English language skills. (Tr., p. 34:12-22). He
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also testified that as time has passed, his English language abilities have improved. (Tr., pp.
53:15-2; 132:7-16). He has poor Spanish and English reading/writing skills.
2.

Claimant did not admit to having any particular problem communicating with his

physicians in connection with the treatment/evaluation he received following the accident. He
testified that if he initially does not understand a question posed by a physician, he will ask for
clarification. (Tr., p. 151: 14-25). Nor do the medical records in evidence suggest that Claimant's
providers/evaluators had any particular difficulty communicating with him. For example, in his
August 2, 2010 report, Dr. Han-is reported that Claimant provided the history recorded. Dr.
Han-is noted that Claimant was a "good historian." (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 602). In connection with his
evaluation of September I 0, 20 I 0, Dr. Hammond noted that Claimant "can give a lucid history
and has no language dysfunction." (Cit. Ex. 9, p. 458). In a follow-up visit of October 1, 2013,
an employee of Dr. Hammond's office updated history taken from Claimant. She also noted that
Claimant did not require an interpreter, and that his language preference was English. (Cit. Ex.
9, p. 466).

Finally, Claimant's counsel acknowledged in his June 22, 2016 letter to Dr.

Hammond, that Claimant speaks English well enough that Claimant does not require an
interpreter to converse with English speakers. (Cit. Ex. 24, p. 659i).
3.

Between 1974 and 1995, Claimant was employed primarily as a laborer on farms

and ranches in the vicinity of Bruneau, Idaho.

He was briefly employed by a trailer

manufacturer in Boise where his job involved installing electrical wiring in trailers. He was
employed as a laborer, not as an electrician. In 1995, he commenced his employment with
Meyers Farms, Employer herein. Claimant was initially employed as the fa1m foreman, and still
works in that capacity. Even though Claimant has always directed one or two employees since
1995, he was, before 2009, more of a working foreman. He testified that between 1995 and
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2009, he did "everything" on the farm, including some heavy physical labor. (Tr., pp. 61 :362:12). Claimant knows how to weld, and has some skills as a mechanic. However, his real
value to Employer is his specific knowledge of the in-igation system, and how to maximize that
system for the benefit of crops grown by Employer. Since the 2009 accident, Claimant does less
heavy lifting, and gives more direction to his subordinates to perform this work. He intends to
continue working for Employer as long as he can. Claimant's tax records reflect that for 2015,
he earned approximately $43,000 in his job for Employer, approximately twice as much as he
earned in 2009. (Tr., p. 169:3-13).
4.

Morgan Meyers, one of the principals of Meyers Farms, testified to the business

of Meyers Fatms. Employer controls approximately 12,000 acres of fmmland, at three different
locations. Employer's Bruneau operation is managed by Claimant, whose expertise regarding
the Bruneau fatm in-igation system is important to that operation's success; the Bruneau tract is
somewhat "gravelly" and does not hold water well, making in-igation management that much
more impotiant. According to Mr. Meyers, Claimant possesses the peculiar skills needed to
make that operation successful. (Tr., pp. 173:14-185:19). Claimant does not require much in the
way of supervision, and Meyers relies on Claimant to delegate work as Claimant sees fit. In
addition to his expertise with the farm's in-igation system, Meyers depends on Claimant a great
deal to oversee and supervise the annual harvest at Bruneau. Meyers testified that he would hire
Claimant today, and that his knowledge and expertise is so impotiant that Meyers "would be in a
panic" if Claimant decided to leave or retire. (Tr., pp. 189:13-190:1).
Pre-Injury Medical Condition
5.

Claimant testified that immediately prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle

accident, he had no limitations on his ability to perform his work. Specifically, Claimant denied
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any problems with his neck, left shoulder, left elbow, or low back immediately prior to October
6, 2009.

(Tr., pp. 82:15-85:12). However, the record reflects that Claimant did have periodic

problems with low back pain/discomfort in the years prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle
accident. On November 6, 2001, Claimant was referred to chiropractor Jeffery Kieffer, D.C., by
John Booth, PA-C for care of low back pain. PA Booth noted that Claimant had received no
relief from conventional medical intervention.

Evidently it was thought that chiropractic

treatment might offer some relief. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 31). However, Dr. Kieffer's records appear to
reflect that he treated Claimant following November 6, 2001 for a principal complaint of cervical
spine and upper extremity complaints. Nevertheless, Dr. Kieffer's January 3, 2002 report to the
State Insurance Fund reflects that among his diagnoses of Claimant was a diagnosis of lumbar
segmental joint dysfunction. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 37).
6.

On March 1, 2004, Claimant saw Dr. Kieffer with complaints of low back

soreness. On March 8, 2004, he was again seen with complaints of low back pain and bilateral
leg numbness. (Cit. Ex. 2, pp. 38-39). In a statement dated October 11, 2012, Dr. Kieffer,
referring to the 2004 notes, stated:
This is to verify that I evaluated and treated Mr. Ayala on two occasions for lower
back and lower extremity "numb feeling" as secondary complaints to a cervical
and mid-scapular injury. These treatment dates were March 1 and March 8, 2004.
There were no significant objectives finding regarding his lower back complaints
at that time. . ...
(Cit. Ex. 2, p. 45). It is unclear at whose instance the October 11, 2012 statement was prepared,
or what information/representations accompanied that request.
7.

On June 23, 2004 Claimant was seen at the Glenns Ferry Health Center (GFHC)

with a principal complaint of low back pain/soreness in the SI area.

No neuroradicular

symptoms were noted. The note reflects that Claimant expressed "multiple past experience[ s]"
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of similar discomfort. (Clt. Ex. 3, p. 65). Right SI soreness was noted on July 15, 2004 at the
GFHC. On May 21, 2007, Claimant was again seen at the GFHC with complaints of right hip
and SI joint pain "for over two years, with no recent trauma," although he did admit to an injury
to this part of his back in 1974.2 He admitted to discomfort associated with sitting in a tractor
and walking in the fields. He did not complain of any neuroradicular symptoms. (Clt. Ex. 3, p.
115).
8.

On Febrnary 25, 2009, Claimant underwent a musculoskeletal exam as part of his

encounter of that date. Findings were as follows:
On examination, the patient walks with a normal gait. There is no visible
scoliosis. The shoulders and pelvis are well-balanced. There is no tenderness over
the spine or SI joints. There is no inguinal adenopathy. There is full spine range of
motion without pain, and the patient can touch their toes. There is full hip range
of motion bilaterally. There is a negative Patrick's test, and a negative straight leg
raising test on both sides. Motor strength is 5/5 in both lower extremities, and
sensation is intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk and ankle jerk reflexes are
2+ bilaterally, and toes are downgoing. There is no clonus.
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 129).
9.

The GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 figure prominently in

the paiiies' arguments concerning whether or not Claimant's current low back complaints are
causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Those notes deserve particular
attention. On September 9, 2009, Claimant presented with the following history:
Established patient for evaluation of
1. back pain.
Location of symptoms: the upper back, mid back, and low back,
Symptom(s) are described as persistant [sic] and achey [sic], Severity: mild and
stable.
Onset is/was abrnpt. Symptoms have persisted for about one week.
Context: Pt/ felt like he had an "internal fever" and felt restless and achey [sic].
His back along the paraspineous [sic] muscle straps, bilaterally have ached. He
denies any vomiting but had some nausea. No change in bowel or bladder

2

Per Dr. Hammond, hip pain is an indicator of nerve root impingement. (Hammond Depo., p. 39: 1-8).
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function. Modifying factors include: OTC drugs, which does not alleviate or
worse the problem.
Denies drowsiness; trouble falling asleep;
Repotis appetite loss; which is/are mild; fatigue, restlessness, which is/are mild;
restless sleep, muscle cramps, which is mild;
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 136). Claimant denied fever. Examination of his back revealed mild vertebral
muscle spasm. Claimant's diagnosis was obesity and back pain. Lab work was ordered and
weight loss was recommended. Prescriptions for Cyclobenzaprine and Naprosyn were written.
(See Cit. Ex. 3, pp. 136-140).
10.

Claima~t again presented to the GFHC on October 5, 2009, the day before the

subject October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. He presented with complaints of a cough, which
he described as a longstanding condition related to exposure to cold air and other irritants.
Claimant was also noted to be obese. He reported mild joint pain, muscle aches, and back pain.
Claimant's musculoskeletal exam was positive for grinding at the lateral aspect of the lateral
joint line of the right knee. Diagnoses at this visit included obesity, asthma, and back pain.
Claimant's prescription for Naprosyn was refilled, as were other prescriptions related to obesity
and diabetes.
11.

To other providers, Claimant also gave some history of low back problems

predating the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. When seen by D. Peter Reedy, M.D., on
January 8, 2010, Claimant reported a past history of chiropractic visits for low back problems.
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 150). In his letter of January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy proposed that the treatment notes
from the GFHC reflect that Claimant was treated for complaints of low back pain immediately
preceding the subject accident. Dr. Reedy also acknowledges that prior to the subject accident,
Claimant suffered from a degenerative condition of the lumbar spine. He likened the subject
accident to "the straw that broke the camel's back." (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a follow-up letter to
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Claimant's counsel of January 19, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had periodic
episodes of low back pain which predated the 2009 motor vehicle accident, which was
unsurprising to Dr. Reedy based on Claimant's vocation. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187).
12.

Vernon McCready, PA-C, too, was asked by Claimant's counsel to comment on

the nature of the complaints with which Claimant presented at the time of his evaluation by PA
McCready and/or his staff on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009.
13.

On November 5, 2015, December 14, 2015, and again on January 5, 2016,

Claimant's counsel queried PA McCready about the nature of the problems with which Claimant
presented on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, suggesting a narrative that Claimant's
problems were more-or-less systemic in nature and not reflective of a mechanical low back
injury. (Cit. Ex. 6., p. 358). Also important in Claimant counsel's November 5, 2015 letter to PA
McCready is the representation, which appears with some regularity in letters to Claimant's
treating/evaluating physicians, that Claimant is the type of person who, on presenting for medical
care, will only reference a primary complaint, declining to reference complaints of secondary
importance:
From my perspective, Mario presents as a straight-forward but rather
unsophisticated individual. Following the industrial motor vehicle accident, Mario
focused his complaints upon what was then causing him the greatest difficulty and
produced the greatest symptomatology. Although logical, this approach results in
an absence of medical records for other than primary or more obvious
presentments, and oft-times in confusion or medical disagreement upon the issue
of causal relation of the medical presentment to the injury at question.
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 351). This assertion finds little, if any, support in the record, and must be
distinguished from a related assertion, discussed infra, that Claimant did not discuss his postinjury low back complaints with Dr. Reedy because Dr. Reedy instructed Claimant to hold off
discussing his low back until Dr. Reedy had completed his treatment of Claimant's cervical spine
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condition. PA McCready failed to respond to the November 5, 2015 letter, the December 14,
2015 letter, but finally did respond to the January 5, 2016 letter. Rather than provide a narrative
response, PA Mccready simply acceded to the prepared statements offered by Claimant's
counsel. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 348).
Accident of October 6, 2009 and Subsequent Low Back Complaints
14.

The accident giving rise to the first of the two claims in this consolidated

proceeding occutTed on October 6, 2009. On that date, Claimant was operating a Meyers Farms'
vehicle heading north on Highway 51, intending to pick up a part for a piece of farm machinery
when his left front tire blew out, causing his vehicle to pull to the left. Claimant over-corrected,
and struck the guard rail on the right side of the road. The vehicle then came back across the
roadway, hitting the west guard rail. (Clt. Ex. 26, p. 679). Claimant was not wearing a seatbelt
at the time of the accident. He testified he was thrown about the interior of the cab in the course
of the accident. Afterwards, he was driven to his home by a passerby and transported later that
day to the Elmore Medical Center (EMC) in Mountain Home.
15.

The EMC records of October 6, 2009 reflect that Claimant presented with a

laceration to his left hand and with a history of striking his left chest wall as his vehicle swerved
back and fotth. Claimant denied any injury to his head, neck, abdomen, or other injuries. He
admitted only to the hand laceration and chest contusion. Claimant was examined, and other
than the aforementioned injuries to his left hand and chest wall, no abnormalities were noted.
Diagnosis on discharge was left chest wall contusion and left hand contusion, with puncture
wounds. Claimant was seen again in follow-up on October 13, 2009 at EMC complaining ofleftsided rib pain and left anterior shoulder pain that radiated into the left arm. He stated that these
symptoms began shortly after the accident of October 6, 2009. Claimant denied neck pain.
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Neurological exam of the upper and lower extremities was normal.

Gait was intact.

The

discharge diagnosis was expanded to include left rib fracture and left shoulder contusion. (Cit.
Ex. 3, p. 148).
16.

On October 16, 2009, PA McCready evaluated Claimant at GFHC. Claimant's

primary complaint was diminished urinary stream, a complaint for which he had been seen in the
past.

Secondarily, Claimant presented for removal of sutures from his left hand and an

authorization to return to work.
17.

The November 4, 2009 chart note from the GFHC reflects that while Claimant did

complain of left shoulder and left arm pain, he specifically denied low back pain or difficulty
walking.

Next, the GFHC records contain two separate chart notes, both signed by PA

McCready, and both dated November 12, 2009. The first note from 11 :41 a.m. reflects that
Claimant was seen in follow-up for his neck and left upper extremity discomfort. The second
note from 12:01 p.m. reflects that Claimant was seen for treatment of a chronic urinary problem.
Neither of the November 12, 2009 notes reference the low back.
18.

The GFHC record from November 16, 2009 reflects continued complaints of neck

and left upper extremity symptoms. PA McCready recommended MRI evaluation of the cervical
spine. PA McCready's note reflects that Claimant specifically denied low back pain or difficulty
walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 205). In treatment notes dated November 30, 2009 and December 11,
2009, PA McCready also specifically noted that Claimant denied complaints of low back
discomfort or difficulty with walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, pp. 206-211 ).
19.

While none of the aforementioned post-accident medical records reference

complaints of low back or lower extremity difficulty, (even when Claimant appears to have been
asked whether he had problems in these areas) the record does contain other references to post-
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accident back pain. The Notice oflnjury and Claim for Benefits prepared on or about November
17, 2009 reflects that as a result of the October 6, 2009 accident Claimant suffered injuries as
follows: "Cut and btuised hand when hit driver's side window and hutt back." (Cit. Ex. 25, p.
673). On November 20, 2009, a State Insurance Fund investigator contacted Claimant to discuss
the occun-ence of the 2009 accident. In a claimant contact repmt, Claimant described the
following problems which he evidently related to the subject accident:
How are you doing? left arm is numb. neck. back entire back. No strength in my
left arm. both hands went numb. left hand worse. Cut on left hand.
Please give a brief description of your job: farming
Please give a description of what you were doing when the accident occurred. 1
was going to get some patt in town and on hwy 51. I was coming up on the patt of
the road where the guard rails were on both sides of the road and my left front tire
blew out on the pickup. it all happened so fast. I pulled to[o] hard on the steering
wheel and over con-ected too far and hit the other guard rail. Both of my hands
went numb. After hit the first guard rail on the right side and I went to grab the
steering wheel I could not feel my left hand at all, shook my right hand it had
some feeling. Accident happened about 2:30-3 :00pm 10-04-09
Describe the nature of your injury. Injuries from cart accident, left hand. back,
neck (Emphasis in original).
(Cit. Ex. 25, p. 674a).
20.

The Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division opened its file on Claimant in

March of 2010. While the Rehabilitation Division's initial April 18, 2010 interview of Claimant
does not reflect that Claimant described complaints of low back pain, a subsequent note of May
12, 2010 does reflect that Claimant described complaints of numbness in his legs when standing
at physical therapy for over 30 minutes.
21.

The first post-accident medical record making reference to Claimant's low back

or lower extremities is Dr. Reedy's letter of January 8, 2010 to PA McCready, who had refen-ed
Claimant to Dr. Reedy for evaluation. Per Dr. Reedy's letter, Claimant presented on January 8,
2010 with the following complaints:
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fa1m foreman out at Robert J. Meyers
As you know, he is a pleasant
farms in Twin Falls who comes in complaining of pain "everywhere." He has
neck pain and left arm pain primarily that arose from a work related motor vehicle
accident in October 2009. He tells me that if he stands for 20-25 minutes his legs
go numb. He has seen a chiropractor in the past for low back problems but he has
never had a neck problem before this. He tried oral steroids without much relief.
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 150). Therefore, per the history recorded by Dr. Reedy, Claimant did relate his
neck and left arm pain to the 2009 motor vehicle accident. However, Dr. Reedy's note does not
explicitly reflect that Claimant also related his complaints of bilateral leg numbness to the motor
vehicle accident. On exam, Claimant had findings suggestive of a cervical spine injury. Also, it
was noted that lumbar range of motion was mildly decreased, although station and gait were
normal. Deep tendon reflexes were 2+, and both ankle jerks were missing. Dr. Reedy went on
to treat Claimant for his cervical spine condition, eventually performing surgery on Claimant's
cervical spine on February 19, 2010, to include microdiscectomies at C5 thru C6 followed by
instrumented fusions at the same levels. Claimant was seen in follow-up by Dr. Reedy on
multiple occasions, but it was not until Dr. Reedy's December 5, 2011 office visit with Claimant
that Claimant's low back and lower extremities are again referenced. On December 5, 2011, Dr.
Reedy's office notes reflect that in addition to ongoing complaints with his cervical spine,
Claimant presented with complaints of leg numbness and low back pain "ever since 10/09
accident," which had never been investigated. Claimant also described more low back pain in the
3-4 weeks prior to December 5, 2011. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 168).
22.

The December 5, 2011 office visit is further memorialized in Dr. Reedy's

December 10, 2011 letter to PA McCready. This letter contains further information concerning
the history of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints that was not captured in the
December 5, 2011 chart note:
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He also complains about low back pain that he has had since the accident but that
was never investigated, He said that when I first saw him I said lets work on the
neck first and then we will deal with the lumbar issue but it never came up again.
He describes what sounds like neurogenic claudication in that he can go into a
store and walk around for 15-20 minutes but then he has bilateral leg pain,
especially in the thighs when he is walking and he needs to sit down to get some
relief. I think he certainly should have gotten an MRI of the lumbar spine and I
will ask his attorney to get his case reopened so that we may pursue the lumbar
end of things. I will also suggest to his attorney that he get a second opinion about
his neck.
(Cit, Ex. 5, p. 166). This letter does not reflect that Dr. Reedy has a recollection of instructing
Claimant, in December of 2009, that Claimant's back and lower extremity complaints would be
sorted out after Dr. Reedy dealt with Claimant's cervical spine. (Indeed, Dr. Reedy's January 8,
2010 note does not reflect that he told Claimant to hold his low back complaints in abeyance).
The letter only reflects that in December of 2011 Claimant came to Dr. Reedy stating that Dr.
Reedy had previously told Claimant that investigation of Claimant's lumbar spine would be
deferred pending treatment of the cervical spine.
23.

However, in his December 10, 2011 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Reedy

reported the following history of Claimant's low back complaints following the 2009 motor
vehicle accident: "In addition, his lumbar spine, which he has complained about since the
accident, has never been investigated and I would request authorization to perform an MRI if you
get his case file reopened." (Clt. Ex. 5, p. 176). If Claimant persistently claimed about low back
and lower extremity complaints following the 2009 motor vehicle accident, he either did not
share these complaints with Dr. Reedy, or Dr. Reedy failed to make note of these symptoms.
24.

Nor does Claimant appear to have shared his persistent low back complaints with

his attorney prior to December of 2011. Counsel's June 17, 2010 letter to Dr. Reedy describes
Claimant's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints and poses a number of questions to
Dr. Reedy about Claimant's residual functional capacity, and whether Claimant is at risk for
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accelerated degeneration of cervical spine segments above and below the C5-C7 fusion.
However, that letter does nothing to suggest that counsel was aware of an as yet untreated low
back complaints.
25.

Between January of2010 and December of 2011, Claimant also continued to be

seen at the GFHC. (See Cit. Ex. 6). The GFHC note of March 15, 2010 makes no reference to
Claimant's low back or lower extremities. The April 2, 2010 note reflects that Claimant was
able to walk with a normal gait with no visible signs of scoliosis. He had full spinal range of
motion without pain and was able to touch his toes. Hip motion was full bilaterally. Patrick's
test was negative and Claimant had negative straight-leg raising on both sides. Motor strength
was 5/5 in both lower extremities and sensation was intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk
and ankle jerk reflexes were 2+ bilaterally. Identical findings were noted in an April 7, 2010
chart note and Claimant reported that the back pain associated with his cough was gone. The
June 4, 2010 office visit note makes no reference to Claimant's low back or lower extremities
and Claimant specifically denied that there were additional symptoms to report. On June 21,
2010 Claimant presented to the GFHC with complaints of back pain which Claimant described
as "new." Claimant's discomf01i was located in the right mid-back. He described a sudden
onset of symptoms for three days. Claimant was seen in follow-up for these complaints of midback pain on July 21, 2010. On the occasion of that visit, PA McCready noted the same midback pain with symptoms persisting for about a month. On exam, Claimant had tightness in the
paraspinous musculature of the lumbar spine with spasm from T12 to SI. By August 17,. 2010,
Claimant's complaints persisted in the right mid-to-lower back.

PA McCready noted the

persistence of symptoms over the past three months with insidious onset. However, on exam, no
back abnormalities were noted. GFHC chart notes from August 30, 2010 reflect a past medical
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history of chronic back pain and a 1975 right leg fracture. However, on the occasion of the
August 30 exam, Claimant denied back pain or difficulty walking. On October 1, 2010 Claimant
reported back pain, among his other complaints. GFHC notes from October 22, 2010, November
1, 2010, January 6, 2011, January 11, 2011 and February 11, 2011 make no reference to low
back or lower extremity symptoms.

A chart note from June 3, 2011 does reflect arthritic

complaints in Claimant's wrists, ankles, and feet.

However, no complaints of low back

pain/discomfort are referenced. Gait and station were normal. Claimant's hips were normal,
bilaterally. A chart note from August 3, 2011 does not reflect low back complaints, but does
note that Claimant presented with normal gait and an ability to stand without difficulty. The note
referencing the office visit of August 23, 2011 reflects that Claimant denied muscular weakness,
tingling, or numbness. The August 23, 2011 chart note does not reflect any back complaints.
Claimant had normal gait and station. Similar findings were noted in the October 14, 2011 office
visit.
26.

Then, in the chart note memorializing a December 1, 2011 visit, Claimant

presented to PA McCready with the following complaints:
other race, Hispanic or Latino male who presents a
The patient is a
history of lumbar region pain which began two weeks ago. He describes the pain
as moderate in severity and radiating into the right leg and left leg. The onset of
the back pain was gradual and began without a clear precipitating event.
The pain is aggravated by prolonged standing and sitting. The pain is alleviated
by change of position and rest. He states that the pain does not wake him from
sleep and the pain is improved in the morning. He also complains of left leg
paresis, right leg paresis and cough, right lung discomfort, rhinorrhea ...
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 288). Neurologic exam of Claimant's lower extremities was normal.

PA

Mccready diagnosed Claimant as suffering from sciatica. Five days later, Claimant was seen by
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Dr. Reedy, who noted Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints which had not been
referenced in Dr. Reedy's records since January of 2010.
27.

Following Claimant's cervical spine surgery, Dr. Reedy referred Claimant to

Gregory Schweiger, M.D., for evaluation of persistent left upper extremity complaints. Dr.
Schweiger first saw Claimant on April 28, 2010.

His note does not reflect that Claimant

described any lumbar spine or lower extremity problems.

MRI evaluation of Claimant's

shoulder demonstrated a rotator cuff tear.
28.

Dr. Schweiger arranged for Claimant to be seen by Dr. Hessing, who first

examined Claimant on November 2, 2010. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessing reported that
Claimant injured his shoulder in the 2009 motor vehicle accident as well as his cervical spine.
Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant had suffered from left shoulder pain since the motor vehicle
accident. Per Dr. Hessing, Claimant's August 23, 2010 left shoulder MRI was read as showing a
large intrasubstance tear of the supraspinatus tendon. EMG evaluation of Claimant's left upper
extremity was also thought to show an ulnar neuropathy at the elbow.

Dr. Hessing

recommended shoulder surgery to include probable rotator cuff repair and decompression of the
shoulder joint. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessing's initial evaluation of Claimant does not reflect
that Claimant presented with complaints of low back or lower extremity problems.
29.

On November 2, 2010 Claimant was also evaluated by Mark Clawson, M.D., for

suspected left cubital tunnel syndrome. Dr. Clawson's initial evaluation does not reflect any
complaints of low back or lower extremity problems.
30.

On December 9, 2010, Claimant underwent left ulnar nerve neurolysis and

anterior subcutaneous nerve transposition performed by Dr. Clawson, along with a left shoulder
decompression, labral debridement, and rotator cuff repair performed by Dr. Hessing.
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31.

Claimant was rated and released by Dr. Hessing for his shoulder injury on April

20, 2011. Dr. Hessing reported that Claimant was working at his regular job, and felt that his
residual left shoulder symptoms were tolerable. Claimant did note some residual neck difficulty,
but Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant would be seen by Dr. Reedy for care/evaluation of these
complaints. Dr. Hessing gave Claimant an impairment rating of 5% of the upper extremity and
released him to return to his pre-injury job without restriction.
32.

On November 8, 2011, Claimant was seen for a closing evaluation by Dr.

Clawson. Dr. Clawson noted that recent electrodiagnostic testing demonstrated normal nerve
function in the left upper extremity. Claimant described symptoms that were more compatible
with cervical spine pathology. Dr. Clawson also noted, for the first time, that Claimant presented
with complaints of lower back pain. Dr. Clawson recommended that Claimant visit with Dr.
Reedy regarding his neck and low back complaints. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 456).
33.

As Claimant neared medical stability following his cervical spine surgery, Surety

arranged for Claimant to be evaluated by Mark J. Harris, M.D. In his July 26, 2010 introductory
letter, TJ Martin, Claims Examiner for Surety, introduced Claimant to Dr. Harris. He provided
Dr. Harris with all medical records in possession of the Fund relating to Claimant's claim and
provided a very brief history of Claimant's treatment. Importantly, Mr. Martin indicated that in
his last conversation with Mr. Ayala, Claimant indicated that he was having some lower
extremity pain and numbness. Mr. Martin's letter coincides with the GFHC treatment notes from
June 21, July 21, and August 7, 2010 reflecting new onset of back pain. Mr. Martin posed a
number of questions to Dr. Harris relating to Claimant's cmTent status, need for medical
treatment, impairment, and restrictions. Dr. Harris saw Claimant for evaluation on August 2,
2010.

He took history from Claimant concerning the occurrence of the accident, his post-
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accident symptoms, and his treatment to date.
description of Claimant's then-current complaints.

Dr. Harris also elicited from Claimant a
Dr. Harris reported these complaints as

follows:
CURRENT STATUS: The examinee's chief complaint is decreased range of
motion and pain in the neck and left arm pain. I asked him several times in several
different ways if he has any other areas of concern and he stated no. It was not
until later that I asked him about the left leg symptoms and he stated those have
now resolved and he has no further concerns about that area. He reports difficulty
with pain, primarily located in the neck and left arm. Pain is described as stabbing
in the left shoulder anteriorly, laterally, and down the arm into the fingers,
specifically the small, ring, and long fingers. He states he always has numbness in
the thumb and index fingers as well. The pain is worsened by resting his arm after
work and improved by taking pain medications. The pain is reported as constant.
On a scale of 0/10 which is no pain and 10/10 which is excruciating pain he
rep011s the pain is a 6-7/10. During the past month he has averaged 2/10-3/10 with
a high of 10/10 and a low of2/10-3/10. The examinee also reports difficulty with
activity using the left hand carrying over 20 pounds and difficulty with grip. He
denies any symptoms prior to the motor vehicle collision on 10/06/09.

(Clt. Ex. 20, p. 603). Therefore, Claimant was provided with a number of opportunities to
describe all symptoms from which he was then suffering. Claimant was specifically asked about
lower extremity complaints. Claimant said that his lower extremity complaints had resolved and
were no longer an issue. Claimant did not describe any low back complaints, Dr. Harris did
relate Claimant's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints to the subject accidents and
proposed that Claimant was in need of further medical care for treatment/evaluation of these
conditions. Neve11heless, he felt that Mr. Ayala was capable of working at his time-of-injury job
since he was evidently doing so at the time of Dr. HatTis' evaluation. However, pending MRI
evaluation of the shoulder, Dr. Harris felt it appropriate to limit Claimant's lifting to 50 pounds.
34.

By letter dated June 27, 2011, Mr. Martin again asked for Dr. Harris to evaluate

Claimant as he neared medical stability following the surgeries perfo1med by Drs. Hessing and
Clawson. Mr. Martin asked Dr. Harris to ascertain whether Claimant was at a point of medical
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stability, and if so, whether he had permanent impairment referable to his work injuries, as well
as work-related limitations/restrictions.
35.

Claimant was seen by Dr. Harris for the second time on August 15, 2011. Dr.

HatTis again asked Claimant to describe his cmTent complaints. Those complaints included left
hand pain with some residual pain in the shoulder and neck. Claimant described his discomfort
as cramping pain. He described the pairl as constant. Dr. Harris did not record any low back or
lower extremity difficulties as described by Claimant. Dr. Harris felt that Claimant had reached
medical stability following his neck, shoulder, and elbow surgeries. Dr. Harris felt that Claimant
was entitled to a 6% whole person impairment for his neck condition, a 5% upper extremity
impairment for his shoulder condition, and no impairment for his ulnar nerve condition.
36.

Dr. Harris noted that as of August 15, 2011, none of Claimant's treating

physicians had imposed restrictions on Claimant's functional activities. However, Dr. Harris felt
that Claimant should use caution in overhead activities and heavy lifting even though his treaters
had not issued such restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 618).
37.

As developed infra, after Claimant presented to Dr. Reedy in December of 2011

with complaints of low back pain, Dr. Reedy referred Claimant to Michael Hajjar, M.D., for
evaluation of the low back complaints. Dr. Hajjar eventually requested authorization to perform
an L4-S1 decompression and fusion. By letter dated August 30, 2012, Claims Examiner Martin
asked Dr. Harris to review additional records generated since August 15, 2011, and to provide
his analysis of whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject 2009
motor vehicle accident. By letter dated September 21, 2012, Dr. Harris noted that at the time of
his initial evaluation of Claimant, Claimant had been asked to describe his problems and only
reported neck and left ann injuries. The pain diagram filled out by Claimant only denoted

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 22

150

burning and stabbing pain in the left upper shoulder area. Dr. Hanis also noted the September 9,
2009 chart note from the GFHC and the May 21, 2007 chart note from the same facility, both of
which, as discussed above, reference low back pain. Concerning the May 21, 2007 chart note,
Dr. Harris noted:
In reviewing the records from John Booth on 05/21/07 it shows hip pain under the
farmer complaining of right hip
subjective main complaint: "This is a
and SI area pain for over two years with no recent trauma. He did have injury to
the area in 1974; no fracture. He has more pain after Inactive [sic] sitting in
tractor and then tries to walk. He also has progressive pain in the lateral hip when
walking in the fields. He expresses no new radicular or neuritic pain."
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 629). Dr. Harris also had the opportunity to review records generated by Drs.
Clawson, Schweiger, and Hessing at Orthopedic Associates. Dr. Harris enoneously described
Dr. Clawson's note of November 8, 2011 as having been authored on October 6, 2009. As
developed above, Dr. Clawson's note of November 8, 2011 contains the first reference in the
Orthopedic Associates notes of "lower back pain." At any rate, following his review of the
records supplied by the State Insurance Fund, Dr. Han·is opined that Claimant's complaints of
low back pain are not causally related to the industrial accident. This conclusion is based on Dr.
Hanis' observations that there is evidence of low back pain which predates the subject accident
and no medical evidence suppotting the proposition that Claimant presented with complaints of
low back pain following the subject accident. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 630). Based on Dr. Hanis' letter of
September 21, 2012, Surety denied responsibility for Claimant's low back condition,
38.

Following Dr. Reedy's letter to PA McCready of December 10, 2011,

authorization for MRI evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine was requested. That study was
performed on January 16, 2012 and was read as follows:
LUMBAR DISK LEVELS:
Ll-2: Nonna! for age.
L2-3: Normal for age.
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L3-4: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Mild bilateral facet arthropathy. Mild
canal and mild bilateral foraminal stenosis.
L4-5: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral facet degeneration.
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis.
L5-S 1: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral facet degeneration.
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis.

CONCLUSION: Old Tl2 compression fracture with mild height loss. No acute
fracture. No listhesis.
Lumbar spondylosis with moderate bilateral L4/5 and L5/S 1 foraminal stenosis.
There is mild canal and foraminal stenosis elsewhere, as detailed above.
Clt. Ex. 11, p. 488. Thereafter, Dr. Reedy ordered a CT myelogram of Claimant's lumbar spine
which was performed on April 3, 2012. That study was read as follows:
Stable mild ve1iebral spurring throughout the lumbar spine. Mild deformity of the
ventral thecal sac contour paiiicularly at the L4-5 level to a lesser extent through
out the lumbar spine without significant lateralizing mass effect. In particular
there is no significant displacement of lumbar nerve roots or underfilling of the
nerve root sleeves at Ll-L5 levels. There is underfilling of the thecal sac at the
lumbosacral junction and for opacification of the S 1 nerve root sleeves. There is
facet a1ihropathy at L4-5 and L5-S 1 levels. There is no new significant vertebral
malalignment.
Cit. Ex. 11, p. 489
39.

In April of 2012, Dr. Reedy refe1Ted Claimant to Dr. Hajjar for fmiher evaluation

of Claimant's lumbar spine.
40.

Dr. Hajjar first saw Claimant on June 23, 2012. At that time, Claimant gave a

history to Dr. Hajj ar that he suffered from back and lower extremity pain which Claimant related
to the motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009. Dr. Hajjai· reviewed prior radiological studies,
concluding that they demonstrated anterolisthesis at L4-5 "likely degenerative in nature." Dr.
Hajjar also noted findings of bilateral recess stenosis and foraminal stenosis at L4-5 and L5-S 1.
Per Dr. Hajjar, the studies demonstrated impingement of both the L4 and L5 nerve roots. Dr.
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Hajjar counseled Claimant that his back condition might be amenable to surgical treatment. He
recommended a bone scan to further evaluate Claimant's low back. When seen again by Dr.
Hajjar on August 7, 2012, Claimant expressed continuing back and lower extremity pain, as well
as difficulties with standing, walking, and other activities. Dr. Hajjar reiterated Claimant's
radiographic findings, apparently consisting largely of degenerative pathology.

Dr. Hajjar

recommended L4 through SI decompression and fusion.
41.

By letter dated November 14, 2012 to Claims Examiner Martin, Dr. Hajjar

responded to the several reports generated by Dr. Harris by this date. Dr. Hajjar erroneously
noted that Dr. Hanis had not, by this time, expressed an opinion on the etiology of Claimant's
low back complaints. 3 Regardless, Dr. Hajjar stated that like Dr. Reedy, he believed Claimant's
low back complaints are causally related to the subject accident, although his November 14,
2012 letter to Claims Examiner Martin does not elaborate on what persuaded him to this point of
view. Time passed, and Dr. Hajjar was not again quizzed about the causation issue until the date
of hearing approached.
42.

By letter dated January 6, 2016, Defense counsel provided Dr. Hajjar with the

pre-injury treatment records from the GFHC generated in the fall of 2009, and invited Dr. Hajjar
to revisit the question of the cause of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints. In
his response of January 27, 2016, Dr. Hajjar acknowledged receipt of the GFHC records from
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. His review of those records led him to agree with Paul
Montalbano's, M.D., view that, at most, Claimant suffered a temporary and self-limiting
exacerbation of his lumbar spine condition as a consequence of the October 6, 2009 accident.
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472A). However, there the matter did not rest because, on Febrnary 4, 2016,
3

In his September 21, 2012 report, Dr. Han-is explained that certain pre-injury medical records, including GFHC
records from May 21, 2007 and September 9, 2009 supported his conclusion that Claimant's low back complaints
are not causally related to the subject accident.
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Claimant's counsel authored an extensive letter to Dr. Hajjar in which Dr. Hajjar was again .
invited to visit the issue of the cause of Claimant's current low back complaints and need for
surgery. Counsel's February 4, 2016 letter is worthy of further comment. As he did in other
letters to providers/evaluators, Claimant's counsel introduced his questions with the following
narrative:
From my perspective, Mr. Ayala presents as a rather straight-forward but rather
unsophisticated individual. Mr. Ayala's principal language is Spanish, although
he can and does communicate in English at a base level. Following his industrial
motor vehicle accident, Mr. Ayala focused his complaints upon what was then
causing him the greatest difficulty and produced the greatest symptomatology.
Although logical, this approach results in an absence of medical records for other
than primary or more obvious presentments and oft-times in confusion or medical
disagreement upon the issue of casual relation of the medical presentment to the
injury in question, following a delay in appropriate diagnosis and treatment of that
condition.
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472G-472H). Concerning Claimant's past medical history, while Claimant's
counsel did synopsize for Dr. Hajjar the GFHC records from September 14, 2007 forward, he did
not advise Dr. Hajjar of earlier records from GFHC which do reflect a history of low back
symptomatology. (Clt. Ex. 10, p. 472i). For example, Dr. Hajjar does not appear to have been
made aware of the May 21, 2007 notes which reflect complaints of right hip and SI joint
discomfort for two years without recent trauma. (Cit. Ex. 3, p. 115). Further, as he did in his
letter to PA McCready of January 5, 2016, Claimant's counsel proposed to Dr. Hajjar that the
complaints with which Claimant presented to PA McCready on September 9 and October 5,
2009 were not of the type that warranted further workup for injury to the low back. (Cit. Ex. 10,
p. 472J). Claimant's counsel further represented that Dr. Reedy confinned that he told Claimant
to hold his low back complaints in abeyance until Dr. Reedy had finished treating Claimant's
cervical spine. (Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472J). (Dr. Reedy has never confirmed that he recalls having this
conversation with Claimant.) Finally, in his February 4, 2016 letter to Dr. Hajjar, Claimant's
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counsel represented that Claimant's low back and lower extremity symptomatology has persisted
ever since the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. This is, assuredly, an asse1tion which
Claimant now makes, but to say that it is a fact is not completely accurate; the record just as
easily supp01ts the proposition that Claimant's low back complaints have waxed and waned
following the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident.
43.

With that background, Claimant's counsel then asked Dr. Hajjar whether it would

be appropriate to revisit the opinion he gave to Defense counsel on January 27, 2016.
44.

In his February 19, 2016 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Hajjar did, indeed,

revise his opinion. Informing Dr. Hajjar's change of hea1t is his conclusion that the GFHC
records do not demonstrate any history of low back complaints prior to the subject accident.
Concerning the notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Dr. Hajjar concluded that these
notes suggest a condition that "sounds more like a flu" versus any type of mechanical low back
issue. He also noted that PA McCready did not order any follow-up radiological testing which
would have been a logical next step had PA McCready entertained the possibility of mechanical
low back problems in September 2009. These records and reasoning caused Dr. Hajjar to change
his opinion and rejoin Dr. Reedy in supporting a causal relationship between the motor vehicle
accident and Claimant's low back complaints. (See Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472E-F).
45.

On August 28, 2013, Claimant suffered the second of the two accidents which are

the subject of this proceeding. On that date, Claimant fell from an 8 foot ladder, landing on his
feet, but, in the process, flexing his right knee. He experienced the immediate onset of right knee
pain. He was initially evaluated at the Nampa Medical Center on the day of accident. He was
seen for fmther treatment of his right knee by Miers Johnson, M.D., on September 11, 2013. Dr.
Johnson noted Claimant's history of prior right knee surgeries, but also noted that Claimant had
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had no significant problems with the right knee since the last surgery in 1987. He noted that as
of the 2013 right knee injury, Claimant had been working full time, without restrictions, even
though he had some pain/discomfort in his low back and lower extremities.' Claimant admitted
. to being able to drive farm equipment, but to having trouble with any climbing or prolonged
standing or pivoting. Claimant did not believe that the 2013 accident aggravated his low back
condition and, indeed, no such assertion is made in these proceedings. MRl evaluation of the
right knee revealed severe tri-compartmental degenerative changes and a chronic fracture of the
posterior tibial plateau and the posterior lateral tibia. Also noted was a chronic avulsion of the
posterior cruciate ligament tibial insertion. Within all tluee compartments of the knee, areas of
full thickness cartilage loss were identified. Dr. Johnson noted that while Claimant assuredly
had pre-existing osteoarthritis of the knee, some of the findings were likely referable to the
subject accident. Dr. Johnson recommended a right total knee arthroplasty, and this procedure
was performed on or about May 6, 2014. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 514). Dr. Johnson released Claimant
from care on or about September 24, 2014. At that time, Claimant denied any pain in the right
knee, noting that he was driving tractor and otherwise performing his job. He denied any trouble
walking on uneven surfaces, although he did admit to some difficulty after long periods of time
on his feet. However, Dr. Johnson noted that Claimant related this discomfort to his back.
Claimant indicated that long periods of standing and walking produced pain radiating into both
anterior thighs and legs, and that he had permanent numbness in his left anterior thigh.
46.

On September 22, 2014, Dr. Johnson released Claimant to full duty work. He did

not give Claimant any restrictions regarding walking related to Claimant's right knee
arthroplasty. However, he did believe that Claimant should be followed for his low back and
lower extremity complaints. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 525).
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47,

Dr. Johnson referred Claimant to Fred Shoemaker, M.D., for the purposes of

rating Claimant's right knee injury. That rating was performed on October 6, 2014. Claimant
told Dr. Shoemaker that he felt he had had a good result from the knee replacement surgery.
Based on Claimant's good outcome, confirmed by clinical exam, Dr. Shoemaker felt it
appropriate to give Claimant a 21 % impairment rating of the lower extremity referable to his
right knee, one-half of which Dr. Shoemaker related to Claimant's pre-existing right knee
condition.

Dr. Shoemaker was aware that Dr. Johnson had released Claimant without

restrictions, but Dr. Shoemaker did not speak to limitations/restrictions as part of his evaluation.
(Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 538-540),
48.

From the record it appears that Dr. Johnson referred Claimant to Paul

Montalbano, M.D., for further care/evaluation of Claimant's low back condition. Dr. Montalbano
saw Claimant for the first time on October 15, 2014. Claimant gave Dr. Montalbano a history of
the October 6, 2009 accident, and that he had suffered from low back pain ever since that event.
Sh01tly after the motor vehicle accident, Claimant described noting bilateral and anterior thigh
discomfort as well as numbness and tingling into his extremities going down into the lateral
aspect of his leg to his foot. He denied having any lower extremity symptomatology prior to the
motor vehicle accident, He described his back pain as constant burning pain at level 7 on a scale
0/10. Dr. Montalbano recommended new imaging of Claimant's lumbar spine to include x-rays
and MRI evaluation.

Instead, it appears that a myelogram and post-myelogram CT were

performed on October 31, 2014.

The post-myelogram CT was read as follows by Jeffrey

Pugsley, M.D.,:
T12-Ll: 2 mm of grade 1 retrolisthesis ofT12 on LI with mild disc height loss.
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis, Mild right neural
foraminal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis.
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Ll-12: 2 mm of grade I retrolisthesis of LI on 12 with mild disc height loss.
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis, small disc bulge, and
mild facet arthropathy. Moderate right and mild left neural foraminal nan·owing
secondary to the retrolisthesis and facet arthropathy.
12-13: Mild central canal nano wing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing secondary to facet
arthropathy and disc bulge.
13-14: Mild central canal nanowing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal nanowing secondary to facet
arthropathy and disc bulge.
14-15: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and
moderate facet arthropathy. Moderate to severe bilateral neural foraminal
narrowing secondary to endplate osteophytes and facet arthropathy.
15-S I: Mild central canal nanowing secondary to severe facet arthropathy.
Severe right and moderate left neural foraminal nerve secondary to facet
arthropathy and endplate osteophytes.
(Cit. Ex. 19, pp. 591-592). Flexion/extension films of the lumbar spine demonstrated multi-level
degenerative disc disease, most pronounced at T12-Ll, multi-level facet degeneration, most
prominent at 13-4 thru LS-SI, and a Grade I retrolisthesis of LI on 12, unchanged on
flexion/extension.
49.

In his letter to Dr. Johnson of November 7, 2014, Dr. Montalbano expressed his

agreement with Dr. Pugsley's interpretation of the post-myelogram CT. On exam, Claimant's
muscle strength was 5/5 in both upper and lower extremities. Claimant did exhibit antalgic gait
and station. Deep tendon reflexes were normal, and Claimant's sensory exam was intact.
50.

Claimant was again seen by Dr. Montalbano on February 25, 2015, following a

course of physical therapy. He presented with continued complaints of low back pain and lower
extremity symptomatology. Dr. Montalbano ordered a bone scan in an effort to further sort out
Claimant's problems. That study, performed on March 20, 2015, showed uptake at the right 14-5
facet joint, and bilaterally at 15-Sl. (See Cit. Ex. 19, p. 595). In his note of April 8, 2013, Dr.
Montalbano described the bone scan results as "quite mild." Dr. Montalbano recommended a
facet joint injection from which Claimant enjoyed only limited improvement. Subsequent
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neurological exam was n01mal. Dr. Montalbano recommended continuation of conservative
modalities, including physical therapy and weight loss.
51.

By June 3, 2015, Dr. Montalbano rep01ied that Claimant was much improved

with conservative modalities. Based on Claimant's improvement, and his limited findings on the
post-myelogram CT, Dr. Montalbano did not believe that Claimant was a surgical candidate.
52.

By letter dated June 22, 2015, Claimant's counsel queried Dr. Montalbano as to

whether or not Claimant's lumbar spine condition is causally related to the subject MV A. Again,
Claimant's counsel made the representation that Claimant's practice, when meeting with treaters,
is to withhold history of secondary complaints and reference to treaters/evaluators only those
problems that are of greater significance. (Cit. Ex. 17, p. 577)
53.

Claimant's counsel's letter of June 22, 2015 does reflect that he provided Dr.

Montalbano with selected medical records, including records from Dr. Reedy and Mountain
Home Physical Therapy. Counsel's letter does not reflect that he provided Dr. Montalbano with
copies of the September 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes from the GFHC, but Counsel did
offer the following comments concerning Claimant's pre-injury low back complaints:
Upon Dr. Hajjer recommending lumbar surgery, the State Insurance Fund
required that Mr. Ayala undergo an IME by Dr. Mark Harris, with Idaho Physical
Medicine & Rehabilitation. Dr. Hanis' opinions were not upon actual
examination of Mr. Ayala, but were based upon a review of medical records
provided by the State Insurance Fund. Following the records review, Dr. Harris
noted that Mr. Ayala did present prior to the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle
accident with sporadic complaints of low back symptomatology. When
questioned about this, Mr. Ayala responded that he is a "faim-worker," and that
all farm-workers experience low back pain upon occasion.
(Cit. Ex. 17, p. 579). Therefore, while Dr. Montalbano was generally apprised of Claimant's
sporadic pre-injury back complaints, he was not specifically apprised of the September 9 and
October 5, 2009 GFHC visits, nor was he provided with copies of those notes. He was, however,
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provided with a synopsis of some of Claimant's medical contacts between October 5, 2009 and
December 2011 chronicling Claimant's complaints of low back and lower extremity discomfort.
Dr. Montalbano was asked whether, against this background, he would agree that the medical
evidence establishes a causal connection between the motor vehicle accident and Claimant's
cmTent low back condition. Dr. Montalbano's reply of July 8, 2015 reveals something about the
assumptions he made in forming a response to Counsel's question. Dr. Montalbano premised his
conclusions on the observation that it was "clear" that Claimant suffered from symptomatic low
back complaints "since that motor vehicle accident," but that he had been "asymptomatic" prior
to the motor vehicle accident. Therefore, Dr. Montalbano concluded that Claimant's
symptomatology is directly related to the October 6, 2009 MV A.
54.

By letter dated September 30, 2015, Defense counsel provided Dr. Montalbano

with the GFHC records from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 and inquired of Dr.
Montalbano how or whether those records would cause him to revisit his opinion that Claimant's
low back complaints are causally related to the subject motor vehicle accident. In his reply of
October 8, 2015 Dr. Montalbano explained that the opinions contained in his July 8, 2015 letter
to Claimant's counsel were based on limited medical records. After reviewing the pre-injury
GFHC records, Dr. Montalbano stated:
After reviewing the additional medical records provided to me via your office, it
is quite clear that Mr. Mario G. Ayala was symptomatic in terms of low back pain
on at least two separate occasions. He was evaluated for low back pain on
September 9, 2009 and once again on October 5, 2009. The latter was one day
prior to his motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009, in which Mr. Ayala
attributes all of his symptomatology to be related to. Within these two visits of
September 9, 2009, as well as October 5, 2009, Mr. Ayala started on treatment on
two separate occasions for low back pain and even received a prescription for a
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agent in order to manage such pain.
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(Cit. Ex. 21, p. 639). Dr. Montalbano concluded that, at most, the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle
accident caused but a temporary sprain/strain which he would have expected to be of relatively
short duration. Dr. Montalbano's October 8, 2015 letter suggests that any care required later than
4-6 weeks after the motor vehicle accident would be related to Claimant's underlying
degenerative condition. In his letter of October 3, 2016, Dr. Montalbano stated that none of the
records/materials generated by Dr. Hammond would cause him to revise any of his previouslystated opinions.
55.

Dr. Montalbano's testimony was taken by way of post-hearing deposition. Dr.

Montalbano testified that he had the oppmtunity to review both the 2012 and 2014 postmyelogram CT studies. Those studies did not reveal any progression of Claimant's condition
between 2012 and 2014. Dr. Montalbano also testified that none of the post-accident lumbar
spine studies provide any suppmt for the proposition that Claimant suffered an acute injury to his
lumbar spine as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 29:2430:22; 37:8-38:9; 92:21-93:12; 116:12-22).

While Claimant's lumbar spine studies do

demonstrate severe multi-level degenerative arthritis, facet disease, and anterolisthesis, neither
the studies, nor Dr. Montalbano' s clinical examination demonstrated that Claimant has
impingement of existing nerve roots. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 12:19-13:15; 16:23-17:6; 65:366: 17). On exam, Claimant's lower extremity symptoms did not follow a dermatomal pattern
suggestive of nerve root compromise. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 13:7-15; 16:23-6). Because of the
lack of findings suggestive of nerve root compromise/radiculopathy, Dr. Montalbano does not
believe that Claimant is a surgical candidate, especially after Claimant experienced improvement
in symptoms following the course of physical therapy ordered by Dr. Montalbano.
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56.

Dr. Montalbano originally opined that based on Claimant's lack of pre-injury low

back symptoms, and the development of symptoms following the accident, it followed that
Claimant's low back condition must be, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. Dr.
Montalbano changed his mind after reviewing the September 9 and October 6, 2009 GFHC
notes. Contrary to the narrative proposed by Claimant's counsel, Dr. Montalbano saw nothing in
those notes which suggested that Claimant's low back complaints were mediated by some type
of systemic ailment such as the flu, or other illness. Medications prescribed for Claimant on
September 9, 2009, Naprosyn and Flexeril, are medications typically prescribed for
musculoskeletal pain. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 26:24-28:23; 79:25-92:7). Therefore, from his
review of the medical records, Dr. Montalbano concluded that in the years preceding the October
6, 2009 motor vehicle accident, Claimant had periodic problems with low back pain and that
immediately prior to the motor vehicle accident, he had one of these episodes.
57.

Dr. Montalbano recognized that Claimant's course following the subject accident

is equally important.

For example, he appears to concede that if Dr. Reedy is conect in

supposing that Claimant had "unrelenting" low back/lower extremity discomfort since the
subject accident, this fact would auger in favor of a conclusion that the subject acciderit did
something to aggravate or accelerate Claimant's low back problems on a permanent basis.
However, the medical records do not support the proposition that Claimant suffered from
persistent/unrelenting low back pain ever since the subject accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp.
30:23-31:19; 32:11-37:3).

Based on the failure of the record to document persistent and

unrelenting low back pain following the October 6, 2009 MVA, the existence of medical records
which document a lack of low back symptoms/findings at various times after the October 6, 2009
accident, and other medical records which document new occurrences of low back pain
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following periods of no low back symptomatology, Dr. Montalbano believed that the subject
accident caused, at most, a temporary exacerbation of Claimant's documented pre-existing low
back condition.
58.

Richard Hammond, M.D., first saw Claimant on September 10, 2010, on refen-al

from PA Mccready. Dr. Hammond took a history from Claimant concerning the accident and
the cervical spine surgery previously performed by Dr. Reedy. Dr. Hammond noted that since
the accident Claimant suffered from continued pain across the top of his left shoulder and had
difficulty using his left arm. Dr. Hammond did not report that Claimant presented with any
complaints of low back or lower extremity pain. Nor did Dr. Hammond's clinical exam suggest
any findings indicative of low back problems.

Dr. Hammond believed that Claimant had

possible ulnar nerve and left shoulder problems and recommended further evaluation. (See Cit.
Ex. 9, pp. 458-459). Dr. Hammond next saw Claimant on October 1, 2013 for complaints of
blacking out. On the occasion of that visit, Dr. Hammond noted that Claimant did have some
low back complaints for which he had been evaluated by Dr. Hajjar. Also noted was the 2013
industrial injury to Claimant's right knee. Claimant was next seen by Dr. Hammond on August
1, 2016, at the instance of Claimant's counsel. Counsel re-introduced Claimant to Dr. Hammond
by way of a letter dated June 22, 2016. 4 Among other things, Claimant's counsel inquired of Dr.
Hammond whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the October 6, 2009
motor vehicle accident. To Dr. Hammond, Claimant gave a history of having significant low
back pain commencing immediately after the subject motor vehicle accident. Concerning the
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 GFHC notes, Claimant told Dr. Hammond that the back
4

As he did with Dr. Hajjar, Counsel synopsized Claimant's pre-injury medical history, noting that Claimant had not
presented to tjle GFHC with any low back complaints between September 14, 2007 and September 9, 2009.
Claimant's Counsel did not include a synopsis of GFHC and Kieffer Chiropractic records generated between
November 200 I and September of 2007. As noted infi'a, these records do reference episodes of low back, SI joint, or
hip pain during this time frame.
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complaints he had prior to the motor vehicle accident were of an entirely different nature than the
low back complaints he developed thereafter. He reiterated that his low back complaints have
been persistent since the motor vehicle accident. Based on Claimant's history, the records
provided by Claimant's counsel , and his examination of Claimant, Dr. Hammond concluded that
Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject accident.
59.

Dr. Hammond's deposition was taken on December 16, 2016. He testified that

Claimant had radiographic evidence of 14-5 anterolisthesis with significant bilateral stenosis at
Dr. Hammond testified that Claimant's anterolisthesis closed-off Claimant's

LS-SI.

neuroforamina, bilaterally, causing exiting nerve root impingement. Concerning the GFHC
records from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Dr. Hammond agreed with Claimant's
counsel that these notes are consistent with Claimant's treatment for some type of systemic
complaint, as opposed to a musculoskeletal low back complaint. (Hammond Depo., pp. 17:1820:19). At most, Dr. Hammond believed that the September 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes
reflected muscular pain, while Claimant's cutTent complaints are referable to a structural
abnormality. (Hammond Depo., pp. 20:20-21: 17).
60.

Concerning his September 10, 2010 evaluation of Claimant, Dr. Hammond

testified that unless Claimant had presented with significant low back or lower extremity
problems, he probably would not have made note of these, since he was seeing Claimant for left
upper extremity problems. (Hammond Depo., p. 59:3-19). However, review of Dr. Hammond's
September 10, 20 IO chart note demonstrates that he did talce a complete history from Claimant
that involved inquiries well beyond the ambit of the nature and extent of Claimant's left upper
extremity complaints. His history and exam of Claimant included Claimant's eyes, ears, nose and
throat, cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, genital/urinary, musculoskeletal, neurologic
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and neurogenic systems. Claimant was invited to admit to any problems in these areas. Dr.
Hammond also conducted a limited exam of Claimant's lower extremities. Knee jerk and ankle
jerk were 1+. Claimant's i,;ait and station were normal. Per Dr. Hammond, the knee and ankle
jerk findings, though not normal, were not significant enough to warrant follow-up at that time.
(Hammond Depo., p. 61 :6-24). In summary, in September of 2010, Dr. Hammond noted nothing
regarding Claimant's low back which would have caused him to refer Claimant for further
evaluation or treatment.
61.

Dr. Hammond testified that trauma can be one cause of anterolisthesis of the type

seen in Claimant's lumbar spine. (Hammond Depo., pp. 15:21-16:19). However, he also
acknowledged that wear and tear in populations that perfmm heavy labor "can certainly cause"
anterolisthesis. (Hammond Depo., p. 85:15-21). Dr. Hammond believes that the subject accident
caused injury to Claimant's lumbosacral spine and is responsible for Claimant's need for
surgery. His reasons for coming to this conclusion are several. Dr. Hammond was willing to
acknowledge that Claimant did have disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject
accident. However, he believed that the pre-injury and post-injury medical records he reviewed
support the conclusion that the subject accident aggravated the pre-existing condition. Dr.
Hammond believed that Claimant's pre-injury complaints consisted of a one or two-time visit to
PA McCready for complaints oflow back pain on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, while
his post-injury complaints have been persistent and umelenting. (Hammond Depo., pp. 42: 1143:7; 79:1-13;

92:15-93:23; 107:18-108:14; 109:23-110:12; 111:14-24; 123:6-124:1). Dr.

Hammond did not believe that the GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 were
significant.
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62.

Dr. Hammond was not provided with medical records generated by Dr. Kieffer

and the GFMC, and discussed at~ 5-7, infra. Those records cover a period from a 2001 through
May, 2007 and do reflect more longstanding complaints of hip/low back discomfort.

It is

unknown whether, or how, the additional notes which he did not see would cause him to amend
any of the opinions he expressed concerning the significance of the subject accident to the
development of Claimant's cun-ent low back condition.
63.

As noted, Dr. Hammond's opinion is also suppotted by his belief that Claimant's

complaints were different in character following the motor vehicle accident and have been
persistent and unrelenting since that time. In this belief he joins with Dr. Reedy:
Q: [By Mr. Ben-y]:
Basically, Dr. Reedy advised Mr. Augustine that just
because Mr. Ayala may have had a backache once in a while prior to the motorvehicle accident that - - and here I'm quoting " ... does not preclude the fact that
the exacerbation of the accident led to the persistent, unrelenting pain in the back
and leg with neurogenic claudication-like symptoms, and he clearly has pathology
to demonstrate the validity of those claims." Do you agree with that?

A:

I couldn't have said it better.

(Hammond Depo., p. 111:14-24). However, as developed inji·a, the medical records do not
supp01t the conclusion that Claimant's low back/lower extremity complaints have been persistent
and unrelenting since the subject accident, at least until the late fall of 2011.
64.

Dr. Hammond was in general agreement with the FCE performed by Brian

Wright, DPT. However, he believed that it might be appropriate to assign more of Claimant's
sitting, standing, and walking restrictions to the low back condition as opposed to Claimant's
knee injury.
65.

As noted, Dr. Reedy treated Claimant through December 2011, but thereafter,

engaged in some back-and-forth with Claimant's counsel concerning the etiology of Claimant's
low back complaints. In a letter dated November 20, 2012, Claimant's counsel introduced a
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number of questions to Dr. Reedy by first synopsizing medical records tending to support the
proposition that while Claimant may have had some periodic flares of low back pain prior to the
subject accident, his complaints have been persistent and unrelenting since the subject accident.
Claimant's counsel asked Dr. Reedy to confirm that Claimant's low back complaints were, in
some respect, referable to the subject accident. In his response of December 12, 2012, Dr. Reedy
stated:
I clearly think Mr. Ayala's lumbar presentment and need for surgery that both I
and Dr. Hajjar issued is causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle
accident. Obviously, he did have pre-existing spine (he had worked hard for a
living fol' his entire life)! However, he was asymptomatic until the time of the
MVA which precipitated the need for intervention. Please contact me if I can be
of any further assistance.
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 177). Counsel's November 20, 2012 letter did not specifically refe!'ence the muchdiscussed GFHC records of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009.
66.

By letter dated December 17, 2015, Defense counsel advised Dr. Reedy that Dr.

Montalbano had ultimately concluded that Claimant's low back condition is not referable to the
subject accident. He also provided Dr. Reedy with copies of the chart notes from September 9,
2009 and October 5, 2009, which Dr. Montalbano had found to be significant. He asked for Dr.
Reedy's comment. By letter dated January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had a
pre-existing degenerative condition of the lumbar spine, but proposed that the subject accident
was a "straw that broke the camel's back," causing Claimant to suffer "persistent unrelenting"
pain in the back and leg since the motor vehicle accident. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). He minimized the
GFHC notes from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, explaining that just because Claimant
had a back ache prior to his industrial accident did not mean that the industrial accident did not
cause additional injury to Claimant's lumbar spine. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a January 19, 2016
follow-up letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Reedy again elaborated on his view of what is and is
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not significant in this case in terms of Claimant's clinical presentation. He stated Claimant may
well have suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain prior to the motor vehicle accident, and
he clearly did have degenerative disease of the lumbar spine prior to the industrial accident;
however, it was only following the industrial accident that Claimant suffered from persistent and
intractable low back pain, and therefore, the motor vehicle accident is directly related to
Claimant's cunent lumbar spine condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187).
Further Discussion Concerning Claimant's Lumbar Spine
67.

It is well established by a long line of authorities that in any proceeding before the

Industrial Commission, a claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, all facts essential to his recovery. See Ball v. Daw Forest Products Co., 136 Idaho
155, 30 P.3d 933 (2001); Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 P.2d 932 (1993). Where
medical causation is at issue, a claimant must provide medical evidence that supports the claim
for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley v. State Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). Probable is defined as having

more evidence for than against. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974).
Magic words are not necessary to convey that a doctor's opinion is given with the requisite
degree of medical probability; all that is needed is testimony demonstrating the physician's plain
and unequivocal conviction that a causal connection exists between an accident and an injury.
See Jensen v. City ofPocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 P Jd 211 (2001 ).
68.

In the instant matter, the parties have devoted reams of exhibits, testimony, and

argument for and against the proposition that Claimant's lumbar spine condition is, in some
respect, causally related to the subject accident. The opinions are numerous, and vacillating, but
th~y generally acknowledge that Claimant has degenerative disease of the lumbar spine which
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predated the subject accident. All physicians who have reviewed the films taken in connection
with evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine acknowledge that there is no finding in any of those
studies which, standing alone, constitutes evidence of acute injury of Claimant's lumbar spine.
The studies alone do not provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the subject accident
contributed something to Claimant's pre-existing low back condition. However, while the
radiographic evidence demonstrates longstanding disease of the lumbar spine, the studies are not
inconsistent with the proposition that these processes may have been aggravated by the subject
accident. As is not uncommonly the case, the objective medical evidence must be correlated with
Claimant's history and clinical examination to inform an opinion on whether or not the subject
accident did cause some permanent injury to Claimant's lumbar spine.
69.

It is clear from review of the causation opinions in this case that the

treating/evaluating physicians are cognizant of the importance of c01Telating the objective
medical evidence with Claimant's history, clinical presentation, and exam. The parties, too,
recognize the importance of this correlation, and have pulled out the stops to posit questions to
treating/evaluating physicians premised on the facts they deem most important to their case.
70.

Having reviewed the record in its entirety, and having considered the writings and

testimony of all the physicians who have rendered an opinion on the cause of Claimant's low
back condition, the Commission concludes that Claimant has failed to demonstrate, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, that his cmTent low back complaints are causally
related to the subject accident.
71.

First, the radiological studies unambiguously establish that Claimant has multi-

level degenerative disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject accident. The record
also establishes that Claimant presented, in the years preceding the October 6, 2009 accident
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with periodic complaints of low back pain. Claimant endorses this, as does Dr. Reedy. (Cit. Ex.
5, pp. 179, 180, 187; Cit Ex. 20, p. 635). However, Dr. Hammond was not aware of the Kieffer
Chiropractic and GFHC records which reflect some complaints of low back/hip pain between
2001-2007. On September 9, 2009, Claimant was seen at the GFHC for a number of complaints,
including, inter a/ia, low back pain. He was seen again on October 5, 2009, the day before the
subject accident, with complaints of a cough, which he described as longstanding and mild joint
pain, muscle aches, and back pain. Having reviewed the testimony and records of the numerous
providers who have commented on the September 9 and October 5, 2009 notes, the evidence
does not establish that the back pain or low back pain with which Claimant presented on those
occasions was simply a manifestation of a systemic illness such as the flu. PA McCready's
January 19, 2016 reply to counsel's check-the-box questionnaire is not particularly persuasive,
and it is given little weight. Such evidence is always regarded with some skepticism. Rather
than the physician's unalloyed opinion, what is received is an opinion fotmulated by the party
offering it, to which the physician is asked to give his assent.

It is unclear whether PA

McCready's reply represents his actual opinion, or was simply his way to buy some peace;
Claimant's counsel contacted him on three occasions seeking a response to certain questions, and
only obtained it after advising PA Mccready that failing a written response, it would be
necessary to notice

McCready's deposition.

Further, PA McCready's response does not

discount the possibility that the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9, 2009
included musculoskeletal low back complaints. All that PA McCready admitted to is that as of
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Claimant's low back complaints did not indicate
"serious or significant" injury to the low back.

How serious or how significant an injury

Claimant's symptoms might have indicated, is left to speculation. PA McCready next signified
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his agreement with the assertion that absent the October 5, 2009 accident, he would not have
expected Claimant to "thereafter" present with a significant low back injury as later documented
by Drs. Hajjar and Reedy in 2012. The term "thereafter" admits a lot ofleeway, and it is unclear
how or whether PA McCready' s opinion might change if Claimant did not develop significant
low back symptoms until several months following the accident or, if, he had waxing and waning
symptoms between the date of the subject accident and Dr. Reedy's chart note in December of
2011. Accordingly, PA McCready's January 19, 2016 response to Claimant's counsel is not
especially probative of the question of whether Claimant's low back condition is related to his
MVA.
72.

Both Dr. Hammond and Dr. Montalbano have speculated on the significance of

the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9 and October 5, 2009. In general,
Dr. Montalbano's reasoning is more persuasive. He has pointed out that Naprosyn and Flexeril
are typically prescribed for musculoskeletal complaints, thus denigrating the suggestion that
Claimant merely had the flu. He also noted that ff PA McCready had suspected the flu, he would
undoubtedly have ordered a quick flu test in addition to the other labs he ordered.

Dr.

Montalbano also noted other of PA McCready's findings that ran counter to a systemic condition
or infection as the explanation for Claimant's presenting complaints. Dr. Hammond was far less
persuasive in this regard.
73.

The most problematic, and hardest fought, aspect of this case lies in making some

determination as to whether or not, or to what extent, Claimant suffered from low back
complaints following the October 5, 2009 accident. Based on the medical opinions that have
been adduced, if Claimant's low back complaints following the 2009 accident were persistent
and unrelenting, it would be rather easy to conclude that the subject accident must have
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aggravated Claimant's pre-existing low back disease; objective findings consistent with an
accident caused aggravation of a pre-existing condition could be correlated with a medical
history of new and unrelenting back and lower extremity symptoms since the accident to support
the conclusion that the accident caused permanent injury to Claimant's iow back. On the other
hand, if the evidence is more susceptible of a conclusion that Claimant did not present with
persistent low back complaints following the subject accident until the late fall of 2011, then .it
becomes much more difficult to conclude that the subject accident is implicated in the cause of
Claimant's low back condition. The evidence on this issue is conflicting but, as developed
below, the record offers less support to the proposition that Claimant suffered from persistent
and unrelenting low back pain since the October 5, 2009 MVA, and more support to the
proposition that his low back complaints began, in earnest, in late 2011.
74.

Claimant testified that he has suffered from low back and lower extremity

numbness unremittingly since the accident of October 6, 2009. (Claimant Depo., p. 33:11-22;
Tr., p. 95: 13-17). However, there are multiple post-accident medical records which are silent on
the issue of whether Claimant complained of low back and lower extremity pain; these records
admit the possibility that Claimant had low back symptomatology which he simply did not
describe to his providers. However, the post-accident medical records generated between the date
of accident and the late fall of 2011 contain an equal number of records in which Claimant
specifically denied low back/lower extremity symptoms, or which reference an exam of the low
back and lower extremities which turned up nothing untoward. These records are much harder to
reconcile with Claimant's current insistence that he has suffered from unrelenting low back/
lower extremity symptomatology ever since the subject accident. Moreover, the post-injury
medical records generated between the date of accident and the late fall of 2011 also reflect that
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on several occasions when Claimant did complain of back or low back discomfort the onset of
these problems was not related to the subject accident, but was described as being of more recent
origin. It is clear that Claimant did describe suffering from back pain immediately after the
accident to Employer and the SIP. It is also clear that he complained of back pain in the spring
of 2010, and again, in the late fall of 2011. However, these records are not sufficient to support a
finding that Claimant's symptomatolog_y following the motor vehicle accident was persistent and
unrelenting in light of the other medical records which show that Claimant's history oflow back
symptomatology following the motor vehicle accident was, at most, intermittent. Dr. Reedy was
prepared to acknowledge that on a pre-injury basis Claimant suffered from intermittent low back
and/or lower extremity problems.

Claimant's post-accident history does not persuasively

demonstrate more significant or persistent low back symptoms, at least not until the fall of 2011.
Of particular interest, are medical records from a number of sources generated in the late fall of
2011.

These records reflect a new onset of low back and lower extremity discomfort in

November of 2011.
75.

Claimant has explained the failure of the medical records to uniformly reflect

persistent and unrelenting low back pain since the subject accident by his practice to only
reference to the many providers he saw following the subject accident his most predominant
complaint, leaving unstated any secondary complaint such as low back and lower extremity
discomfort. Having reviewed Claimant's testimony, both at hearing, and at the time of his
prehearing deposition, there is little-if-any support for this proposition in the record.

For

example, following cervical s.pine surgery Claimant was refe1Ted to Mountain Home Physical
Therapy. He was first evaluated at that facility on March 25, 2010, and was last seen on June 9,
2010.

Claimant was again referred to Mountain Home Physical Therapy by Dr. Hessing
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following Claimant's shoulder and elbow surgery.

During the first session of physical therapy

(March 25, 2010 - June 9, 2010) Claimant was seen for treatment on 31 occasions. Claimant
contends that the physical therapy chart notes from March 25, April 7, April 19, April 27, and
May 25 reflect that Claimant presented on those occasions to the physical therapist with
complaints of hip/lower extremity pain. The notes reflect that throughout the course of physical
therapy, Claimant's primary complaints related to his neck and left upper extremity. However,
on March 25, 2010 the therapist noted that Claimant had complaints of pain in the left foot. (Cit.
Ex. 7, p. 361). The note from April 7, 2010 reflects that Claimant complained about hip soreness
after riding the bike. The chart note from April 19, 2010 reflects that Claimant presented with
complaints that his hip had been bothering him more and was waking him at night. The chart
note from April 27, 2010 reflects that Claimant's hip did better with a different type of exercise
bicycle. The note from May 25, 2010 reflects that Claimant told his doctor about his hip pain but
the doctor did not have an answer. Therefore, for the period March 25, 2010 through June 11,
2010 there is reference to hip discomfort in four of the 31 chart notes. They do not reveal
complaints of low back pain or lower extremity numbness. Between January 18, 2011 and April
7, 2011 Claimant was seen at Mountain Home Physical Therapy on 21 occasions. These notes
make no reference to complaints of hip or lower extremity discomfort. In all, the Mountain
Home Physical Therapy records lend little support to the proposition that Claimant complained
of persistent and unrelenting back and lower extremity discomfort at all times following the
industrial accident of October 5, 2009. However, these records do denigrate Claimant's other
insistence that the medical records do not contain reference to low back complaints either
because (I) he only told physicians about his mo~t significant complaint; or (2) Dr. Reedy
counseled Claimant to withhold discussion of the low back until Claimant's neck/upper
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extremity complaints were dealt with. Nor do the PT notes support the proposition that if
Claimant was seeing a paiticular provider for his neck or upper extremity complaints, he would
not discuss any other complaints he was having with such provider.
76.

As noted, Dr. Reedy has reported that Claimant told Dr. Reedy in December of

2011 that he (Dr. Reedy) had advised Claimant back in January of 2010 that Dr. Reedy would

concentrate first on Claimant's neck problem, and after resolution of the same, attention would
be turned to the low back. Dr. Reedy has never endorsed this; he has only reported that this is
what Claimant has said. That the nairntive proposed by Claimant to Dr. Reedy in December of
2011 does not accurately represent a discussion had between Dr. Reedy and Claimant in January

of 2010 is perhaps best demonstrated by Dr. Reedy's letter of November 18, 2010 to PA
McCready. By that time, Claimant was thought to be medically stable following his cervical
spine fusion performed by Dr. Reedy. However, rather than take-up the next of Claimant's
complaints, i.e. his low back, which had been held in reserve pending resolution of Claimant's
cervical spine condition, Dr. Reedy released Claimant from his care. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 164)
77.

Claimant saw Dr. HatTis for the purposes of an IME. Dr. Han-is was not

designated to treat Claimant for his back, shoulder, or any other condition. Claimant was invited
to describe the nature and extent of the complaints he related to the work accident and low back
complaints were not among those described. Claimant treated with Dr. Clawson for his left
upper extremity, yet in November of 2011 shared with Dr. Clawson the low back complaints he
was having. In shmt, Claimant's explanation for the failure of the medical record to document
persistent and umelenting complaints in the low back is not persuasive. The record better
supports the proposition that Claimant suffered from periodic, but not unrelenting, low back and
lower extremity discomfo1t between October 6, 2009 and the late fall of 2011, just as he had
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suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain in the years prior to October 6. 2009. The opinions
of Dr. Reedy, Dr. Hammond, and Dr. Hajjar are all premised on the assumption that Claimant's
low back symptomatology increased precipitously following the industrial accident. This
assumption is important because it provides support for the proposition that Claimant's objective
degenerative changes were more likely-than-not aggravated by the subject accident. Otherwise,
how is one to explain the sudden and precipitous worsening described by Claimant? Absent this
underlying assumption there is little-to-no support for the proposition that the objective changes
noted on radiology studies are, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. As described
by Drs. Hammond, Montalbano, and Reedy, Claimant's lumbar spine films demonstrate
degenerative findings with no clear evidence of an acute injury which could be related to the
subject accident. For these reasons, Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition
is causally related to the subject accident.
Further Findings and Discussion Relating to Neck, Left Upper Extremity, and Right Knee
78.

As initially explained, the parties are in agreement that Claimant's cervical spine,

left shoulder, left ulnar nerve, and right knee injuries are causally related to the accidents of 2009
and 2013. There remains the issue of Claimant's disability referable to these compensable
conditions.
79.

Dr. Reedy released Claimant to return to work without restriction on May 20,

2010. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 161). He continued to follow Claimant during Claimant's treatment with
Dr. Clawson and Dr. Hessing. By June of 2011, Claimant presented with complaints of
experiencing acute cervical discomfort after he tilted his head and felt a "pop" in his neck.
Follow-up MRI evaluation did not reveal anything untoward although Dr. Reedy did comment
on persistent foraminal encroachment at the C6-7 level.

On December 10, 2011, Claimant
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presented to Dr. Reedy with continuing complaints of having difficulty turning his neck, more so
on the left than the right. Dr. Reedy did not believe that Claimant's situation could be improved
by further surgery, but recommended that Claimant obtain a second opinion. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 166).
Dr. Reedy has not seen Claimant since December 5, 2011, and, despite Claimant's recurrent
cervical spine complaints, did not ever revise his release to return to work without restrictions, at
least not until he received a copy of the September 25, 2015 FCE performed by PT Wright. On
November 2, 2015, nearly four years after he last saw Claimant, Dr. Reedy expressed his full
agreement with the restrictions proposed by PT Wright and the apportionment of those
restrictions between Claimant's cervical spine/upper extremity complaints and his low back
condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 182). Concerning the impai1ment referable to Claimant's cervical spine
condition, Dr. Reedy defeITed to the rating proposed by Dr. HaiTis. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 173).
80.

Dr. Hessing, who performed Claimant's left shoulder surgery, was aware of

Claimant's work as a farm laborer. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 415). Following surgery, he gave Claimant a
5% upper extremity rating and released Claimant to return to work at his preinjury job without
restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 445).
81.

Dr. Clawson, who performed Claimant's ulnar nerve surgery, released Claimant

to return to work without restrictions, and without reference to residual impairment, on January
11,2011.
82.

Claimant was first seen by Miers Johnson, M.D., for treatment of his right knee,

on September 11, 2013. Dr. Johnson's note of that date reflects that Claimant described working
as a farm laborer, without restrictions, although he did complain of some lower extremity and
low back difficulties. Following the right knee arthroplasty perfo1med by Dr. Johnson, he noted,
on July 14, 2014, that Claimant was doing quite well vis-a-vis the right knee:
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He seldom has trouble with the knee except maybe the next day after physical
therapy and if he tries to kneel on his kneecap. He is driving a tractor and
otherwise doing his job. He has trouble walking on uneven ground. He is able to
walk, but has trouble when he is on his feet for very long periods of time. Most of
this seems secondary to his back ...
(Cit. Ex. 13, p. 522). On September 22, 2014 Claimant was released from care by Dr. Johnson
with these comments:
Patient can work full duty. I have no restrictions regarding his walking with his
total knee. His biggest problem seems to be sciatica and should be re-evaluated
by the spine surgeon.
(Cit. Ex. 13, p. 524). Dr. Johnson did not offer impairment rating for Claimant's right knee
arthroplasty. In this regard, he deferred to Dr. Shoemaker.
83.

Dr. Shoemaker saw Claimant for the purposes of evaluation on October 6, 2014.

Dr. Shoemaker noted Claimant's pre-existing right knee surgeries, as well as the surgery
performed by Dr. Johnson. He gave Claimant a 21% impairment rating of the lower extremity
based on Claimant's good surgical outcome and the fact that Dr. Johnson did not deem it
necessary to provide Claimant with any pennanent restrictions. Dr. Shoemaker apportioned onehalf of the 21 % lower extremity rating to Claimant's documented pre-existing right knee
problems. (See Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 539-540). In his report, Dr. Shoemaker referenced a separate
"activity status report" which he prepared, and which discussed work restrictions/precautions
applicable to Claimant. However, that document is not contained in the record.
84.

At the instance of Defendants, Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Harris following

Claimant's release by Drs. Hessing, Clawson, and Reedy. To Dr. Harris, Claimant described the
requirements of his job and indicated that as of August 15, 2011 he was perfonning this work
without physician-imposed restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 614). Claimant complained of neck and
upper extremity discomfort, but no low back/lower extremity difficulties.
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Claimant a 6% whole person rating for his cervical spine, concurred with Dr. Hessing's 5%
upper extremity rating for the left shoulder and awarded no impairment for the left ulnar nerve
transposition surgery performed by Dr. Clawson. (Cit. Ex. 20, pp. 617-618).

Concerning

permanent limitations/restrictions, Dr. Harris offered the following:
At this point, Mr. Ayala has no work restrictions as noted by the treating
physicians in this case and I would agree that he should use caution in overhead
activities and heavy lifting, although no permanent restrictions are given or
suggested.
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 618).
85.

Claimant's counsel referred Claimant to Brian Wright, DPT, for the purpose of a
I

functional capacities evaluation. In his cover letter, Counsel cautioned PT Wright that because
Claimant's low back condition might ultimately be determined to be unrelated to the 2009
accident, it would be important for PT Wright to distinguish between limitations/restrictions
referable to Claimant's right knee/neck/left upper extremity injuries and his low back condition.
(See Cit. Ex. 23, pp. 656-659). PT Wright performed this functional capacity evaluation on
September 25, 2015. PT Wright noted that Claimant participated in the evaluation with "full
objective signs of maximum effort and cooperation." He also noted that "between similar
functional tests, client consistently performed as expected and these findings correlated well with
each other." PT Wright did not have access to the job site evaluation prepared by the ICRD. He
relied on Claimant to describe the functional components of his job, and this informed his
ultimate conclusion that the physical abilities demonstrated on exam constituted a significant
barrier to Claimant's performance of his job.

Per PT Wright, the limitations referable to

Claimant's specific areas of injury are as follows:
1. Cervical spine/neck, status-post microdiskectomy and fusion by Dr. Reedy This particular presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following
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functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-cany,
elevated activity and forward bend - stand activities.
2. Left upper extremity, status -post left ulnar nerve neurolysis, anterior
subcutaneoustransposition by Dr. Clawson. This particular presentment is
responsible for the limitations in the following functional categories: Waist to
floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-cal1"y and elevated activity.
3. Left shoulder, status-post arthroscopic subacromial decompression, distal
claviculectomy, labral and joint debridement with rotator cuff repair by Dr.
Hessing. This particular presentment is responsible for the limitations in the
following functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, liftcal1"y and elevated activity.

4. Right knee, status-post right TKA by Dr. Johnson. This particular presentment
is responsible for the limitations in the following functional categories: Walking
(low back is contributing 20-40% of this in my opinion), Waist to floor lift (low
back is contributing 20-40% to this), lift-ca11"y (I 0-20% contribution from low
back), forward bend - stand (20-40% contribution) and sitting (60-80%
contribution from the low back).
5. Low back/ lumbar spine, cu11"ently presenting as non-surgical. This particular
presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following functional
categories: Walking (low back is· contributing 20-40% of this in my opinion),
Waist to floor lift (low back is contributing 20-40% to this) lift-can-y (10-20%
contribution from low back), forward bend - stand (20-40% contribution) and
sitting (60-80% contribution from the low back).
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 647).
86.

Conceming his findings relating to Claimant's low back, PT Wright did not

explain his conclusion that 20-40% of Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting limitation should be
attributed to Claimant's low back condition. For example, does this mean that since Claimant
was found to be capable of occasional waist-to-floor lifting in the range of 15 pounds,
subtracting out the low back condition's contribution to this limitation would result in increasing
Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting by 20-40%? Neither Mr. Jordan nor Dr. Collins were able to
offer any insights on this question, and PT Wright was not deposed.
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87:

In summary, there is general agreement that Claimant has the following

impairments referable to his industrial injuries: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person; left
shoulder - 5%; upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%; right knee - 21 %; lower
extremity -- 50% attributable to pre-existing condition, 50% referable to 2013 accident.
Claimant's low back condition is not deemed stable and ratable.
Vocational Testimony
88.

William Jordan conducted a forensic vocational evaluation of Claimant at the

instance of Defendants. His report reflects that Claimant has been employed primarily as a farm
laborer/foreman since approximately 1990, Since 1999, Claimant has been employed by Meyers
Farms. Social Security earnings records reflect a steady annual increase in earnings since 1999,
the only exception being the years 2009, 2010, and 2013, when Claimant lost time from work
referable to his work-related injuries.

In 2008, for example, the year preceding the 2009

accident, Claimant earned $24,170. In 2015, Claimant's earnings are reported at $42,911. Mr.
Jordan had the opportunity to interview both Claimant and Robert Meyers, the principal of
Meyers Farms. Per Mr. Meyers, Claimant is a good worker who Meyers expects to retain as an
employee, notwithstanding that Claimant has been forced to modify how he performs his work
as faim foreman, From Mr. Meyers, Mr. Jordan recorded the following:
Mr. Meyers indicated that he was aware that the Claimant has modified his work
activities so that he does less lifting: he estimated that the Claimant probably lifts
a maximum of 50 pounds. He uses equipment for lifting, can get help with lifting
or he can delegate heavier lifting to the other two employees. The Employer
stated that the Claimant still does about all of the same job tasks that he has
always done - he just goes about it a little differently.
Mr. Meyers indicated that the Claimant possesses knowledge that is helpful on the
farm. He gave the example of how they draw water out of the river using pumps.
The 14 pivots that they use for irrigating have to be balanced to manage the use of
the water. The Claimant is in charge of this task.
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Mr. Meyers reiterated that he is not planning on terminating the employment
relationship with the Claimant as he continues to be productive, although he noted
that he has heard through some of the chemical distributors that the Claimant has
been considering quitting. Mr. Meyers is aware that the Claimant is getting older,
the
and is approaching full Social Security Retirement age (approximately within
next year).
nt's sense of his
(Def. Ex. 9, pp. 207-208). Mr. Jordan also elicited from Claimant, Claima
a functional
functional abilities. Per Mr. Jordan, Claimant's sense of what he can do from
outlined by PT
standpoint is somewhat more generous than the maximum functional capabilities
e to his current
Wright. Mr. Jordan noted that Claimant has a fund of agricultural skills valuabl
illustrates the
employer, and to other similarly-situated employers. Mr. Jordan's report
trictions: absent
importance of understanding the extent and degree of Claimant's limitations/res
g, Clawson,
limitations/restrictions, as might be suggested by the work releases of Drs. Hessin
the work injuries
Harris, and Johnson, Claimant has suffered no disability as a consequence of
gainful activity.
since he has no functional limitations that would impede his ability to engage in
ons/restrictions
On the other hand, Mr. Jordan acknowledged that if one accepts the limitati
of his ability to
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has suffered significant loss
prior to the 2009
engage in gainful activity as compared to the labor market access he enjoyed
into account his
accident. Based on Claimant's status as an able-bodied individual, and taldng
to approximately
relevant non-medical factors, Mr. Jordan proposed that Claimant had access
ons/restrictions
17% of his labor market prior the 2009 accident. However, assuming the limitati
labor market with
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has lost 62% of his pre-injury
by vocational
an anticipated wage loss of 32%. Employing a convention frequently utilized
d in the FCE,
rehabilitation experts, Mr. Jordan proposed that the limitations/restrictions outline
47%, inclusive of
coupled with Claimant's non-medical factors, yield disability in the range of
PPL (62 + 32 = 94 + 2 = 47).
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89.

Nancy Collins, Ph.D., was engaged by Claimant's counsel to perform a forensic

vocational assessment of Claimant's residual employability following the subject accidents. Her
report appears at Claimant's. Exhibit 32. She reviewed medical records, interviewed Claimant,
and undertook an assessment of Claimant's employability. Her report reflects that the subjective
complaints described by Claimant have been consistent. Over time she noted that none of
Claimant's treating physicians, with the exception of Dr. Reedy, felt that Claimant required any
physician-imposed limitations/restrictions following his dates of medical stability. Even Dr.
Reedy initially proposed no limitations/restrictions. Dr. Collins did note that the FCE imposed
significant restrictions, and these were generally adopted by Dr. Reedy and Claimant's expert,
Dr. Hammond. Dr. Collins also took a detailed history from Claimant concerning his subjective
sense of what he can and cannot do. Claimant's subjective sense of his functional abilities is
much more consistent with the FCE than it is with the opinions of his treating physicians.
Generally speaking, Dr. Collins found that the FCE results are consistent with the ability of
Claimant to perform limited light-duty work. Per Dr. Collins, Claimant's skills are as a farm
laborer and foreman. He also has supervisory skills and some skills in operating/repairing faim
and inigation equipment.

Although Dr. Collins did not perform an analysis of Claimant's

percentage access to his labor mai-Icet on a pre-injury basis, she did conclude that based on
Claimant's age, education, work experience, and other non-medical factors, he was best suited to
working as a farming supervisor, agricultural equipment operator, farm worker/laborer, or
landscaper/grounds keeper.
90.

As did Mr. Jordan, Dr. Collins acknowledged that absent functional

limitations/restrictions, Claimant has suffered no loss of earning capacity as a consequence of the
subject accidents. However, considering the limitations/restrictions suggested by the FCE, led
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Dr. Collins to propose that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled at present. Although Dr.
Collins acknowledged that she did not understand how to apply PT Wright's attempt to subtract
low back limitations from the totality of Claimant's limitations, she believes that even if
Claimant's low back restrictions are not considered, Claimant is totally and permanently disabled
by virtue of his knee, neck, and left upper extremity limitations. Dr. Collins is of the opinion that
were it not for Claimant's "superhuman" effort, and the accommodation offered by a
"sympathetic employer," Claimant would not be employed at this time, and absent his current
job, he is, essentially, totally and permanently disabled. On the matter of the effort Claimant has
gone to in order to retain employment, Dr. Collins noted that he has been forced to delegate work
he can no longer perform to his subordinates, and to work longer hours in order to accomplish
the things he can still do. At the time of her post-hearing deposition Dr. Collins acknowledged
that if Claimant has no limitations/restrictions, he has no disability. However, Dr. Collins did
not consider this assumption in formulating her opinion. Her concluding remarks make it clear
that it is her opinion that Claimant is 100% disabled but for the one job he is currently
perfmming for an accommodating and sympathetic employer.
Discussion and Further Findings Relating to Claim of Disability
91.

Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot

doctrine. Defendants contend that Claimant has suffered no disability, but if he has, it is less than
total and permanent. Moreover, Defendants contend that Claimant's less-than-permanent and
total disability must be apportioned between the subject accident and a pre-existing condition
pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code § 72-406.
92.

"Permanent Disability" or "under a permanent disability" results when. the actual

or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of permanent
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impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected.
(See Idaho Code § 72-423). The evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured
worker's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the
medical factor of permanent impairment and by permanent non-medical factors as set f01ih at
Idaho Code § 72-430. (See Idabo Code § 72-425). The test for determining whether a claimant
has suffered a permanent disability greater than permanent impaitment is whether the physical
impairment, taken in conjunction with non-medical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity
for gainful employment. Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 Idabo 293, 766 P.2d 763 (1988). The
focus of a determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful
activity. Sund v. Gambrell, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995).
93.

The labor market to be considered in evaluating Claimant's disability is ordinarily

the labor market in which Claimant resides as of the date of hearing. Brown v. The Home Depot,
152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012). Whether Claimant has a permanent disability is a question
of fact, and Claimant bears the burden of proving that he has suffered disability in excess of
impairment. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 130 Idabo 278, 989 P.2d 854
(1997). An odd-lot worker is one who is so injured that he is unable to perform services other
than those limited in quality, dependability or quantity, such that a reasonably stable market for
such services does not exist. Boley v. State Idaho Special Indemnity Fund, supra. An odd-lot
worker need not be physically unable to do anything w01ihy of compensation, but he does need
to demonstrate that he is so handicapped that he will not be employed regularly in any wellknown branch of the labor market absent the business boom, the sympathy of a paiiicular
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or superhuman effort on his part. Lyons v. Industrial

Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idabo 403,565 P.2d 1360 (1977).
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94.

Claimant bears the burden of adducing proof sufficient to establish, on a prima

facie basis, his odd-lot status. A claimant may prove odd-lot status by showing that he has

unsuccessfully attempted other types of employment, that he, or a vocational expert on his
behalf, has searched for other work but other work is not available, or that any efforts to find
suitable employment would be futile. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra.
95.

Once a claimant has satisfied his burden of proving a prima facie case of odd-lot

status by one of the three aforementioned methods, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
prove claimant's employability. Hoye v. Daw Forest Products, Inc., 125 Idaho 582, 873 P.2d
836 (1994). Employer cannot meet this burden merely by showing that claimant is able to
perform some type of work. Lyons v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. Rather,
Employer must show that there is an actual job within a reasonable distance from Claimant's
home which he is able to perform or for which he can be trained that he has a reasonable
opportunity to be employed at that job. Lyons, supra.
96.

Apportionment of disability, while not at issue in this case if Claimant is adjudged

totally and permanently disabled, is at issue in the event the Commission determines that
Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled. Idaho Code § 72-406(1) provides:
In cases of permanent disability less than total, if the degree or duration of
disability resulting from an industrial injury or occupational disease is increased
or prolonged because of a preexisting physical impairment, the employer shall be
liable only for the additional disability from the industrial injury or occupational
disease.
Under this section, and Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008), where
apportionment is at issue in a less-than-total case, a two step process must be employed. First,
claimant's disability must be evaluated in light of all physical impairments resulting from the
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industrial accident, and any pre-existing conditions.

Thereafter, the amount of permanent

disability attributable to the industrial accident(s) must be apportioned.
97.

As noted above, evaluation of Claimant's disability depends, in the first instance,

on making some judgment about the extent and degree to which Claimant has permanent
limitations/restrictions. Here, Defendants argue that because neither Drs. Reedy, Clawson,
Hessing, or Harris initially imposed any restrictions on Claimant at medical stability, and, in fact,
released him to return to a job that they probably knew was fairly onerous, Claimant has no
disability in excess of impairment.

On the other hand, Claimant argues that the

limitations/restrictions identified in the September 2015 functional capacities evaluation are a
much more accurate portrayal of Claimant's ability to engage in physical activities, and these
limitations/restrictions support a conclusion that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled.
98.

There is evidence to suppott a finding that Claimant has no physical

limitations/restrictions relating to his right knee, neck, left shoulder, and ulnar nerve
transposition. Drs. Clawson, Hessing, Reedy, Han-is, and Johnson have all rendered opinions
that suppott this conclusion. Only Dr. Reedy has changed his mind, but his conclusion is subject
to criticism because he had not seen Claimant for nearly four years prior to his wholesale
adoption of the FCE findings. However, when last seen by Dr. Reedy on December 5, 2011,
Claimant was no longer enjoying good relief from cervical spine surgery previously perfo1med
by Dr. Reedy.

In fact, Dr. Reedy recommended a second opinion in an effort to better

understand Claimant's recurrent cervical spine problems.

As well, by December 2011, Dr.

Reedy was aware that Claimant was having low back problems which would go on to be
evaluated by Dr. Hajjar. Following December of 2011, Dr. Reedy was updated on Claimant's
status by Claimant's counsel, especially regarding Claimant's progress with lumbar spine
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evaluation. Therefore, even though Dr. Reedy had not seen Claimant since December 5, 2011, it
is possible that he was well enough apprised of Claimant's status to embrace a set of restrictions
without the need to see Claimant for confirmation.

Regardless, Dr. Reedy' s enthusiastic

embrace of the FCE is the weakest evidence of its legitimacy.
99.

The FCE has also been explicitly endorsed by Dr. Hammond. Dr. Hammond

testified to his general agreement with the recommendations of the FCE, even though neither did
he understand PT Wright's reasoning in apportioning low back limitations the way he did. In
fact, Dr. H~ond testified that probably more of Claimant's limitations relating to sitting and
walking are related to the lumbar spine condition. (Hammond Depo., pp. 50:19-51:12). Even
though Claimant had been released by Dr. Reedy for his cervical spine, Dr. Hammond did not
quarrel with the FCE results which suggested that Claimant continued to have significant neck
and upper extremity difficulties. (Hammond Depo., pp. 52:10-56:2). In fact, Dr. Hammond
reported that Claimant still had complaints of cervical spine pain when he evaluated Claimant in
August of 2016. However, Dr. Hammond's August 1, 2016 office note reflects the following
about the history he received from Claimant concerning his neck and upper extremity:
Dr. Reedy did surgery on his neck and he says he has some decreased limitation
but no other significant pain. His left shoulder feels well and occasionally is stiff
but he can pretty much do everything he wants with this. There. was also the left
ulnar nerve difficulty. This was transposed and he has a little bit of numbness
into his palm of his left hand, but there was no difficulty with grip or using the left
arm or hand otherwise.
(Cit. Ex. 24, p. 569A). The record also contains medical records from the GFHC entered
contemporaneous with the September 2015 FCE. On September I, 2015, Claimant was seen by
Dr. Ensminger at the GFHC, for complaints ofleft lmee pain which Claimant related to work that
Claimant was doing during potato harvest which required him to work bent over or kneeling. Dr.
Ensminger noted that Claimant's artificial knee (on the right) was doing well. Finally, it was
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noted that Claimant's degenerative disc disease of his neck and low back were "stable." On
physical exam, no spinal tenderness or misalignment was noted. Spine range of motion was
normal. Paraspinal muscle strength and tone was within normal limits. Concerning Claimant's
left upper extremity, no tenderness was noted to palpation. Claimant's shoulder, elbow, and
wrist joint were stable. He had normal range of motion, without crepitus or pain in the left upper
extremity.
100.

Dr. Hessing's note from August of 2016, and more particularly, Mark

Ensminger's, M.D., note from September 2015 are not entirely consistent with Claimant's
presenting complaints on the occasion of the September 25, 2015 FCE. To PT Wright, Claimant
made the following pain report:
Reported discomfort in the lumbar spine, knee, shoulder and cervical spine was
part of the reason for limitations with lifting, carrying, elevated activity,
crouching or low level activity, walking, forward bending. Objective signs
coincided with the Client's reports of discomfort.
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 646). On exam, Claimant was noted to have decrease in neck and left shoulder
range of motion, inconsistent with the September 1, 2015 findings by Dr. Ensminger.
101.

On the other hand, to Defendants' criticism that the FCE must be invalid because

greater problems are noted with Claimant's unaffected extremities, i.e. the right shoulder and the
left knee, is nonsensical. Claimant's left shoulder was surgically repaired, as was his right knee.
Claimant has documented left knee arthritis, and it would be unsurprising if a manual laborer of
his age also did not have right shoulder arthritis.

That Claimant's surgically-addressed

extremities exhibit less severe findings than his contralateral extremities does not cause the
Commission to question PT Wright's examination. After all, if the surgeries were not intended
to improve Claimant's function or reduce his pain, there would be little purpose in doing them.
Defendants also criticize PT Wright's report because validity testing, measured in what
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Defendants call the customary manner, is not identified in PT Wright's report. This criticism is
rejected because PT Wright has clearly expressed his conclusion that in performing Claimant's
evaluation PT Wright was satisfied that Claimant gave full effort, and that the test results are
consistent with this conclusion.

Nothing in PT Wright's report suggests that it should be

discounted because Claimant was consciously manipulating the evaluation.
102.

Finally, the Commission is impressed by the fact that Employer is obviously

aware that Claimant does not retain the same physical ability he had prior to the 2009 accident.
The Employer is aware that Claimant has physical limitations/restrictions and that he has found a
way to accommodate his limitations by assigning more tasks to his subordinates. There is
nothing in the Employer's testimony that would support the conclusion that Claimant is now just
as physically capable as he was prior to the October 6, 2009 MVA.
103.

Claimant continued to have cervical spine complaints after being released to full

duty by Dr. Reedy; Dr. Reedy's notes confirm it. Claimant's ulnar nerve transposition does not
seem to have resulted in any limitations/restrictions. It is less clear whether or not Claimant has
continued to have left shoulder complaints following Dr. Hessing's surgery, and the dissonance
between Dr. Ensminger's September 1, 2015 office note and the nearly contemporaneous FCE is
troubling. Further, by his own statements to Mr. Jordan, Claimant appears to be able to engage
in physical activities somewhat more onerous than those described in the FCE.
104.

In summary, while it is certainly possible to challenge certain aspects of the FCE,

it is a better prognosticator of Claimant's limitations than the choice offered by Defendants'
suggestion that Claimant has no physician-imposed limitations/restrictions, and therefore no
disability.
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105.

Therefore, the FCE will be used as a guide to evaluating Claimant's disability

from all causes combined.
106.

Having determined that the September 2015 FCE provides the best snapshot of

Claimant's functional limitations/restrictions, it is next necessary to evaluate how those
limitations/restrictions, in conjunction with Claimant's relevant non-medical factors, affect his
ability to engage in gainful activity. Per the two-step process envisioned by Page v. McCain
Foods, supra, attention is first directed to understanding Claimant's disability from all causes.

107.

As reflected in his testimony, and in the rep01is and testimony of Dr. Collins and

Mr. Jordan, Claimant is an older worker of Hispanic extraction who, while bilingual, has limited
education and limited ability to read and write in either English or Spanish. He has limited
computer skills, but is able to use a computer to perform some parts of his current job, i.e,
searching for replacement pmis. He has some transferable vocational skills; he can weld, and
has some abilities relating to repair and maintenance of farm and other equipment. He also has
abilities in the area of heavy equipment operation.

As foreman at Meyers Farms, he has

necessarily acquired some skills as a supervisor; he supervises and delegates work to two
subordinates. Claimant's past relevant work experience has largely been in the agricultural field,
although he has done some work in the remote past in a manufacturing environment. Based on
his job at Meyers Farms, Claimant has a demonstrated ability to assume responsibility for the
day-to-day operation of a relatively large farming operation. His skills are somewhat unique to
the Meyers Farm's operation; the Bruneau Farm has unique soil characteristics which make
in-igation challenging.
108.

Mr. Jordan proposed that on a pre-injury basis, Claimant had reasonable access to

17% of the jobs in his geographic locale. Dr. Collins did not quantify Claimant's pre-injury
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access to his local labor market, but proposed that based on Claimant's non-medical factors, he
would have access to agricultural and landscaping-type work absent physical limitations. These
assessments seem reasonable and not inconsistent.
109.

Mr. Jordan and Dr. Collins part ways, however, when it comes to the impact of

Claimant's current functional status on his employability, With no explanation other than his
reliance on OASYS software, Mr. Jordan opined that assuming the FCE recommendations, and
further assuming that Claimant loses his current employment with Meyers Farms, Claimant has
suffered 62% loss of access to his pre-injury labor market. Mr. Jordan also calculated a 32%
wage loss based on his belief that even with the limitations/restrictions derived from the
September 2015 FCE, Claimant has access to work paying in the range of $8.00 per hour. An
$8.00 per hour hourly wage in the labor market at large seems reasonable for any job that
Claimant might obtain in light of his current limitations/restrictions.
110.

The real issue is whether there are in fact suitable jobs for Claimant within his

limitations/restrictions. In his report, Mr. Jordan did not articulate the types of employment that
Claimant could compete for, assuming the limitations/restrictions outlined in the FCE and in Dr.
Hammond's testimony. However, in the course of his deposition, Mr. Jordan did offer some
comments on the types of employment he believed Claimant could still compete for in his labor
market should he lose his job with Meyers Farms. Mr. Jordan thought that Claimant's light-duty
restrictions would enable him to perform the physical requirements of a greeter, car porter at a
car dealership, security work, shuttle bus driving, school bus driving, sandwich making, job
coach monitor, pizza deliveryman, and sorter. (Jordan Depo., pp. 53:24-54:6). Mr. Jordan was
uncertain with what frequency jobs of these types become available in Claimant's labor market.
On cross examination, Mr. Jordan admitted that some aspects of school driving, sotting, and
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security jobs might be in excess of what is contemplated by the FCE. (Jordan Depo., pp. 160:20168:9). While it is probably true that Claimant can perform some, or even most, of the jobs
described by Mr. Jordan, there was little evidence about the number of jobs in the labor market
that remain for Claimant in his geographic area.
111.

Certainly, this was Dr. Collins' concern. She proposed that in view of the

limitations/restrictions identified in the FCE, and elaborated-on by Dr. Hammond, Claimant is
essentially unemployable in his geographic area, particularly when one takes into account the
fact that he is relatively unsophisticated, has minimal reading/writing skills, and was
as of the date of hearing. Dr. Collins acknowledged, of course, that Claimant has continued
to work for Employer since the subject accident, but she contends that he has required a great
deal of accommodation by his employer, that Claimant must make a "superhuman" effort to
continue in his current job and that the Employer is a "sympathetic employer." These factors
lead Dr. Collins to conclude that even though Claimant is currently employed, this fact does not
denigrate her conclusion that he is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled. However, Dr.
Collins had a poor understanding of the actual physical requirements of Claimant's cutTent job,
and an equally poor understanding of to what extent Claimant required the assistance of other
workers to perform. this work.

(Collins Depo., pp. 78:6-80:25; 84:20-92:5).

Dr. Collins'

uncertainty about the specific requirements of Claimant's current position, coupled with her
uncertainty of whether or how Claimant finds a way to perform this work, denigrates her
conclusion that Claimant is only able to continue working in his current job because of his
superhuman effort. Claimant has the ability, endorsed by his Employer, to delegate work to his
subordinates as necessary. Therefore, Claimant is not required to perform physical tasks which
are too difficult for him. While it's true that Claimant now takes longer to perform certain work,
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and now performs some of his work with more difficulty than he once did, the record does not
suppmi the conclusion that it is only by dint of superhuman effmi that Claimant is able to
continue in his current job,
112.

Relatedly, the record does not support the conclusion that Meyers Farms is a

"sympathetic" employer, Morgan Meyers' testimony is that Claimant is a valuable employee
who has a peculiar knowledge of Employer's operation such that his loss an almost untenable
proposition for Employer. This sentiment is perfectly expressed in Morgan Meyers' observation
that "we would be in a panic if he were gone." (Tr., pp. 189:24-190: 1). The record supports the
conclusion that the job Claimant performs is real and that his service is valuable, perhaps
essential, to Employer's business. However, Claimant's ability to perform his current job and
his value to his cmTent employer is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that Claimant is
totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. In other words, in the presence of
proof that Claimant is not "regularly employable in any well know branch of the labor market,"
the conclusion that Claimant is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine via
the route of futility (his only available route) would not be foreclosed by the fact that he is
demonstrably employable. After all, an odd-lot worker need not be unable to perform any work
at all. Gooby v, Lake Shore Management Co,, 136 Idaho 74, 29 P.3d 390 (2001). However,
Claimant's current job is nevertheless relevant, because once Claimant establishes, by prima
facie evidence, that he is an odd-lot worker, the burden shifts to the Employer to demonstrate

employability. Employer must show that there is an actual job within a reasonable distance from
Claimant's home which he is capable of performing, and which he has a reasonable opportunity
to obtain. Claimant's current job more than satisfies Employer's obligation to rebut a prima
facie case of total and pennanent disability. There is no reason to believe that Claimant's job
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will not continue, or that he will be unable to perform the requirements of that job until he
decides to retire.
113.

Based on the foregoing, even if Claimant had met his burden of proving a prima

facie case of odd-lot status, Defendants have clearly met their burden of proving that Claimant is
capable of performing an actual job which is likely to continue. However, the evidence does
establish

that

Claimant nevertheless

suffered

disability

as

a

consequence

of his

limitations/restrictions. Defendants' argument that Claimant's disability must be assessed at zero
because Claimant continues in his employment with Employer is rejected; this argument ignores
Claimant's significant limitations/restrictions and the consequences of those restrictions on his
ability to engage in gainful activity. However, the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous
employment since 2009, with significant annual increases in earnings, must be taken into
account. These facts set up the central conundrum of evaluating Claimant's disability: the fact
that in the labor market at large he has suffered a significant loss of access must be reconciled
with the seeming likelihood that Claimant will never suffer the financial impact of his disability.
114.

Claimant's age is, of course, one of the nonmedical factors which must be

considered when evaluating his disability under Idaho Code § 72-430. In many cases, the fact
that a claimant is an older worker is a factor which tends to support higher disability; everything
else being equal, employers are less inclined to hire an older worker, particularly one with some
functional limitations. In this case, Claimant's status as an older worker has the opposite effect.
If Claimant was 20 years of age, the Commission would be much less impressed by the fact that

Claimant has a job for which he is well suited, and an Employer who values his service. A lot
could happen in the forty or fifty years remaining in such an employee's work life. Here, though,
Claimant is near the end of his work life and holds employment in which he is likely to remain
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until he retires. This makes the fact of Claimant's cun-ent job much more significant in
evaluating his disability.
115.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that absent Claimant's cun-ent

employment, his disability, as of the date of hearing, would be profound, and possibly total and
permanent under the odd-lot doctrine. However, the fact that Claimant's current employment is
likely to continue at his current or higher wage must be taken into account. Based on these facts,
Claimant's proven disability is 40% of the whole person, inclusive of impaitment. Even though
Claimant may never suffer a wage loss, there is no dispute that the accident has left him without
access to a large swath of his pre-injury labor market, thus constraining his employment options
now and in the future, should he, for whatever reason, lose his current job. However, it seems
likely that Claimant's cun-ent employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to change
his cmTent situation.
Apportionment
116.

Since Claimant is less than totally and pe1manently disabled and since Claimant's

low back condition is not related to his employment, apportionment of disability between
Claimant's accident-produced condition and his low back condition under Idaho Code § 72-406
must be considered.
117.

Where a claim for disability less than total is before the Commission, so is the

issue of whether Employer bears full responsibility for Claimant's disability.

See Page v.

McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). In keeping with Barton v. Seventh
Heaven Recreation,_ Inc., 2010 IIC 0379 (2010), Claimant bears the burden of persuasion on the

issue of whether he has suffered disability referable to the subject accident. However, once
Claimant makes a prima facie showing in this regard, the burden of going forward with evidence
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that some portion of Claimant's disability is, in fact, referable to a pre-existing condition, shifts
to Defendants. See Albright v. MGM Construction, Inc., 102 Idaho 269, 629 P.2d 665 (1981);

Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473 (1980) (Bistline, J., and Donaldson, J. specially
concun'ing).
118.

In the instant matter, it is asserted that some part of Claimant's disability is

referable to Claimant's non-work related ,and pre-existing low back condition, because both PT
Wright and Dr. Hammond have established that some part of Claimant's limitations against
sitting, walking, and perhaps other functions, are referable to his low back condition. No one,
including the two vocational expet1s who were quizzed about the matter, could decide how these
opinions, as couched, could be applied to apportion responsibility for Claimant's disability. Nor
will the Commission attempt to do so. Defendants have adduced insufficient evidence to allow
consideration of how or whether Claimant's 40% disability should be appottioned to Claimant's
pre-existing low back condition.
Attorney Fees
119.

Claimant argues that because Defendants did not provide certain medical records

to Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan, the opinions of Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan are faulty,
and it was therefore unreasonable for Defendants to rely on these opinions to defend the claim,
such that Defendants are liable for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. These
arguments are not persuasive. There may be several reasons Defendants chose to proceed the
way they did, and these reasons do not even include simple oversight. There is insufficient
evidence that Defendants had designs on obtaining unsupported opinions on which to rely in
defending the claim. The Commission.declines to award attorney fees. 5

5

Moreover, we note that Claimant's counsel, too, chose what records to provide to the recipients of his several
letters.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1.

Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition is causally related to

the 2009 accident. Claimant is not entitled to benefits for this condition.
2.

Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his neck, left shoulder, and

left upper extremity as a consequence of the accident of October 5, 2009.
3.

Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his right knee as a

consequence of the accident of August 28, 2013,
4.

As a consequence of the October 5, 2009 accident Claimant has suffered

permanent impairment as follows: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person; left shoulder - 5%
of the left upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%.
5.

With respect to the accident of August 28, 2013, Claimant has suffered

impairment as follows:

right knee - 21 % lower extremity, 50% attributable to pre-existing

condition and 50% attributable to the 2013 accident.
6.

Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine, or if

he is, Defendants have met their burden of proving that there is an actual job within a reasonable
distance from Claimant's home which he is capable of performing.
7.

Defendants have failed to come forward with evidence which would support

apportionment of disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406.
8.

Claimant has suffered disability of 40% of the whole person, inclusive of

impairment, referable to the 2009 and 2013 accidents.
9.

Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804.

10.

There is no basis for the Commission's retention of jurisdiction over this case,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 70

198

11.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.
DATED this

1

day of

)b:pn' /

, 2018.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

:1
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Thomas P. Baskin, Co!l1l):llS§loner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ~ a y of ~ " (
, 2018, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONLSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was
served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:

L. CL YEL BERRY
POBOX302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

es!
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D ORIGn\\L,
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014
Attomeys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

IC No. 2009-029533
2013-024075

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendants, Robert J Meyers Farms, Inc., and State Insurance Fund, by and through their
counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law Offices, PLLC, hereby move the
Commission pursuant to J.R.P. 3 for an Order clarifying its Conclusions of Law and Order dated
April 9, 2018, ("Order") specifically paragraph 8 of its Conclusions of Law and Order that
"Claimant has suffered disability of 40% of the whole person, inclusive of impairment, referable
to the 2009 and 2013 accidents."
Defendants request clarification of this Conclusion of Law and Order to enable them to
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - I
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,,

pay benefits to Claimant. Defendants do not challenge the Commission's Conclusion of Law and
Order regarding the amount of permanent disability suffered by the Claimant; rather they seek to
determine what percentage of said permanent disability is owed for each of his accidents. As the
Commission is aware, pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-435 the rate of benefits payable for
permanent disability is based upon the date of injury. As a result, the permanent disability rates
for 2009 and 2013 are different. In order for Defendants to make proper payment to Claimant of
his 40% permanent disability inclusive of impairment, Defendants seek clarification from the
Commission as to what percentage of Claimant's permanent disability is attributable to each
accident.
In its April 9, 2018 Order the Commission found that as a consequence of Claimant's
October 5, 2009 accident he suffered permanent impairment of 6% of the whole person due to
his cervical spine injury and 5% of the left upper extremity due to his left shoulder injury. Order,
p. 70. This translates into a 9% whole person impairment suffered as result of his 2009 accident
and injury. With regard to his 2013 industrial accident, the Commission found that Claimant
suffered impairment of 21 % of the lower extremity of which 50% was attributable to pre-existing
conditions. Order, p. 70. Thus, the Claimant suffered permanent impairment in the amount of
10.5% of the lower extremity or 4.2% of the whole person due to his 2013 accident and injury.
Defendants believe, pursuant to the Commission's Conclusions of Law and Order, that
permanent disability benefits owed to Claimant should be paid in proportion to the respective
percentage of impairment suffered by the Claimant for each accident. Under this scenario,
approximately 68% (9% of 13.2%) of Claimant's permanent disability in excess of his
impairment is attributable to his 2009 accident while 32% (4.2% of I 3.2%) is attributable to his
2013 accident. Defendants seek clarification from the Commission so that they can make proper
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ d a y of April, 2018, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
¥Telecopy

L. Clyel BetTy
PO Box 83
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083
Attorney for Claimant

!~

\

i/1 di I
// ! / \ '
i

I

V

Paul J. Auf stine
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
Ayala/RES-DEF-REQ-CLARIFICATION/mek
Attorney for Claimant

0
'.._

ii

_,

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,

I.C. No. 2009-029533
1.C. No. 2013-024075

Plaintiff,

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
· COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his counsel of record herein, and
hereby files response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification; as follows:
Claimant concurs that the Commission's April 9, 2018, Order, referencing
paragraph 8 within the Conclusions of Law and Order, requires revisiting, as urged by
Defendants within Defendants' Motion for Clarification. It is believed that not only does
Claimant's impairment flowing from the .October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, accidents
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF
r.ONCI l lRIOJ,,f~ 01= I AW ANn ORIJER - 1
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
Ayala/RES-DEF-REQ-CLARI FICATION/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

I.C. No. 2009-029533
I.C. No. 2013-024075
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION OF
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW t3ND
~
ORDER

Employer,

:.n

,,and

=

l

f '"1

"'
-l

~-c·--

__·;:,r-q

- -. CJ

STATE INSURANCE FUND,

V>

u,

Surety,
Defendants.
and
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his counsel of record herein,
:
hereby files response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification, as follows
Claimant concurs that the Commission's April 9, 2018, Order, referencing
ng, as urged by
paragraph 8 within the Conclusions of Law and Order, requires revisiti
not only does
Defendants within Defendants' Motion for Clarification. It is believed that

2013, accidents
Claimant's impairment flowing from the October 6, 2009, and August 28,
ION OF
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICAT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER - 1
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nt's permanent
and injuries require separate analysis and discussion, but that Claima
be the subject of
disability flowing from and resultant of each of those accidents must also
separate discussion, analysis and findings.
the
However, it would be highly improper for the Commission to determine
6, 2009 or Augus t
extent of Claimant's permanent disability related to either the October
to one accident
28, 2013 accidents by utilizing the "ratio" of Claimant's impairment related
tively. Doing
to the sum of Claimant's impairment resultant of the two accidents, cumula
and 72-430.
so would both ignore and circumvent the mandate of Idaho Code§ § 72-425
is an
I.C. § 72-425 advises that a claimant's permanent disability rating " ...
engage in gainful
appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future ability to
and by pertinent
activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment
non-medical factors as provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code."

Thusly, permanent

ual's permanent
impairment is but the starting point in the determination of the individ
(impairment) as
disability, which requires both the evaluation of the physical disabl ement
nts separated
well as non-medical factors which, where the claim involves multiple accide
, 145 Idaho 302
by several years, require analysis as outlined in Page v. McCain Foods
(2008).
Dated this

_i,,/J_ day of April, 2018.

By_ ~£:: 1Z.. IC::. =l--- -.1-- ----- L. Clyel erry
Attorney for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
the 26 day of April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by facsimile to the
following:
th

Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTI NE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Fax No. (208) 947-0014

L. Clyel Berry
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
Ayala/MOT-RECON/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

>

r ··

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,

LC. No. 2009-029533
I.C. No. 2013-024075

Plaintiff,
vs.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO
REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF
AWARD UPON CONSIDERATION
OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE
OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO
CORRECT A MANIFEST
INJUSTICE; AND, FOR
CONSOLIDATION

Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant by and through his counsel of record herein and
pursuant to Rules JRPP 3F and/or 3G, in conjunction with I.C. §§ 72-718 and 72-719, and
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR
MODIFICATION OF AWARD UPON CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE
NATURE OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORRECT A 207
MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND, FOR CONSOLIDATION -1

hereby petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission to reconsider its Findings,
Conclusions and Order dated April 9, 2018; to reopen proceedings herein for the purpose
of presenting further and additional matters to be considered by the Commission upon the
grounds that Claimant has suffered a change in the nature and/or extent of his
disablement; to correct a manifest injustice; and, for consolidation.
This Motion is made upon the grounds and for the reasons as are stated both
within Claimant's Affidavit and Memorandum in Support, each filed contemporaneously
herewith.
Dated this

o?l day of April, 2018.
STEPHA N,KVA

, STONE & TRAINO R

By_~ '::J/, l,~.1 .----, /----- -L. Clyel erry
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
the ;),Jrrlday of April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing docume nt by depositing a
true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
.J,(_

Paul J. Augustine
AUGUST INE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR
MODIFICATION OF AWARD UPON CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE
NATURE OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORRE CT A208
MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND, FOR CONSOLIDATION - 2

STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303 -0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-73 3-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
Ayala/MOT-RECON-AFF/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

1.C. No. 2009-0 29533
1.C. No. 2013-0 24075

MARIO AYALA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO
AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION;
MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR
MODIFICATION OF AWARD UPON
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE
IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT OF
CLAIMANT'S DISABLEMENT
AND/OR TO CORRECT A
MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND, FOR
CONSOLIDATION

Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County

ofJt.Ji..

fd/r

)
) ss.
)

U)

U>

(Ji

w
':;,}
oath,
on
COMES NOW Claimant, Mario Ayala and, being first duly sworn

deposes and states as follows:
N FOR
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPPO RT OF MOTIO
OF AWARD UPON
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION
CLAIMANT'S
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT OF
FOR
AND,
ICE;
INJUST
EST
MANIF
A
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORR ECT
CONSOLIDATION - 1
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That affiant is Mario Ayala, Claimant in the above captioned cause

1.

and

ission. Further, affiant
matter currently pending before the Idaho State Industrial Comm
he would be competent
makes this Affidavit based upon personal knowledge as to which
to testify before the Commission.
2.

t
That following the October 26, 2016, hearing in this matter, affian

rt J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
remained within the employ of Defendant-employer herein, Robe
were $47,690.00, as
Affiant's wages/earnings by reason of said employment during 2016
and Tax Statement,
evidenced by the true and correct copy of affiant's 2016 W-2 Wage
herewith affixed and attached as Exhibit A hereto.
3.

were
That, commencing in 2017, affiant's wages and/or earnings

gs for and during tax
reduced by Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc., such that affiant's earnin
within affiant's 2017 W-2
year ended December 31, 2017, totaled $27,500.00, as set-forth
is herewith affixed and
Wage and Tax Statement, a true and correct copy of which
attached as Exhibit B hereto.
4.

r
That for and during calendar year 2018, affiant's wages and/o

Farms, Inc., remain at the
earnings by reason of his employment with/by Robert J. Meyers
the monthly salary which
reduced rate/level, with affiant's understanding that rather than
an hourly basis with the
he earned during 2016 and prior thereto, he is currently paid upon
also employed by Robert
hourly wage being approximately the same as his two "helpers,"
J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
5.

t J.
That on or about June 7, 2017, while employed with/by Rober

ith, affiant fell while
Meyers Farms, Inc., and engaged in the duties of employment therew
MOTION FOR
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF
ON OF AWARD UPON
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATI
OF CLAIMANT'S
T
EXTEN
OR
RE
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE NATU
AND, FOR
TICE;
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORR ECT A MANIFEST INJUS
CONSOLIDATION - 2
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' irrigation system, and
working upon one of the pivots constituting a part of the Farms
Johnson, who was
suffered left knee injury. Affiant thereafter presented to Dr. Miers
r August 28, 2013, right
affiant's orthopedic surgeon who treated affiant regarding his earlie
knee injury, at issue herein.
6.

It is affiant's understanding and belief, from Dr. Johnson, that the

affiant under
7, 2017, right knee injury consisted of a torn meniscus, for which

June

went surgery

by Dr. Johnson.
7.

at
Affiant last presented to Dr. Johnson on or about April 16, 2018,

achieved maximum
which time Dr. Johnson advised that he was releasing affiant as having
Dr. Johnson advised
medical improvement absent the surety authorizing left TKA, which
it C hereto a true and
affiant he requires. Affiant herewith affixes and attaches as Exhib
dated April 16, 2018,
correct copy of Dr. Johnson's Report of Work Status and Restrictions
tions and/or limitations
confirming the same and which sets-forth the physical restric
recommended by Dr. Johnson.

Pursuant thereto, said limitations and/or restrictions

preclusion from continual
encompass preclusion from repeated bending and/or stooping;
s; and, Dr. Johnson
standing and/or walking; preclusion from lifting in excess of 20 pound
pivots/irrigation system,
instructed affiant that he was precluded from climbing onto the
engaging in the integral
which, if adhered to by affiant, effectively precludes affiant from
rs Farms, Inc.
and/or primary function of his employment with/at Robert J. Meye
8.

a.
From the perspective of affiant, he is currently faced with a dilemm

by Dr. Johnson, taken
If he adheres to the physical restrictions and/or limitations as set
and August 28, 2013
cumulatively with those residual to/from his earlier October 6, 2009
MOTION FOR
AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPP ORT OF
ON OF AWARD UPON
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATI
OF CLAIMANT'S
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with the
industrial injuries, it will be impossible for affiant to continue in his employment
and/or
farm. Conversely, if he fails to conform to Dr. Johnson's recommended restrictions
y
limitations, there is certainty that affiant will suffer significant increased symptomatolog
as well as risk of injury and/or re-injury.
DATED this

JS

day of April, 2018.

MaMo~

(jj£

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
~ day ofI hereby
April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true

the
g:
copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the followin
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT, MARIO AYALA, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
UPON
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF AWARD
NT'S
CLAIMA
OF
CONSIDERATION OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE OR EXTENT
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO CORRE CT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE; AND, FOR
CONSOLIDATION - 4
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Message:
Attached, please find Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision Motions; and,
Claimant's Objection to Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Claimant, dated May 22, 2018, for filing, with
hard copies having been mailed via U.S. Mail.

Hard copy to follow:

'g Yes D No

IMPORTANT: This communication is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is
addressed. It may contain information that is confidential and/or privileged. If you are not the intended recipient,
or ifyou are not responsible for delivering tllis communication to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that
the disclosure of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please
notify us immediately by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via regular postal
service. Thank you.
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

.,
C.J

"· '"

I.C. No. 2009-029533
I.C. No. 2013-024075

MARIO AYALA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION; MOTION TO
REOPEN; FOR MODIFICATION OF
AWARD UPON CONSIDERATION
OF A CHANGE IN THE NATURE
OR EXTENT OF CLAIMANT'S
DISABLEMENT AND/OR TO
CORRECT A MANIFEST
INJUSTICE; AND, FOR
CONSOLIDATION

Surety,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Octob
Hearing in this matter was held before Referee Michael Powers upon
26, 2016.

er

depositions
Following the submission of the parties' respective post-hearing

ber 3, 2017.
and briefing, this matter came under advisement upon Novem

By
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correspondence to counsel dated January 3, 2018, the Commission advised that Referee
Powers was experiencing "a backlog of cases," such that,
... the Commissioners are willing to write this decision on the record adduced
to expedite moving this along. If you are willing for the Commissioners to do
so, we will reassign the case and will proceed accordingly. If not, resolution
of the case will be handled by Referee Powers in due course.
nt
By correspondence to the Commission dated January 11, 2018, counsel for Claima
thanked the Commission for its offer but noted that,
[h]owever, the decision rendered would then be absent the consideration of
Mr. Ayala's observational credibility which (was) believed to be an important
consideration in this case. For that reason, both Mr. Ayala and my office are
willing to wait for Mr. Powers' Recommendation.
e
Page 5 of the Commission's April 9, 2018, Decision noted that, "[w]hile we are sensitiv
timely
to the desires of the parties, our obligation to manage our docket to promote
April 9,
decisions supports assignment of this matter to the Commission." Thusly, the
tional
2018, decision rendered herein was without consideration of Mr. Ayala's observa
context
credibility or benefit of Mr. Powers' impressions of Mr. Ayala at hearing within the
which
of his ability to understand the proceedings, generally, and specifically the degree to
to
he understood questions interposed (and thusly the accuracy of his responses given
Powers
those questions) during the taking of his testimony; impressions made by Mr.
d
during the course of the hearing as to whether or to what extent Mr. Ayala exhibite
indication of symptomatology; and, somewhat interrelated with indicators of manifes

tation,

in his
impressions regarding the likelihood that Mr. Ayala would be able to continue
s
employment with Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc., and irrespective of the accommodation
context
made by the employer as of the date of hearing. It is, to certain extent, within this
that certain of the instant Motion is made.
TION;
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The Commission's April 9, 2018, decision noted that Claimant's " ... real value
to Employer is his specific knowledge of the irrigation system." F/F, ,i 3 at p. 7. The
Commission further noted that Mr. Ayala's " ... skills are somewhat unique to the Meyers
Farm's operation." F/F, ,i 107 at p. 63. After discussing and, in fact, determining that the
Wright FCE results was " ... a better prognosticator of Claimant's limitations than ...
Defendants' suggestion that Claimant has no physician-imposed limitations/restrictions,"
the Commission noted it was "impressed" by the fact that Employer is obviously aware
" ... that Claimant does not retain the same physical ability he had prior to the 2009 accident
(and) ... is aware that Claimant has physical limitations/restrictions and that he has found
a way to accommodate his limitations .... " F/F, ,i,i 102-104, p. 62.
While acknowledging that Claimant's ability to perform his current job and his
value to his current employer is not necessarily inconsistent with the finding that Claimant
is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine, the Commission reasoned
that,
[i]n many cases, the fact that a claimant is an older worker is a factor which
tends to support higher disability; everything else being equal, employers are
less inclined to hire an older worker, particularly one with some functional
limitations. In this case, Claimant's status an older worker has the opposite
effect. If Claimant was 20 years of age, the Commission would be much less
impressed by the fact that Claimant has a job for which he is well suited, and
an employer who values his service. A lot could happen in the 40 or 50
years remaining in such an employee's work life. Here, though, Claimant is
near the end of his work life and holds employment in which he is likely to
remain until he retires.
F/F, ,i 114, pp. 67-68. The Commission rationalized that there was no reason to believe
that Mr. Ayala's job would not continue, or that he will be unable to perform the
requirements of that job until he decides to retire. F/F, ,i 112, pp. 66-67.
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The Commission then determined that,
... absent Claimant's current employment, his disability, as of the date of
hearing, would be profound, and possibly total and permanent under the
odd-lot doctrine. However, the fact that Claimant's current employment is
likely to continue at his current or higher wage must be taken into account.
Based on these facts, Claimant's proven disability is 40 percent of the whole
person, inclusive of impairment. ... There is no dispute that the accident has
left him without access to a large swath of his pre-injury labor market, thus
constraining his employment options now and in the future, should he, for
whatever reason, lose his current job. However, it seemed likely that
Claimant's current employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to
change his current situation.
F/F ,i 16, P. 68. Since Mr. Ayala's industrial accidents of October 6, 2009 and August 28,
2013, he suffered an industrial injury to his finger, which was somewhat discussed at
hearing. Tr., p. 138, L. 16-p. 139, L. 10. Within her post-hearing deposition, Dr. Collins
expressed concern over the possibility of "safety issues," presented by Mr. Ayala's
continued employment. Collins Depo., p. 29, LL. 18-21.
Following hearing but prior to the April 9, 2018, Decision herein, the concerns
of Dr. Collins have come to fruition and the confidence expressed by the Commission that
there was " ... no reason to believe that Claimant's job will not continue, or that he will be
unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire ... (and Claimant)
holds employment in which he is likely to remain until he retires," is seen to have been
overly optimistic. Request is made that the Commission take judicial notice of the claim
file regarding I.C. No. 2017-017451, relating to Mr. Ayala's June 7, 2017, left knee
industrial injury suffered while continuing in his employment at Meyers Farms.
Upon June 7, 2017, Mr. Ayala injured his left knee and currently presents
status-post surgery by Dr. Miers Johnson. Upon April 16, 2018, Dr. Johnson determined
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status
that Mr. Ayala requires left TKA. Following that procedure, Mr. Ayala will present
cage
post anterior microdiskectomy, C6-7 with arthrodesis, C5-6 arthrodesis, Bengal
r
lordotic prosthetics X2 and anterior stabilization; left ulnar nerve neurolysis, anterio
labral
subcutaneous transposition; left subacromial decompression, distal claviculectomy,
of said
and joint debridement and rotator cuff repair; right TKA; and, left TKA, with each
The
procedures related to injuries suffered during his employment at Meyers Farms.
res
effects and/or cumulative residuals from these injuries and related medical procedu
ition
most certainly cast considerable doubt upon the validity of the Commission's suppos
will be
that, "[t)here is no reason to believe that Claimant's job will not continue, or that he
unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire."
Mr. Ayala currently presents status post surgical repair of his left torn
d to
meniscus by Dr. Miers Johnson related to his June 7, 2017, industrial injury. Attache
Work
Mr. Ayala's Affidavit in Support is a true and correct copy of Dr. Johnson's Report of
ed
Status and Restrictions dated April 16, 2018, which advises that Mr. Ayala then present
left
at maximum medical improvement absent the surety's authorization to proceed with
TKA, which Dr. Johnson advises Mr. Ayala requires.

Absent TKA, Mr. Ayala has

d
restrictions related to left knee presentment which include preclusion of repeate
lifting
bending/stooping; preclusion from continual standing and/or walking; preclusion from
by Mr.
greater than 20 pounds; and, preclusion from "climbing into pivots." As noted
Morgan Meyers at hearing, Claimant is the "only one" on the farm qualified to fix/repa

ir the

recent
pivots, which requires climbing. Tr., p. 180, LL. 1-7. Of note, Claimant's most
while
industrial injury, being to his left knee, was the result of an accident occurring
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In expressing its
Claimant was working upon one of the farm's pivot irrigation systems.
t permanent
rationale for the April 9, 2018, decision awarding Mr. Ayala but 40 percen
disability, the Commission determined at pages 66-68 that:

,i 112: "[t]here is no reason to believe that Claimant's job will not

continue, or that he will be unable to perform the requirements
of that job until he decides to retire."
,i 113: "...the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous
employment since 2009, with significant annual increases in
earnings, must be taken in to account."
,i 114: "Claimant... holds employment in which he is likely to remain
until he retires. This makes the fact of Claimant's current job
much more significant in evaluating his disability."
,i 115: "... the Commission concludes that absent Claimant's current
employment, his disability, as of the date of hearing, would be
profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot
However, the fact that Claimant's current
doctrine.
employment is likely to continue at his current or higher wage
must be taken into account. ... Even through Claimant may
never suffer a wage loss, there is no dispute that the accident
has left him without access to a large swath of his pre-injury
labor market, thus constraining his employment options now
and in the future, should he, for whatever reason, lose his
current job. However, it seems likely that Claimant's current
employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to
change his current situation."
Claimant again emphasizes the Commission's assumption that " ... the fact

that Claimant's current employment is likely to continue at his current or higher
be taken

into account."

Attached to Claimant's Affidavit in

wage must

Support,

filed

for 2016 and
contemporaneously herewith, are true and correct copies of Claimant's W-2s
s Farms totaled
2017. As seen thereby, during 2017 Claimant's earnings from Meyer
of the October
$27,500.00, being far less than the $47,690.00, Claimant earned the year
gs for/during
26, 2016, hearing herein. Tr., p. 169, LL. 5-15. In fact, Claimant's earnin
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2017 were actually less than Claimant's 2013 time of injury earnings of $28,652.00. Def.

Ex. 7, p. 143.
Thusly, it is certain and cleartha tthe April 9, 2018, Decision was based upon
the Commission's assumptions that, (1) Claimant's time-of-hearing level of earnings would
continue if not increase; and, (2) that Claimant's time-of-hearing employment with Meyers
Farms would continue "... until he decides to retire."

Upon the premise that these

assumptions would, in fact, prove true the Commission discounted Mr. Ayala's disability,
from being "... profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine," to
but 40 percent of the whole man, inclusive of impairment.
The first of these assumptions has now been proven to be ill founded and
false. Hearing in this matter was held upon October 26, 2016. The very next year Meyers
Farms reduced Mr. Ayala's earnings/wages from $47,690.00, earned during 2016, to
$27,500.00, earned during 2017.
The Commission's second assumption was that Mr. Ayala's time-of-hearing
employment with Meyers Farms would continue "until he retires." In this regard, Mr. Ayala
never wanted to "retire." Rather, Mr. Ayala planned upon working "until I can't." Tr., p.
137, LL. 16-17; also see Tr., p. 163, LL. 20-23. As of current, it appears clear that with Dr.
Johnson's recommended physical restrictions/limitations it is highly doubtful that Mr. Ayala
will be able to continue in his employment with Meyers Farms, even considering the
accommodations made/allowed by Meyers Farms as of the date of hearing herein. It is for
and upon the above that counsel has made the instant Motions upon behalf of Claimant.
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

As above-noted and clearly stated by the Commission within

its April 9, 2018,

ant is an "older worker"; the
decision, by reason of the combination of the facts that Claim
rs Farms was secure; and,
Commission's assumption that his employment at/with Meye
rements of that
that he would have physical capacity to conform to the requi

position " ... until

nt is likely to continue
he decides to retire"; and, " ... that Claimant's current employme

at his

but 40 percent disability as
current or higher wage ... ,"the Commission awarded Mr. Ayala
und, and possibly total and
opposed to disability described by the Commission as " ... profo
permanent under the odd-lot doctrine."
, hearing, Mr.
As above-noted, during the year of the October 26, 2016
first calendar year following
Ayala's earnings from Meyers Farms were $47,690.00. The
$20,190.00, less than the year
the hearing Mr. Ayala's earnings were $27,500.00, being
Claimant presents status post
prior. Further, by reason of yet another industrial injury
he "needs" left TKA, without
meniscus repair, with his orthopedic surgeon advising that
r limitations than were existing
which Claimant has significant additional restrictions and/o
employment at/with Meyers
at the time of hearing herein, which places his continued
Farms highly improbable if not impossible.
resulted in the
Thusly, the factors considered by the Commission which
Commission's treatment of Claimant as "an older worker" in

the exact opposite matter than

invalid.
is typically and customarily done have been shown to be
significantly
In the instant matter, it is clear that the Commission
reason of his being an "older
discounted/reduced Mr. Ayala's permanent disability by
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worker," as opposed to supporting a higher disability.

The Commission's rationale

expressed in the instant matter must be compared with and contrasted to prior decisions
presenting similar facts.
In Woody v. Seneca Foods, I.C. 2010-012114, decided May 23, 2013,
claimant was within two months of being 65 at the time of hearing and resided in Buhl,
th
Idaho. That claimant had finished the 9 grade and enjoyed reading. That claimant's

employment history included being a housekeeper at a hospital; working at Green Giant,
inspecting corn; working in a position packaging beans; and, ultimately was employed at
Seneca on a machine which packaged boxes of corn into larger boxes, which required no
lifting and could be done either seated or standing. In the consideration of relevant nonmedical factors, the Commission noted that claimant was

and, "[a)s an

older worker, claimant's age reduces her employability," and awarded disability accordingly.
In fact, excepting the instant matter, counsel was unable to find a singular instance where
the Commission decreased a claimant's permanent disability from what it otherwise would
have awarded upon the basis that that claimant was an "older worker." Doing so appears
to be in direct conflict with the promise set-forth within I.C. § 72-201, which clearly notes
that Title 72 was promulgated to provide " ... sure and certain relief for injured workman and
their families." In case after case Idaho's Supreme Court provided instruction that Idaho's
Workman's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of claimants. The
Commission's decision herein represents the exact opposite.
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's rationale as specifically setforth within its decision herein punishes Mr. Ayala for continuing to work following his
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October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, industrial accidents. Had Mr. Ayala terminated his
employment after either of those events, he most likely would have been awarded the
entirety of his permanent disability related to and resultant of injuries suffered therein,
without reduction.
I.C. § 72-719 MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF AWARD

Claimant hereat petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for a
modification of the April 9, 2018, award upon the basis that Claimant has suffered a
significant and substantial change in the nature or extent of his disablement; and, the
reopening and/or review of the April 9, 2018, decision is required to correct a manifest
injustice.
Upon the same grounds, basis and references to the record as herein-above
set-forth and/or made, Claimant argues that the nature of his disablement has significantly
changed/increased subsequent to the April 9, 2018, decision herein. As therein stated by
the Commission, the rationale advanced by the Commission to support its 40 percent
whole person disability award to Claimant was upon the dual-pronged assumptions that
Mr. Ayala's time-of-hearing employment would continue at the then current or higher
wages; and, that Mr. Ayala would not become unable to perform the requirements of that
employment "until he decides to retire."
First of all, as above set-forth, Mr. Ayala's wages/earnings for the year during
which his hearing was held, being 2016, were $47,690.00. The very next year, being 2017,
his earnings were reduced to $27,500.00. Further, during 2017 Mr. Ayala suffered yet
another serious injury as a result of his employment, related to which he has undergone
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meniscectomy and currently requires left TKA. Absent left TKA, Mr. Ayala presents at MMI
and has work restrictions and/or limitations related to his left lower extremity which include
preclusion from repeated bending and/or stooping; preclusion from continual standing
and/or walking; preclusion from lifting in excess of 20 pounds; and, preclusion from
climbing into/onto pivots.
It should appear obvious that Mr. Ayala is currently faced with the decision
of either continuing in his employment requiring activities significantly in excess of his
restrictions and/or limitations, which will expose him to both increased symptomatology as
well as risk of further injury; or, refusing to engage in physical activities excess to Dr.
Johnson's recommended restrictions and/or limitations, resulting in probable termination.
With the invalidity of the Commission's assumptions expressed as support
for its decision to reduce Mr. Ayala's disability award from " ... profound, and possibly total
and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine," the 40 percent disability, actually awarded by
the April 9, 2018, decision most certainly and clearly represents an extreme manifest
injustice which requires correction.
As noted by the Commission's April 9, 2018, decision, prior to receipt of
Referee Powers' recommendations, the Commission determined to reassign the case to
itself, and proceeded to render its decision absent benefit of observing Mr. Ayala at
hearing. Thusly, the decision herein is without benefit of observing Mr. Ayala manifesting
symptomatology upon sitting and/or arising from a seated position; exhibiting instability
upon walking; or, to weigh the credibility and/or truthfulness of Mr. Ayala's testimony when
describing his symptomatology and restrictions residual from the 2009 and 2013 industrial
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injuries. Claimant submits that had the Commission had opportunity to observe Mr. Ayala
at hearing, it may well not have concluded that Mr. Ayala would be able to continue in his
time-of-hearing employment until he wished to retire and would have awarded Mr. Ayala
the " ... profound, and possibly total and permanent (disability) under the odd-lot doctrine"
then due.
However, irrespective of the Commission's opportunity to have observed Mr.
Ayala and thusly to add its impressions thereasto into its consideration of the appropriate
award of permanent disability, what is most certainly clear is that, even as of the date the
Commission's decision was released, the rationale expressed by the Commission as
support for discounting Mr. Ayala's disability from profound, and possibly total and
permanent, no longer existed.
MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION

Absent the Commission revisiting its April 9, 2018, decision together with its
stated rationale as therein set-forth, Title 72 Defendants herein will receive a windfall,
either at the expense of Mr. Ayala or, more likely, the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund within
proceedings brought before the Commission flowing from the June 7, 2017, industrial
accident and left knee injury. With the filing of Mr. Ayala's Complaint for Hearing relating
to the June 7, 2017, industrial accident, that cause should be consolidated with the instant
action regarding the October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, claims.

Therein, the

responsibility of current Title 72 Defendants for Claimant's cumulative permanent disability
from the combined effects of the three industrial occurrences could be determined.
However, absent consolidation/joinder of the three claims, if the Commission refuses to
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revisit its April 9, 2018, decision, upon the likelihood that Mr. Ayala will be determin ed to
be totally and permane ntly disabled within the 2017 claim, the responsibility for Mr. Ayala's
permane nt disability which otherwis e would have and should have been borne by current
Title 72 Defenda nts will become that of the ISIF.
Wherefo re, it is respectfully submitted that the instant matter compels the
Commis sion's reconsideration of its April 9, 2018, decision rendered herein; the
modifica tion thereof pursuan t to I.C. § 72-719(1 )(a) and/or (3); and/or the consolidation of
the instant matter with I.C. 2017-01 7451.
Dated this

.:f:J__ day of April, 2018.
STEPHAN, KVANVI G, STONE & TRAINO R

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on
day of April, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing docume nt by depositin g a true
the
copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addresse d to the following:
~

,:[l

Paul J. Augustin e
AUGUST INE LAW OFFICE S, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

L. Clyel B
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STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
22659/MOT-CONSOLIDATE/mek
Attorney for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARIO AYALA,

LC. No. 2009-029533
LC. No. 2013-024075

Claimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC,

MOTION FOR ORDER O!j';:
CONSOLIDATION
CJ
c::
(/)
--j

Employer,

I

r-0
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
MARIO AYALA,

LC. No. 2017-017451

Claimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
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COMES NOW Claimant, in the above-referenced matters, causes and claims,
pursuant to Rule 3 (B) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, and hereby moves and
petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission for its Order of Consolidation, consolidating the
above-referenced claims and actions for all further purposes herein.
Claimant advises that, pursuant to that Order to Consolidate, dated March 28, 2014,
LC. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2013-024075 were consolidated. Thusly, the instant Motion seeks to
consolidate LC. No. 2017-017451 into those proceedings, such that the three claims/actions are
consolidated into a single proceeding. In support of the instant Motion, Claimant notes that both the
employer and surety are "common" as among and between each of the three claims. Further, it is
believed that Defendants may have "common" defenses thereto, such that there are common issues
presented by and within each of the above-captioned actions by reason of which the respective
liability of Defendants together with the entitlement of Claimant to workers' compensation benefits
cannot be determined except upon consolidation of said claims within a single proceeding.
Claimant directs the attention of the Commission to the fact that hearing on claims
numbered 2009-029533 and 2013-040275 was held upon October 26, 2016 and, thereafter, the
Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated and filed April 9,
2018. However, in light of there being post-hearing Motions filed by and upon behalf of both
Defendants and Claimant herein, it is respectfully submitted that the April 9, 2018, Findings,
Conclusions and Order, is not final, such that said matter remains pending. Further, by reference to
Claimant's Motions currently pending therein, consolidation thereof with LC. No. 2017-017451 is
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mandate d.
DATED This_ _/_ day of May, 2018.
, STONE & TRAIN OR

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the
day of May, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing docume nt by depositi ng a true copy
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:

l

Paul J. Augustine
AUGUS TINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Idaho State Insuranc e Fund
Post Office Box 990004
Boise, Idaho 83 799
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0 000
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PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014
Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION
MOTIONS

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustine Law
Offices, PLLC, hereby oppose Claimant's Post-Decisions Motions on the grounds that: (1) Claimant
seeks to introduce new evidence which is not properly in the record to support his Motion for
Reconsideration; (2) Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because there is
substantial evidence to suppmt the Commission's April 9, 2018 decision and Claimant now alleges
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that he is totally and permanently disabled by virtue of a new 2017 injmy; (3) Claimant's Motion for
Modification of Award pursuant to LC.§ 72-719 is not ripe, is barred by the five year statute of
limitations as it relates to the 2009 accident and is unfounded as there has been no change in the
nature or extent of Claimant's disablement nor has there been a manifest injustice; (4) Claimant's
Motion for Consolidation lacks merit and would penalize employer for continuing to gainfully
employ Claimant; and (5) Claimant's Motion to Reopen is based upon a 2017 accident and injmyto
a new body part that is unrelated to his injuries suffered in 2009 and 2013.
Claimant's counsel, through his various contradicto1y and untimely motions, is performing
the legal equivalent of throwing spaghetti against the wall to see what sticks in an attempt to claim
that the Commission should find that his client is totally and permanently disabled. On the one hand,
he alleges that due to his Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission's April 9, 2018 award is not
final. On the other hand, he moves to reopen and/or for modification of the Commission's April 9,
2018 award on the grounds that there has been a change in the nature of Claimant's disablement
and/or to correct a manifest injustice. On the one hand, he alleges that the Commission erred in its
April 9, 2018 award when it found that Claimant only suffered a 40% disability inclusive of
impairment as a result of his 2009 and 2013 accidents. Yet, on the other hand, he argues that by
virtue of a new injury suffered in 2017, the Claimant has suffered a change in his disablement and is
now totally and permanently disabled. All of Claimant's motions lack merit and should be denied.
A review of Claimant's testimony and the exhibits ofrecord establish that Claimant's main
disabling condition at the time of his hearing was his low back which required surgery and which the
Commission found was not related to either of his industrial accidents. Claimant does not challenge
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this finding in his Motion for Reconsideration. Claimant testified that he is limited by both sitting
and standing which causes pain in his low back and numbness down his legs. HT p. 120. His low
back pain causes him difficulty getting up and walking from a seated position. HT p. 121. As a
result, he feels like he has trouble with his balance and falls over. Id. His low back affects his ability
to drive long distances which requires him to stop all the time. Id. His low back limits his walking to
a quarter of a mile. lfhe walks up and down it causes additional low back pain. HT p.122. His low
back pain requires him to use a cane occasionally. Id. He was ve1y clear that it was his low back
condition and not his knee that causes him to use a cane. HT p. 123. Claimant also testified that
assuming he had no problems with his left shoulder, left elbow or right knee he would still have
difficulty lifting things off of the floor due to his low back. Id. At the time of his FCE, upon which
the Commission relied in determining the Claimant suffered disability and access of his impai1ment,
the Claimant 's primary diagnosis was "lumbar spine injury." Ex. 23, p. 646. The therapist who
perfmme d the FCE determined that the Claimant's low back condition affected the Claimant 's
functional ability to walk, lift from waist to floor, lift and carry, forward bend, stand and sit. Id. at p.
647.
In light of this evidence, Claimant now alleges that there is a change in his disablement due to
his 2017 left knee injury. Claimant claims that he should be allowed to consolidate his previously
adjudicated 2009 and 2013 accident claims with his new 2017 claim against the employer as the
recent restrictions he received for his left knee injury render him totally and permanently disabled.
The fact that the Claimant now alleges that his new restrictions which he claims prohibit him from
climbing on pivots is totally disabling to him completely undercuts his argument that his prior 2009
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and 2013 injuries alone render him totally and permanently disabled. Defendants contend that these
contradict01y positions are sanctionable.
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration Should be Denied
Under Idaho Code§ 72-718 a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be
final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided within twenty days for the date of filing
the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision. In this case,
Claimant based, in part, his Motion for Reconsideration on new post- hearing evidence that is not
properly before the Commission in its record and should not be considered as evidence. This new
evidence is contained in Claimant's affidavit which, upon inspection, is clearly the declaration of his
counsel and not a statement of the Claimant who required an interpreter at hearing. This new
evidence is not properly before the Commission on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration, as a
motion for reconsideration should be limited to the evidence that is of record at the time the case was
submitted to the Commission for a decision and was properly submitted to the Commission pursuant
to Rule 10.
The new evidence which the Claimant wishes the Commission to consider on his Motion to
Reconsider includes a decrease in his total earnings from 2016 to 2017 and his new restrictions
imposed as a result of a 2017 left knee injury. Defendants have moved to strike Claimant's affidavit
on the grounds that this new evidence is not properly before the Commission on Claimant's Motion
for Reconsideration. Regardless, this new evidence does not justify a change in the Commission's
award of 40% disability inclusive of impairment set forth in the Commission's April 9, 2018 award.

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION MOTIONS - 4
236

Allowing any post-decision change in Claimant's employment should not be a basis for
reconsidering the Commission's disability dete1mination.
There is no evidence that the Claimant's reduction in his total earnings from 2016 to 2017 is
a result of the Claimant's injuries that he suffered in 2009 and 2013 or the impailments resulting
therefrom. Claimant offered no explanation as to why his total earnings were lowered. Claimant
testified that he receives an annual bonus from his employer although he does not know how that is
figmed. HT p. 78. Claimant is forcing the Commission to speculate as to why his total earnings were
reduced in 201 7 because he offered no evidence that his earnings were reduced by his failure to
perform his duties or his failure to receive his n01mal wage. One explanation is that the Claimant
failed to receive a bonus in 2017. At the time of the hearing, Claimant made approximately double
what he made at the time he was injured. HT p. 169. Therefore, even if the Commission considers
the Claimant's earnings in 2017, he has not suffered wage loss from the time of his 2009 accident.
As is readily apparent from the fact that the Claimant suffered a new injury in 2017, the
Claimant continues to perf01m the essential functions of his job upon which the Commission based
its decision that the Claimant failed to prove total and permanent disability. By Claimant's counsel's
admissions in his briefing, the Claimant's new restrictions due to his 2017 left knee injury affect his
ability to perform the essential functions of his job, i.e., irrigation work, because he allegedly cannot
climb on pivots to repair them.
The fact that the Claimant continues to receive his n01mal wages nine years after his initial
accident establishes that the Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled and proves that the
Commission's April 2017 decision should not be altered. His continued employment is consistent
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with the Commission's findings that he would continue to be employed as he performs essential
functions necessary for the continued operation of the employer's farm.
While Claimant argues that the Commission erred in finding that the Claimant could continue
working at the employer's farm until his retirement, the fact that the Claimant testified that he
contacted Social Security within one year of the hearing to determine how much he would receive in
retirement benefits proves that the Claimant was considering retirement prior to hearing. HT p. 145,
I. 9 - p. 146, I. 1. Claimant also testified that he intended to work as long as Mr. Meyers has a job
available for him. HT p. 163, LI. 19-22. The fact that the Claimant is still working nine years
following his initial industrial accident establishes that the Claimant's employment is likely to
continue as long as Claimant is able to work and the employer has work available for him.
The Commission's decision awarding Claimant 40% disability inclusive ofhis impai1ment is
consistent with the facts of record regarding the Claimant's physical limitations resulting from his
2009 and 2013 accidents, his failure to prove that his significantly disabling low back condition was
related to either accident, and his nine year work history following his industrial accident.
Therefore, even if the Commission decides to consider the Claimant's attempt to circumvent
Rule 10 and consider his new evidence, his Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.

Claimant's Motion for Modification of Award Pursuant to I.C. § 72-719 Must be Denied
Claimant moved, pursuant to I.C. § 72-719, for modification of the Commission's April
9, 2018 award on two grounds: (1) that Claimant suffered a "significant and substantial change in
the nature or extent of his disablement" and (2) the correction of a manifest injustice. As
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previously noted, since the Commission's April 9, 2018 award is not final by virtue of the
Claimant's contemporaneously filed Motion for Reconsideration, Claimant's motion pursuant to
I.C. § 72-719 is not ripe. Regardless, the purported factual basis for the Claimant's allegation that
he suffered a "significant and substantial change in the nature or extent of his disablement" is
that his earnings were reduced in 2017 and that he suffered a new injury to his left knee in 2017.
As is shown in greater detail below, Claimant's counsel misrepresented the Claimant's purported
basis for his decrease in annual earnings and ignored long-standing Supreme Court precedent that
clearly sets fmih the grounds for asse1iing a change in condition. Moreover, Claimant's motion
pursuant to I.C. § 72-719 as it relates to his 2009 motor vehicle accident which caused injuries to
the Claimant's cervical spine, left arm and left shoulder is time barred by the five year limitations
period set forth in I.C. § 72-719.
LC. § 72-719 reads, in relevant part:
MODIFICATION OF A WARDS AND AGREEMENTS - GROUNDS TIME WITHIN WHICH MADE. (1) On application made by a pa1iy in
interest filed with the Commission at any time within five (5) years of the
date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an
occupational disease, on the ground of a change in conditions, the
Commission may, but not oftener than once in six (6) months, review any
order, agreement or award upon any of the following grounds:
(a)
Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or
disablement ... (emphasis added)
This statute allows the Commission to modify an award only if there is a" [c]hange in the
nature or extent of the employee's injmy or disablement." LC.§ 72-719(1)(a). The Idaho
Supreme Comi has made the Claimant's burden of establishing a change in condition under LC.
§ 72-719(1)(a) clear:
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When a Claimant applies for modification of an award due to a change in
condition under LC.§ 72-719(a), the Claimant bears the burden of showing
a change in condition. Matthews v. Dep't of Corr., 121 Idaho 680,681,8 27
P.2d 693,694 (1992) (citing Boshers v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391
(1937)). The Claimant is "required to make a showing before the
Commission that he had an increased level of impairment, and to establish
with reasonable medical probability the existence of a causal relationship
between the change in condition and the initial accident and injury."
Matthews, 121 Idaho at 681-82, 827 P.2d at 694-95 (internal citations
omitted).

Magee v. Thompson Creek Min. Co., 152 Idaho 196,268 P.3d 464, (2012) (emphasis added).
Therefore, it is clear that Claimant must establish with reasonable medical probability the
existence of a causal relationship between the change of condition/disablement and the 2013
accident and injmy to his right knee, which is the only accident that occmTed within the five year
window applicable to LC. § 72-719 motions.
In support of his argument, Claimant's counsel alleges that the Claimant suffered a
decrease in earnings between 2016 and 2017. However, Claimant failed to produce any facts
demonstrating that this decrease in earnings had anything to do with the impairment caused by
his 2013 right knee injmy or other alleged impairments. In fact, as shown by the Declaration of
Morgan J. Meyers, the Claimant continued to earn his normal wage in 2017 (which was higher
than his wage at the time of his accident). The Claimant did not receive a bonus in 2017, which
explained his decrease in total earnings. The decision by management not to issue a bonus to the
workers on the Bruneau Farm was um-elated to the Claimant's accident, injuries, alleged
impairment or his production. Therefore, the Claimant's decreased earnings was not affected by
his 2013 right knee injmy or any other alleged impairments.
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More problematic, however, is Claimant's counsel's ignorance of Supreme Comi
precedent set fotih in Magee because he based his change in condition argument upon a new
injury to his left knee that occuned in 2017. Claimant offered no evidence or facts that his 2017
left knee injury was related to his 2013 right knee injury (or any other alleged impairments for
that matter). Claimant now argues that the restrictions attributable to his 2017 left knee injury
support his claim that he is totally and pennanently disabled. However, in order to prevail under
LC. § 72-719, Claimant must establish with reasonable medical proQability the existence of a
causal relationship between the change of condition/disablement and the 2013 accident and
injury to his right knee. Claimant offered no proof, facts or other argument as required by the
Idaho Supreme Comi in Magee. Thus, Claimant's Motion pursuant to LC. § 72-719 alleging a
change in condition is meritless, frivolous and should be denied by the Commission.
Claimant also alleges that the Commission's decision to reassign the case to itself thus
depriving itself of the opportunity to observe Claimant's symptomatology at hearing, constitutes
a manifest injustice under LC. § 72-719(3). This provision allows the Commission within five
years of the date of the accident causing the injury to review a case in order to conect a manifest
injustice. Since the Claimant's 2009 accident occuned well over nine years ago, the Commission
may only consider the Claimant's 2013 right knee injury in determining whether a manifest
injustice exists. Regardless, Claimant's argument lacks merit because the Claimant testified
extensively to his perceived limitations due to the injuries he suffered in his motor vehicle
accident and his 2013 right knee injury. See, Hearing Transcript, pp. 99 - 101; 111 - 119. Thus,
Claimant and his counsel had adequate opportunity to present his alleged physical limitations and
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issues at hearing. He also relied upon an FCE that further detailed his limitations. Thus, no
manifest injustice exists pursuant to LC. § 72-719.
Claimant's argument is also meritless and frivolous because the primmy condition that
affected Claimant's symptomatology at the hearing was his low back which the Commission
properly determined, based upon the medical testimony and evidence, was not causally related to
his 2009 or 2013 industrial accidents. For example, the Claimant testified upon examination by
his own counsel that his low back negatively impacts his balance while walking, ability to sit,
stand, walk, drive, and lift. See, Hearing Transcript, pp. 120 - 123. Therefore, the Claimant's
purported difficulty sitting in a rising from a seated position, instability upon walking, etc. is
immaterial to the Commission's determination that he suffered 40% disability inclusive of his
impairment. Again, no manifest injustice exists pursuant to LC. § 72-719.
Claimant's Motion for Consolidation is Frivolous and Must be Denied
The Claimant, after a long hearing and extensive, exhaustive post-hearing depositions, failed
to establish that his considerable low back problems were related to either of his 2009 or 2013
industrial accidents and also failed to establish that he was totally and permanently disabled due to
the injuries he suffered in 2009 and 2013. Claimant now seeks to reopen his 2009 and 2013 cases
and consolidate them with a more recent 2017 injury to his left knee in order to establish that he is
totally and permanently disabled. In other words, Claimant is admitting that the evidence he
produced related to his 2009 and 2013 injuries that he fully litigated was insufficient to establish he
was totally and permanently disabled. Otherwise, there would be no reason for him to attempt to
reopen the case and consolidate it with a new injury which he now claims total and permanent
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disability.

Defendants contend that this establishes the frivolous nature of his Motion for

Reconsideration filed contemporaneously with his Motion for Consolidation.
Claimant's counsel's gamesmanship in this regard should be rejected by the Commission as it
is similar to what he attempted to do in a another case, Hartgrave v. City of Twin Falls, where he
attempted to reopen the case after it had been decided by the Commission (in which Defendants also
prevailed) during a stay of his appeal because he wanted to submit additional evidence that he failed
to produce prior to the Commission's original decision. Although in this case Claimant presented all
of the evidence that he felt was necessary to establish that his 2009 and 2013 injuries resulted in his
total and permanent disability, he now seeks to reopen the case following the Commission's decision
that he failed to meet his burden and awarding Claimant disability inclusive ofimpaitment of 40%. If
Claimant reasonably believes that he is now totally and permanently disabled by virtue of his most
recent injury combined with his prior impairments Idaho law provides that the liability for such
disability is to be apportioned between the employer and the ISIF. As a result, Claimant's Motion for
Consolidation must be denied.

DATED this / \l\tday of May, 2018.

AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

B

,j

Y----1'----+--+-------

Paul , Augu\tinf Of the Firm
Attorneys for\Errlployer/Surety

\J

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION MOTIONS - I I
243

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /yf"' day of May, 2018, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITON TO CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION MOTIONS,
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
L. Clyel Beny
PO Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
::£_Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant

ugµstine

L)
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PAUL J. AUGUSTJNE ISB 4 08
AUGUSTiNE LAW OFFICES, LLC

1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9 00
Facsimile: (208) 947-0 14
Attorneys for Employer/ urety
BEFORE TH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
laimant,
vs.
ROBERT J. MEYERS ARMS, INC.,
mployer,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

DECLARATlON OF MORGAN J.
MEYERS IN RESPONSE: TO
CLAIMANT'S POST-AWARD
MOTIONS

and
STATE INSURANCE

D,

, urety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of TWIN FALL

)

) ss.

MORGAN J. M YERS, under penalty of perjury her,:,by declares as follows:
1.

lama

ager employed by the defendant employer. I have knowledge of all the
ed herein.
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2.

In 2017,

yer. Mr.
laiwant Mario Ayala, was ewployed by the defendant emplo

Ayala
not receive a bonus. This explains
was paid his normal wa es in 2017. However, Mr. Ayala did
ensation he received in 2016.
why his total compensa1·on in 2017 was less than his total comp
g to do with his
The reas n Mr. Ayala di.d not receive a bonUJl in 2017 had nothin
3.
·
or the number of hours that he
inability to perform. the lO!'!mll duties of his job, his production
the fatm in Bruneau was made by
worked. The decision n t to pay bonuses to the workers at
management, including
4.

yer and receive his
Mr. Aya\ continues to be employed by the defendant emplo

normal wages.
FlIBTHER YO
DATED this

DECLARANT SAYETHNAUGHT.

,L f:

day o{May, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CE TJJ1Y that on the I~ Y' day of 5/11/2018,
IN RESPONSE TO CLAIM.ANT'S POSTcopy of the foregoing ECLARATION OF MORGAN J. MEYERS
to each of the following:
ssed
addre
AWAJ?JJ MOTIONS, by t e method indicated below, and
L. Clyel Berry
POB ox30 2
Twin Falls, ID 8330 -03 02

_U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid

_Ha nd Delivered
_Ov ernig ht Mail
",IJ Te1ecopy

Attorney for C!aima t

CLAIMANT'S POST-AWARD MOTIONS - 2
DECLARATION OF MO GAN J. MEYERS fN RESPONSE TO
246

P u~ J. Augustine
\
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PAUL J. AUGUSTINE ISB 4608
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1004 W. Fort Street
Post Office Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 367-9400
Facsimile: (208) 947-0014
Attorneys for Employer/Surety
BEFORE THE INDUST RIAL COMMIS SION OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC No. 2009-029533
2001-520958
2013-024075

VS.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

DEFENDANTS' MOTIO N TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT
DATED APRIL 23, 2018

Employer,
and
STATE INSURA NCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Defendan ts, by and through their counsel of record, Paul J. Augustine of Augustin e Law
Offices, PLLC, hereby move the Commiss ion for an Order striking the Affidavit of Claimant,
Mario Ayala dated April 23, 2018 submitted in support of Claimant 's Motion for
Reconsid eration and other post-deci sion motions. The basis of this motion is that Claimant 's
affidavit contains the averment of facts and exhibits pertainin g to events that occurred after the
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October 2016 hearing and constitutes an attempt by Claimant and his counsel to present
additional testimony following the close of evidence and the record in violation of Rule 10 of the
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure. As such, allegations made by Claimant's counsel in
Claimant's affidavit and the exhibits thereto are not evidence, should be stricken from the record
and not considered by the Commission on Claimant's various post-decision motions.
The sole purpose of Claimant's affidavit is Claimant's counsel's attempt to have the
Commission consider new evidence which he alleges contradicts the factual basis for the
Commission's April 9, 2018 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. This is Claimant's
second attempt in this case to circumvent Rule 10 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and
Procedure. The first occmTed when Claimant sought to reopen Dr. Hammond's post-hearing
deposition testimony by presenting additional opinion testimony in Dr. Hammond's affidavit.
Since the evidence in Claimant's affidavit was presented after the close of the record it
cannot be considered by the Commission in ruling upon Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration
pursuant to LC. § 72-718 or his Motion for Modification pursuant to LC. § 72-719. Claimant's
motions must be decided based upon the evidence ofrecord at the time the record closed
following the post-hearing depositions of the parties' experts. As a result, for purposes of the
record relating to the Claimant's 2009 and 2013 accident claims, it should be stricken.
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DATED this

\cj¾' day of May, 2018.
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
/)

~

..

1/v)
By-----<i---------1~-----Paul J. Augu ne- Of the Firm
Attorneys forlJ;!mployer/Surety
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \~\'--day of May, 2018, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIMANT DATED
APRIL 23, 2018, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

L. Clyel Berry
PO Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_Hand Delivered
_Overnight Mail
_::l_Telecopy

Attorney for Claimant

Paul J. Augµ\itine
\l

\}
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L, Clyel Berry - ISB #1897

P. 0. Box83
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/_1_//i_) ii

Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idahoalaw.com
Ayala!REPLY/mek
Attorney for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARlO AYALA,
Claimant,
vs,
ROBERT J. MEYERS FA~S , INC,,

I.C. No. 2009-029533
LC. No. 2013-024075
CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION
MOTIONS

Employer,
and
STATE INSURA NCE FUND,
Surety,

Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel of record herein, and hereby replies to
Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision Motions as follows:

CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANT'S POST
..
DECISION MOTIONS - 1
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L. Clyel Berry - ISB # 1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83 303-0083
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Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
Ayala/REPLY/m ek
Attorney for Claim ant
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BEF ORE THE INDU STR IAL COM MISS ION
OF THE STATE OF IDAH O

MAR IO AYALA,
Claimant,

vs.
ROB ERT J. MEY ERS FAR MS, INC.,

LC. No. 2009-029533
LC. No. 2013-024075

CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
CLAIMANT'S POST-DECISION
MOTIONS

Employer,
and
STA TE INSU RAN CE FUN D,
Surety,
Defendants.
of recor d herein, and hereby replies to
COM ES NOW Claimant, by and throu gh counsel
Moti ons as follows:
Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision
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Claimant's Moti on for Reconsideration:
Clai man t's Repl y to Defendants' Argu men t upon

opposition to Claimant's Motion for
It appears that the thrust of Defendants' argument in
Reconsideration is that Claimant's Motion is" ... based

, in part, ... on new post-hearing evidence is that

and should not be considered as evidence."
not properly before the Commission in its record
sideration should be limited to the evidence
Defendants continue to assert that" ... a motion for recon
that is of record at the time the case was submitted.to

the Commission for decision and is properly

Defendants' Opposition p. 4. Although it is
submitted to the Commission pursuant to Rule 10."
Opposition, at page 9, regarding "Claimant's
tempting to "borrow" language within Defendants'
temptation to disparage counsel is resisted
counsel's ignorance of Supreme Court precedent...," the
references the Idaho Supreme Court case of
in favor of opting for the high road. Rather, counsel
Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005). There, in
Curtis v. MH King and State Insurance Fund, 142
ppellant's Motion for Reconsideration, the
addressing the Commission's denial of that claimant/a
Court reaffirmed that,
Commission new reasons
[i]t is axiomatic that a claimant must present to the
on her Mot ion for
factu ally and legal ly to supp ort a hear ing
nce previously presented.
Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashing evide
ort of her motion she did not
Although Curtis presented a very detailed brief in supp
or reconsideration.
produce new law or evidence to necessitate a rehearing
ration/Re
Thusly, it is perfectly clear that a Motion for Reconside

hearing is to be based upon "new

law or evidence."
argued through the testimony of
Counsel finds it interesting that Defendants, who
within Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, that
Defendants' vocational expert, Mr. Jordan, as well as
that the Commission did not have opportunity
Claimant actually spoke English quite well, knowing
and, thusly, was unaware as to the extent of
for observational credibility of Claimant at hearing
of, now assert that "Claimant required an
Claimant's proficiency to speak English, or lack there
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ant's Affidavit in Support of
interpreter at hearing," in commenting upon who prepared Claim
dants are correct. The Affidavit
Motions as between Claimant and his counsel. In that regard, Defen
was prepared by counsel, but was from information and/or data

received from Claimant following

nt thereof and representations
which Claimant and his counsel met to personally review the conte
made therein.
of Claimant's Motion for
However, on a more meaningful point referencing the basis
assert that," [a] !lowing any postReconsideration, Defendants' argument is not on point. Defendants
reconsidering
decision change in Claimant's employment should not be a basis for

the Commission's

no evidence that the Claimant's
disability determination." Defendants argue that there is " ...
of the Claimant's injuries that he
reduction in his total earnings from 2016 to 2017 is a result
Then, "[w]ithout referencing
suffered in 2009 and 2013 or the impairments resulting therefrom."
evidence of record," Defendants assert that,
new injury in 2017,
[a]s is readily apparent from the fact that the Claimant suffered a
job upon which the
the Claimant continues to perform the essential functions of his
total and permanent
Commission based its decision that the Claimant failed to prove
disability.
Again, Defendants miss the point.
reduction of wages from
There most certainly is no evidence establishing that Claimant's
2016, the year of his hearing before this Commission, and the very

next year following, being 2017,

Meyers in Response to Claimant's
was volitional on Claimant's part. The Declaration of Morgan
Post-Award Motions attempts to explain that the decrease in wages

as between 2016 and 2017was

ins why his total compensation in
that, in 2017 " ... Mr. Ayala did not receive a bonus. This expla
" At hearing and thereafter
2017 was less than his total compensation he received in 2016.
of his employment constituted
Defendants argued that the bonuses paid to Claimant by reason
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in arguing that Claimant's
"wages." Most certainly, they were taxable and utilized by Defendants
wages were not static but were actually increasing through the date of the

October 26, 2016, hearing

wages
herein. When considering Mr. Morga n's explanation for the decreased

in 2017, being that

ed bonuses through 2016.
Claimant was not paid a bonus by the employer, whereas he had receiv
es totaling $47,690.00, but
Records reflect that during 2016 Mr. Ayala received wages and bonus
0.00. This reduction is
during 2017, his earnings totaled $27,500.00, being a reduction of $20,19
which fact casts significant
approximately twice the level of Mr. Ayala's bonuses prior to 2017,
p. 169, LL. 18-22.
doubt upon Mr. Morga n's explanation of the decrease in wages. Tr.,
to be employed and
Mr. Morga n's Declaration further asserted that Mr. Ayala continues
inconsistent with the record
"receives his normal wages." This statement flies in the face of and is
a salary
herein. First, prior to year-end 2016, Mr. Ayala's employment was upon

plus annual bonus

Mr. Jordan, Claimant earned
basis, as opposed to wages. As noted by Defendants' vocational expert,
From Morgan Meyers'
$2,200.00 per month plus housing and bonuses. Def Ex. 9, p. 207.
a salary with expectation of
Declaration, one would believe that Claimant continues to receive
ant's Affidavit in Suppo
annual year-end bonuses. Such conflicts with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Claim
of Motions dated April 23, 2018 and bearing a Certificate of Service of

rt

April 27, 2018. There, it is

gs were reduced and that,
clearly stated that commencing in 2017 Claimant's wages and/or earnin
gs on a per hour basis as
continuing for and during calendar year 2018, Claimant receives earnin
March 20, 2018, Emplo
opposed to a salary. Attached hereto is a true and accurate copy of the
Notice "poste d" by Mr. Robert Meyers, owner/principal ofDefendant-emplo

yee

yer herein, which clearly

are to work
states that, " ... so for the two workers and Mario, the maximum that you

is 48 hours per

as the two helpers, Mario
week. No more. You will not be paid for additional time." Furthe r,just
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ue to receive his "norm al"
is now required to submit time cards. In short, Mr. Ayala does not contin
Commission, being 2016.
wages, at least not following the year of his hearing hereof before the
ition asserts that,
Further taking excerpts from the record out of context, Defendants' Oppos
" ... the fact that the Claimant testified that he contacted Social Security

within one year of the hearing

that the Claimant was
to determine how much he would receive in retirement benefits proves
attempting to mislead the
considering retirement prior to hearing." In a continuing pattern of
Commission, Defendants' counsel omitted the fact that Claimant contac

ting Social Security was not

out of any desire to "retire," but was responsive to Robert Meyers' condu

ct toward Claimant related

Johnson, with the surgery
to him proceeding with the required right TKA as ordered by Dr. Miers
s. Tr., p. 191, L. 22-p. 193,
falling within the farm's irrigation season, thusly angering Mr. Meyer
L. 4.

Defendants' Opposition failed to mention or discuss the fact that the Comm
awarding Claimant but 40% permanent partial disability inclusive ofimp

ission 's decision

airmen t was premised upon

that Claim ant's job will not
the Comm ission 's rationale that, "[t]here is no reason to believe
continue, or that he will be unable to perform the requirements of that

job until he decides to retire,"

and, " ... the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous employment

since 2009, with significant

ary, " ... the Comm ission
armual increases in earnings, must be taken into account." In summ
concludes that absent Claim ant's current employment, his disability, as

of the date ofhearing, would

be profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctrin

e."

ission 's decision,
Following hearing herein but even prior to the release of the Comm
by an amount in excess of
Defendant-employer reduced Claim ant's time-of-hearing earnings
that " ... Claim ant's current
$20,000.00, thusly proving false the Comm ission 's assum ption
employment is likely to continue at his current or higher wage .... "
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Motions were made, by
Defendants further misconstrue the basis upon which Claim ant's
is totally and permanently disabled
asserting that the pending motions were arguing that Claimant
ant's Motio n for Reconsideration,
by virtue of the new 2017 left knee injury. With respect to Claim
the importance of the 2017 left knee injury is not within the conte

xt of Claim ant's disability related

left knee injury within the context
to the 2017 left knee injury. Rather, the significance of the 2017
same together with Dr. Johns on's
of the Motio n for Reconsideration is that the occurrence of the
significant doubt upon the secon d
significant recom mend ed restrictions and/or limitations casts
assum ption upon which the Comm ission 's decision to award Claim

ant but 40% pe1manent disability

Claim ant's job will not continue, or
was premised, being that, "[t]he re is no reason to believe that
until he decides to retire."
that he will be unable to perform the requirements of that job
ant's ability to continue in
Clearly, the left knee injury creates substantial doubt as to Claim
to do so. In this regard, counsel
his emplo ymen t at Meyers Farms and irrespective of his desire
left knee injury, being the same
repres ents to the Comm ission that Defendants in the 2017
Defendants as in the instant matter, had Claimant undergo IME

review by orthopedic surgeon Kyle

t copy of correspondence from
Palme r upon May 2, 2018. Attached hereto is a true and correc
3, 2018, requesting copies of all
couns el to Defendant-surety, State Insurance Fund, dated May
reproducible communications by and between the Fund and Dr.

Palmer/Dr. Palme r's office regarding

generated by reason of Claim ant's
Claimant; and, requesting a copy of all reproducible opinion
exam inatio n by Dr. Palmer, as quickly as the same is available.

As of current date, counsel has not

ission 's decision regarding pendi ng
received response to those requests but asserts that the Comm
afforded opportunity to review the
motio ns should be held in abeyance until the Commission is
g from the May 3, 2018, IME of
opinions, conclusions and recommendations of Dr. Palme r flowin
erably greater light
Claim ant herein. It is believed that the same will shed consid

upon the validity
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e that Claimant... will be
of the assumption of the Commission that, "[t]here is no reason to believ
Obviously, being disabled

unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire."
from employment is a far different cry than deciding to retire.

Reconsideration is
Upon this basis, it is respectfully urged that Claim ant's Motion for
appropriate, well-based and should be granted by the Commission.
n for Modification of
Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Argument Upon Claimant's Motio
Awar d Pursuant to I.e.§ 72-719.

t that Claim
Counsel initially concedes that Defendants may be technically correc

ant's LC.

the Comm ission 's April
§ 72-719 Motion for Modification may not be ripe, upon the basis that
2018, award is not final, by reason of Defendants' Motion for Clarification

9,

dated April 13, 2018, as

, dated April 26, 2018.
joined in by Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification
72-719 motions should
However, while being perhaps technically premature, it seemed that LC.§
be considered in conjunction with the basis for Claim ant's Motion for

Reconsideration.

Speaking as to the "thrust" of Defendants' Opposition, Defendants cite

Magee v. Thompson

an LC. § 72-719(a) movant
Creek Mine. Co., 152 Idaho 196,26 8 P.3d 464 (2012) as precedent that
Claim ant's LC.§ 72-719
bears the burden of establishing " ... an increased level of impairment."
has
Motions are not premised upon any argument that Claimant's impairment

increased since the

, counsel notes that LC. § 72date ofhear ing herein, related to the 2009 and/or 2013 injuries. Rather
719(1 )(a) sets forth as alternative grounds either a change in the nature

or extent of the employee's

ant's LC. § 72-71 9(l)(a)
injury, meaning impairment, or, in the disjunctive, disablement. Claim
ing the date of hearing
Motion is upon the ground of a change in Claimant's disablement follow
a) Motio
herein. Conversely, Magee concerned the Claimant's LC. § 72-719(1 )(

n upon the argument

of the Claim ant's change in the nature or extent of injury/impairment.
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ission held a hearing upon
What is important about Magee is the fact that, there, the Comm
ission is respectfully urged to hold
that Claimant's Motion. In the instant proceedings, the Comm
his disablement following hearing
a hearing regarding this Claimant's allegation of a change in
ission awarded Claimant but 40%
herein which invalidates the premises upon which the Comm
ission determined " ... would be
permanent disability as opposed to disability which the Comm
ne."
profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctri
not allege a change in his
Counsel reiterates and emphasizes that the instant Motion does
impairment but, rather, a change in his disablement by reason of

the conduct of Defendant-employer

effect of Claim ant's "new " left
in reducing Claimant's earnings from the date of hearing and the
knee injury upon the Comm ission 's rationale in reducing Claim
stated it would have awarded mandates LC.§ 72-719(1) review

ant's disability from that which it

, pursuant to both sub-sections (a),

being a change in the nature or extent of Claimant's disablement

; and, (3), Commission review to

correct a manifest injustice.
the restrictions
Defendants' Opposition asserts that, "Claimant now argues that

attributable

permanently disabled." Again,
to his 2017 left knee injury support his claim that he is totally and
Defendants totally miss the point and basis of Claimant's Motio

n. Strictly limited to the claims at

attributable to Claimant's 2017
issue in LC. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2013-024075, the restrictions
left knee injury should not be considered in the determination of

Claimant's permanent disability,

was made upon the basis that where
inclusive of potential odd-lot status. Rather, the pending Motion
ing the reduction of Claimant's
the two assumptions referenced by the Commission as justify
permanent disability from " ... profound, and possibly total and perma

nent... ," have been shown to be

ly total and permanent disability
invalid, Claimant should be entitled to the profound and possib
2013 injuries at issue herein.
which the Commission determined to be related to the 2009 and
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Defendants further argue that Claimant's pending motions

are without merit " ... because of

tology at the hearing was his low back
the primary condition that affected Claimant's symptoma
causally related to his 2009 or 2013
which the Commission properly determined " ... was not
lf of Defendants is the
industrial accidents." This argument made by or upon beha

product of smoke

e within Claimant's pending Motions is
and/or mirrors in attempting to create an illusion. No wher
there a single reference to Claimant's low back presentments
Rather, again, all that Claimant seeks is that which this Com

or any symptomatology related thereto.

mission clearly expressed it would have

and permanent disability related to
granted to Claimant, being profound and possibly total
Claimant's injuries which the Commission determined were

related to and resultant of the at-issue

accidents and injuries occurring in 2009 and 2013.
Commission's April 9, 2018,
Upon this basis, it is respectfully urged that allowing the
decision to stand ignores Claimant's profound increase in disab

lement and results in an extreme and

manifest injustice.
ant's Motion for Consolidation:
Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Argument Upon Claim

ant's "cons
Defendants' Opposition to this Motion again referenced Claim
problems" which were not advanced by or within Claimant's

iderable low back

pending Motions, or even referenced

and confuse the Commission as to the
therein. Clearly, Defendants attempt to muddy the water
purpose, basis and grounds upon and by which Claimant's

pending Motions were filed. Similarly,

dants allege that,
commencing at page 10 of Defendant's Opposition, Defen
d to his 2009 and 2013
... Claimant is admitting that the evidence he produced relate
lish he was totally and
injuries that he fully litigated was insufficient to estab
n for him to attempt to
permanently disabled. Otherwise, there would be no reaso
reopen the case and consolidate it with the new injury.
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Defendants misconstrue or, perhaps more accurately, misrepresent that which Claimant's
Motion for Consolidation clearly intends to accomplish. Again, the report upon Dr. Palmer's May
2, 2018, IME of Claimant has not yet been produced to Claimant/Claimant's counsel. Claimant
respectfully petitions the Commission for leave to produce the same in conjunction with and support
of his Motion for Consolidation for the consideration of the Commission immediately upon receipt.
Simply stated, the effect of the Commission's April 9, 2018, Decision will result in
Defendants' receipt of an undeserved windfall if the 2017 claim, identified as I.C. No. 2017-017 451,
is not consolidated with the instant proceedings in I.C. Nos. 2009-029533 and 2013-024075, most
likely at the expense of the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund.

Defendants' Opposition Brief

inadvertently concedes and admits the same within the last paragraph upon page 11 thereof by
stating,
[i]f Claimant reasonably believes that he now is totally and permanently disabled by
virtue of his most recent injury combined with his prior impairments Idaho law
provides that the liability for such disability is to be apportioned between the
employer and the ISIP.
This windfall comes about soley by reason of the Commission "discounting" Claimant's
disability from " ... profound, and possibly total and permanent under the odd-lot doctrine" to 40%
by giving Claimant's status as an "older worker" the opposite effect than is typical and customary,
upon the assumptions that his current employment is likely to continue at his current or higher wage;
and, that " ... there is no reason to believe that Claimant's job would not continue, or that he will be
unable to perform the requirements of that job until he decides to retire." By this rationale and
premised upon these assumptions, which have shown to have been invalid even as of the date of the
Commission's April 9, 2018, decision herein, significant of Claimant's permanent disability directly
related to the 2009 and 2013 injuries at issue herein was not awarded.
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If Claimant establishes entitlement to total and permanent disability in proceedings pending
in LC. No. 2017-017451, absent consolida tion Defendants will only be liable for Claimant 's
impairme nt and permanen t disability directly flowing from the June 7, 2017, accident with the ISIF
becoming responsible for Claimant 's disablement related to impairme nt preceding the June 7, 2017,
injury and, thusly, Claimant 's disability not awarded by the Commiss ion by and within its April 9,
2018, decision herein, which rightfully, logically and ethically should be borne by Defendants herein.
It is respectfully submitted that such was not the result anticipated by the creation of the ISIP.
It is respectfully submitted that consolidation of the instant proceedings with LC. No. 2017-

017 451 is both necessary and just.

CONCLUSION
First, a few comment s regarding Defendan ts' representations and/or positions as set-forth
within the Opposition Brief.
1.

At page 2, Defendants assert that Claimant 's Motion for Consolid ation " ... would
penalize employer for continuing to gainfully employ Claimant ." This position is a
far cry from if not the exact opposite of Defendan ts' position throughout these
proceedings and repeatedly set-forth within Defendan ts' Post-Hearing Brief, that the
continued employm ent by Defendant-employer of Claimant was not as a sympathetic
employer but was in recognition ofDefend ants' reliance upon Claimant 's experience,
skills and expertise relating to the Farm's irrigation system.
Since hearing, Defendan t-employ er's position appears to have radically
changed. Rather than a salary, Claimant is now required to keep meticulous time
cards and is paid upon an hourly basis. Claimant 's annual earnings decreased by an
amount in excess of $20,000.00, the year following hearing and now, with the
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occurrence of Claimant's 2017 left knee injury, it appears to be the position of
Defendant-employer that it is being "penalized" for continuing Claimant's
employment through his succession of injuries requiring extensive cervical surgery
involving multi-level fusion; left shoulder and elbow surgeries; a right TKA; and,
most recently, a significant left knee injury which Claimant's orthopedic surgeon
advises requires TKA. Rhetorically speaking, any "penalty" perceived by Defendants
related to the continued employment of Claimant pales in comparison to the
"penalty" clearly suffered by Claimant in continuing to exhaust his body beyond
anatomical limits for the benefit of Meyers Farms.
Defendant's position in this regard appears to be closely akin by analogy to
an 18th century farmer working his plow horse well beyond endurances, to then
abandon it without remorse, conscience or compassion.
2.

Again, at page 2 of Defendants' Opposition, Defendants assert that it is Claimant's
position " ... that by virtue of a new injury suffered in 2017, the Claimant has suffered
a change in his disablement and is now totally and permanently disabled." As
counsel attempted to set-forth and clarify above, it is not Claimant's position that the
2017 injury and related disablement should add to Claimant's disability award related
to the 2009 and 2013 injuries, at issue herein. Rather, the significance of2017 injury
is to provide clear and certain example that the Commission's assumption that
Claimant's employment with Defendant-employer herein would continue; and, that
Claimant would be physically able to continue in that employment until he decides
to retire, were without basis and, in fact, proved to be invalid even prior to the release
of the Commission's April 9, 2018, decision rendered herein.
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The second significance of the 2017 injury is that, absent the Commission revisiting
its decision herein and/or ordering consolidation of the instant claims with the 2017
proceedings, Defendants will receive a windfall at the expense of the ISIF within the 2017
litigation.
3.

Throughout Defendants' Opposition, Defendants made multiple and continued
references to Claimant's low back presentment in an obvious effort to bias the
Commission against Claimant's pending Motions when, in reality, Claimant was
careful so as to exclude any reference to his low back within the pending Motions;
Claimant's Affidavit in Support; and, Claimant's briefing. Simply stated, Claimant's
low back, both prior to and subsequent from the hearing herein and/or the
Commission's April 9, 2018, decision is a non-issue for purposes of Claimant's
pending Motions.

It is respectfully submitted that Claimant's pending Motions are, each, well-based of record,
applicable statutes, and controlling case· precedent and should, in the interests of equity, justice and
the spirit of LC.§ 72-201, be granted.
Dated this

)l_,__ day of May, 2018.
NE&TRAINOR

l
By_ _ _-J-l~---'1-----f.~-L. Clyel Be
Attorney for Claimant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1' 2...

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State ofldaho and that on the
day
of May, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy thereof in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

L.
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Rob ert J. Mey ers Farm s
3921 North 3300 East4'Twin Falls, Idaho 83301

Employee Notice:

March 20, 2018

To the worke rs on the Brune au Farm (River Ranch West):
As an emplo yer I am to guaran tee 8 hours a day for 6 days or 48 hours a week.

I am to comply with this.
So for the two worke rs and Mario, the maximum that you are to work is.48.
hours per week. No more. You will not be paid for additio nal time.
Split your day up, some mornin g hours and some night hours, so that it will fit
the irrigat ion schedule.
Also, I will not accept time cards UNLESS you list the specific jobs th.at you
have done for the day, i.e. operation, field job done. Every single day.
For the worke rs catching rock chucks and ground pests, I only want you to
work for 4 hours per day. This applies to everyone catching ground pests, no
exceptions.
Thank you for your attenti on to this matter .

Sincerely,
Rober t Meyers
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STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
ATTORN EYS AT LAW
102 MAIN AVENUE SOUTH, STE#J
POST OFFICE BOX 83
TWIN FALLS, IDAHO 83303-0083

RUSSELL G. KVANVIG
LAIRD B. STONE
JEREMY C. VAUGHN - ASSOCIATE
L. CLYEL BERRY -OF COUNSEL
TELEPHONE 208-733-2721

Ove1· 100 Years of Legal Services to the Magic Valley
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May 3, 2018
Via Facsimile: (208) 332-2171
Claims Adjuster
Idaho State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 990004
Boise, ID 83799
Re:

My Client/Claimant - Mario G. Ayala
Date oflnjury- June 7, 2017
I.C. No. -2017-017 451

Dear Sir/Madam:
I am writing this letter to you upon my understanding that Mr. Ayala presented for IME
with/by Dr. Palmer upon Wednesday, May 2, 2018. The purpose of this correspondence is to request
your courtesy in providing me with a copy of all reproducible communications by and between the
State Insurance Fund, inclusive of any agent, employee and/or representative thereof, and Dr.
Palmer/Dr. Palmer's office regarding Mr. Ayala.
Secondly, request is made that I be provided with a copy of all reproducible opinion
generated by reason of and/or as related to Dr. Palmer's examination of Mr. Ayala, as quickly as the
same, is/are available.
Should you have questions or concerns, I would be more than happy to be responsive.
Very truly yours,
STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
Dictated by the attorney and faxed without
Signature in his absence to avoid delay
L. Clyel Berry
LCB:mek

268

05/23/2018 9:46AM FAX

14!0018/0019

SKS&T

2087333618

.__,

STEPHAN, KVANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry • ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
Ayala/OBJ-MTS-AFF/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFOlIB THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MA:R.1O AYALA,

J.C. No. 2009-029533
r.c. No. 2013-024075

Claimant,
vs.

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENOANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
CLAlMANT

Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through counsel ofrecord herein, and hereby responds and

objects to Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Claimant, dated April 23, 2018. As noted by
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Claimant,
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ROB ERT J. MEY ERS FAR MS, INC.,

CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
CLAIMANT

Employer,
and
STA TE INS URA NCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.
COM ES NOW Claimant, by and thro ugh coun

sel of reco rd herein, and hereby responds and

noted by
davit of Claimant, dated April 23, 2018. As
objects to Defendants' Mot ion to Strike Affi
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t was submitted in support of Claimant's postDefendants' Motion, Claimant's subject Affidavi
mant's Motion for
decision motions, generally, and specifically Clai
It is respectfully submitted that Defendants overlook

Reconsideration.

ed the fact that, both respect to a Motion

ons, the movant is not precluded from
for Reconsideration as well as LC. § 72-719 moti

submitting

Commission for review in the consideration of
new/additional facts, data and/or evidence to the
which those motions are premised. The Idaho
those motions. In fact, it is this submission upon
Supreme Court's Opinion in Curtis v. MH King Co.,

142 Idaho 3 83, 128 P .3d 920 (2005), is decisive

Strike. There, in determining whether or not the
and controlling regarding Defendants' Mot ion to
rt
is' Mot ion for Reconsideration, the Supreme Cou
Commission abused its discretion in denying Curt
noted that,
to the Commission new reasons
[i]t is axiomatic that a claimant mus t present
on for rehearing/reconsideration
factually and legally to support a hearing on her moti
itted. Although Curtis presented a
rather than rehashing evidence previously subm
not produce new law or evidence
very detailed brie f in support of her motion she did
to necessitate a rehearing or reconsideration.
regarding whic h coun
128 P .3d 920, at 926. In a more recent decision

sel is somewhat familiar, in

265 (2008), the Affidavit of Dr. Jose ph Peterson
Page v. McC ain Foods, 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d
for Reconsideration, which effectively reversed
was submitted in Support of Claimant's Motion
certain of Dr. Peterson's post-hearing deposition

testimony. Dr. Peterson's revised opinions, as set-

r in the Court reversing the Commission's decision
forth within his Affidavit, was a significant facto
in that matter.
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S' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF
CLAIMANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT
CLA IMA NT- 2

is with out basis in law and, in fact, seeks that
In sunnnary, Defe ndan ts' Mot ion to Strike
respects,
and controlling precedent, and mus t be, in all
whi ch is in contravention to established law
denied.
Date d this

JJ,..__ day of May, 2018.
STO NE & TRA INO R

---By_ _._ .~W C.. ::0 .-\- -,/- ---- -1-

L. Clyel erry
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SER VIC E
of the State of Idaho and that on the
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney
going document by depositing a true copy
day of May, 2018, I served a copy of the fore
aid, addressed to the following:
ther eof in the Unit ed States mail, postage prep

J1

Paul J. Augustine
AUG UST INE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2001-520958
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2013-024075

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

v.

Employer,

Fil

and

22

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
On April 9, 2018, the Commission entered its Findings of
degree of Claimant's disability and
Order addressing, inter alia, the issue of the extent and
Claimant's work-related injuries and
whether that disability should be apportioned between the
determined that Claimant's disability
his pre-existing low back condition. The Commission
t.
from all causes combined is 40%, inclusive of impairmen

On the question of whether

work-related injuries and Claimant's
Claimant's disability should be apportioned between the
sions of Idaho Code § 72-406, the
pre-existing low back condition pursuant to the provi
rt apportionment pursuant to that
Commission ruled that the evidence was insufficient to suppo
pay the entirety of Claimant's 40%
section and charged Defendants with responsibility to
disability.
fact that Claimant's workDefendant's Motion for Clarification is prompted by the
er 6, 2009 and August 28, 2013.
related injuries derive from separate accidents of Octob
9, disability less-than-total is payable
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-42
of injury.
at 55% of the average weekly state wage for the year
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dants are held responsible
Commission's guidance as to how the 40% disability for which Defen
ct of Claimant's preshould be paid. They contend that since Claimant's disability is the produ
nt, that some part of
existing low back condition, the 2009 accident, and the 2013 accide
be paid at 2013 rates.
Claimant's disability should be paid at 2009 rates and some po1iion should
ed between the 2009 and
Defendants propose that disability over and above impaiiment be prorat
nts contribute to Claimant's
2013 accidents in the same ratio that the 2009 and 2013 accide
permanent physical impairment.
ionment advanced
In response, Claimant contends that the mechanistic approach to apport
for Claimant's 40%
by Defendants is disfavored, and that apportionment of responsibility
t of each accident on
disability must be based on an evaluation and assessment of the impac
ions of Idaho Code §
Claimant's ability to engage in gainful activity as anticipated by the provis
72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-430.

n" as a motion for
We believe it appropriate to treat Defendant's Motion for "Clarificatio
ission, in the absence
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718. A decision of the Comm
ed that within 20 days
of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated, provid
ideration. Idaho Code
from the date of the filing of the decision, any party may move for recons
to the Commission new
§ 72-718. However, "it is axiomatic that a claimant must present
ring/Reconsideration
reasons factually and legally to suppmi a hearing on her Motion for Rehea
King Co., 142 Idaho 383,
rather than rehashing evidence previously presented." Cu1iis v. M.H.
388, 128 P.3d 920 (2005).

in the case, and
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence
The Commission is
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions.
on. Davison v. H.H.
not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during reconsiderati
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may reverse its decision upon
Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission
on, based on the arguments
a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in questi
the time frame established in
presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within
Idaho 94, 15 P.3d 329 (2000)
Idaho Code § 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135
P.2d 410 (1988)).
(citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756
has suffered disability of
In the underlying decision, the Commission found that Claimant
nts. The Commission found
40%, inclusive of impairment referable to the 2009 and 2013 accide
would support a ruling that some
that Defendants failed to come forward with such evidence as
pre-existing low back condition
portion of Claimant's disability should be apportioned to his
determination is not challenged.
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-406(1 ). That
payment of
However, the Connnission's Order assigning responsibility for the

the 40% disability

ated in contributing to that
is complicated by the fact that two industrial accidents are implic
award should be paid at 2009 or
disability, leaving Defendants unable to understand whether the
award between the 2009 and
2013 rates. They urge the Commission to prorate the disability
to Claimant's permanent physical
2013 accidents in the same ratio that each accident contributed
impairment.

m be solved by
In other words, they suggest that the apportiomnent proble

pe1manent disability cases to
application of the Carey formula, the rule applied in total and
Special Indemnity Fund and
apportion total and permanent disability between the Industrial
Idaho 109, 118 686 P.2d 54
Employer. (See Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107
formula has no application in
(1984)). However, the Court has made it clear that the Carey
provisions of Idaho Code § 72apportioning responsibility in less than total cases under the
P.2d 757 (1994); Henderson v.
406(1 ). (See Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 878
Rather, in appo1tioning less-thanMcCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 130 P.3d 1097 (2006)).
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total disability under Idaho Code § 72-406(1 ), the Commission is presumed, by its experience, to
be able to judge the causative factors in a particular case, and should be allowed a degree of
latitude in making an apportionment under Idaho Code § 72-406. (See Brooks v. Standard Fire
Ins., Co., 117 Idaho 1066, 793 P.2d 1238 (1990)). Still, any decision on apportionment must be

'
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Consideration
of the factors outlined in Idaho
Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-430 is the most appropriate way to determine whether,
under Idaho Code § 72-406, Claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by virtue of a preexisting condition. As we noted in the underlying decision, once Claimant has made a prima
facie showing of Claimant's disability from all causes, the burden of coming forward with

evidence that Defendants should not bear responsibility for that disability shifts to Defendants.
Defendants did not adduce proof adequate to persuade the Commission that Claimant's 40%
disability should be apportioned between the subject accidents and Claimant's pre-existing low
back condition.
With respect to whether or how the 40% disability should be apportioned between the
2009 and 2013 accidents, it is worth noting that Claimant was found to be medically stable from
the 2009 injuries prior to the 2013 accident.

Vis-a-vis the 2013 accident, the impairments

relating to the 2009 accident are certainly pre-existing, and there seems to be no reason why the
rules relating to appmtionment between a work accident and a non-work related pre-existing
condition should not also apply to appmtion responsibility between two work-related accidents
separated by a period of years, but consolidated for the purposes of hearing.
As was the case with Claimant's low back condition, upon a prima facie showing that
Claimant had suffered disability of 40%, inclusive of impairment, the burden of coming forward
with evidence that disability should be shared as between the 2009 and 2013 accidents falls to

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4
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Defendants. Review of the record reveals no evidence that would allow the Commission to do
anything but guess how the 2009 and 2013 accidents individually contribute to Claimant's 40%
disability except to say that each accident is responsible for ce1iain disability payable as
impairment, as set forth in Paragraph 87 of the April 9, 2018 decision. As noted in Page v.
McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008), where a claim for disability less-than-

total is before the Commission, so is the issue of whether Employer bears full responsibility for
Claimant's disability. Accordingly, appotiionment of disability as between the 2009 and 2013
accidents is an issue before the Commission.

Unfotiunately, there is neither medical nor

vocational evidence before the Commission, and no argument made to the Commission in
briefing or the underlying matter, that would suppo1i appotiionment of disability between the
2009 and 2013 accidents. Defendants' having failed to establish that some part of Claimant's

disability should be paid at the lower 2009 rate, the Commission concludes that the balance of
Claimant's 40% disability over and above the impairments referable to the 2009 and 2013
accidents must be paid at the higher 2013 rate.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission orders that the impairments identified at
Paragraph 87 of the April 9, 2018 decision shall be paid at the appropriate percentage of the
average weekly state wage based on the year of injury.

The balance of Claimant's 40%

impairment shall be paid at 2013 rates.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

d)f'..til

day of

~

, 2018.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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~c~C~-=>

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner-···-

A~~
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I hereby certify that on the J.hd.,day of
,u •
, 2018, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was served by
regular United States Mail upon each of the following:

L. CL YEL BERRY
POBOX302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

es!
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STA TE OF IDAHO
BEF ORE THE INDUSTRIAL COM MISS ION OF THE

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2001-520958
2009-029533
2013-024075

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION,
MODIFICATION,
AND CONSOLIDATION

v.

Employer,
and

FIL
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

22

Surety,
Defendants.
r dated April 9, 2018, the
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orde
n disability of 40% of the whole
Commission determined, inter alia, that Claimant has prove
2009, 2013, and Claimant's non-work
person, inclusive of disability referable to the accidents of
related low back condition.

the
Defendants failed to adduce evidence sufficient to allow

Code § 72-406 and, accordingly,
Commission to apportion disability pursuant to Idaho
ant's 40% disability. In a separate
Defendants were found responsible for the entirety of Claim
has determined that Claimant's 40%
Order issued contemporaneously herewith, the Commission
disability is payable at 2013 rates.
Motions for Reconsideration,
On or about April 30, 2018, Claimant filed his
30, 2018 Affidavit of Claimant. That
Modification, and Consolidation, supported by the April
e for 2016, but only $27,500 in 2017.
affidavit reflects that Claimant earned $47,690 in incom
salary at the time of hearing, he is
Claimant also avers that while he was paid a monthly
approximately the same as his two
currently paid on an hourly basis, with his hourly wage being

MOD IFIC ATIO N, AND
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or about June 7, 2017, Claimant suffered a
subordinates. The affidavit further reflects that on
he has received arthroscopic surgery by Dr.
work-related injmy to his left knee for which
right knee arthroplasty arising from the 2013
Johnson, the same physician who performed the
it further appears that Dr. Johnson has
right knee injury. From Claimant's affidavit,
cement. That surgery has not taken place
recommended that Claimant requires left knee repla
to authorize this treatment. Exhibit C to
and the affidavit suggests that Surety has declined
Johnson.
Claimant's affidavit is a brief report from Dr.

It reflects that Claimant carries a

meniscus. It further reflects Dr. Johnson's
diagnosis of degenerative joint disease and a torn
cement, suggesting that Dr. Johnson is of the
opinion that Claimant requires a left total knee repla
stability. Somewhat paradoxically, he then
view that Claimant is not yet at a point of medical
r the recommended total knee replacement,
suggests that if worker's compensation will not cove
medical improvement, with certain delineated
Claimant may be considered to be at maximum
ns which may be more onerous than those at
impairment and permanent restrictions, restrictio
issue in this proceeding.
have offered the Affidavit of Morgan
In opposition to Claimant's motions, Defendants
avit reflects that in the 2017 calendar year,
Meyers of Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc. That affid
, Claimant did not receive an annual bonus in
Claimant was paid his "normal wages." However
why his total compensation in 2017 was
2017, and according to Mr. Meyers, this explains
avit further reflects that the decision not to
significantly less than his 2016 income. The affid
and that insofar as this decision applied to
offer a bonus in 2017 applied to all employees
performance. Mr. Meyers' affidavit implies
Claimant, it had nothing to do with Claimant's job
the payment of the 2017 bonus, was unchanged
that Claimant's compensation scheme, except for
avit which reflects that in 2017 Claimant went
from prior years. This contradicts Claimant's affid
ION, MODIFICATION, AND
ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERAT
CONSOLIDATION - 2
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ever, Claimant's affidavit does not reflect that
from a monthly salary to an hourly wage. How
lted in a pay reduction. Claimant argues that the
this change in the method of compensation resu
red in 2017 cannot be explained solely by
approximate $20,000 reduction in income he suffe
2017, the implication being that some pmt of
Emp loye r's decision not to award a bonus for
utable to a decrease in his monthly income.
Claimant's decrease in compensation must be attrib
make this averment in his affidavit.
However, Claimant, who should know, does not
Meyers Farms employees, including
Morgan Meyers' affidavit does not explain why
. Claimant's affidavit does not explain why he
Claimant, were not paid an annual bonus for 2017
ly wage in 2017. Nor does Claimant's affidavit
was switched from a monthly salary to an hour
ificantly in 2017; it may be that Claimant's
explain why Claimant's income was reduced sign
ined in 2017. The affidavits are potentially in
income loss is related to new injuries he susta
Meyers' use of the te1m "normal wages" at ~ 2
conflict depending on what is meant by Morgan
to support the proposition that Claimant's 2017
of this affidavit. However, both affidavits seem
2016 annual income.
income is approximately $20,000 lower than his
the accident of June 7, 2017 and
support of his motions, Claimant argues that
2017 constitute new evidence which warrants
Claimant's demonstrated income reduction for
r pursuant to Idaho Cod e§ 72-718 and/or Idaho
review of the Commission's April 9, 2018 Orde
In

t urges the Commission to consolidate the 2009
Code § 72-719. As a fallback position, Claiman
and 2013 claims with the new 2017 claim.
decision to issue its own Findings of
Claimant first takes issue with the Commission's
benefit of having observed Claimant at hem·ing.
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order without the
ion to write the April 9, 2018 decision was not
As we have explained, the Commission's elect
our docket to issue timely decisions informed
lightly made. However, our obligation to manage

ION, MODIFICATION, AND
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the fact that not having observed Claimant at
our judgment. We are, of course, sensitive to
Claimant's observational credibility. However,
hearing, we are unable to make any finding as to
d the matter to compare Claimant's testimony
we are just as competent as the Referee who hear
e substantive credibility determinations. For
to other testimony and evidence of record to mak
ion, we found Clai man t's testimony that he has
example, as explained in the April 9, 2018 decis
pain ever since the October 6, 2009 accident to
experienced significant and unremitting low back
evidence of record. This finding was important
be incredible as compared to other testimony and
t's low back condition is not causally related to
to the Commission's determination that Claiman
the subject accident.
e pain and functional loss stemming
Claimant also testified at hearing to his subjectiv
g
mission considered this testimony in evaluatin
from his various injuries/conditions. The Com
Claimant that had we had the ability to observe
Clai man t's disability. However, it is urged by
to and from the witness stand, grimace with
Claimant at hearing, e.g., had we watched him walk
might have been more inclined to give greater
certain movements, or squirm in his seat, we
s.
weight to his recitation of his functional limitation
city was one of the principle issues with
Identifying Claimant's residual functional capa
with evaluating Clai man t's disability. Based on
which the Commission struggled in connection
ers, Defendants argued that Claimant has no
the opinions of a number of Claimant's treat
and 2013 injuries.
limitations/restrictions referable to the 2009

In further support of this

inued to work for this time-of-injury employer
asse1tion, they pointed out that Claimant has cont
ent.
in his time-of-injury position since the 2009 accid
in supp mt of his assettion that the 2009
Claimant relied on the September 25, 2015 FCE
back condition, have significantly degraded his
and 2013 accidents, along with Claimant's low

ION, MODIFICATIO
ORD ER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERAT
CONSOLIDATION - 4

N, AND
282

functional capacity.

not limited by the
We rejected Defendants' argument that Claimant is

findings are not unchallenged by other
residual effects of the subject accidents. While the FCE
the Commission determined that the FCE is
evidence of record (see Findings of Fact, ,r,r 98-105),
ional abilities and relied on it to evaluate
the least objectionable measure of Claimant's funct
exactly as Claimant asked. If Claimant's
Claimant's disability. Therefore, the Commission did
mfort and loss of functional ability, it
presentation at hearing was demonstrative of his disco
the evidence the Commission accepted
seems that this additional information only reiterates
fore cumulative. Medical evidence is
concerning Claimant's functional ability, and is there
prefened as a guide to evaluating limitations/restrictions.
ment of Claimant's age, 65, as of
Next, Claimant takes issue with the Commission's treat
mission's decision subverts conventional
the date of hearing. Claimant argues that the Com
ree. Idaho Code § 72-4 30 specifies that
wisdom about the impact of age on disability. We disag
the Commission in evaluating disability is
among the non-medical factors to be considered by
award higher disability to older workers,
Claimant's age. The statute does not direct us to
by statute, the Commission did take
although that is frequently the result. As directed
liar facts of this case, that Claimant's
Claimant's age into account and found, under the pecu
of continued employment with his time-ofstatus as an older worker, coupled with the likelihood
d be the case for a similarly situated 20injury employer, supported lower disability than woul
Claimant's age. Woody v. Seneca Foods,
year-old. We find no reason to revise our treatment of
involved an older injured worker who was
LC. 2010-012114 (2013) is inapposite. That case
unemployed at the time of hearing and without prospects.
the Commission to attach the
Next, Claimant charges that it was improper for
nt and annual income in evaluating his
significance it did to Claimant's current employme

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIO
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disability.

ideration of Claimant's cu1Tent
Claimant argues that the Commission's cons

to work following the 2009 accident:
employment "punishes" Claimant for continuing
rationale as specifically setIt is respectfully submitted that the Commission's
continuing to work following his
forth within its decision punishes Mr. Ayala for
strial accidents. Had Mr. Ayala
October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, indu
events, he most likely would have
terminated his employment after either of those
ility related to and resultant of
been awarded the entirety of his permanent disab
injuries suffered therein, without reduction.
argument goes, Claimant's post-accident
Clt's Memorandum, p. 9-10. Therefore, the
otherwise have been entitled to, had he not gone
employment denies him disability that he would
1
t as entirely inconsistent with the purpose of our
back to work. We reject this cynical argumen
work er's compensation system.

accidents.
In this case, Claimant suffered two work-related

mant, all for the purpose of supporting his
Income and medical benefits were paid to Clai
he did, and in his case, the system did what it is
recovery and return to gainful employment. This
supposed to do.

Claimant has hardly been punished.

We can think of no justification for

his time-of-injury job, since return to gainful
ignoring Claimant's current ability to work at
activity is the aim of worker's compensation.
mt of his Idaho Cod e§ 72-718 and Idaho
The main argument offered by Claimant in supp
ts occutTing subsequent to the October 26, 2016
Cod e§ 72-719 motions is his assertion that even
mptions made by the Commission in an·iving
hearing have invalidated one of the significant assu
ility referable to the pre-existing back condition
at the determination that Claimant has 40% disab
g decision reflects, it was, indeed, significant
and the 2009 and 2013 accidents. As the underlyin
performed his time-of-injury job, albeit with
to the Commission's decision that Claimant has
pting those times when he has been in a period
some modification, since the 2009 accident, exce
mant was so employed at the time of hearing,
of recovery following his various surgeries. Clai
ent insurance
employed is unfairly deprived of the unemploym
By dint of similar reasoning, any person who is
benefits he would get were he laid off.
1

ORD ER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERAT
CONSOLIDATION - 6

ION, MODIFICATION, AND
284

ases in compensation, such that by 2016 his
and since 2009, he has enjoyed steady annual incre
was also significant to the Commission that
annual income slightly exceeded $47,000. It
seemed reasonably secure; Morgan Meyers
Claimant's prospects for ongoing employment
al, to Employer's business. Based on past
testified that Claimant was important, if not critic
ibility that Claimant's annual income would
history, the Commission also entertained the poss
from this job. Claimant argues that the
increase, and that he would eventually retire
ent would continue at the same or greater
Commission's assumption that Claimant's employm
disability. However, the fact that Claimant is
wage was central to the Commission's decision on
which the Commission relied in evaluating
currently employed is far from the sole factor upon
we might have adopted Defendant's argument
Claimant's disability. Had it been the sole factor,
coupled with a significant increase in annual
on disability: Claimant's continuing employment,
d future employment, augers in favor of a
income since 2009, and the prospect for continue
over and above impairment. However, we
conclusion that Claimant has suffered no disability
must reconcile Claimant's seeming prospects
did not adopt this argument, recognizing that we
has suffered a significant disability should he
for continued employment with the fact that he
ons of Law and Order at ,i,i 113-115).
ever lose his job. (See Findings of Fact, Conclusi
a measure of Claimant's "present and
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-425, disability is
ity.
probable future" ability to engage in gainful activ

Our finding that Claimant's current

iant to our decision, but our award of a 40%
employment is likely to continue is assuredly impm
continuation of Claimant's employment is not
disability necessarily reflects our recognition that
e, yet the statute requires us to consider the
assured. The Commission cannot predict the futur
t's probable future ability to engage in gainful
impact of the 2009 and 2013 accidents on Claiman
recognizes that the future holds uncertainties
activity. Our synthesis of Claimant's disability
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nces of Claimant's future employment. The 40%
which we cannot know, including the circumsta
r
mant's significant loss of access to the labo
disability figure we arrived at recognizes Clai
our
continued to work for Employer. Nothing in
market, and the fact that he has successfully
While
obtain should Claimant lose his current job.
ld
wou
lt
resu
rent
diffe
a
that
als
sign
sion
deci
njury
that Claimant will continue in his time-of-i
the 40% rating is based on our perception
ent that he may not. Otherwise, we might have
employment, it also reflects our acknowledgem
ily
ent. That one of the possibilities we necessar
awarded Claimant no disability above impailm
t's
persuade us to revisit our gestalt of Claiman
entertained has now come to pass does not
disability since that possibility is merged into

the Commission's evaluation.

ies leave us unable to understand why
Further, the affidavits provided by the part
ease
in 2017. Claimant specifically denies any incr
Claimant's income declined so precipitously
pp.
and 2013 accidents. (See Claimant's Reply at
in disability or limitation referable to the 2009
nt
7, 2017 accident is responsible for a significa
June
the
that
e
argu
,
ever
how
,
does
He
8).
7 and
t to
s and may make it impossible for Claiman
tion
stric
ns/re
tatio
limi
t's
man
Clai
in
ease
incr
t's
this likelihood adds further support to Claiman
continue in his employment. It is argued that
the
based its evaluation of Claimant's disability on
argument that the Commission erred when it
If
continue. This argument seems nonsensical.
likelihood that Claimant's employment would
dent
because of a new injury associated with an acci
Claimant suffers income loss or loses his job
dent,
a claim for disability referable to the new acci
of June 7, 2017, this loss is part-and-parcel of
al
mant might lose his job because of addition
not the 2009 and 2013 claims. While Clai
e an
, this does not prove that the Commission mad
limitations related to the June 7, 2017 accident
All it
d for Claimant's continued employment.
ihoo
likel
the
ng
erni
conc
ion
mpt
assu
lid
inva
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claim for disability arising from a new
proves (or may prove) is that Claimant has an actionable
accident/injury.
ant in suppo1t of his motions, we
Having addressed the broad arguments made by Claim
ant in connection with his motions made
turn now to the specific arguments made by Claim
and for consolidation.
pursuant to Idaho Cod e§ 72-718, Idaho Cod e§ 72-719,
72-718
Moti on for Reconsideration Und er Idah o Cod e§

Claimant has filed a timely Motion for Reconsideratio

n pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718.

That section provides:
fraud, shall be final and
A decision of the comm1ss10n, in the absence of
ission upon filing the
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the comm
in twenty (20) days from
decision in the office of the commission; provided, with
for reconsideration or
the date of filing the decision any party may move
r or reconsider its decision
rehearing of the decision, or the commission may rehea
ion shall be final upon denial
on its own initiative, and in any such events the decis
filing of the decision on
of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration or the
be appealed to the Supreme
rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may
Com t as provided by section 72-724, Idaho Code.
evidence in the case and dete1mine
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the
conclusions. The Commission is not
whether the evidence presented supports the legal
during reconsideration. Davison v. Ii Ii
compelled to make findings on the facts of the case
). The Commission may reverse its decision
Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986
the decision in question, based on the
upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of
ided that it acts within the time frame
arguments presented, or upon its own motion, prov
ol District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d
established in Idaho Cod e§ 72-718. See, Dennis v. Scho
114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)). A
329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,

by a recitation of the factual findings
motion for reconsideration must be properly supp01ted
takes issue. However, the Commission is
and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party
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the case
ts during reconsideration simply because
men
argu
and
e
enc
evid
eigh
re-w
to
not inclined
was not resolved in a par ty's favor.
undercut
arising subsequent to the date of hearing
In this case, Claimant argues that facts
of which the
's decision and constitute new evidence
sion
mis
Com
the
ing
port
sup
ions
mpt
the assu
ing the Motion
eration. Defendants argue that in evaluat
Commission must consider on reconsid
record, not new
limited to consideration of evidence of
for Reconsideration, the Commission is
the Affidavit of
n, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike
evidence. Consistent with this positio
nt's affidavit,
the Commission will entertain Claima
Claimant, but against the chance that
ments not in the
Meyers, which also makes factual ave1
Defendants filed the Affidavit of Morgan
sider
n of whether the Commission may con
stio
que
the
on
nt
sile
is
ute
stat
The
cun ent record.
earlier
the Commission in connection with the
re
befo
not
was
that
e
enc
evid
i.e.,
e,
new evidenc
observed, the
nsideration. However, as Claimant has
reco
for
ion
mot
a
ing
luat
eva
in
ing,
proceed
g Co., 142
ressed this issue. In Curtis v. MH . Kin
add
e
hav
to
ear
app
s
doe
rt
Cou
e
rem
Sup
Idaho
of the hip was
t asserted that her avascular necrosis
man
clai
5),
(200
920
P.3d
128
,
383
o
Idah
sion determined
the testimony of Dr. Rudd, the Commis
attributable to a fall at work. Relying on
a motion for
ted to claimant's accident. Claimant filed
that this condition was not causally rela
Commission. On
e § 72-718, which was denied by the
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Cod
Rud d's testimony
medical evidence was in conflict, Dr.
appeal, the Court noted that although
imant
porting the Commission's decision. Cla
sup
e
enc
evid
nt
pete
com
and
tial
stan
constituted sub
rt
her motion for reconsideration. The Cou
ying
den
in
d
erre
sion
mis
Com
the
that
also argued
does not
the party to request reconsideration, but
es
oriz
auth
18
72-7
§
e
Cod
o
Idah
noted that
est. The Court then stated:
require the Commission to grant such requ
ons
present to the Commission new reas
It is axiomatic that a claimant must
a hearing on her Motion for
factually and legally to support
DERATION,
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shing evidence previously presented.
Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than reha
brie f in support of her motion she did
Although Curtis presented a very detailed
te a rehearing or reconsideration.
not produce new law or evidence to necessita
a motion
language suggests that to properly support
this
t,
man
Clai
by
d
note
As
.
925
,
388
at
Id.
or legal
t present to the Commission new facts
mus
y
part
ing
mov
the
ion
erat
nsid
reco
for
ment upon
to think some more about the facts and argu
argument rather than ask the Commission
of the
in reaching its decision. Indeed, review
which the Commission originally relied
rely on any
ion in Curtis reflects that Claimant did not
Commission's Order denying reconsiderat
deration at
nsideration. (See Order Denying Reconsi
new facts to support her motion for reco
2004-IIC0735.l) (2004).
bly
consider is not evidence that could reasona
The evidence that Claimant would have us
facts
Claimant would have us consider are new
that
s
fact
The
ing.
hear
at
uced
add
have been
not
ing, and therefore could not and were
hear
the
g
win
follo
e
tenc
exis
into
e
cam
which
evidence in
r recent cases we have considered such
othe
In
ion.
miss
Com
the
by
red
side
con
Inc., 2016
ion. (See Strope v. Kootenai Medical Ctr,
connection with a motion for reconsiderat
tled to a
ments at hearing was that claimant was enti
IIC0046.1 ). In Strope, one of claimant's argu
treatment.
al that she was entitled to further medical
new MRI which it was thought might reve
entitlement
r, finding that claimant had not proven her
The Commission ruled in defendants' favo
her own
's decision, claimant obtained the study at
to such a study. Following the Commission
did reveal
nsider its decision, arguing that the study
expense, and urged the Commission to reco
mission
dition requiring additional care. The Com
that she suffered from a work-related con
basis
mant's motion for reconsideration upon the
clai
ted
gran
and
ve
uasi
pers
t
men
argu
this
found
mission to
e that it is not inappropriate for the Com
agre
we
,
ngly
ordi
Acc
.
ence
evid
new
of
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in connection with Claimant's Motion for
consider the affidavits of Claimant and Mr. Meyers
Strike Claimant's Affidavit.
Reconsideration and we deny Defendants' Motion to
ant's arguments, in particular, his
However, as explained above, we do not find Claim
the date of hearing, to be persuasive. We
arguments involving events occutTing subsequent to
disability based on the evidence that was
continue to be satisfied with our analysis of Claimant's
included consideration of a number of
before us. Our deliberations on the issue of disability
remain in his time-of-injuty job to the date
"what-ifs," including the fact that Claimant might not
ant's Motion for Reconsideration under
of his eventual retirement. Therefore, we deny Claim
Idaho Code § 72-718.
o Cod e§ 72-719
Motion to Correct a Manifest Injustice under Idah

Idaho Code § 72-719(3) provides:
in five (5) years of the date
The commission, on its own motion at any time with
festation of an occupational
of the accident causing the injuty or date of first mani
injustice.
disease, may review a case in order to correct a manifest
it comes on the Commission's own motion,
While the plain language of the statute specifies that
exercising its powers when notice of a
this fact 'does not preclude the Commission from
by a party. Banz haf v. Carnation Co., l 04
purported manifest injustice is brought to its attention
reopening and review of an order of the
Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983). As grounds for
given broad construction to advance the
Commission the term "manifest injustice," must be
Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982). As to the
humane purposes of the Act. Sines v. Appel, 103
meaning of the term, the Sines Court stated:
being easily understood or
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of
us. Webster's Third New
recognized at once by the mind; not obscure; obvio
defined to mean: absence of
International Dictionary, 1967. "Injustice" has been
ity, unfairness; an unjust
justice; violation of right or of the rights of another; iniqu
Dictionary, 1967.
act or deed; wrong. Webster's Third New International
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265 (2008), the Commission
In Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P .3d
ity from the effects of a knee injury on
determined that Claimant reached a point o_f medical stabil
from Claimant's physician. Claimant
November 26, 2001. This decision was based on a note
2001, but was a no-show for the
was scheduled to see her physician on November 26,
have been getting along well and
appointment. The physician concluded that claimant must
nce the Commission relied upon to
pronounced her medically stable. This was the only evide
define Claimant's date of medical stability.
ion, claimant filed a motion
Subsequent to the issuance of the Commission's decis
on to reopen the case to correct a
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3), urging the Commissi
letter written by Dr. Peterson stating
manifest injustice. Claimant suppotied her motion with a
, but that he had since examined her
that he had not examined claimant on November 26, 2001
was in need of further care. The
and determined that she was not medically stable and
that Dr. Peterson's letter presented an
Commission denied the motion to reopen the case, ruling
w the case. On appeal, the Supreme
insufficient factual basis upon which to reopen and revie
on relied in defining claimant's
Cam i noted that the only evidence upon which the Commissi

date

chaii note. The Cam i further noted
of medical stability was Dr. Peterson's November 26, 2001
did not actually examine claimant on
that the unrebutted evidence established that Dr. Peterson
that date.

eai·lier statement and
Dr. Peterson's subsequent letter entirely undermined his

in need of further care. Therefore,
established that claimant was not medically stable and was
lishing claimant's date of medical
the only evidence upon which the Commission relied in estab
i reasoned, this is an adequate factual
stability was demonstrated to be invalid. Clearly, the Cam
of medical stability. To do otherwise
basis upon which to reopen the case to revisit the finding
would be unjust.
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of the case in order to
In this case, Claimant appears to state three bases for reopening
ission considered Claimant's
correct a manifest injustice. First, as above noted, the Comm
It is argued by Claimant that
testimony concerning his subjective limitations and discomfort.

might have been more inclined to
had the Commission actually observed Claimant at hearing, we
abilities. However, as explained
give greater weight to his recitation of his residual functional
urged us to adopt, as the best
above, we have accepted the FCE findings, which Claimant
additional insights might have
analysis of Claimant's residual functional capacity. Whatever
the hearing room are largely
been obtained by watching the Claimant as he sat or walked about
invitation to reopen the case for
reiterative and cumulative. We decline to entertain Claimant's
further review on this basis.
a new June 7, 2017
Next, Claimant appears to suggest that because he suffered
tions on his ability to engage in
accident/injury which implicates further and more onerous restric
to allow consideration of these
gainful activity, the Commission's decision must be reopened
as a reason to reopen the April
new facts in assessing Claimant's disability. We reject this, too,
7, 2017 accident/injury, if it
9, 2018 decision to conec t a manifest injustice. Simply, the June
able and, as explained below, we
did occur, is not pati of this proceeding. It is separately action
decline to consolidate it with the 2009 and 2013 claims.
must be reopened to
Finally, Claimant argues that to avoid a manifest injustice the record
his 2017 earnings, which reflects
allow consideration of Claimant's changed circumstances, i.e.,
g aside the possibility that this
a significant decrease, as compared to his 2016 earnings. Settin
ry, we conclude that it is not
decrease is attributable to a separately actionable 2017 accident/inju
ating Claimant's disability. As
unjust to decline to consider this change in circumstance in evalu
Claimant's significant loss of
explained above, our evaluation of disability is a synthesis of
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ed that
continued employment. Bill Jordan speculat
his
of
fact
the
and
ket
mar
r
labo
the
to
ss
acce
not lost
would be in the range of 4 7%. Claimant has
if Claimant ever lost his job, his disability
imant's
e an award of 40% disability to balance Cla
his job, yet the Commission nevertheless mad
analysis
of his continuing employment. Simply, our
labor market access loss against the fact
That they
circumstances might change in the future.
contemplates the possibility that Claimant's
job and his
case is not like Page. Claimant's current
did does not undermine our analysis. This
ation of
ors we relied on in making our determin
2016 income were far from the sole fact
Claimant's disability.
Idaho Code § 72-719(3) motion.
Based on the foregoing, we deny Claimant's
nge in Condition
Motion for Modification Pursuant to Cha

pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a) was
Claimant's motion for modification made
ifies that
reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718 spec
made contemporaneous with his motion for
dicated
8 is final and conclusive as to matters adju
the Commission's decision of April 9, 201
o Code §
eration is filed, as it was in this case. Idah
therein unless a timely motion for reconsid
tances.
al and conclusive" award in certain circums
72-719(1) authorizes the reopening of a "fin
t filed his
773 P.2d 269 (1988). At the time Claiman
Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1,
ng to
decision was not final and conclusive, owi
8
201
9,
il
Apr
the
ion,
mot
19
72-7
§
e
Idaho Cod
18.
nsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-7
reco
for
ion
mot
us
neo
pora
tem
con
nt's
Claima
Con-ect a
ion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Mot
nt's
ima
Cla
ed
deni
ing
hav
,
ever
How
ive as
of the Commission is now final and conclus
Manifest Injustice, the April 9, 2017 decision
consider
refore, we accept Claimant's invitation to
anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-718. The
19(1)
ess a change in condition. Idaho Cod e§ 72-7
whether the case should be reopened to addr
provides:
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- Time within
72-719. Modification of awards and agreements - Grounds
st filed with the
which made. - (1) On application made by a party in intere
accident causing
commission at any time within five ( 5) years of the date of the
e, on the ground
the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational diseas
r than once in six
of a change in conditions, the commission may, but not oftene
of the following
(6) months, review any order, agreement or award upon any
grounds:
ement; and
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disabl
(b) Fraud.
grounds of a change in the nature
Therefore, a case may be reopened to review an award on the
there has been no change in the
of the employee's injury or disablement. Claimant concedes that
extent or degree or Claimant's impairment since date of hearing:
any argument
Claimant's Idaho Code § 72-719 motions are not premised upon
g herein, related
that claimant's impairment has increased since the date of hearin
to the 2009 and/or 2013 injuries .....
ecision Motions at p.7)
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-D
of a change in the circumstances
Rather, Claimant argues that his condition has changed because
es that such a change warrants
of his employment, and that Idaho Code § 72-719 provid
reopening of the case because it may reflect a change in Claimant's

"disablement":

as alternative
Rather, counsel notes that Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a) sets forth
injury, meaning
grounds, either a change in the nature or extent of employee's
impairment, or, in the disjunctive, disablement. ...
ecisions Motions at p.7)
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-D
ning for change in condition are
Therefore, the argument is that because the ground for reope
be justified where there is either
stated in the disjunctive, a petition for change in condition may
a change in the nature and extent
a change in the nature and extent of Claimant's impairment, or
this case, Claimant's significant
of his disability, owing to some non-medical circumstance, in
we conclude that Claimant must
2017 decrease in earnings. For the reasons set fmth below,
injury in order to successfully
demonstrate a change in the nature and extent of his physical
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Code § 72-719(1)(a), and that such a
pursue a petition for change in condition under Idaho
change in a non-medical factor, alone.
petition cannot be pursued upon a showing of some
ion for change in condition may
Essentially, Claimant's argument is that because a petit
ant's "disablement," the statute clearly
be pursued when there has been a change in Claim
there has been a change in one of the nonanticipates that such a petition may be pursued where
s "disability." Necessarily, this argument
medical factors relied on by the Commission to asses
is the equivalent of "disability" as defined
pre-supposes that "disablement" as used in the statute
§ 72-430. Had the legislature intended that
and evaluated at Idaho Code § 72-423, § 72-425, and
a showing of a change in one of the nona petition for change in condition could be supported by
bility," it could have unambiguously
medical factors central to the determination of "disa
§ 72-719( 1)(a). Instead, the legislature
signaled this intent by using that term in Idaho Code
is a concept central to the compensability
chose to use another term: "disablement." Disablement
2)(c) defines disablement as follows:
of occupational disease claims. Idaho Code § 72-102(2
the event of an employee's
"Disablement," except in the case of silicosis, means
of an occupational disease
becoming actually and totally incapacitated because
h injuriously exposed to
from performing his work in the last occupation in whic
s the state of being so
the hazards of such disease; and "disability" mean
incapacitated.
er is incapacitated, i.e. disabled, from
A claim for occupational disease anses when a work
was injuriously exposed to the hazards of
perfo1ming his work in the last occupation in which he
ent," in this sense, represents a physical
his disease. See Idaho Code § 72-437. "Disablem
the hazards of that job. It does not have
inability to work at the time of injury job, caused by
d at Idaho Cod e§ 72-430. The nonmedical
anything to do with the nonmedical factors enumerate
not at issue when assessing whether
factors implicated in evaluating "disability" are
is physically incapable of performing the
"disablement" has occurred, i.e. whether a claimant
N, MODIFICATION, AND
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blement" versus "disability" in Idaho Code §
time of injury job. The legislature's choice of "disa
ment that a change in one of the non-medical
72-719(1)(a) lends no support to Claimant's argu
ant's disability watTants reopening of the claim
factors relevant to the original evaluation of claim
y that the disjunctive language of the statute
for a change in condition. It seems just as likel
ge in condition can be brought in both
simply reflects the fact that petitions for chan
but only where there has been a change in the
accident/injury and occupational disease claims,
er.
nature of the physical condition of the injured work
for changes in the extent and degree
Case law also supports the conclusion that it is only
ion for change in condition may be pursued.
of an injured worker's physical condition that a petit
Idaho 196, 268 P.3d 464 (2011), claimant
In Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 152
in 2002. His injuries resulted in permanent
suffered a work-related injury to his low back
the Commission found that Claimant had
complaints of chronic pain. In a 2004 decision,
a consequence of the accident. Claimant later
suffered permanent impairment and disability as
that the Commission's decision should be
filed a Petition for Change in Condition, arguing
ition. A second hearing was held and the
modified because of a change in Claimant's cond
e that a change in his condition had occutTed
Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to prov
ion rnled that Claimant had failed to prove that
since the original hearing. Further, the Commiss
to continue to abide by its original decision.
it would be manifestly unjust for the Commission
original 2000 injury, Claimant resided in
The evidence established that at the time of the
t 2000 people. As of the date of hearing on
Cascade, Montana, a town with a population of abou
ed in Radersburg, Montana, a town with a
the Petition for Change in Condition, Claimant resid
n with the Petition for Change in Condition
population of around 150 people. In co1111ectio
Claimant acknowledged that his physical condition

was about the same as it had been at the time
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evidence that Claimant had been diagnosed
of the original hearing. However, there was also
hearing, which had been attributed to the May
with a major depressive disorder since the original
nal hearing, Claimant had undergone the
2000 industrial injmy. Fmther, since the origi
effo1t to diminish Claimant's chronic pain. This
implantation of a dorsal column stimulator in an
ing on the Petition for Change of Condition,
evidently offered Claimant some relief. At hear
tional rehabilitation specialist who opined that
Claimant also put on the testimony of a voca
but it was also noted that this opinion was
Claimant was totally and permanently disabled,
et in Radersburg, Montana. The vocational
delivered in the context of his very small labor mark
might provide better employment opportunities
expe1t acknowledged that a larger labor market
for Claimant.
of Condition, concluding that Claimant
The Commission denied the Petition for Change
a change in condition had occurred. The
had failed to adduce evidence showing that
ect a Manifest Injustice. Claimant appealed,
Commission also denied Claimant's Motion to Co1T
that Claimant had failed to establish a change
arguing that the Commission erred in determining
in condition.
acknowledged the disjunctive nature of
Concerning Idaho Code § 72-719(1), the Comt
in order to pursue a Petition for Change of
Idaho Code § 72-719(1)(a), yet concluded that
1theless demonstrate a change in the nature or
Condition under this section, Claimant must neve
extent of his impairment:
ition pursuant to Idaho Code
Magee asse1ts that he sustained a change in cond
ion to modify an award if there
section 72-719(a). The statute allows the Commiss
loyee's injury or disablement."
is a "[c]hange in the nature or extent of the emp
ification of an award due to
I. C. § 72-719(1 )(a). When a claimant applies for mod
the claimant bears the burden of
a change in condition under I.C. § 72-719(a),
't of Corr., 121 Idaho 680, 681,
showing a change in condition. Matthews v. Dep
e, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391
827 P.2d 693, 694 (1992) (citing Boshers v. Payn
ing before the Commission that
(1937)). The claimant is "required to make a show
ION, MODIFICATION, AND
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establish with reasonable medical
he had an increased level of impairment, and to
between the change in condition
probability the existence of a causal relationship
121 Idaho at 681-82, 827 P.2d
and the initial accident and injury." Matthews,
694- 95 (internal citations omitted).
nt change in the non-medical factors considered
Id Arguably, Magee did experience a significa
on disability. By the time of the Petition for
by the Commission in reaching its original decision
00 to a town of 150, a move which, according
Rehearing, Claimant had moved from a town of20
ased his disability. Yet the Court did not
to Claimant's vocational expert, dramatically incre
ge of Condition pursuant to the provisions of
consider this fact in evaluating the Petition for Chan
Claimant had failed to adduce evidence of a
Idaho Cod e§ 72-719(l)(a), concluding that since
there the inquiry stops.
change in the nature or extent of his impai1ment,
of Matthews v. Dept. of Corrections,
Cited with approval by the Magee Court is the case
suffered a low back injury in 1985. He
121 Idaho 680, 827 P.2d 693 (1992). Matthews
impairment rating. Thereafter, claimant and
underwent surgery and was eventually given a 20%
to the terms of which the claim for disability
surety executed a compensation agreement pursuant
unt of his impairment rating. Some months
was resolved by the payment of $15,895, the amo
and requested that the Commission increase his
later, claimant alleged a change in his condition
72-719(3) motion to con-ect a manifest injustice.
disability award. He also filed an Idaho Cod e§
low back injury made it impossible for him to
His argument was based on his assertion that his
resulted in significant additional loss of wages
re-enter the Army National Guard, and that this
and future retirement benefits.
ition under Idaho Cod e§ 72-719(1)(a)
In connection with the petition for change of cond
claimant must prove an increase in the extent
the Court stated that to support such a petition, the
or degree of impairment:
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ies for a modification of an award
As the Commission noted, when a claimant appl
burden of showing a change in
under LC. Section 72-719, he or she bears the
P.2d 391 (1937). Matthews was
condition. Boshors v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70
ion that he had an increased level
required to make a showing before the Commiss
Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769
of impairment, Urry v. Walker & Fox Masomy
onable medical probability the
P.2d 1122 (1989), and to establish with reas
change in condition and the initial
existence of a causal relationship between the
ines, 105 Idaho 59, 665 P.2d 1069
accident and injury. Carter v. Garrett Freightl
(1983).
which arguably supported a change in the
As in Magee, the Court had before it, facts
the Commission suggested that claimant's 1985
level of claimant's disability; new facts before
reowing to its effect on claimant's designs upon
injury was more limiting than initially found
the
o Cod e§ 72-719(1)(a) issue was resolved by
entering the National Guard. Even so, the Idah
ence
lusion that claimant had failed to adduce evid
Court's affirmation of the Commission's conc
injury. See also Ivie v. Daw Forest Products,
ical
phys
his
of
nt
exte
or
re
natu
the
in
ge
chan
of a
1998 IIC 1253 (1998).
19(l)(a) makes perfect sense. Otherwise,
The Court's construction of Idaho Cod e§ 72-7
to
GED, flunked out of school, got a raise, refused
any time someone lost a job, got a job, got his
ket, lost access to daycare, got older, etc., the
cross a picket line, moved to another labor mar
to change a previous disability award because
Commission might be faced with a petition
d
r words, anytime claimant's earnings increase
somebody's circumstances had changed. In othe
the
extent and degree of the work-related injury,
or decreased for reasons unconnected with the
t is
to reopen the case. This is clearly not wha
Commission could be faced with a petition
of Idaho Code § 72-423 which obligates the
intended, particularly in view of the charge
ful
and probable future ability to engage in gain
ent
pres
t's
man
Clai
uate
eval
to
ion
miss
Com
how
ssarily requires the Commission to consider
activity as of the date of hearing. This nece
are
by things that may or may not happen. We
Claimant's future disability may be impacted
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an undue burden on the administration
obligated to make this judgment once, and it would place
disability assessments based on
of the worker's compensation system to continually revise
Claimant's changing circumstances.
) motion is not premised on
Since Claimant concedes that his Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a
related to the 2009 and 2013 accidents,
any change in the nature or extent of his physical injuries
n.
we deny his Petition for Change in Condition under that sectio
Motion for Consolidation

withdraw the April 9, 2018
In the alternative, Claimant urges the Commission to
for hearing, and rehear the case so
decision, consolidate the 2009, 2013, and 2017 complaints
the disability referable to Claimant's
that Defendants may be held responsible for the entirety of
from shifting responsibility for some
employment, and so that Defendants will be prevented
nity Fund. We decline to do this
po1tion of Claimant's disability to the Industrial Special Indem
for several reasons.
Employer/Surety will pay what
First, it is unclear to us why consolidation will assure that
oyer's liability for the 2009 and 2013
it should, but that a refusal to consolidate will not. Empl
believes that he is entitled to further
accidents has been decided by the Commission. If Claimant
claim. Consolidation or no, Employer
benefits by reason of the 2017 accident, he may pursue his
compensation benefits owed as a
will be held responsible for the payment of worker's
consequence of the subject accidents.
be held responsible for that
In a case of total and permanent disability, the ISIF may
ility caused by impainnents which
pmtion of an injured worker's total and permanent disab
irments are work related, sometimes
predate the last accident. Sometimes these pre-existing impa
ISIF's liability.
they are not. The distinction is unimpo1tant in evaluating the
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ent allegedly occurred on or
Finally, there is the matter of timing. Claimant's third accid
ition following that accident was of
about June 7, 2017. It appears that Claimant's left knee cond
ugh we have no way of knowing
sufficient seriousness to require surgical treatment, altho
ent. Had Claimant been sufficiently
whether the accident is responsible for that need for treatm
of the land, he had ample time within
concerned that the June 7, 2017 accident changed the lay
st action of some type prior to the
which to alert the Commission to his concerns, and to reque
parties and the Commission devoted
issuance of the April 9, 2018 decision. Instead, the
presented. That Claimant may not have
considerable effort to hearing and deciding the claims as
sitting on his hands.
expected the decision to go the way it did is no defense to
We DENY the Motion to Consolidate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

s on Claimant's motions, we
Having reviewed the affidavits and arguments of the partie
hereby enter the following Order.
1.

Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

2.

to Idaho Code § 72Claimant's Motion to Cone ct a Manifest Injustice Pursuant

719(3) is denied.
3.

the Provisions of Idaho
Claimant's Motion for Change in Condition Pursuant to

Code § 72-719(1)(a) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ,;;J2 rd,,d ay o f ~ IJ <?

✓

, 2018.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, 2018, a true and correct
I hereby certify that on the ?Jf\.lNl!ay of ~ l l i l ,
FOR RECONSIDERATION,
copy of the foregoing ORD ER ON MOTION
regular United States Mail upon
MODIFICATION, AND CONSOLIDATION was served by
each of the following:
L, CL YEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J, AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

esl
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STEPH AN, KV ANVI G, STON E & TRAIN OR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB # 1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Teleph one: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-73 3-3619
E-Mail: skst@ idaho- law.co m
Ayala /NOA /mek
Attorn ey for Claim ant/Appel lant

BEFO RE THE INDU STRIA L COMM ISSIO N
OF THE STAT E OF IDAH O

MARI O AYAL A,
Claim ant/Appel lant,

LC. No. 2001-5 20958
LC. No. 2009-0 29533
LC. No. 2013-0 24075

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
ROBE RT J. MEYE RS FARM S, INC.,
Employer,

'

i

'

and
(;)

."I)

STAT E INSUR ANCE FUND ,
Surety,
Defen dants/ Respo ndents .

TO:

Insura nce Fund, and
The above -name d Respondents, Rober t J. Meyer s Farms , Inc. and State
P.O. Box 1521, Boise,
their counsel, Paul J. Augus tine, Augus tine Law Offices, PLLC ,
ission of the State of
Idaho, 83701, and the Clerk of the above-entitled Indust rial Comm
Idaho.
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NOTI CE IS HERE BY GIVEN THAT:

1.

-named
The above-named Appellant, Mario Ayala, appeals against the above
n for
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from that Order on Motio
Reconsideration, Modification, and Consolidation, dated and filed

June 22, 2018,

, dated and
together with that Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

filed April 9, 2018, each entered ofrecord in the above-entitled proceeding,

Thomas

ed are
E. Limbaugh, Chairman, presiding. A copy of said Orders being appeal
attached to the Notice.
2.

the orders
That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and
l(d)I.A.R.
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders pursuant to Rule l

3.

Preliminary statement of issues on appeal:
(a)

Did the conduct of the Idaho State Industrial Commission in reassigning

the

ing
claim from the Referee, Mr. Michael Powers, to the Commission follow
hearing involving testimony presided over by Mr. Powers; the taking of post'
hearing depositions by the respective parties; the filing of the parties
for
respective post-hearing briefs; and, the submission of the claim
his
determination but prior to Mr. Powers having opportunity to issue
proposed Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Recommendation and/or
of
submit the same to the Commission over the written objection
Claimant/Appellant, constitute error herein?
(1)

Was said conduct by the Commission in excess of the Commission's
jurisdiction, power and/or authority?
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(2)

Was said conduct by the Commission arbitrary and capricious so as
to constitute an abuse of its discretion?

(3)

Whether said conduct by the Commission without properly enacted
regulations and/or guidelines in violation of the Due Process Clauses
of the United States and Idaho Constitutions?

(b)

Whether it was error for the Commission to consider matters (certain of
Claimant's medical records) which were not admitted of record, but which
had been, in fact, specifically excluded by the January 10, 2017, Order on
Claimant's Motion to Strike; Amended Order Regarding Hearing Exhibits,
ofreco rd herein?

(c)

Did the Commission err in its determination that Claimant's low back
presentment from and following the October 6, 2009, industrial motor vehicle
accident was not compensable as a result and/or consequence thereof?

(d)

Whether Claimant's I. C. §§ 72-718 and 72-719 Motions for Reconsideration;
to Reopen; for Modification of Award Upon Consideration of a Change in the
Nature or Extent of Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest
Injustice; and, for Consolidation, together with the Supporting Affidavit of
Claimant, Mario Ayala, inclusive of the attachments thereto, each dated April
27, 2018, in conjunction with the record then before the Commission, present
a sufficient factual basis to warrant review by the Commission such that the
Commission's denial thereof was an abuse of discretion?
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(1)

an LC. § 72Whether the Commission erred in concluding that
in the nature
719(1)(a) Motion required demonstration ofa change
precedent
and extent of Claimant's physical injury as a condition
thereof?

(e)

determinations within
Whether the Commission's findings, rationale and/or
llant herein, were
the Orders appealed from, to the extent adverse to Appe
al and competent
erroneous as a matter of law; supported by substanti
and required for
evidence of record; set-forth specific findings necessary
, and/or the product
meaningful appellate review; were arbitrary, capricious
of abuse of discretion; or, whether relevant thereto, the

Commission failed to

make proper application ofla wto the evidence and/or

facts ofrecord herein,

in reaching the same?
(f)

Whether, pursuant to Idaho Cod e§ 72-804 and/or Rule

41, I.AR ., Claimant

n.
is entitled to reasonable attorney fees on appeal herei
4.

record.
No order has been entered sealing any portion of the

5.

The reporter's transcript is requested of the October 26,
the pre-hearing colloquially between counsel and Refe
Claimant, Mario Ayala; the testimony of Mr. Morgan

2016, hearing, inclusive of

ree Powers; the testimony of

Meyers; and, the post-hearing

llant hereby requests a hard
colloquially between Referee Powers and counsel. Appe
copy of said transcript.
6.

Appellant requests the following documents to be inclu

ded in the agency's record in

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,

LA.R.:
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(a)

Claimant's Rule 10 Submission of Exhibits.
(1)

Exhibits,
Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Regarding
dated November 22, 2016.

(2)

of Order
Defendants' Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification
Regarding Hearing Exhibits, dated December 3, 2016.

(3)

dants'
Claimant's Objection; Motion to Strike; and, Reply to Defen
rding
Response to Claimant's Motion for Clarification of Order Rega
Hearing Exhibits, dated January 3, 2017.

(4)

rding
Order on Claimant's Motion to Strike; Amended Order Rega
Hearing Exhibits, dated and filed January 10, 2017.

(b)

o Ayala, taken
Transcript of pre-hearing deposition of Claimant, Mari
exhibits thereto.
November 10, 2015, together with Change Sheet and any

(c)

ond, M.D.,
Transcript of post-hearing deposition of Richard John Hamm
taken December 16, 2016, inclusive of exhibits.

(d)

o, M.D., taken
Transcript of post-hearing deposition of Paul J. Montalban
April 26, 2017, inclusive of exhibits.

(e)

., taken June
Transcript of post-hearing deposition of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D
20, 2017, inclusive of exhibits.

(f)

n, taken June 20,
Transcript of post-hearing deposition of William C. Jorda
2017, together with Change Sheet thereto and any exhibits.

(g)

The parties' respective post-hearing briefs, being:
(1)

2017;
Claimant's Post-Hearing Opening Brief, dated September 28,
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(h)

(2)

Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, dated October 23, 2017;

(3)

Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief, dated November 1, 2017.

That January 3, 2018, correspondence from the Commission to counsel,
inquiring whether the parties were willing for the Commissioners to issue a
decision on the record adduced, to expedite the same in light of Referee
Powers having a backlog of cases.
(1)

Correspondence to the Commission from Clyel Berry, as counsel for
Claimant herein, dated January 11, 2018, advising the Commission
that in light of the importance of Claimant's observational credibility
as consideration in the matter, that Claimant and his counsel were
willing to wait for Mr. Powers' Recommendation.

(2)

Any correspondence from counsel for Defendants, Mr. Augustine,
responsive to the Commission's January 3, 2018, correspondence to
counsel.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
M. Dean Willis
c/o M.D. Willis, Inc.
Certified Shorthand Reporters
P.O. Box 1241
Eagle, ID 83616

(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the Agency's Record has been paid.
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(c)

That the Appellant filing fee has been paid.

(d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

DATED This

2!/_ day of July, 2018.
STEPHAN, KVANVI

t)

By·- --LA ~~~ ==.1 ----- L. Clyel Be

Attorney for Claimant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the
,.. , /
.oCJ__ day of July, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701
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RECEIVED
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ST~~ (2Js1™1f:IO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2001-520958
2009-029533
2013-024075

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

ORDER ON MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION,
MODIFICATION,
AND CONSOLIDATION

v.

Employer,
and

FILED

STATE INSURANCE FUND,

JUN 2 2 2018

Surety,
Defendants.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. dated April 9, 2018, the
Commission detennined, inter alia, that Claimant has proven disability of .40% of the whole
person, inclusive of disability referable to the accidents of 2009, 2013, and Claimant's non-work
related low back condition.

Defendants failed to adduce evidence sufficient to allow the

Commission to apportion disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406 and, accordingly,
Defendants were found responsible for the entirety of Claimant's 40% disability. In a separate
Order issued contemporaneously herewith, the Commission has determined that Claimant's 40%
disability is payable at 2013 rates.
On or about April 30, 2018, Claimant filed his Motions for Reconsideration,
Modification, and Consolidation, supported by the April 30, 2018 Affidavit of Claimant. That
affidavit reflects that Claimant earned $47,690 in income for 2016, but only $27,500 in 2017.
Claimant also avers that while. he was paid a monthly salary at the time of hearing, he is
currently paid on an hourly basis, with his hourly wage being approximately the same as his two
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subordinates. The affidavit further reflects that on or about June 7, 2017, Claimant suffered a
work-related injury to his left knee for which he has received arthroscopic surgery by Dr.
Johnson, the same physician who perfo1med the right knee arthroplasty arising from the 2013
right lmee injury.

From Claimant's affidavit, it further appears that Dr. Johnson has

recommended that Claimant requires left knee replacement. That surgery has not taken place
and the affidavit suggests that Surety has declined to authorize this treatment. Exhibit C to
Claimant's affidavit is a brief report from Dr. Johnson.

It reflects that Claimant carries a

diagnosis of degenerative joint disease and a torn meniscus. It further reflects Dr. Johnson's
opinion that Claimant requires a left total knee replacement, suggesting that Dr. Johnson is of the
view that Claimant is not yet at a point of n:i,edical stability. Somewhat paradoxically, he then
suggests that if worker's compensation will not cover the recommended total lmee replacement,
Claimant may be considered to be at maximnm medical improvement, with ce1iain delineated
impairment and permanent restrictions, restrictions which may be m?re onerons than those at
issue in this proceeding.
In opposition to Claimant's motions, Defendants have offered the Affidavit of Morgan
Meyers of Robe1i J. Meyers Farms, Inc. That affidavit reflects that in the 2017 calendar year,
Claimant was paid his "normal wages." However, Claimant did not receive an annual bonus in
2017, and according to Mr. Meyers, thi~ explains why his total compensation in 2017 was
significantly less than his 2016 income. ,The affidavit further reflects that the decision not to
offer a bonus in 2017 applied to all employees and that insofar as this decision applied to
Claimant, it had nothing to do with Claimant's job performance. Mr. Meyers' affidavit implies
that Claimant's compensation scheme, except for the payment of the 2017 bonus, was unchanged
from prior years. This contradicts Claimant's affidavit which reflects that in 2017 Claimant went

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, MODIFICATION, AND
CONSOLIDATION - 2

312

from a monthly salary to an hourly wage. However, Claimant's affidavit does not reflect that
this change in the method of compensation resulted in a pay reduction. Claimant argues that the
approximate $20,000 reduction in income he suffered in 2017 cannot be explained solely by
Employer's decision not to award a bonus for 2017, the implication being that some part of
Claimant's decrease in compensation must be attributable to a decrease in his monthly income.
However, Claimant, who should know, does not make this averment in his affidavit.
Morgan Meyers' affidavit does not explain why Meyers Farms employees, including
Claimant, were not paid an annual bonus for 2017. Claimant's affidavit does not explain why he
was switched from a monthly salary to an hourly wage in 2017. Nor does Claimant's affidavit
explain why Claimant's income was reduced significantly in 2017; it may be that Claimant's
income Joss is related to new injuries he sustained in 2017. The affidavits are potentially in
conflict depending on what is meant by Morgan Meyers' use of the term "normal wages" at~ 2
of this affidavit. However, both affidavits seem to support the proposition that Claimant's 2017
income is approximately $20,000 lower than his 2016 annual income.
In

support of his motions, Claimant argues that the accident of June 7, 2017 and

Claimant's demonstrated income reduction for 2017 constitute new evidence which warrants
review of the Commission's April 9, 2018 Order pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-718 and/or Idaho
Code§ 72-719. As a fallback position, Claimant urges the Commission to consolidate the 2009
and 2013 claims with the new 2017 claim.
Claimant first takes issue with the Commission's decision to issue its own Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order without the benefit of having observed Claimant at hearing.
As we have explained, the Commission's election to write the April 9, 2018 decision was not
lightly made. However, our obligation to manage our docket to issue timely decisions informed
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our judgment. We are, of course, sensitive to the fact that not having observed Claimant at
hearing, we are unable to make any finding as to Claimant's observational credibility. However,
we are just as competent as the Referee who heard the matter to compare Claimant's testimony
to other testimony and evidence of record to make substantive credibility determinations. For
example, as explained in the April 9, 2018 decision, we found Claimant's testimony that he has
experienced significant and unremitting low back pain ever since the October 6, 2009 accident to
be incredible as compared to other testimony and evidence of record. This finding was important
to the Commission's detennination that Claimant's low back condition is not causally related to
the subject accident.
Claimant also testified at hearing to his subjective pain and functional loss stemming
from his various injuries/conditions. The Commission considered this testimony in evaluating
Claimant's disability. However, it is urged by Claimant that had we had the ability to observe
Claimant at hearing, e.g., had we watched him walk to and from the witness stand, grimace with
certain movements, or squhm in his seat, we might have been more inclined to give greater
weight to his recitation of his functional limitations.
Identifying Claimant's residual fun_ctional capacity was one of the principle issues with
which the Commission struggled in c01mection with evaluating Claimant's disability. Based on
the opinions of a number of Claimant's treaters, Defendants argued that Claimant has no
limitations/restrictions referable to the 2009 and 2013 injuries.

In further support of this

assertion, they pointed out that Claimant has continued to work for this time-of-injury employer
in his time-of-injury position since the 2009 accident.
Claimant relied on the September 25, 2015 FCE in support of his asse1iion that the 2009
and 2013 accidents, along with Claimant's low back condition, have significantly degraded his
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functional capacity.

We rejected Defendants' argument that Claimant is not limited by the

residual effects of the subject accidents. While the FCE findings are not unchallenged by other
evidence of record (see Findings of Fact, ,r,r 98-105), the Commission determined that the FCE is
the least objectionable measure of Claimant's functional abilities and relied on it to evaluate
Claimant's disability. Therefore, the Commission did exactly as Claimant asked. If Claimant's
presentation at hearing was demonstrative of his discomfort and loss of functional ability, it
seems that this additional information only reiterates the evidence the Commission accepted
concerning Claimant's functional ability, and is therefore cumulative.

Medical evidence is

preferred as a guide to evaluating
limitations/restrictions.
.
'
.
Next, Claimant takes issue with the Commission's treatment of Claimant's age, 65, as of
the date of hearing.
. .

Claimant
argues that the Commission's
decision
'
.
.
. subverts' conventional
'

wisdom about the impact of age on disabHity. We disagree. Idaho Code § 72-430 specifies that
'

,,

'

.

'

!'

'

'

'

'

among the. non-medical factors
to be
considered. by the Commission in evaluating disability is
"
.
'

Claimant's age.

The statute does not direct us to awmd higher disability to older workers,

although that is frequently the re~ult.

As directed by
statute,. the Commission
did take
'
.
'

Claimant's age into account and found, un.der the pecuEar facts of this case, that Claimant's
status as an aide~ worker, coupled with the likelihood of continued employment with his time-ofinjury employer, supported lower disability than would be the case for a similarly situated 20year-old. We.find no reason to .revise, our treatment of Claimant's age. Woody v. Seneca Foods,
LC. 2010-012114 (2013) is inapposite.

That case involved an older injured worker who was

unemployed at the time of hearing and with.out prospects.
Next, Claimant charges that it was improper for the Commission to attach the
significance it did to Claimant's current employment and annual income in evaluating his
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disability.

Claimant argues that the Commission's consideration of Claimant's cutTent

employment "punishes" Claimant for continuing to work following the 2009 accident:

It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's rationale as specifically setf01ih within its decision punishes Mr. Ayala for continuing to work following his
October 6, 2009, and August 28, 2013, industrial accidents. Had Mr. Ayala
terminated his employment after either of those events, he most likely would have
been awarded the entirety of his permanent disability related to and resultant of
injuries suffered therein, without reduction.
Clt's Memorandum, p. 9-10. Therefore, the argument goes, Claimant's post-accident
employment denies him disability that he would otherwise have been entitled to, had he not gone
back to work. 1 We reject this cynical argument as entirely inconsistent with the purpose of our
worker's compensation system.

In this case, Claimant suffered two work-related accidents.

Income and medical benefits were paid to Claimant, all for the purpose of supporting his
recovery and return to gainful employment. This he did, and in his case, the system did what it is
supposed to do.

Claimant has hardly been punished.

We can think of no justification for

ignoring Claimant's current ability to work at his time-of-injury job, since return to gainful
activity is the aim of worker's compensation.
The main argument offered by Claimant in support of his Idaho Code § 72-718 and Idaho
Code§ 72-719 motions is his assertion that events occun-ing subsequent to the October 26, 2016
hearing have invalidated one of the significant assumptions made by the Commission in arriving
at the determination that Claimant has 40% disability referable to the pre-existing back condition
and the 2009 and 2013 accidents. As the underlying decision reflects, it was, indeed, significant
to the Commission's decision that Claimant has performed his time-of-injury job, albeit with
some modification, since the 2009 accident, excepting those times when he has been in a period
of recovery following his various surgerie~. Claimant was so employed at the time of hearing,
1 By

dint of similar reasoning, any person who is employed is unfairly deprived of the unemployment insurance
benefits he would get were he laid off.
·
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and since 2009, he has eajoyed steady annual increases in compensation, such that by 2016 his
annual income slightly exceeded $47,000.

It was also significant to the Commission that

Claimant's prospects for ongoing employment seemed reasonably secure; Morgan Meyers
testified that Claimant was impo1iant, if not critical, to Employer's business. Based on past
history, the Commission also ente1iained the possibility that Claimant's annual income would
increase, and that he would eventually retire from this job.

Claimant argues that the

Commission's assumption that Claimant's employment would continue at the same or greater
wage was central to the Commission's decision on disability. However, the fact that Claimant is
currently employed is far from the sole factor upon which the Commission relied in evaluating
Claimant's disability. Had it been the sole factor, we might have adopted Defendant's argument
on disability: Claimant's continuing employment, coupled with a significant increase in annual
income since 2009, and the prospect for continued future employment, augers in favor of a
conclusion that Claimant has suffered no disability over and above impahment. However, we
did not adopt this argument, recognizing that we must reconcile Claimant's seeming prospects
for continued employment with the fact that he has suffered a significant disability should he
ever lose his job. (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 11113-115).
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-425, disability is a measure of Claimant's "present and
probable future" ability to engage in gainful activity.

Our finding that Claimant's current

employment is likely to continue is assuredly important to our decision, but our award of a 40%
disability necessarily reflects our recognition that continuation of Claimant's employment is not
assured. The Commission cannot predict the future, yet the statute requires us to consider the
impact of the 2009 and 2013 accidents on Claimant's probable future ability to engage in gainful
activity. Our synthesis of Claimant's disability recognizes that the future holds uncertainties
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which we cannot know, including the circumstances of Claimant's future employment. The 40%
disability figure we arrived at recognizes Claimant's significant loss of access to the labor
market, and the fact that he has successfully continued to work for Employer. Nothing in our
decision signals that a different result would obtain should Claimant lose his cmTent job. While
the 40% rating is based on our perception that Claimant will continue in his time-of-injury
employment, it also reflects our acknowledgement that he may not. Otherwise, we might have
awarded Claimant no disability above impaitment. That one of the possibilities we necessarily
entertained has now come to pass does not persuade us to revisit our gestalt of Claimant's
disability since that possibility is merged into the Commission's evaluation.
Further, the affidavits provided by the parties leave us unable to understand why
Claimant's income declined so precipitously in 2017. Claimant specifically denies any increase
in disability or limitation referable to the 2009 and 2013 accidents. (See Claimant's Reply at pp.
7 and 8). He does, however, argue that the June 7, 2017 accident is responsible for a significant
increase in Claimant's limitations/restrictions and may make it impossible for Claimant to
'

'

continue in his employment. It is argued that this likelihood adds futiher support to Claimant's
argument that the Commission erred when it based its evaluation of Claimant's disability on the
likelihood that Claimant's employment would continue. This argument seems nonsensical.

If

Claimant suffers income loss or loses his job because of a new injury associated with an accident
of June 7, 2017, this loss is part-and-parcel of a claim for disability referable to the new accident,
not the 2009 and 2013 claims.

While Claimant might lose his job because of additional

limitations related to the June 7, 2017 accident, this does not prove that the Commission made an
invalid assumption concerning the likelihood for Claimant's continued employment.
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proves (or may prove) is that Claimant has an actionable claim for disability arising from a new
accident/injury.
Having addressed the broad arguments made by Claimant in support of his motions, we
turn now to the specific arguments made by Claimant in connection with his motions made
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, Idaho Code § 72-719, and for consolidation.
Motion for Reconsideration Under Idaho Code§ 72-718

Claimant has filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718.
That section provides:
A decision of the comm1ss10n, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the
decision in the office of the commission; provided, within twenty (20) days from
the date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or
rehearing of the decision, or the commission may rehear or reconsider its decision
on its own initiative, and in any such events the decision shall be final upon denial
of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration or the filing of the decision on
rehearing or reconsideration. Final decisions may be appealed to the Supreme
Court as provided by section 72-724, Idaho Code.
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case and determine
whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is not
compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during reconsideration. Davison v. HH
Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196 (1986). The Commission may reverse its decision

upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question, based on the
arguments presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame
established in Idaho Code§ 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 P.3d
329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 (1988)). A
motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual findings
and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue. However, the Commission is
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simply because the case
not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration
was not resolved in a party's favor.
hearing undercut
In this case, Claimant argues that facts arising subsequent to the date of
evidence of which the
the assumptions supporting the Commission's decision and constitute new
in evaluating the Motion
Commission must consider on reconsideration. Defendants argue that
ce of record, not new
for Reconsideration, the Commission is limited to consideration of eviden
to Strike the Affidavit of
evidence. Consistent with this position, Defendants filed a Motion
in Claimant's affidavit,
Claimant, but against the chance that the Commission will enterta
l averments not in the
Defendants filed the Affidavit of Morgan Meyers, which also makes factua
ission may consider
current record. The statute is silent on the question of whether the Comm
ction with the earlier
new evidence, i.e., evidence that was not before the Commission in conne
ant has observed, the
proceeding, in evaluating a motion for reponsideration .. However, as Claim

v. MH. King Co., 142
Idaho Supreme Court does appear to have addressed this issue. In Curtis
necrosis of the hip was
Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005), ~laimant asserted that her avascular
Commission dete1mined
attributable to a fall at work. Relying on the testimony Clf Dr. Rudd, the
ant filed a motion for
that this condition was not causally related to claimant's accide11t. Claim
by the Commission. On
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, which was denied
ce was in conflict, Dr. Rudd' s testimony
appeal, the Court noted that although medical eviden
'
.
's decision. Claimant
constituted substantial and competent eyidence supporting the Commission
ideration. The Court
also argued that the Commissi9n erred in denying her motion for recons
ideration, but does not
noted that Idaho Code § 72-718 authorizes the party to request recons
require the Commission to grant such request. The Court then stated:
reasons
It is axiomatic that a claimant must present to the Commission new
n for
factually and legally to support a hearing on her Motio
TION, AND
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Rehearing/Reconsideration rather than rehashing evidence previously presented ..
Although Curtis presented a very detailed brief in support of her motion she did
not produce new law or evidence to necessitate a rehearing or reconsideration.
Id. at 388, 925. As noted by Claimant, this language suggests that to properly support a motion

for reconsideration the moving party must present to the Commission new facts or legal
argument rather than ask the Commission to think some.more about the facts and argument upon
which the Commission originally relied in reaching its decision. Indeed, review of the
Commission's Order denying reconsideration in Curtis reflects that Claimant did not rely on any
new facts to support her motion for reconsideration. (See Order Denying Reconsideration at
2004-IIC0735.l) (2004).
The evidence that Claimant would have us consider is not evidence that could reasonably
have been adduced at hearing. The facts that Claimant would have us consider are new facts
which came into existence following the· hearing, and therefore conld not and were not
considered by the Commission. In other recent cases we have considered such evidence in
connection with a motion for reconsideration. (See Strope v. Kootenai Medical Ctr, Inc., 2016
IIC0046.1). In Strope, one of claimant's arguments at hearing was that claimant was entitled to a
new MRI which it was thought might reveal that she was entitled to further medical treatment.
The Commission ruled in defendants' favor, finding that claimant had not proven her entitlement
to such a study. Following the Commission's decision, claimant obtained the study at her own
expense, and urged the Commission to reconsider its decision, arguing that the study did reveal
that she suffered from a work-related c9ndition requiring additional care. The Commission
found this argument persuasive and granted claimant's motion for reconsideration upon the basis
of new evidence. Accordingly, we agree that it is not inappropriate for the Commission to
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for
consider the affidavits of Claimant and Mr. Meyers in connection with Claimant's Motion
Reconsideration and we deny Defendants' Motion to Strike Claimant's Affidavit.
However, as explained above, we do not find Claimant's arguments, in particular, his
We
arguments involving events occurring subsequent to the date of hearing, to be persuasive.
was
continue to be satisfied with our analysis of Claimant's disability based on the evidence that
of
before us. Our deliberations on the issue of disability included consideration of a number
date
"what-ifs," including the fact that Claimant might not remain in his time-of-injury job to the
under
of his eventual retirement. Therefore, we deny Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration
Idaho Code § 72-718.
Motion to Correct a Manifest Injustice under Idaho Code§ 72-719

Idaho Code§ 72-719(3) provides:
The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the date
of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational
disease, may review a case in order to c01Tect a manifest injustice.
While the plain language of the statute specifies that it comes on the Commission's own motion,

,
of a
this fact does not preclude the Commission from exercising its powers when notice
104
purported manifest injustice is brought to its attention by a party. Banzhafv. Carnation Co.,
of the
Idaho 700, 662 P.2d 1144 (1983). As grounds for reopening and review of an order
the
Commission the term "manifest injustice," must be given broad construction to advance
to the
humane purposes of the Act. Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982). As
meaning of the te1m, the Sines Court stated:
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or
recognized at once by the mind; not obscure; obvious. Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, 1967. "Injustice" has been defined to mean: absence of
justice; violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust
act or deed; wrong. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967.

ORDER ON MOTIO N FOR RECONSIDERATION, MODIFICATION, AND
CONSO LIDAT ION - 12

322

265 (2008), the Commission
In Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d
from the effects of a knee injury on
determined that Claimant reached a point o.f medical stability
from Claimant's physician. Claimant
November 26, 2001. This decision was based on a note
2001, but was a no-show for the
was scheduled to see her physician on November 26,
have been getting along well and
appointment. The physician concluded that claimant must
nce the Commission relied upon to
pronounced her medically stable. This was the only evide
defin~ Claimant's date of medical stability.
ion, claimant filed a motion
Subsequent to the issuance of the Commission's decis
on to reopen the case to correct a
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(3), urging the Commissi
letter written by Dr. Peterson stating
manifest injustice. Claimant supported her motion with a
, but that he had since examined her
that he had not examined claimant on November 26, 2001
was in need of further care. The
and determined that she ·was not medically stable and
that Dr. Peterson's letter presented an
Commission denied the motion to reopen the case, ruling
w the case. On appeal, the Supreme
insufficient factual basis upon which to reopen and revie
on relied in defining claimant's date
Court noted that the only evidence upon which the Commissi
chart note. The Court further noted
of medical stability was Dr. Peterson's November 26, 2001
did not actually examine claimant on
that the unrebutted evidence established that Dr. Peterson
mined his earlier statement and
that date. Dr. Peterson's subsequent letter entirely under
in need of further care. Therefore,
established that claimant was not medically stable and was
lishing claimant's date of medical
the only evidence upon which the Commission relied in estab
t reasoned, this is an adequate factual
stability was demonstrated to be invalid. Clearly, the Cour
of medical stability. To do otherwise
basis upon which to reopen the case to revisit the finding
would be unjust.
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In this case, Claimant appears to state three bases for reopening of the case in order to
t's
correct a manifest injustice. First, as above noted, the Commission considered Claiman
t that
testimony concerning his subjective limitations and discomfort. It is argued by Claiman
to
had the Commission actually observed Claimant at hearing, we might have been more inclined
d
give greater weight to his recitation of his residual functional abilities. However, as explaine
best
above, we have accepted the FCE findings, which Claimant urged us to adopt, as the
have
analysis of Claimant's residual functional capacity. Whatever additional insights might
largely
been obtained by watching the Claimant as he sat or walked about the hearing room are
case for
reiterative and cumulative. We decline to ente1iain Claimant's invitation to reopen the
further review on this basis.
Next, Claimant appears to suggest that because he suffered a new June 7, 2017
in
accident/injury which implicates further and more onerous restrictions on his ability to engage
these
gainful activity, the Commission's decision must be reopened to allow consideration of
April
new facts in assessing Claimant's disability. We reject this, too, as a reason to reopen the
if it
9, 2018 decision to correct a manifest injustice. Simply, the June 7, 2017 accident/injmy,
we
did occur, is not part of this proceeding. It is separately actionable and, as explained below,
decline to consolidate it with the 2009 and 2013 claims.
Finally, Claimant argues that to avoid a manifest injustice the record must be reopened to
reflects
allow consideration of Claimant's changed circumstances, i.e., his 2017 earnings, which
this
a significant decrease, as compared to his 2016 earnings. Setting aside the possibility that
it is not
decrease is attributable to a separately actionable 2017 accident/injury, we conclude that
y. As
unjust to decline to consider this change in circumstance in evaluating Claimant's disabilit
loss of
explained above, our evaluation of disability is a synthesis of Claimant's significant
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that
access to the labor market and the fact of his continued employment. Bill Jordan speculated
lost
if Claimant ever lost his job, his disability would be in the range of 47%. Claimant has not
t's
his job, yet the Commission nevertheless made an award of 40% disability to balance Claiman
labor market access loss against the fact of his continuing employment. Simply, our analysis
they
contemplates the possibility that Claimant's circumstances might change in the future. That
his
did does not undermine our analysis. This case is not like Page. Claimant's current job and
of
2016 income were far from the sole factors we relied on in making our determination
Claimant's disability.
Based on the foregoing, we deny Claimant's Idaho Code§ 72-719(3) motion.
Motion for Modificatiol\ Pursuant to Change in Condition

Claimant's motion for modification made pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a) was
s that
made contemporaneous with his motion for reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718 specifie
ted
the Commission's decision of April 9, 2018 is final and conclusive as to matters adjudica
§
therein unless a timely motion for reconsideration is filed, as it was in this case. Idaho Code
72-719(1) authorizes the reopening_ of a "final and conclusive" award in certain circumstances.
his
Fowler v. City of Rexburg, 116 Idaho 1, 773 P.2d 269 (1988). At the time Claimant filed
to
Idaho Code§ 72-719 motion, the April 9, 2018 decision was not final and conclusive, owing
Claimant's contemporaneous motion for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718.
a
However, having denied Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Correct
ve as
Manifest Injustice, the April 9, 2017 decision of the Commission is now final and conclusi
r
anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-718. Therefore, we accept Claimant's invitation to conside
1)
whether the case should be reopened to address a change in condition. Idaho Code § 72-719(
provides:
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72-719. Modification of awards and agreements - Grounds - Time within
which made. - (1) On application made by a party in interest filed with the
commission at any time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing
the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, on the ground
of a change in conditions, the commission may, but not oftener than once in six
(6) months, review any order, agreement or award upon any of the following
grounds:
(a) Change in the nature or extent of the employee's injury or disablement; and
(b) Fraud.

Therefore, a case may be reopened to review an award on the grounds of a change in the nature
in the
of the employee's injury or disablement. Claimant concedes that there has been no change
extent or degree or Claimant's impairment since date of hearing:
Claimant's Idaho Code § 72-719 motions are not premised upon any argument
that claimant's impairment has increased since the date of hearing herein, related
to the 2009 and/or 2013 injuries .....
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decision Motions at p.7)
Rather, Claimant argues that his condition has changed because of a change in the circumstances
s
of his employment, and that Idaho Code § 72-719 provides that such a change warrant
reopening of the case because it may reflect a change in Claimant's "disablement":
Rather, counsel notes that Idaho Code § 72-719(1)(a) sets fo1ih as alternative
grounds, either a change in the nature or extent of employee's injury, meaning
impairment, or, in the disjunctive, disablement....
(Claimant's Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Post-Decisions Motions at p. 7)
n are
Therefore, the argument is that because the ground for reopening for change in conditio
either
stated in the disjunctive, a petition for change in condition may be justified where there is
a change in the nature and extent of Claimant's impairment, or a change in the nature and extent
nt
of his disability, owing to some non-medical circumstance, in this case, Claimant's significa
must
2017 decrease in earnings. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Claimant
ully
demonstrate a change in the nature and extent of his physical injury in order to successf
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pursue a petition for change in condition under Idaho Code § 72-719(1)(a), and that such a
petition cannot be pursued upon a showing of some change in a non-medical factor, alone.
Essentially, Claimant's argument is that because a petition for change in condition may
be pursued when there has been a change in Claimant's "disablement," the statute clearly
anticipates that such a petition may be pursued where there has been a change in one of the nonmedical factors relied on by the Commission to assess "disability." Necessarily, this argument
pre-supposes that "disablement" as used in the statute is the equivalent of "disability" as defined
and evaluated at Idaho Code § 72-423, § 72-425, and § 72-430. Had the legislature intended that
a petition for change in condition could be supported by a showing of a change in one of the nonmedical factors central to the determination of "disability," it could have unambiguously
signaled this intent by using that term in Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a). Instead, the legislature
chose to use another term: "disablement." Disablement is a concept central to the compensability
of occupational disease claims. Idaho Code§ 72-102(22)(c) defines disablement as follows:
"Disablement," except in the case of silicosis, means the event of an employee's
becoming actually and totally incapacitated because of an occupational disease
from performing his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to
the hazards of such disease; and "disability" means the state of being so
incapacitated.
A claim for occupational disease arises when a worker is incapacitated, i.e. disabled, from
performing his work in the last occupation in which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of
his disease.

See Idaho Code § 72-437. "Disablement," in this sense, represents a physical

inability to work at the time of injury job, caused by the hazards of that job. It does not have
anything to do with the nonmedical factors enumerated at Idaho Code § 72-430. The nonmedical
factors implicated in evaluating "disability" are not at issue when assessing whether
"disablement" has occurred, i.e. whether a claimant is physically incapable of performing the
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§
time of injury job. The legislatme's choice of "disablement" versus "disability" in Idaho Code
dical
72-719(1)(a) lends no support to Claimant's argument that a change in one of the non-me
claim
factors relevant to the original evaluation of claimant's disability warrants reopening of the
for a change in condition. It seems just as likely that the disjunctive language of the statute
both
simply reflects the fact that petitions for change in condition can be brought in
in the
accident/injury and occupational disease claims, but only where there has been a change
nature of the physical condition of the injured worker.
Case law also supports the conclusion that it is only for changes in the extent and degree
.
of an injured worker's physical condition that a petition for change in condition may be pursued
t
In Magee v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 152 Idaho 196, 268 P.3d 464 (2011), claiman
ent
suffered a work-related injury to his low back in 2002. His injuries resulted in perman
complaints of chronic pain.

In a 2004 decision, the Commission found that Claimant had

t later
suffered permanent impairment and disability as a consequence of the accident. Claiman
be
filed a Petition for Change in Condition, arguing that the Commission's decision should
the
modified because of a change in Claimant's condition. A second hearing was held and
d
Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to prove that a change in his condition had occurre
that
since the original hearing. Further, the Commission ruled that Claimant had failed to prove
.
it would be manifestly unjust for the Commission to continue to abide by its original decision
in
The evidence established that at the time of the original 2000 injury, Claimant resided
on
Cascade, Montana, a town with a population of about 2000 people. As of the date of hearing
a
the Petition for Change in Condition, Claimant resided in Radersburg, Montana, a town with
on
population of around 150 people. In connection with the Petition for Change in Conditi
time
Claimant acknowledged that his physical condition was about the same as it had been at the
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Claimant had been diagnosed
of the original hearing. However, there was also evidence that
had been attributed to the May
with a major depressive disorder since the original hearing, which
2000 industrial injmy.

the
Further, since the original hearing, Claimant had undergone

Claimant's chronic pain. This
implantation of a dorsal column stimulator in an effmt to diminish
n for Change of Condition,
evidently offered Claimant some relief. At hearing on the Petitio
n specialist who opined that
Claimant also put on the testimony of a vocational rehabilitatio
noted that this opinion was
Claimant was totally and pe1manently disabled, but it was also
sburg, Montana. The vocational
delivered in the context of his very small labor market in Rader
better employment opportunities
expert acknowledged that a larger labor market might provide
for Claimant.
concluding that Claimant
The Commission denied the Petition for Change of Condition,
condition had occurred.
had failed to adduce evidence showing that a change in

The

Injustice. Claimant appealed,
Conunission also denied Claimant's Motion to Correct a Manifest
had failed to establish a change
arguing that the Commission erred in determining that Claimant
in condition.
the disjunctive nature of
Concerning Idaho Code § 72-719(1), the Court aclmowledged
e a Petition for Change of
Idaho Code § 72-719(l)(a), yet concluded that in order to pursu
nstrate a change in the nature or
Condition under this section, Claimant must nevertheless demo
extent of his impairment:
to Idaho Code
Magee asserts that he sustained a change in condition pursuant
an award if there
section 72-719(a). The statute allows the Commission to modify
or disablement."
is a "[c]hange in the nature or extent of the employee's injury
an award due to
LC. § 72-719(l)(a). When a claimant applies for modification of
the burden of
a change in condition under LC. § 72-719(a), the claimant bears
Idaho 680,6 81,
showing a change in condition. Matthews v. Dep't a/Cor r., 121
109, 70 P.2d 391
827 P.2d 693, 694 (1992) (citing Boshers v. Payne, 58 Idaho
Commission that
(193 7)). The claimant is "required to make a showing before the
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he had an increased level of impairment, and to establish with reasonable medical
probability the existence of a causal relationship between the change in condition
and the initial accident and injury." Matthews, 121 Idaho at 681-82, 827 P.2d
694-95 (internal citations omitted).
red
Id Arguably, Magee did experience a significant change in the non-medical factors conside
for
by the Commission in reaching its original decision on disability. By the time of the Petition
g
Rehearing, Claimant had moved from a town of 2000 to a town of 150, a move which, accordin
not
to Claimant's vocational expert, dramatically increased his disability. Yet the Court did
ns of
consider this fact in evaluating the Petition for Change of Condition pursuant to the provisio
e of a
Idaho Code§ 72-719(l)(a), concluding that since Claimant had failed to adduce evidenc
change in the nature or extent of his impairment, there the inquiry stops.
Cited with approval by the Magee Court is the case of Matthews v. Dept. a/Corre ctions,
121 Idaho 680, 827 P.2d 693 (1992).

Matthews suffered a low back injury in 1985.

He

t and
underwent surgery and was eventually given a 20% impairment rating. Thereafter, claiman
y
surety executed a compensation agreement pursuant to the terms of which the claim for disabilit
was resolved by the payment of $15,895, the amount of his impaitment rating. Some months
his
later, claimant alleged a change in his condition and requested that the Commission increase
.
disability award. He also filed an Idaho Code § 72-719(3) motion to correct a manifest injustice
him to
His argument was based on his assertion that his low back injury made it impossible for
wages
re-enter the Army National Guard, and that this resulted in significant additional loss of
and future retirement benefits.
In connection with the petition for change of condition under Idaho Code§ 72-719(l)(a)
extent
the Court stated that to support such a petition, the claimant must prove an increase in the
or degree of impairment:
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As the Commission noted, when a claimant applies for a modification of an award
under LC. Section 72-719, he or she bears the burden of showing a change in
condition. Boshors v. Payne, 58 Idaho 109, 70 P.2d 391 (1937). Matthews was
required to make a showing before the Commission that he had an increased level
of impairment, Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769
P.2d 1122 (1989), and to establish with reasonable medical probability the
existence of a causal relationship between the change in condition and the initial
accident and injury. Carter v. Garrett Freightlines, l 05 Idaho 59, 665 P.2d 1069
(1983).
As in Magee, the Court had before it, facts which arguably supported a change in the
1985
level of claimant's disability; new facts before the Commission suggested that claimant's
reinjury was more limiting than initially found owing to its effect on claimant's designs upon
by the
entering the National Guard. Even so, the Idaho Code§ 72-719(1)(a) issue was resolved
e
Court's affirmation of the Commission's conclusion that claimant had failed to adduce evidenc
s,
of a change in the nature or extent of his physical injury. See also Ivie v. Daw Forest Product

1998 IIC 1253 (1998).
The Court's construction of Idaho Code § 72-719(1 )(a) makes perfect sense. Otherwise,
to
any time someone lost a job, got a job, got his GED, flunked out of school, got a raise, refused
the
cross a picket line, moved to another labor market, lost access to daycare, got older, etc.,
Commission might be faced with a petition to change a previous disability award because
d
somebody's circumstances had changed. In other words, anytime claimant's earnings increase
the
or decreased for reasons unconnected with the extent and degree of the work-related injury,
is
Commission could be faced with a petition to reopen the case. This is clearly not what
s the
intended, particularly in view of the charge of Idaho Code § 72-423 which obligate
Commission to evaluate Claimant's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful
r how
activity as of the date of hearing. This necessarily requires the Commission to conside
are
Claimant's future disability may be impacted by things that may or may not happen. We
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on the administration
obligated to make this judgment once, and it would place an undue burden
assessments based on
of the worker's compensation system to continually revise disability
Claimant's changing circumstances.
not premised on
Since Claimant concedes that his Idaho Code§ 72-719(1)(a) motion is
2009 and 2013 accidents,
any change in the nature or extent of his physical injuries related to the
we deny his Petition for Change in Condition under that section.
Motion for Consolidation

April 9, 2018
In the alternative, Claimant urges the Commission to withdraw the
g, and rehear the case so
decision, consolidate the 2009, 2013, and 2017 complaints for hearin
referable to Claimant's
that Defendants may be held· responsible for the entirety of the disability
responsibility for some
employment, and so that Defendants will be prevented from shifting
We decline to do this
portion of Claimant's disability to the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund.
for several reasons.
rety will pay what
First, it is unclear to us why consolidation will assure that Employer/Su
y for the 2009 and 2013
it should, but that a refusal to consolidate will not. Employer's liabilit
he is entitled to further
accidents has been decided by the Commission. If Claimant believes that
lidation or no, Employer
benefits by reason of the 2017 accident, he may pursue his claim. Conso
n benefits owed as a
will be held responsible for the payment of worker's compensatio
consequence of the subject accidents.
sible for that
In a case of total and permanent disability, the ISIF may be held respon
by impairments which
portion of an injured worker's total and permanent disability caused
work related, sometimes
predate the last accident. Sometimes these pre-existing impairments are
y.
they are not. The distinction is unimp01iant in evaluating the ISIF's liabilit
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allegedly occun-ed on or
Finally, there is the matter of timing. Claimant's third accident
following that accident was of
about June 7, 2017. It appears that Claimant's left knee condition
we have no way of !mowing
sufficient seriousness to require surgical treatment, although
Had Claimant been sufficiently
whether the accident is responsible for that need for treatment.
land, he had ample time within
concerned that the June 7, 2017 accident changed the lay of the
action of some type prior to the
which to alert the Commission to his concerns, and to request
issuance of the April 9, 2018 decision.

Instead, the parties and the Commission devoted

ted. That Claimant may not have
considerable effort to hearing and deciding the claims as presen
on his hands.
expected the decision to go the way it did is no defense to sitting
We DENY the Motion to Consolidate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORD ER

Claimant's motions, we
Having reviewed the affidavits and arguments of tl;ie parties on
hereby enter the following Order.
1.

Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

2.

Idaho Code § 72Claimant's Motion to Correct a Manifest Injustice Pursuant to

719(3) is denied.
3.

sions of Idaho
Claimant's Motion for Change in Condition Pursuant to the Provi

Code § 72-719(l)(a) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

;;)JJAd,, day of ~ - f l t7 ~

, 2018.
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Claimant,

IC 2001-520958
2009-029533
2013-024075

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
ANDORDER

v.

Employer,
and

FI LED
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

APR O9 2018

Surety,

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

This matter came before the Industrial Commission for hearing on October 26, 2016.
Appearing

for Mario Ayala (Claimant) was L.

Clyel Be1Ty, Esq. Appearing for Defendants

Robert J. Meyers Fmms, Inc. (Employer) and its worker's compensation surety, the State
Insurance Fund (Surety), was Paul Augustine, Esq. The testimony of Claimant and Morgan
Meyers was adduced at hearing. The testimony of William Jordan, Nancy Collins, PhD, Paul
Montalbano, M.D., and Richard Hammond, M.D., was taken by way of post-hearing deposition.
At hearing, Defendants' Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted into evidence. Claimant identified
propq~ed Exhibits 1 through 33, but withdrew Exhibit 1, and pages 46 through 115 (inclusive) of
Exhibit 3, Exhibit 25(a), and Exhibit 28(a). 1 Pursuant to Commission Orders of November 18,

1 Pages 46-115 of Exhibit 3 consists ofrecords from GFHC, and cover visits from 2004-2007. These records contain
certain references to pre-injury low back/SJ joint pain, and were reviewed by William Jordan and relied upon by
Mark Harris, M.D., (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 601,629). Claimant's counsel referenced some of these records in his
November 5, 2015 letter to Vernon Mccready, PA-C. (Cit E_x. 6, p. 349).These records are also implicit in
Claimant's acknowledgement that he suffered from episodic bouts oflow back pain in the years preceding the 2009
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2016 and January 10, 2017, the balance of Claimant's proposed exhibits are admitted into
evidence.
Per the Commission's Orders of July 19, 2016 and September 14, 2016, the following
matters are at issue:
I.

Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing injury or

disease or cause not work-related;
2.

Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care as

provided for by Idaho Code § 72-432, and the extent thereof;
3.

Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary partial and/or temporary total disability

(TPD/TTD) benefits, and the extent thereof;
4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits, and

the extent thereof;
5.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability (PPD) in excess of

permanent impairment, and the extent thereof;
6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot

doctrine, or otherwise;
7.

Whether apportiomnent for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-

406 is appropriate; and,
8.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees due to Employer/Surety's

unreasonable denial of compensation as provided for by Idaho Code § 72-804.

accident (See Cit. Ex. 20, p. 635). It seems preferable to consider the original of these notes rather than rely on
second hand synopses. Therefore, and notwithstanding the Commission's previous accession to Claimant's nropos~l
to withdraw these Exhihits, these portions ofExhihit 2 are sonsidered in this necis10n: However, exclus10n ofthese

records wvuld not change any asp·ect of the Commission's decision; as noted., rnei-e is other evidence of record
which establishes that Claimant did have some pre-injury low back symptoms.
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9.

Whether, if it is determined that Claimant's low back injury, condition and/or

presentment is casually related to or resultant of the industrial accidents/occurrences forming the
basis of the instant consolidated proceeding; that Claimant does not yet present at maximum
medical improvement related to said low back presentment; and that additional medical care,
treatment and/or services are reasonably required by reason of said low back presentment, that
the Commission reserve jurisdiction herein upon the issues of Claimant's entitlement to
permanent impairment and permanent disability, inclusive of odd-lot states, with said issues to
be considered/determined at the conclusion of Claimant's reasonably required medical care and
achieving maximum medical improvement.
This matter was calendared for hearing following the consolidation of three claims; an
accident of October 14, 2001 involving an injury to Claimant's back, an accident of October 6,
2009 involving multiple injuries to Claimant, and an accident of August 28, 2013 involving
injuries to Claimant's right knee. At hearing, Claimant signified his intention to withdraw from
consideration in the current proceeding, the October 14, 2001 claim. Accordingly, this matter is
before the Industrial Commission for consideration of the October 6, 2009 and August 28, 2013
accidents only.
At hearing, the parties expressed their agreement that Claimant suffered a compensable
injury to his right knee as a consequence of the August 28, 2013 accident, which injury
eventually resulted in the need for a total knee arthroplasty. Similarly, the parties agreed that as
a consequence of the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident, Claimant suffered injuries to his
neck, left shoulder, and left elbow. Claimant has undergone surgical treatment for each of these
injuries. Defendants have accepted responsibility for related medical care, income benefits owed
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to Claimant during his period of recovery, and impairment attributable to the neck, shoulder,
elbow, and knee.
Claimant contends that the evidence demonstrates that his low back condition is cansally
related to the 2009 motor vehicle accident, and that he is entitled to medical and income benefits
related to that injury. Claimant asserts that should the Commission dete1mine that Claimant's
low back condition is causally related to the 2009 accident, it is inappropriate to consider
Claimant's claim for disability at this juncture; Claimant requires further medical treatment for
his low back and the Commission should retain jurisdiction over this case pending such
treatment. In the alternative, Claimant contends that if the Commission dete1mines that
Claimant's low back condition is not a compensable consequence of the 2009 motor vehicle
accident, Claimant is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled as a result of those injuries
'

which the parties acknowledge to be causally related to the accidents of 2009 and 2013. In this
regard, Claimant contends that the FCE performed by PT Wright best delineates the
limitations/restrictions referable to Claimant's injuries, and as demonstrated by the testimony of
Dr. Collins, these limitations/restrictions leave Claimant totally and permanently disabled.
Defendants dispute that the October 9, 2009 industrial accident caused anything more
than a temporary aggravation of Claimant's documented pre-existing degenerative aithritis of the
lumbar spine, and that to the extent Claimant may require further medical treatment for his low
back, those consequences of Claimant's low back c9ndition are entirely referable to Claimant's
pre-existing low back condition and/or the natural progression of that condition unrelated to the
October 9, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Defendants contend that PT Wright's FCE is flawed,
and that the assertion of total and permanent disability is denigrated by the fact that Claimant has
been continuously employed in his time-of-injury job since the 2009 accident.
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contend that the evidence demonstrates that Claimant has a
fund of essential skills which
continue to make him a valuable employee and that he does not
enjoy continued employment by
virtue of his own superhuman effort or the Employer's sympathy.
In view of Claimant's ongoing
successful employment at his time-of-injury job, and the fact
that no physician has authored
limitations/restrictions for Claimant, Defendants contend that
Claimant has failed to prove
entitlement to disability in excess of impairment paid to date.
This matter was originally heard by Referee Powers. At the time
this matter came under
advisement, on November 3, 2017, the assigned Referee faced
a significant case backlog that
would result in a delay of this decision. In an effort to minim
ize the anticipated delay, the
Commission contacted the parties to suggest that the case be
decided on the record by the
Commission. The parties responded, stating that due to observationa
l credibility issues relating to
Claimant's presentation .at hearing, they preferred to have the
case decided by the Referee who
observed Claimant at hearing. However, as developed infra, the
outcome in this case does not
depend on an assessment of whether Claimant appeared to testify
credibly at hearing. It does, to
some extent, depend on a comparison of Claimant,' s testimony,
with other evidence of record.
While we are sensitive to the desires of the parties, our obliga
tion to manage our docket to
promote timely decisions supports assignment of this matter to the
Commission.
FINDINGS OF F'ACT

I.

Claimant was

. At the time of hearing, he was

Claimant was born in Mexico and attended school there for three
years. He moved to the
United States in 1974 and became a U.S. Citizen in 1992. He spoke
no English when he moved
to the United States. Claimant has pursued no formal education
in the United States. He learned
English on his own, and has good conversational English language
skills. (Tr., p, 34: 12-22). He
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es have improved. (Tr., pp.
also testified that as time has passed, his English language abiliti
ing skills.
53: 15-2; 132:7-16). He has poor Spanish and English reading/writ
2.

ting with his
Claimant did not admit to having any paiticular problem communica

ed following the accident. He
physicians in connection with the treatment/evaluation he receiv
by a physician, he will ask for
testified that if he initially does not understand a question posed
nce suggest that Claimant's
clarification. (Tr., p. 151:14-25). Nor do the medical records in evide
with him. For example, in his
providers/evaluators had any paiticular difficulty communicating
ded the history recorded. Dr.
August 2, 2010 repo1t, Dr. Harris reported that Claimant provi
p. 602). In connection with his
Harris noted that Claimant was a "good histori.an." (Cit. Ex. 20,
ant "can give a lucid history
evaluation of September 10, 2010, Dr. H~mmond noted that Claim
-up visit of October 1, 2013,
and has no language dysfunction." (Cit. Ex. 9, p. 458). In a follow
at1

ant. She also noted that
employee of Dr. Hammond's office updated histmy taken from Claim

ence was English. (Cit. Ex.
Claimant did not require an interpreter, and that his language prefer
9, p. 466).

letter to Dr.
Finally, Claimant's counsel aclmowledged in his June 22, 2016

Claimant does not require an
Hammond, that Claimant speaks English well enough that
interpreter to converse with English speakers. (Cit. Ex. 24, p. 659i).
3.

laborer on farms
Between 1974 and 1995, Claimant was employed primarily as a

briefly employed by a trailer
and ranches in the vicinity of Bruneau, Idaho. . He was
ical wiring in trailers. He was
manufacturer in Boise where his job involved installing electr
enced his employment with
employed as a laborer, not as an electrician. In 1995, he comm
as the farm foreman, and still
Meyers Farms, Employer herein. Claimant was initially employed
ed one or two employees since
works in that capacity. Even though Claimant has always direct
ed that between 1995 and
1995, he was, before 2009, more of a working foreman. He testifi
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORD

341

pp. 61:32009, he did "everything" on the farm, including some heavy physical labor. (Tr.,
r, his real
62: 12). Claimant knows how to weld, and has some skills as a mechanic. Howeve
ze that
value to Employer is his specific knowledge of the inigation system, and how to maximi
less
system for the benefit of crops grown by Employer. Since the 2009 accident, Claimant does
to
heavy lifting, and gives more direction to his subordinates to perfo1m this work. He intends
2015,
continue working for Employer as long as he can. Claimant's tax records reflect that for

as he
he earned approximately $43,000 in his job for Employer, approximately twice as much
earned in 2009. (Tr., p. 169:3-13).
4.

Morgan Meyers, one of the principals of Meyers Farms, testified to the business

t
of Meyers Faims. Employer controls approximately 12,000 acres of fa1mland, at three differen
g
locations. Employer's Bruneau operation is managed by Claimant, whose expertise regardin
is
the Bruneau farm inigation system is impo1tant to that operation's success; the Brnneau tract
much
somewhat "gravelly" and does not hold water well, making inigation management that
to
more important. According to Mr. Meyers, Claimant possesses the peculiar skills needed
in the
make that operation successful. (Tr., pp. 173:14-185:19). Claimant does not require much
In
way of supervision, and Meyers relies on Claimant to delegate work as Claimant sees fit.

great
addition to his expertise with the faim's inigation system, Meyers depends on Claimant a
hire
deal to oversee and supervise the annual harvest at Bruneau. Meyers testified that he would
in a
Claimant today, and that his knowledge and expe1tise is so important that Meyers "would be
panic" if Claimant decided to leave or retire. (Tr., pp. 189:13-190:1).
Pre-Injury Medical Condition
5.

Claimant testified that immediately prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle

accident, he had no limitations on his ability to perform his work. Specifically, Claimant denied
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any problems with his neck, left shoulder, left elbow
, or low back immediately prior to October
6, 2009. (Tr., pp. 82:15-85:12). However, the recor
d reflects that Claimant did have periodic
problems with low back pain/discomfort in the years
prior to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle
accident. On November 6, 2001, Claimant was refer
red to chiropractor Jeffery Kieffer, D.C., by
John Booth, PA-C for care of low back pain. PA Boot
h noted that Claimant had received no
relief from conventional medical intervention. Evid
ently it was thought that chiropractic
treatment might offer some relief. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 31).
However, Dr. Kieffer's records appear to
reflect that he treated Claimant following November
6, 2001 for a principal complaint of cervical
spine and upper extremity complaints. Nevertheless,
Dr. Kieffer's January 3, 2002 report to the
'
State Insurance Fund reflects that among his diagnoses
of Claimant was a diagnosis of lumbar
segmental joint dysfunction. (Cit. Ex. 2, p. 37).
6.

On March I, 2004, Claimant saw. Dr. Kieffer with
complaints of low back

soreness. On March 8, 2004, he was again seen with
complaints of low back pain and bilateral
leg numbness. (Cit. Ex. 2, pp. 38-39). In a statement
dated October 11, 2012, Dr. Kieffer,
referring to the 2004 notes, stated:
This is to verify that I evaluated and treated Mr. Ayal
a on two occasions for lower
back and lower extremity "numb foeling" as secondary
complaints to a cervical
and mid-scapular injury. These treatment dates were
March 1 and March 8, 2004.
There were no significant objectives finding regarding
his lower back complaints
at that time. . ...
(Cit. Ex. 2, p. 45). It is unclear at whose instance the
October 11, 2012 statement was prepared,
or what information/representations accompanied that
request.
7.

On June 23, 2004 Claimant was seen at the Glenns Ferry
Health Center (GFHC)

with a principal complaint of low back pain/soren
ess in the SI area.

No neuroradicular

symptoms were noted. The note reflects that Claim
ant expressed "multiple past experience[s ]"
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of similar discomfort. (Cit. Ex. 3, p. 65), Right SI soreness was noted on July 15, 2004 at the
GFHC. On May 21, 2007, Claimant was again seen at the GFHC with complaints of right hip
and SI joint pain "for over two years, with no recent trauma," although he did admit to an itzjury
to this part of his back in 1974.2 He admitted to discomfort associated with sitting in a tractor
and walking in the fields. He did not complain of any neuroradicular symptoms. (Cit. Ex. 3, p.

115),
8.

On Febrnary 25, 2009, Claimant underwent a musculoskeletal exam as part of his

encounter of that date. Findings were as follows:
On examination, the patient- walks with a normal gait. There is no visible
scoliosis. The shoulders and pelvis are well-balanced. There is no tenderness over
the spine or SI joints. There is no inguinal adenopathy. There is full spine range of
motion without pain, and the patient can touch their toes. There is full hip range
of motion bilaterally. There is a negative Patrick's test, and a negative straight leg
raising test on both sides. Motor strength is 5/5 in both lower extremities, and
sensation is intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk and ankle jerk reflexes are
2+ bilaterally, and toes are downgoing. There is no clonus.
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 129).
9.

The GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 figure prominently in

the parties' arguments concerning whether or not Claimant's current low back complaints are
causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. Those notes deserve particular
attention. On September 9, 2009, Claimant presented with the following history:
Established patient for evaluation of
1. back pain.
Location of symptoms: the upper back, mid back, and low back,
Symptom(s) are described as persistant (sic] and achey [sic], Severity: mild and
stable.
Onset is/was abrnpt. Symptoms have persisted for about one week.
Context: Pt/ felt like he had an "internal fever" and felt restless and achey [sic].
His back along the paraspineous [sic] muscle straps, bilaterally have ached. He
denies any vomiting but had some nausea. No change in bowel or bladder
2

Per Dr. Hammond, hip pain is an indicator of nerve root impingement. (Hammond Depa., p. 39:1-8).

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 9

344

function. Modifying factors include: OTC drugs, which does not alleviate or
worse the problem.
Denies drowsiness; trouble falling asleep;
Repmis appetite loss; which is/are mild; fatigue, restlessness, which is/are mild;
restless sleep, muscle cramps, which is mild;
(Cit. Ex. 3, p. 136). Claimant denied fever. Examination of his back revealed mild vertebral
muscle spasm. Claimant's diagnosis was obesity and back pain. Lab work was ordered and
weight loss was recommended. Prescriptions for Cyclobenzaprine and Naprosyn were written.
(See Cit. Ex. 3, pp. 136-140).
10.

Claima~t again presented to the GFHC on October 5, 2009, the day before the

subject October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. He presented with complaints of a cough, which
he described as a longstanding condition related to exposure to cold air and other initants.
Claimant was also noted to be obese. He reported mild joint pain, muscle aches, and back pain.
Claimant's musculoskeletal exam was positive for grinding at the lateral aspect of the lateral
joint line of the right knee. Diagnoses at this visit included obesity, asthma, and back pain.
Claimant's prescription for Naprosyn was refilled, as were other prescriptions related to obesity
and diabetes.
11.

To other providers, Claimant also gave some history of low back problems

predating the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. When seen by D. Peter Reedy, M.D., on
January 8, 2010, Claimant reported a past history of chiropractic visits for low back problems.
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 150). In his letter of January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy proposed that the treatment notes
from the GFHC reflect that Claimant was treated for complaints of low back pain immediately
preceding the subject accident. Dr. Reedy also acknowledges that prior to the subject accident,
Claimant suffered from a degenerative condition of the lumbar spine. He likened the subject
accident to "the straw that broke the camel's back." (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a follow-up letter to
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Claimant's counsel of January 19, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had periodic
episodes of low back pain which predated the 2009 motor vehicle accident, which was
unsurprising to Dr. Reedy based on Claimant's vocation. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187).
12.

Vernon McCready, PA-C, too, was asked by Claimant's counsel to comment on

the nature of the complaints with which Claimant presented at the time of his evaluation by PA
McCready and/or his staff on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009.
13.

On November 5, 2015, December 14, 2015, and again on January 5, 2016,

Claimant's counsel queried PA McCready about the nature of the problems with which Claimant
presented on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, suggesting a narrative that Claimant's
problems were more-or-less systemic in nature and not reflective of a mechanical low back
injury. (Cit. Ex. 6., p. 358). Also important in Claimant counsel's November 5, 2015 letter to PA
Mccready is the representation, which appears with some regularity in letters to Claimant's
treating/evaluating physicians, that Claimant is the type of person who, on presenting for medical
care, will only reference a primary complaint, declining to reference complaints of secondary
importance:
From my perspective, Mario presents as a straight-forward but rather
unsophisticated individual. Following the industrial motor vehicle accident, Mario
focused his complaints upon what was then causing him the greatest difficulty and
produced the greatest symptomatology. Although logical, this approach results in
an absence of medical records for other than primary or more obvious
presentments, and oft-times in confusion or medical disagreement upon the issue
of causal relation of the medical presentment to the injury at question.
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 351 ).

This asse1iion finds little, if any, support in the record, and must be

distinguished from a related assertion, discussed infi'a, that Claimant did not discuss his postittjury low back complaints with Dr. Reedy because Dr. Reedy instructed Claimant to hold off
discussing his low back until Dr. Reedy had completed his treatment of Claimant's cervical spine
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condition. PA McCready failed to respond to the November 5, 2015 letter, the December 14,
2015 letter, but finally did respond to the January 5, 2016 letter. Rather than provide a narrative
response, PA Mccready simply acceded to the prepared statements offered by Claimant's
counsel. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 348).
Accident of October 6, 2009 and Subsequent Low Back Complaints
14.

The accident giving rise to the first of the two claims in this consolidated

proceeding occuned on October 6, 2009. On that date, Cla.imant was operating a Meyers Faims'
vehicle heading north on Highway 51, intending to pick up a paii for a piece of farm machinery
when his left front tire blew out, causing his vehicle to pull to the left. Claimant over-c01rncted,
and struck the guard rail on the right side of the road. The vehicle then came back across the
roadway, hitting the west guard rail. (Cit. Ex. 26, p. 679). Claimant was not wearing a seatbelt
at the time of the accident. He testified he was thrown about the interior of the cab in the course
of the accident. Afterwards, he was driven to his home by a passerby and transp01ied later that
day to the Elmore Medical Center (EMC) in Mountain Home.
15.

The EMC records of October 6, 2009 reflect that Claimant presented with .a

laceration to his left hand and with a history of striking his left chest wall as his vehicle swerved
back and forth. Claimant denied any injury to his head, neck, abdomen, or other irtjuries. He
admitted only to the hand laceration and chest contusion. Claimant was examined, and other
than the aforementioned injuries to his left hand and chest wall, no abnormalities were noted.
Diagnosis on discharge was left chest wall contusion and left hand contusion, with puncture
wounds. Claimant was seen again in follow-up on October 13, 2009 at EMC complaining of leftsided rib pain and left anterior shoulder pain that radiated into the left arm. He stated that these
symptoms began shortly after the accident of October 6, 2009. Claimant denied neck pain.
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Neurological exam of the upper and lower extremities was nonnal.

Gait was intact.

The

discharge diagnosis was expanded to include left rib fracture and left shoulder contusion. (Cit.
Ex. 3, p. 148).
16.

On October 16, 2009, PA McCready evaluated Claimant at GFHC. Claimant's

primary complaint was diminished urinary stream, a complaint for which he had been seen in the
past.

Secondarily, Claimant presented for removal of sutures from his left hand and an

authorization to return to work.
17.

The November 4, 2009 chart note from the GFHC reflects that while Claimant did

complain of left shoulder and left arm pain, he specifically denied low back pain or difficulty
walking.

Next, the GFHC records contain two separate chart notes, both signed by PA

McCready, and both dated November 12, 2009. The first note from ll :41 a.m. reflects that
Claimant was seen in follow-up for his neck and left upper extremity discomfo1t. The second
note from 12:01 p.m. reflects that Claimant was seen for treatment of a chronic urinary problem.
Neither of the November 12, 2009 notes reference the low back.
18.

The GFHC record from November 16, 2009 reflects continued complaints of neck

and left upper extremity symptoms. PA McCready recommended MRI evaluation of the cervical
spine: PA McCready's note reflects that Claimant specifically denied low back pain or difficulty
walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, p. 205). In treatment notes dated November 30, 2009 and December 11,
2009, PA Mccready also specifically noted that Claimant denied complaints of low back
discomfort or difficulty with walking. (Cit. Ex. 6, pp. 206-211 ).
19.

While none of the aforementioned post-accident medical records reference

complaints of low back or lower extremity difficulty, (even when Claimant appears to have been
asked whether he had problems in these areas) the record does contain other references to post-
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accident back pain. The Notice oflnjury and Claim for Benefits prepared on or about November
17, 2009 reflects that as a result of the October 6, 2009 accident Claimant suffered injuries as
follows: "Cut and bruised hand when hit driver's side window and hmi back." (Cit. Ex. 25, p.
673). On November 20, 2009, a State Insurance Fund investigator contacted Claimant to discuss
the occmTence of the 2009 accident. In a claimant contact report, Claimant described the
following problems which he evidently related to the subject accident:
How are you doing? left ann is numb, neck, back entire back. No strength in my
left arm, both hands went numb, left hand worse. Cut on left hand.
Please give a brief description of your job: farming
Please give a description of what you were doing when the accident occmTed. I
was going to get some pati in town and on hwy 51. I was coming up on the pati of
the road where the guard rails were on both sides of the road and my left front tire
blew out on the pickup, it all happened so fast. I pulled to [o] hard on the steering
wheel and over conected too far and hit the other guard rail. Both of my hands
went numb. After hit the first guard rail on the right side and I went to grab the
steering wheel I could not feel my left hand at all, shook my right hand it had
some feeling. Accident happened about 2:30-3:00pm i0-04-09
Describe the nature of your injury. Injuries from cart accident, left hand, back,
neck (Emphasis in original).
(Cit. Ex. 25, p. 674a).
20.

The Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division opened its file on Claimant in

March of 2010. While the Rehabilitation Division's initial April 18, 2010 interview of Claimant
does not reflect that Claimant described complaints of low back pain, a subsequent note of May
12, 2010 does reflect that Claimantdescribed complaints of numbness in his legs when standing
at physical therapy for over 30 minutes.
21.

The first post-accident medical record making reference to Claimant's low back

or lower extremities is Dr. Reedy's letter of Januat-y 8, 2010 to PA Mccready, who had refened
Claimant to Dr. Reedy for evaluation .. Per.Dr. Reedy's letter, Claimant presented on January 8,
2010 with the following complaints:
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As you !mow, he is a pleasant
faim foreman out at Robert J. Meyers
farms in Twin Falls who comes in complaining of pain "everywhere." He has
neck pain and left arm pain primarily that arose from a work related motor vehicle
accident in October 2009. He tells me that if he stands for 20-25 minutes his legs
go numb. He has seen a chiropractor in the past for low back problems but he has
never had a neck problem before this. He tried oral steroids without much relief.
(Clt. Ex. 5, p. 150). Therefore, per the history recorded by Dr. Reedy, Claimant did relate his
neck and left arm pain to the 2009 motor vehicle accident. However, Dr. Reedy's note does not
explicitly reflect that Claimant also related his complaints of bilateral leg numbness to the motor
vehicle accident. On exam, Claimant had findings suggestive of a cervical spine injury. Also, it
was noted that lumbar range of motion was mildly decreased, although station and gait were
normal. Deep tendon reflexes were 2+, and both ankle jerks were missing. Dr. Reedy went on
to treat Claimant for his cervical spine condition, eventually performing surgery on Claimant's
cervical spine on February 19, 2010, to include microdiscectomies at CS thru C6 followed by
instrumented fusions at the same levels. Claimant was seen in follow-up by Dr. Reedy on
multiple occasions, but it was not until Dr. Reedy's December 5, 2011 office visit with Claimant
that Claimant's low back and lower extremities are again referenced. On December 5, 2011, Dr.
Reedy' s office notes reflect that in addition to ongoing complaints with his cervical spine,
Claimant presented with complaints of leg numbness and low back pain "ever since 10/09
accident," which had never been investigated. Claimant also described more low back pain in the
3-4 weeks prior to December 5, 2011. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 168).
22.

The December 5, 2011 office visit is further memorialized in Dr. Reedy's

December 10, 2011 letter to PA McCready. This letter contains further infotmation concerning
the history of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints that was not captured in the
December 5, 2011 chart note:
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He also complains about low back pain that he has had since the accident but that
was never investigated. He said that when I first saw him I said lets work on the
neck first and then we will deal with the lumbar issue but it never came up again.
He describes what sounds like neurogenic claudication in that he can go into a
store and walk around for 15-20 minutes but then he has bilateral leg pain,
especially in the thighs when he is walking and he needs to sit down to get some
relief. I think he certainly should have gotten an MRI of the lumbar spine and I
will ask his attorney to get his case reopened so that we may pursue the lumbar
end of things. I will also suggest to his attorney that he get a second opinion about
his neck.
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 166). This letter does not reflect that Dr. Reedy has a recollection of instructing
Claimant, in December of 2009, that Claimant's back and lower extremity complaints would be
sorted out after Dr. Reedy dealt with Claimant's cervical spine. (Indeed, Dr. Reedy's January 8,
2010 note does not reflect that he told Claimant to _hold his low back complaints in abeyance).
came to Dr. Reedy stating that Dr.
The letter only reflects that in December 'of. 2011 .Claimant
.
Reedy had previously told Claimant that investigation of Claimant's lumbar spine would be
deferred pending treatment of the cervical sp'ine.
23.

However, in his December 10, 2011 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Reedy

reported the following history of Claimant's low back complaints following the 2009 motor
vehicle accident: "In addition, his lumbar spine, which he has complained about since the
accident, has never been investigated and I would request authorization to perform an MRI if you
get his case file reopened." (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 176). If Claimant persistently claimed about low back
and lower extremity complaints following the 2009 motor vehicle accident, he either did not
share these complaints with Dr. Reedy, or Dr. Reedy failed to make note of these symptoms.
24.

Nor does Claimant appear to have shared his persistent low back complaints with

his attorney prior to December of 2011. Counsel's June 17, 2010 letter to Dr. Reedy describes
Claimant's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints and poses a number of questions to
Dr. Reedy about Claimant's residual functional capacity, and whether Claimant is at risk for
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accelerated degeneration of cervical spme segments above and below the C5-C7 fusion.
However, that letter does nothing to suggest that counsel was aware of an as yet untreated low
back complaints.
25.

Between January of 20 IO and December of 2011, Claimant also continued to be

seen at the GFHC. (See Cit. Ex. 6). The GFHC note of March 15, 2010 makes no reference to
Claimant's low back or lower extremities. The April 2, 2010 note reflects that Claimant was
able to walk with a normal gait with no visible signs of scoliosis. He had full spinal range of
motion without pain and was able to touch his toes. Hip motion was full bilaterally. Patrick's
test was negative and Claimant had negative straight-leg raising on both sides. Motor strength
was 5/5 in both lower extremities and sensation was intact to light touch in both legs. Knee jerk
and ankle jerk reflexes were 2+ bilaterally. Identical findings were noted in an April 7, 2010
chart note and Claimant reported that the back pain associated with his cough was gone. The
June 4, 2010 office visit note makes no reference to Claimant's low back or lower extremities
and Claimant specifically denied that there were additional symptoms to report. On June 21,
20 IO Claimant presented to the GFHC with complaints of back pain which Claimant described
as "new." Claimant's discomfo1t was located in the right mid-back. He described a sudden
onset of symptoms for three days. Claimant was seen in follow-up for these complaints of midback pain on July 21, 2010. On the occasion of that visit, PA McCready noted the same midback pain with symptoms persisting for a)Jout a month. On exam, Claimant had tightness in the
paraspinous musculature of the lumbar spine with spasm from Tl2 to S1. By August 17,. 2010,
Claimant's complaints persisted in the right mid-to-lower back.

PA Mccready noted the

persistence of symptoms over the past three months with insidious onset. However, on exam, no
back abnormalities were noted. GFHC chart notes from August 30, 2010 reflect a past medical
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history of chronic back pain and a 1975 right leg fracture. However, on the occasion of the
August 30 exam, Claimant denied back pain or difficulty walking. On October 1, 20 IO Claimant
reported back pain, among his other complaints. GFHC notes from October 22, 2010, November
1, 2010, January 6, 2011, January 11, 2011 and February 11, 2011 make no reference to low
back or lower extremity symptoms.

A chart note from June 3, 2011 does reflect arthritic

complaints in Claimant's wrists, ankles, and feet.

However, no complaints of low back

pain/discomfort are referenced. Gait and station were n01mal. Claimant's hips were normal,
bilaterally. A chart note from August 3, 2011 does not reflect low back complaints, but does
note that Claimant presented with normal gait and an ability to stand without difficulty. The note
referencing the office visit of August 23, 2011 reflects that Claimant denied muscular weakness,
tingling, or numbness. The August 23, 2011 chait note does not reflect any back complaints.
Claimant had normal gait and station. Similar findings were noted in the October 14, 2011 office
visit.
26.

Then, in the chart note memorializing a December 1, 2011 visit, Claimant

presented to PA McCready with the following complaints:
other race, Hispanic or Latino male who presents a
The patient is a
history of lumbar region pain which began two weeks ago. He describes the pain
as moderate in severity and radiating into the right leg and left leg. The onset of
the back pain was gradual and began without a clear precipitating event.
The pain is aggravated by prolonged standing and sitting. The pain is alleviated
by change of position and rest. He states that the pain does not wake him from
sleep and the pain is improved in the morning. He also complains of left leg
paresis, right leg paresis and cough, right lw1g discomfort, rhinorrhea ...
(Cit. Ex. 6, p. 288). Neurologic exam of Claimant's lower extremities was normal.

PA

McCready diagnosed Claimant as suffering from sciatica. Five days later, Claimant was seen by
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had not been
Dr. Reedy, who noted Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints which
referenced in Dr. Reedy's records since January of 2010.
27.

Following Claimant's cervical spine surgery, Dr. Reedy refened Claimant to

complaints. Dr.
Gregory Schweiger, M.D., for evaluation of persistent left upper extremity
Schweiger first saw Claimant on April 28, 20 I 0.

His note does not reflect that Claimant

described any lumbar spine or lower extremity problems.

MRI evaluation of Claimant's

shoulder demonstrated a rotator cuff tear.
28.

Dr. Schweiger arranged for Claimant to be seen by Dr. Hessing, who first

g reported that
examined Claimant on November 2, 2010. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessin
cervical spine.
Claimant injured his shoulder in the 2009 motor vehicle accident as well as his
motor vehicle
Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant had suffered from left shoulder pain since the
as showing a
accident. Per Dr. Hessing, Claimant's August 23, 2010 left shoulder MRI was read
nt's left upper
large intrasubstance tear of the supraspinatus tendon. EMG evaluation of Claima
extremity was also thought to show an ulnar neuropathy at the elbow.

Dr. Hessing

ression of the
recommended shoulder surgery to include probable rotator cuff repair and decomp
does not reflect
shoulder joint. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 409). Dr. Hessing's initial evaluation of Claimant
s.
that Claimant presented with complaints of low back or lower extremity problem
29.

On November 2, 2010 Claimant was also evaluated by Mark Clawson, M.D., for

not reflect any
suspected left cubital tunnel syndrome. Dr. Clawson's initial evaluation does
complaints oflow back or lower extremity problems.
30.

On December 9, 2010, Claimant underwent left ulnar nerve neurolysis and

a left shoulder
anterior subcutaneous nerve transposition performed by Dr. Clawson, along with
.
decompression, labral debridement, and rotator cuff repair performed by Dr. Hessing
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31.

Claimant was rated and released by Dr. Hessing for his shoulder injm-y on April

20, 2011. Dr. Hessing reported that Claimant was working at his regular job, and felt that his
residual left shoulder symptoms were tolerable. Claimant did note some residual neck difficulty,
but Dr. Hessing noted that Claimant would be seen by Dr. Reedy for care/evaluation of these
complaints. Dr. Hessing gave Claimant an impainnent rating of 5% of the upper extremity and
released him to retm-n to his pre-injury job without restriction.
32.

On November 8, 2011, Claimant was seen for a closing evaluation by Dr.
0

Clawson. Dr. Clawson noted that recent electrodiagnostic testing demonstrated nmmal nerve
function in the left upper extremity. Claimant described symptoms that were more compatible
with cervical spine pathology. Dr. Clawson also noted, for the first time, that Claimant presented
with complaints of lower back pain. Dr. Clawson recommended that Claimant visit with Dr.
Reedy regarding his neck and low back complaints. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 456).
33.

As Claimant neared medical stability following his cervical spine surgery, Surety

atrnnged for Claimant to be evaluated by Mark J. Harris, M.D. In his July 26, 2010 introductory
letter, TJ Matiin, Claims Examiner for Surety, introduced Claimant to Dr. Harris. He provided
Dr. Harris with all medical records in possession of the Fund relating to Claimant's claim and
provided a very brief history of Claimant's treatment. Importantly, Mr. Matiin indicated that in
his last conversation with Mr. Ayala, Claimant indicated that he was having some lower
extremity pain and numbness. Mr. Martin's letter coincides with the GFHC treatment notes from
June 21, July 21, and August 7, 2010 reflecting new onset of back pain. Mr. Martin posed a
number of questions to Dr. Harris relating to Claimant's current status, need for medical
treatment, impairment, and restrictions. Dr. Harris saw Claimant for evaluation on August 2,
2010.

He took history from Claimant concerning the occurrence of the accident, his post-
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accident symptoms, and his treatment to date.
description of Claimant's then-current complaints.

Dr. Harris also elicited from Claimant a
Dr. Harris reported these complaints as

follows:
CURRENT STATUS: The examinee's chief complaint is decreased range of
motion and pain in the neck and left arm pain. I asked him several times in several
different ways if he has any other areas of concern and he stated no. It was not
until later that I asked him about the left leg symptoms and he stated those have
now resolved and he has no fmther concerns about that area. He reports difficulty
with pain, primarily located in the neck and left arm. Pain is described as stabbing
in the left shoulder anteriorly, laterally, and down the arm into the fingers,
specifically the small, ring, and long fingers. He states he always has numbness in
the thumb and index fingers as well. The pain is worsened by resting his arm after
work and improved by taking pain medications. The pain is reported as constant.
On a scale of 0/10 which is no pain and 10/10 which is excruciating pain he
reports the pain is a 6-7/10. During the past month he has averaged 2/10-3/10 with
a high of 10/10 and a low of2/10-3/10. The examinee also reports difficulty with
activity using the left hand carrying over 20 pounds and difficulty with grip. He
denies any symptoms prior to the motor vehicle collision on 10/06/09.
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 603). Therefore, Claimant was provided with a number of opportunities to
describe all symptoms from which he was then suffeting. Claimant was specifically asked about
lower extremity complaints. Claimant said that his lower extremity complaints had resolved and
were no longer an issue. Claimant did not describe any low back complaints. Dr. Harris did
relate Claimant 's cervical spine and left upper extremity complaints to the subject accidents and
proposed that Claimant was in need of fmther medical care for treatment/evaluation of these
conditions. Nevertheless, he felt that Mr. Ayala was capable of working at his time-of-injury job
since he was evidently doing so at the time of Dr. Harris' evaluation. However, pending MRl
evaluation of the shoulder, Dr. Harris felt it appropriate to limit Claimant's lifting to 50 pounds.
34.

By letter dated June 27, 2011, Mr. Martin again asked for Dr. Harris to evaluate

Claimant as he neared medical stability following the surgeries performed by Drs. Hessing and
Clawson. Mr. Martin asked Dr. Harris to asce1tain whether Claimant was at a point of medical
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stability, and if so, whether he had pe1manent impairment referable to his work injuries, as well
as work-related limitations/restrictions.
35.

Claimant was seen by Dr. Harris for the second time on August 15, 2011. Dr.

HatTis again asked Claimant to describe his cunent complaints. Those complaints included left
hand pain with some residual pain in the shoulder and neck. Claimant described his discomfort
as cramping pain. He described the pairl as constant. Dr. Harris did not record any low back or
lower extremity difficulties as described by Claimant. Dr. Hanis felt that Claimant had reached
medical stability following his neck, shoulder, and elbow surgeries. Dr. Hanis felt that Claimant
was entitled to a 6% whole person impairment for his neck condition, a 5% upper extremity
impairment for his shoulder condition, and no impairment for his ulnar nerve condition.
36.

Dr. Harris noted that as of August 15, 2011, none of Claimant's treating

physicians had imposed restrictions on Claimant's functional activities. However, Dr. Harris felt
that Claimant should use caution in overhead activities and heavy lifting even though his treaters
had not issned such restrictions. (Clt. Ex. 20, p. 618).
37.

As developed infra, after Claimant presented to Dr. Reedy in December of 2011

with complaints of low back pain, Dr. Reedy refened Claimant to Michael Hajjar, M.D., for
evaluation of the low back complaints. Dr. Hajjar eventually requested authorization to perform
an 14-S1 decompression and fusion. By letter dated August 30, 2012, Claims Examiner Martin
asked Dr. Hanis to review additional records generated since August 15, 2011, and to provide
his analysis of whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject 2009
motor vehicle accident. By letter dated September 21, 2012, Dr. Hanis noted that at the time of
his initial evaluation of Claimant, Claimant had been asked to describe his problems and only
reported neck and left arm injuries. The pain diagram filled out by Claimant only denoted
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burning and stabbing pain in the left upper shoulder area. Dr. Hanis also noted the Septemb er 9,
2009 chart note from the GFHC and the May 21, 2007 chart note from the same facility, both of
which, as discussed above, reference low back pain. Concerning the May 2 I, 2007 chart note,
Dr. Hanis noted:
In reviewing the records from John Booth on 05/21 /07 it shows hip pain under the
farmer complaining of right hip
subjective main complaint: "This is a
and SI area pain for over two years with no recent trauma. He did have injury to
the area in 1974; no fracture. He has more pain after Inactive [sic] sitting in
tractor and then tries to walk. He also has progressive pain in the lateral hip when
walking in the fields. He expresses no new radicular or neuritic pain."
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 629). Dr. Harris also had the opportunity to review records generated by Drs.
Clawson, Schweiger, and Hessing at Orthopedic Associates. Dr. Harris enoneous ly described
Dr. Clawson 's note of November 8, 201°1 as having been authored on October 6, 2009.

As

developed above, Dr. Clawson 's note of November 8, 2011 contains the first reference in the
Orthopedic Associates notes of "lower back pain." At any rate, following his review of the
records supplied by the State Insurance Fund, Dr. HaiTis opined that Claimant 's complaints of
low back pain are not causally related to the industrial accident. This conclusion is based on Dr.
Harris' observations that there is evidence of low back pain which predates the subject accident
and no medical evidence supporting the proposition that Claimant presented with complaints of
low back pain following the subject aycident. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 630). Based on Dr. Harris' letter of
September 21, 2012, Surety denied responsibility for Claimant's low back condition.
38.

Following Dr.. Reedy's letter to PA McCready of December 10, 2011,

authorization for MRI evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine was requested. That study was
perfo1med on January 16, 2012 and was read as-follows:
LUMBA R DISK LEVELS:
Ll-2: Normal for age.
L2-3: Normal for age.
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arthropathy. Mild
13-4: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Mild bilateral facet
canal and mild bilateral foraminal stenosis.
facet degeneration.
14-5: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis.
facet degeneration.
15-S I: Disc desiccation with mild bulging. Moderate bilateral
There is mild canal and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis.

t loss. No acute
CONCLUSION: Old Tl2 compression fracture with mild heigh
fracture. No Iisthesis.
foraminal stenosis.
Lumbar spondylosis with moderate bilateral 14/5 and LS/S 1
above.
There is mild canal and foraminal stenosis elsewhere, as detailed
gram of Claimant's lumbar spine
Cit. Ex. 11, p. 488. Thereafter, Dr. Reedy ordered a CT myelo
follows:
which was performed on April 3, 2012. That study was read as
deformity of the
Stable mild vertebral spurring throughout the lumbar spine. Mild
extent through
ventral thecal sac contour particularly at the L4-5 level to a lesser
. In particular
out the lumbar spine without significant lateralizing mass effect
underfilling of the
there is no significant displacement of lumbar nerve roots or
thecal sac at the
nerve root sleeves at Ll-15 levels. There is underfilling of the
sleeves. There is
lumbosacral junction and for opacification of the S 1 nerve root
icant vertebral
signif
facet arthropathy at 14-5 and 15-S I levels. There is no new
malalignment.
Cit. Ex. 11, p. 489
39.

further evaluation
In April of 2012, Dr. Reedy referred Claimant to Dr. Hajjar for

of Claimant's lumbar spine.
40.

Claimant gave a
Dr. Hajjar first saw Claimant on June 23, 2012. At that time,

ity pain which Claimant related
history to Dr. Hajjar that he suffered from back and lower extrem
ed prior radiological studies,
to the motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009. Dr. Hajjar review
y degenerative in nature." Dr.
concluding that they demonstrated anterolisthesis at 14-5 "likel
inal stenosis at 14-5 and LS-S l.
Hajjar also noted findings of bilateral recess stenosis and foram
the L4 and LS nerve roots. Dr.
Per Dr. Hajjar, the studies demonstrated impingement of both
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Hajjar counseled Claimant that his back condition might be amenable to surgical treatment. He
recommended a bone scan to further evaluate Claimant's low back. When seen again by Dr.
Hajjar on August 7, 2012, Claimant expressed continuing back and lower extremity pain, as well
as difficulties with standing, walking, and other activities. Dr. Hajjar reiterated Claimant's
radiographic findings, apparently consisting largely of degenerative pathology.

Dr. Hajjar

recommended L4 through SI decompression and fusion.
41.

By letter dated November 14, 2012 to Claims Examiner Martin, Dr. Hajjar

responded to the several reports generated by Dr. Hall'is by this date. Dr. Hajjar erroneously
noted that Dr. HatTis had not, by this time, expressed an opinion on the etiology of Claimant's
low back complaints. 3 Regardless, Dr. Hajjar stated that like Dr. Reedy, he believed Claimant's
low back complaints are causally related to the subject accident, although his November 14,
2012 letter to Claims Examiner Martin does not elaborate on what persuaded him to this point of
view. Time passed, and Dr. Hajjat· was not again quizzed about the causation issue until the date
of hearing approached.
42.

By letter dated January 6, 2016, Defense counsel provided Dr. Hajjar with the

pre-injury treatment records from the GFHC generated in the fall of 2009, and invited Dr. Hajjar
to revisit the question of the cause of Claimant's low back and lower extremity complaints. In
his response of January 27, 2016, Dr. Hajjar acknowledged receipt of the GFHC records from
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009. His review of those records led him to agree with Paul
Montalbano's, M.D., view that, at most, Claimant suffered a temporai·y and self-limiting
exacerbation of his lumbar spine condition as a consequence of the October 6, 2009 accident.
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472A). However, there the matter did not rest because, on February 4, 2016,
3

In his September 21, 2012 report, Dr. Harris explained that certain pre-injury medical records, including GFHC
records from May 21, 2007 and September 9, 2009 supported his conclusion that Claimant's low back complaints
are not causally related to the subject accident.
·
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r in which Dr. Hajjar was again.
Claimant's counsel authored an extensive letter to Dr. Hajja
nt low back complaints and need for
invited to visit the issue of the cause of Claimant's curre
futiher comment. As he did in other
surgery. Counsel's February 4, 2016 letter is worthy of
his questions with the following
letters to providers/evaluators, Claimant's counsel introduced
narrative:
ht-forward but rather
From my perspective, Mr. Ayala presents as a rather straig
is Spanish, although
unsophisticated individual. Mr. Ayala's principal language
wing his industrial
he can and does communicate in English at a base level. Follo
upon what was then
motor vehicle accident, Mr. Ayala focused his complaints
est symptomatology.
causing him the greatest difficulty and produced the great
cal records for other
Although logical, this approach results in an absence of medi
confusion or medical
than primary or more obvious presentments and oft-times in
cal presentment to the
disagreement upon the issue of casual relation of the 'medi
and treatment of that
injury in question, following a delay in appropriate diagnosis
·
condition.
medical history, while Claimant's
(Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472G-472H). Concerning Claimant's past
September 14, 2007 forward, he did
counsel did synopsize for Dr. Hajjar the GFHC records from
do reflect a history of low back
not advise Dr. Hajjar of earlier records from GFHC which
r does not appear to have been
Hajja
Ex. 10,. p. 472i). ' For exam' ple, . Dr.
.
'
symptomatology. (Clt.
.
complaints of right hip and SI joint
made aware of the May 21, 2007 notes which reflect
3, p. 115). Fmiher, as he did in his
discomfort for two years without recent trauma. (Cit. Ex.
sel proposed to Dr. Hajjar that the
letter to PA Mccready of January 5, 2016, Claimaiit's'coun
on September 9 and October 5,
complaints with which Claimant presented to PA McCready
injmy
2009 were not of the type that warranted further workup for

to the low back. (Cit. Ex. 10,

y confirmed that he told Claimant
p. 4721). Claimant's counsel further represented that Dr. Reed
y .had finished treating Claimant's
to hold his low back complaints in abeyance until Dr. Reed
confitmed that he recalls having this
cervical spine. (Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472J). (Dr. Reedy has never
2016 letter to Dr. Hajjar, Claimant's
conversation with Claimant.) Finally, in his February 4,
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counsel represented that Claimant's low back and lower extremity symptomatology has persisted
ever since the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident. This is, assuredly, an assertion which
Claimant now makes, but to say that it is a fact is ,not completely accurate; the record just as
easily supports the proposition that Claimant's low back complaints have waxed and waned
following the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle accident.
43.

With that background, Claimant's counsel then asked Dr. Hajjar whether it would

be appropriate to revisit the opinion he gave to Defense counsel on January 27, 2016.
44.

In his Febrnary 19, 2016 letter to Claimant's counsel, Dr. Hajjar did, indeed,

revise his opinion. Informing Dr. Hajjar'.s change of hemi is his conclusion that the GFHC
records do not demonstrate any history of low back complaints prior to the subject accident.
I

Concerning the notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Dr. Hajjar concluded that these
notes suggest a condition that "sounds more like a flu" versus any type of mechanical low back
issue. He also noted that PA McCready did not order any follow-up radiological testing which
would have been a logical next step had PA McCready entertained the possibility of mechanical
low back problems in September 2009. These records and reasoning caused Dr. Hajjar to change
his opinion and rejoin Dr. Reedy in supp01iing a causal relationship between the motor vehicle
accident and Claimant's low back complaints. (See Cit. Ex. 10, p. 472E-F).
45.

On August 28, 2013, Claimant suffered the second of the two accidents which are

the subject of this proceeding. On that date, Claimant fell from an 8 foot ladder, landing on his
feet, but, in the process, flexing his right knee. He experienced the immediate onset of right lmee
pain. He was initially evaluated at the Nampa Medical Center on the day of accident. He was
seen for futiher treatment of his right lmee by Miers Johnson, M.D., on September 11, 2013. Dr.
Johnson noted Claimant's history of prior right knee surgeries, but also noted that Claimant had
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had no significant problems with the right knee since the last surgery in 1987. He noted that as
of the 2013 right knee injury, Claimant had been working full time, without restrictions, even
though he had some pain/discomfort in his low back and lower extremities.' Claimant admitted
to being able to drive farm equipment, but to having trouble with any climbing or prolonged
standing or pivoting. Claimant did not believe that the 2013 accident aggravated his low back
condition and, indeed, no such assertion is made in these proceedings. MRI evaluation of the
right knee revealed severe tri-compartmental degenerative changes and a chronic fracture of the
posterior tibial plateau and the posterior lateral tibia. Also noted was a chronic avulsion of the
posterior crnciate ligament tibial. insertion. Within all three compartments of the knee, areas of
full thickness cartilage loss were identified. Dr. Johnson noted that while Claimant assuredly
had pre-existing osteoarthritis of the knee, some of the findings were likely referable to the
subject accident. Dr. Johnson recommended a right total knee arthroplasty, and this procedure
was performed on or about May 6, 2014. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 514). Dr. Johnson released Claimant
from care on or about September 24, 2014. At that time, Claimant denied any pain in the right
knee, noting that he was driving tractor and otherwise performing his job. He denied any trouble
walking on uneven surfaces, although he did admit to some difficulty after long periods of time
on his feet. However, Dr. Johnson noted that Claimant related this discomfo1t to his back.
Claimant indicated that long periods of standing and walking produced pain radiating into both
anterior thighs and legs, and that he had pem1anent numbness in his left anterior thigh.
46.

On September 22, 2014, Dr. Johnson released Claimant to full duty work. He did

not give Claimant any restrictions regarding walking related to Claimant's right lmee
arthroplasty. However, he did believe that Claimant should be followed for his low back and
lower extremity complaints. (Cit. Ex. 13, p. 525).
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47.

, for the purposes of
Dr. Johnson referred Claimant to Fred Shoemaker, M.D.

tmed on October 6, 2014. Claimant
rating Claimant's right knee injury. That rating was perfo
from the knee replacement surgery.
told Dr. Shoemaker that he felt he had had a good result
al exam, Dr. Shoemaker felt it
Based on Claimant's good outcome, confirmed by clinic
the lower extremity referable to his
appropriate to give Claimant a 21 % impairment rating of
Claimant's pre-existing right knee
right knee, one-half of which Dr. Shoemaker related to
on had released Claimant without
condition. Dr. Shoemaker was aware that Dr. Johns
/restrictions as part of his evaluation.
restrictions, but Dr. Shoemaker did not speak to limitations
(Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 53 8-540).
48.

ed Claimant to Paul
From the record it appears that·. Dr. Johnson referr

low back condition. Dr. Montalbano
Montalbano, M.D., for further care/evaluation of Claimant's
ant gave Dr. Montalbano a history of
saw Claimant for the first time on October 15, 2014. Claim
low back pain ever since that event.
the October 6, 2009 accident, and that he had suffered from
noting bilateral and anterior thigh
Shortly after the motor vehicle accident, Claimant described
mities going down into the lateral
discomfort as well as numbness and tingling into his extre
mity symptomatology prior to the
aspect of his leg to his foot. He denied having any lower extre
ant burning pain at level 7 on a scale
motor vehicle accident. He described his back pain as const
ant's lumbat spine to include x-rays
0/10. Dr. Montalbano recommenqed new imaging of Claim
and MRI evaluation.

CT were
Instead, it appe\lrs that a myelogram and post-myelogram

perfmmed on October 31, 2014.

y
The post-myelogram CT was read as follows by Jeffre

Pugsley, M.D.,:
mild disc height loss.
T12-Ll: 2 mm of grade 1 retrolisthesis of T12 on LI with
is. Mild right neural
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthes
foraminal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis.
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Ll-L2: 2 mm of grade 1 retrolisthesis of LI on L2 with mild disc height loss.
Mild central canal narrowing secondary to the retrolisthesis, small disc bulge, and
mild facet arthropathy. Moderate right and mild left neural foraminal narrowing
secondary to the retrolisthesis and facet arthropathy.
L2-L3: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing secondary to facet
arthropathy and disc bulge.
L3-L4: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and mild
facet arthropathy. Mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing secondary to facet
arthropathy and disc bulge.
L4-L5: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to a small disc bulge and
moderate facet arthropathy. Moderate to severe bilateral neural foramin
al
narrowing secondary to endplate osteophytes and facet arthropathy.
L5-S 1: Mild central canal narrowing secondary to severe facet arthropathy.
Severe right and moderate left neural foraminal nerve secondary to facet
arthropathy and endplate osteophytes.
(Cit. Ex. 19, pp. 591-592). Flexion/extension films of the lumbar spine demonstrated
multi-level
degenerative disc disease, most pronounced at Tl2-LI , multi-level facet degene
ration, most
prominent at 13-4 thru LS-SI, and a Grade I retrolisthesis of Ll on L2,
unchanged on
flexion/extension.
49.

In his letter to Dr. Johnson of November 7, 2014, Dr. Montalbano expressed
his

agreement with Dr. Pugsley's interpretation of the post-myelogram CT. On
exam, Claimant's
muscle strength was 5/5 in both upper and lower extremities. Claimant did exhibit
antalgic gait
and station. Deep tendon reflexes were normal, and Claimant's sensory exam was
intact.
50.

Claimant was again seen by Dr. Montalbano on February 25, 2015, following
a

course of physical therapy. He presented with continued complaints of low back
pain and lower
extremity symptomatology. Dr. Montalbano ordered a bone scan in an effort to
further sort out
Claimant's problems. That study, performed on March 20, 2015, showed uptake
at the right L4-5
facet joint, and bilaterally at LS-SJ. (See Clt. Ex. 19, p. 595). In his note of April
8, 2013, Dr.
Montalbano described the bone scan results as "quite mild." Dr. Montalbano
recommended a
facet joint injection from which Claimant enjoyed only limited improvement.
Subsequent
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neurological exam was nmmal.

Dr. Montalbano recommended continuation of conservative

modalities, including physical therapy and weight loss.
51.

By June 3, 2015, Dr. Montalbano reported that Claimant was much improved

with conservative modalities. Based on Claimant's improvement, and his limited findings
on the
post-myelogram CT, Dr. Montalbano did not believe that Claimant was a surgical candida
te.
52.

By letter dated June 22, 2015, Claimant's counsel queried Dr. Montalbano as to

whether or not Claimant's lumbar spine condition is causally related to the subject MVA.
Again,
Claimant's counsel made the representation that Claimant's practice, when meeting with
treaters,
is to withhold history of secondary complaints and reference to treaters/evaluators only
those
problems that are of greater significance. (Cit. Ex. 17, p. 577)
53.

Claimant's counsel's letter of June 22, 2015 does reflect that he provide d Dr.

Montalbano with selected medical records, includi1:1g records from Dr. Reedy and Mounta
in
Home Physical Therapy. Counsel's letter does not reflect that he provided Dr. Montalb
ano with
copies of the September 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes from the GFHC, but Counsel
did
offer the following comments concerning Claimant's pre-injury low back complaints:
Upon Dr.. Hajj er recommending lumbar surgery, the State Insurance Fund
required that Mr. Ayala undergo an IME by Dr. Mark Harris, with Idaho Physical
Medicine & Rehabilitation. Dr. Harris' opinions were not upon actual
examination of Mr. Ayala,· but were based upon a review of medical records
provided by the State Insurance Fund. Following the records review, Dr. Harris
noted that Mr. Ayala did present prior to the October 6, 2009, motor vehicle
accident with sporadic complaints of low back symptomatology. When
questioned about this, Mr. Ayala responded that he is a "farm-worker," and that
all farm-workers experience low back pain upon occasion.
(Cit. Ex. 17, p. 579). Therefore, while Dr. Montalbano was generally apprised of Claiman
t's
sporadic pre-injury back complaints, he was not specifically apprised of the September
9 and
October 5, 2009 GFHC visits, nor was he provided with copies of those notes. He was, howeve
r,
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provided with a synopsis of some of Claimant's medical contacts between October 5, 2009 and
December 2011 chronicling Claimant's complaints of low back and lower extremity discomfort.
Dr. Montalbano was asked whether, against this background, he would agree that the medical
evidence establishes a causal connection between the motor vehicle accident and Claimant's
current low back condition. Dr. Montalbano's reply of July 8, 2015 reveals something about the
assumptions he made in forming a response to Counsel's question. Dr. Montalbano premised his
conclusions on the observation that it was "clear" that Claimant suffered from symptomatic low
back complaints "since that motor vehicle accident," but that he had been "asymptomatic" prior
to the motor vehicle accident. Therefore, Dr. Montalbano concluded that Claimant 's
symptomatology is directly related to the October 6, 2009 MVA.
54.

By letter dated September 30, 2015, Defense counsel provided Dr. Montalbano

with the GFHC records from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 and inquired of Dr.
Montalbano how or whether those records would cause him to revisit his opinion that Claimant's
low back complaints are causally related to the subject motor vehicle accident. In his reply of
October 8, 2015 Dr. Montalbano explained that the opinions contained in his July 8, 2015 letter
to Claimant's counsel were based on limited medical records. After reviewing the pre-injury
GFHC records, Dr. Montalbano stated:
After reviewing the additional medical records provided to me via your office, it
is quite clear that Mr. Mario G. Ayala was symptomatic in terms of low back pain
on at least two separate occasions. He was evaluated for low back pain on
September 9, 2009 and once again on October 5, 2009. The latter was one day
prior to his motor vehicle accident of October 6, 2009, in which Mr. Ayala
attributes all of his symptomatology to be related to. Within these two visits of
September 9, 2009, as well as October 5, 2009, Mr. Ayala started on treatment on
two separate occasions for low back pain and even received a prescription for a
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agent in order to manage such pain.
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(Clt. Ex. 21, p. 639). Dr. Montalbano concluded that, at most, the October 6, 2009 motor
vehicle
accident caused but a temporary sprain/strain which he would have expected to be of relativel
y
short duration. Dr. Montalbano's October 8, 2015 letter suggests that any care required later
than
4-6 weeks after the motor vehicle accident would be related to Claimant's underly
ing
degenerative condition. In his letter of October 3, 2016, Dr. Montalbano stated that none
of the
records/materials generated by Dr. Hammond would cause him to revise any of his previou
slystated opinions.
55.

Dr. Montalbano's testimony was taken by way of post-hearing deposition. Dr.

Montalbano testified that he had the opportunity to review both the 2012 and 2014
postmyelogram CT studies. Those studies did not reveal any progression of Claimant's conditio
n
between 2012 and 2014. Dr. Montalbano also testified that none of the post-accident
lumbar
spine studies provide any support for the proposition that Claimant suffered an acute iajury
to his
lumbar spine as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp.
29:2430:22; 37:8-38:9; 92:21-93:12; 116:12-22).

While Claimant's lumbar spine studies do

demonstrate severe multi-level degenerative arthritis, facet disease, and anterolisthesis,
neither
the studies, nor Dr. Montalbano's clinical examination demonstrated that Claiman
t has
impingement of existing nerve roots. (Montalbano Depo., pp. 12: 19-13:15; 16:23-17:6;
65:366: 17). On exam, Claimant's lower extremity symptoms did not follow a de1matomal
pattern
suggestive of nerve root compromise. (Moptalbano Depo., pp. 13:7-15; 16:23-6). Because
of the
lack of findings suggestive of nerve root compromise/radiculopathy, Dr. Montalbano does
not
believe that Claimant is a surgical candidate, especially after Claimant experienced improve
ment
in symptoms following the course of physical therapy ordered by Dr. Montalbano.
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56.

Dr. Montalbano originally opined that based on Claimant's lack of pre-injury low

back symptoms, and the development of symptoms following the accident, it followed that
Claimant's low back condition must be, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. Dr.
Montalbano changed his mind after reviewing the September 9 and October 6, 2009 GFHC
notes. Contrary to the narrative proposed by Claimant's counsel, Dr. Montalbano saw nothing in
those notes which suggested that Claimant's low back complaints were mediated by some type
of systemic ailment such as the flu, or other illness. Medications prescribed for Claimant on
September 9, 2009, Naprosyn and Flexeril, are medications typically prescribed for
musculoskeletal pain. (Montalbano Depa., pp. 26:24-28:23; 79:25-92:7). Therefore, from his
review of the medical records, Dr. Montalbano concluded that in the years preceding the October
6, 2009 motor vehicle a~cident, Claimant had periodic problems with low back pain and that
immediately prior to the motor vehicle accident, he had one of these episodes.
57.

Dr. Montalbano recognized that Claimant's course following the subject accident

is equally important.

For example, he appears to concede that if Dr. Reedy is c01Tect in

supposing that Claimant had "unrelenting" low back/lower extremity discomfort since the
subject accident, this fact would auger in favor of a conclusion that the subject accident did
something to aggravate or accelerate Claimant's low back problems on a permanent basis.
However, the medical records do not support the proposition that Claimant suffered from
persistent/unrelenting low back pain ever since the subject accident. (Montalbano Depo., pp.
30:23-31:19; 32:11-37:3).

Based on the failure of the record to document persistent and

unrelenting low back pain following the October 6, 2009 MVA, the existence of medical records
which document a lade of low back symptoms/findings at various times after the October 6, 2009
accident, arid other medical records which document new occurrences of low back pain
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believed that the subject
following periods of no low back symptomatology, Dr. Montalbano
ented pre-existing low
accident caused, at most, a temporary exacerbation of Claimant's docum
back condition.
58.

referral
Richard Hammond, M.D., first saw Claimant on September 10, 2010, on

ning the accident and
from PA McCready. Dr. Hammond took a history from Claimant concer
ond noted that since
the cervical spine surgery previously performed by Dr. Reedy. Dr. Hamm
left shoulder and had
the accident Claimant suffered from continued pain across the top of his
ant presented with any
difficulty using his left mm. Dr. Hammond did not report that Claim
clinical exam suggest
complaints of low back or lower extremity pain. Nor did Dr. Hammond's
any findings indicative of low back problems.

Dr. Hammond believed that Claimant had

r evaluation. (See Clt.
possible ulnar nerve and left shoulder problems and recommended furthe
2013 for complaints of
Ex. 9, pp. 458-459). Dr. Hainmond next saw Claimant on October !,
Claimant did have some
blacking out. On the occasion of that visit, Dr. Hammond noted that
1
Also noted was the 2013
low back complaints for which he had been evaluated by Dr. Hajjar.

Hammond on August
industrial injury to Claimant's right knee. Claimant was next seen by Dr.
ant to Dr. Hammond
1, 2016, at the instance of Claimant's counsel. Counsel re-introduced Claim
4
counsel inquired of Dr.
by way ofa letter dated June 22, 2016. Among other things, Claimant's

to the October 6, 2009
Hmnmond whether Claimant's low back condition is causally related
having significant low
motor vehicle accident. To Dr. Hammond, Claimant gave a history of
nt. Concerning the
back pain commencing immediately after the subject motor vehicle accide
Hammond that the back
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 GFHC notes, Claimant told Dr.
medical history, noting that Claimant had not
As he did with Dr. Hajjar, Counsel synopsized Claimant's pre-injury
ber 14, 2007 and September 9, 2009,
presented to tJ,e GFHC with any low back complaints between Septem
actic records generated between
Chiropr
Kieffer
and
C
ofGFH
s
Claima nt's Counsel did not include a synopsi
e episodes of low back, SI joint, or
referenc
do
records
these
infi'a,
noted
As
November 2001 and September of 2007.
hip pain during this time frame.

4
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complaints he had prior to the motor vehicle accident were of an entirely different nature than the
low back complaints he developed thereafter. He reiterated that his low back complaints have
been persistent since the motor vehicle accident. Based on Claimant's history, the records
provided by Claimant's counsel, and his examination of Claimant, Dr. Hammond concluded that
Claimant's low back condition is causally related to the subject accident.
59.

Dr. Hammond's deposition was taken on December 16, 2016. He testified that

Claimant had radiographic evidence of L4-5 anterolisthesis with significant bilateral stenosis at
L5-Sl.

Dr. Hammond testified that Claimant's anterolisthesis closed-off Claimant's

neuroforamina, bilaterally, causing exiting nerve root impingement. Con_ceming the GFHC
records from September 9, 2009 and Oct_ober 5, 2009, Dr. Hammond agreed with Claimant's
counsel that these notes are consistent with Claimant's treatment for some type of systemic
complaint, as opposed to a musculoskeletal low back complaint. (Hammond Depo., pp. 17:1820:19). At most, Dr. Hammond believed that the Sep_tember 9 and October 5, 2009 chart notes
reflected muscular pain, while Claimant's current complaints are referable to a structural
abnormality. (Hammond Depo., pp. 20:20-21: 17).
60.

Concerning his September 10, 2010 evaluation of Claimant, Dr. Hammond

testified that unless Claimant had presented with significant low back or lower extremity
problems, he probably would not have made note of these, since he was seeing Claimant for left
upper extremity problems. (Hammond Depo., p. 59:3-19). However, review of Dr. Hammond's
September 10, 2010 chart note demonstrates that he did talce a complete history from Claimant
that involved inquiries well beyond the apibit of the nature and extent of Claimant's left upper
extremity complaints. His history and exam of Claimant included Claimant's eyes, ears, nose and
throat, cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, genital/urinary, musculoskeletal, neurologic
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and neurogenic systems. Claimant was invited to admit to any problems in these areas.

Dr.

Hammond also conducted a limited exam of Claimant's lower extremities. Knee jerk and ankle
jerk were 1+. Claimant's gait and station were normal. Per Dr. Hammond, the knee and ankle
jerk findings, though not normal, were not significant enough to warrant follow-up at that time.
(Hammond Depo., p. 61 :6-24). 1n summary, in September of 2010, Dr. Hammond noted nothing
regarding Claimant's low back which would have caused him to refer Claimant for further
evaluation or treatment.
61.

Dr. Hammond testified that trauma can be one cause of anterolisthesis of the type

seen in Claimant's lumbar spine. (Hammond Depo., pp. 15:21-16:19). However, he also
acknowledged that wear and tear in populations that perfo1m heavy labor "can ce1iainly cause"
anterolisthesis. (Hammond Depo., p. 85:15-21). Dr. Hammond believes that the subject accident
caused injury to Claimant's Iumbosacral spine and is responsible for Claimant's need for
surgery. His reasons for coming to this conclusion are several. Dr. Hammond was willing to
acknowledge that Claimant did have disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject
accident. However, he believed that the pre-injury and post-injury medical records he reviewed
support the conclusion that the subject accident aggravated the pre-existing condition. Dr.
Hammond believed that Claimant's pre-iajury complaints consisted of a one or two-time visit to
PA McCready for complaints of low back pain on September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, while
his post-injury complaints have been persistent and unrelenting. (Hammond Depo., pp. 42: 1143:7; 79:1-13;

92:15-93:23; 107:18-108:14; 109:23-110:12; 111:14-24; 123:6-124:1). Dr.

Hammond did not believe that the GFHC notes of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009 were
significant.
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62.

Dr. Hammond was not provided with medical records generated by Dr. Kieffer

and the GFMC, and discussed at~ 5-7, inji"a. Those records cover a period from
a 2001 throug h
May, 2007 and do reflect i_nore longstanding complaints of hip/low back
discomfort.

It is

unknown whether, or how, the additional notes which he did not see would cause
him to amend
any of the opinions he expressed concerning the significance of the subject
accident to the
development of Claimant's current low back condition.
63.

As noted, Dr. Hamm ond's opinion is also supported by his belief that Claima
nt's

complaints were different in character following the motor vehicle acciden
t and have been
persistent and umelenting since that time. In this belief he joins with Dr. Reedy:
Q: [By Mr. Berry]:
Basically, Dr. · Reedy advised Mr. Augustine that just
because Mr. Ayala may have had a backache once in a while prior to the motorvehicle accident that - - and here I'm quoting " ... does not preclude the fact
that
the exacerbation of the accident led to the persistent, umelenting pain in the
back
and leg with neurogenic claudication-like symptoms, and he clearly has patholo
gy
to demonstrate the validity of those claims." Do you agree with that?
A:

I couldn 't have said it better.

(Hammond Depo., p. 111: 14-24). However, as developed irifi·a, the medica
l records do not
support the conclusion that Claimant's low back/lower extremity complaints have
been persistent
and umelenting since the subject accident, at least until the late fall of 2011.
64.

Dr. Hammond was in general agreement with the FCE performed by Brian

Wright, DPT. However, he believed that it might be appropriate to assign more
of Claima nt's
sitting, standing, and walking restrictions to the low back condition as oppose
d to Claima nt's
knee injury.
65.

As noted, Dr. Reedy treated Claimant through December 201 I, but thereaf
ter,

engaged in some back-and-forth with Claimant's counsel concerning the etiolog
y cif Claima nt's
low back complaints. In a letter dated November 20, 2012, Claimant's counse
l introduced a
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number of questions to Dr. Reedy by first synopsizing medical records tending to support the
proposition that while Claimant may have had some periodic flares of low back pain prior to the
subject accident, his complaints have been persistent and unrelenting since the subject accident.
Claimant's counsel asked Dr. Reedy to confirm that Claimant's low back complaints were, in
some respect, referable to the subject accident. In his response of December 12, 2012, Dr. Reedy
stated:
I clearly think Mr. Ayala's lumbar presentment and need for snrgery that both I
and Dr. Hajjar issued is causally related to the October 6, 2009 motor vehicle
accident. Obviously, he did have pre-existing spine (he had worked hard for a
living fol' his entire life)! However, he was asymptomatic until the time of the
MV A which precipitated the need for intervention. Please contact me if I can be
of any further assistance.
(Cit. Ex. 5, p. 177). Counsel's November 20, 2012 letter did not specifically refetence the muchdiscussed GFHC records of September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009.
66.

By letter dated December 17, 2015, Defense counsel advised Dr. Reedy that Dr.

Montalbano had ultimately concluded that Claimant's low back condition is not referable to the
subject accident. He also provided Dr. Reedy with copies of the chart notes from September 9,
2009 and October 5, 2009, which Dr. Montalbano had found to be significant. He asked for Dr.
Reedy's comment. By letter dated January 7, 2016, Dr. Reedy acknowledged that Claimant had a
pre-existing degenerative condition of the lumbar spine, but proposed that the subject accident
was a "straw that broke the camel's back," causing Claimant to suffer "persistent unrelenting"
pain in the back and leg since the motor vehicle accident. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). He minimized the
GFHC notes from September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, explaining that just because Claimant
had a back ache prior to his industrial accident did not mean that the industrial accident did not
cause additional injury to Claimant's lumbar spine. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 186). In a January 19, 2016
follow-up letter to C_laimant' s counsel, Dr. Reedy again elaborated on his view of what is and is
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not significant in this case in terms of Claimant's clinical presentation. He stated Claiman
t may
well have suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain prior to the motor vehicle accident
, and
he clearly did have degenerative disease of the lumbar spine prior to the industrial accident
;
however, it was only following the industrial accident that Claimant suffered from persiste
nt and
intractable low back pain, and therefore, the motor vehicle accident is directly related
to
Claimant's cutTent lumbar spine condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 187).
Further Discussion Concerning Claimant's Lumbar Spine
67.

It is well established by a long line of authorities that in any proceeding before the

Industrial Commission, a claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the
evidence, all facts essential to his recovery. See Ball v. Daw Forest Products Co., 136
Idaho
155, 30 P.3d 933 (2001); Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 P.2d 932 (1993). Where
medical causation is at issue, a claimant must provide medical evidence that supports the
claim
for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley v. State Industri
al

Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). Probable is defined as having
more evidence for than against. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974).
Magic words are not necessary to convey that a doctor's opinion is given with the requisite
degree of medical probability; all that is needed is testimony demonstrating the physician's
plain
and unequivocal conviction that a causal connection exists between an accident and an injury.
See Jensen v. City ofPocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 PJd 211 (2001).
68.

In the instant matter, the pmties have devoted reams of exhibits, testimony, and

m·gument for and against the proposition that Claimant's lumbar spine condition is, in
some
respect, causally related to the subject accident. The opinions are numerous, and vacillating,
but
the'y generally acknowledge that Claimant has degenerative disease of the lumbar spine
which
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predated the subject accident. All physicians who have reviewed the films taken in connection
with evaluation of Claimant's lumbar spine aclmowledge that there is no finding in any of those
studies which, standing alone, constitutes evidence of acute injury of Claimant's lumbar spine.
The studies alone do not provide evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the subject accident
contributed something to Claimant's pre-existing low back condition. However, while the
radiographic evidence demonstrates longstanding disease of the lumbar spine, the studies are not
inconsistent with the proposition that these processes may have been aggravated by the subject
accident. As is not uncommonly the case, the objective medical evidence must be con-elated with
Claimant's history and clinical examination to inform an opinion on whether or not the subject
accident did cause some permanent injury to Claimant's lumbar spine.
69.

It is clear from review of the causation opinions in this case that the

treating/evaluating physicians are cognizant of the importance of con-elating the objective
medical evidence with Claimant's history, clinical presentation, and exam. The parties, too,
recognize the importance of this correlation, and have pulled out the stops to posit questions to
treating/evaluating physicians premised on the facts they deem most important to their case.
70.

Having reviewed the record in its entirety, and having considered the writings and

testimony of all the physicians who have rendered an opinion on the cause of Claimant's low
back condition, the Commission concludes that Claimant has failed to demonstrate, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, that his cun-ent low back complaints are causally
related to the subject accident.
71.

First, the radiological studies unambiguously establi.sh that Claimant has multi-

level degenerative disease of the lumbar spine which predated the subject accident. The record
also establishes that Claimant presented, in the years preceding the October 6, 2009 accident
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with periodic complaints of low back pain. Claimant endorses this, as does Dr. Reedy. (Cit. Ex.
5, pp. 179, 180, 187; Cit Ex. 20, p. 635). However, Dr. Hammond was not aware of the Kieffer
Chiropractic and GFHC records which reflect some complaints of low back/hip pain between
2001-2007. On September 9, 2009, Claimant was seen at the GFHC for a number of complaints,
inclnding, inter a/ia, low back pain. He was seen again on October 5, 2009, the day before the
subject accident, with complaints of a cough, which he described as longstanding and mild joint
pain, muscle aches, and back pain. Having reviewed the testimony and records of the numerous
providers who have commented on the September 9 and October 5, 2009 notes, the evidence
does not establish that the back pain or low back pain with which Claimant presented on those
occasions was simply a manifestation of a systemic illness such as the flu. PA McCready's
January 19, 2016 reply to counsel's check-the-box questi01maire is not_particularly persuasive,
I

and it is given little weight. Such evidence is always regarded with some skepticism. Rather
than the physician's unalloyed opinion, what is received is an opinion fonnulated by the paity
offering it, to which the physician is asked to give his assent.

It is unclear whether PA

McCready' s reply represents his actual opinion, or was simply his way to buy some peace;
Claimant's counsel contacted him on three occasions seeking a response to certain questions, and
only obtained it after advising PA McCready that failing a written response, it would be
necessary to notice

McCready's deposition.

Further, PA McCready's response does not

discount the possibility that the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9, 2009
included musculoskeletal low back complaints. All that PA McCready admitted to is that as of
September 9, 2009 and October 5, 2009, Claimant's low back complaints did not indicate
"serious or significant" injury to the low back.

How serious or how significant an injury

Claimant's symptoms might have indicated, is left to speculation. PA Mccready next signified
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he would not have
his agreement with the assertion that absent the October 5, 2009 accident,
as later docum ented
expected Claima nt to "thereafter" present with a significant low back injury
, and it is unclear
by Drs. Hajjar and Reedy in 2012. The te1m "thereafter" admits a lot of leeway
develop significant
how or whether PA McCre ady's opinion might change if Claima nt did not
waxing and waning
low back sympto ms until several months following the accident or, if, he had
note in Decem ber of
sympto ms betwee n the date of the subject accident and Dr. Reedy' s chart
nt's counse l is not
2011. Accordingly, PA McCre ady's January 19, 2016 response to Claima
on is related to his
especially probati ve of the question of whether Claima nt's low back conditi

MVA.
72.

of
Both Dr. Hamm ond and Dr. Montalbano have speculated on the significance

5, 2009. In general,
the complaints with which Claimant presented on September 9 and October
yn and Flexeril
Dr. Montal bano's reasoning is more persuasive. He has pointed out that Napros
the suggestion that
are typically prescribed for musculoskeletal complaints, thus denigrating
ted the flu, he would
Claima nt merely had the flu. He also noted that [f PA McCready had suspec
he ordered.
undoub tedly have' ordered a quick flu test in addition to the other labs

Dr.

a systemic conditi on
Montalbano also noted other of PA McCre ady's findings that ran counter to
ond was far less
or infection as the explanation for Claima nt's presenting complaints. Dr. Hamm
persuasive in this regard.
73.

some
The most problematic, and hardest fought, aspect of this case lies in making

d from low back
determination as to whether or not, or to what extent, Claimant suffere
l opinions that have
complaints following the October 5, 2009 accident. Based on the medica
t were persistent
been adduced, if Claima nt's low back complaints following the 2009 acciden
accident must have
and unrelenting, it would be rather easy to conclude that the subject
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aggravated Claimant's pre-existing low back disease; objective findings consistent with an
accident caused aggravation of a pre-existing condition could be conelated with a medical
history of new and unrelenting back and lower extremity symptoms since the accident to supp01i
the conclusion that the accident caused permanent injury to Claimant's low back. On the other
hand, if the evidence is more susceptible of a conclusion that Claimant did not present with
persistent low back complaints following the subject accident until the late fall of 2011, then.it
becomes much more difficult to conclude that the subject accident is implicated in the cause of
Claimant's low back condition. The evidence on this issue is conflicting but, as developed
below, the record offers less suppo1i to the proposition that Claimant suffered from persistent
and unrelenting low back pain since the October 5, 2009 MV A, and more support to the
proposition that his low back complaints began, in earnest, in late 2011.
74.

Claimant testified that he has suffered from low back and lower extremity

numbness unremittingly since the accident of October 6, 2009. (Claimant Depo., p. 33:11-22;
Tr., p. 95: 13-17). However, there are multiple post-accident medical records which are silent on
the issue of whether Claimant complained of low back and lower extremity pain; these records
admit the possibility that Claimant had, low back symptomatology which he simply did not
describe to his providers. However, the post-accident medical records generated between the date
of accident and the late fall of 2011 contain an equal number of records in which Claimant
specifically denied low back/lower extremity symptoms, or which reference an exam of the low
back and lower extremities which turned up nothing untoward. These records are much harder to
reconcile with Claimant's current insistence that he has suffered from unrelenting low back/
lower extremity symptomatology ever since the subject accident. Moreover, the post-injury
medical records generated between the date of accident and the late fa[l of 2011 also reflect that
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on several occasions when Claimant did complain of back or low back discomfort the onset of
these problems was not related to the subject accident, but was described as being of more recent
origin. It is clear that Claimant did describe suffering from back pain immediately after the
accident to Employer and the SIF. It is also clear that he complained of back pain in the spring
of 2010, and again, in the late fall of 2011. However, these records are not sufficient to suppoti a
finding that Claimant's symptomatolog_y following the motor vehicle accident was persistent and
umelenting in light of the other medical records which show that Claimant's history of low back
symptomatology following the motor vehicle accident was, at most, intermittent. Dr. Reedy was
prepared to acknowledge that on a precinjury basis Claimant suffered from intermittent low back
and/or lower extremity problems.

Claimant's post-accident history does not persuasively

demonstrate more significant or persistent low back symptoms, at least not until the fall of 2011.
Of paiiicular interest, are medical records from a number of sources generated in the late fall of
2011.

These records reflect a new onset of low back and lower extremity discomfort in

November of 2011.
75.

Claimant has explained the failure of the medical records to uniformly reflect

persistent and umelenting low back pain since the subject accident by his practice to only
reference to the many providers he saw following the subject accident his most predominant
complaint, leaving unstated any secondary complaint such as low back and lower extremity
discomfort. Having reviewed Claimant's testimony, both at heai·ing, and at the time of his
prehearing deposition, there is little-if-any support ·for this proposition in the record,

For

example, following cervical s.pine surgery Claimant was referred to Mountain Home Physical
Therapy, He was first evaluated at that facility on March 25, 2010, and was last seen on June 9,
2010.

Claimant was again referred to Mountain Home Physical Therapy by Dr, Hessing
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following Claimant's shoulder and elbow surgery.

During the first session of physical therapy

(March 25, 2010 - June 9, 2010) Claimant was seen for treatment on 31 occasions. Claimant
contends that the physical therapy chart notes from March 25, April 7, April 19, April 27, and
May 25 reflect that Claimant presented on those occasions to the physical therapist with
complaints of hip/lower extremity pain. The notes reflect that throughout the course of physical
therapy, Claimant's primary complaints related to his neck and left upper extremity. However,
on Masch 25, 2010 the therapist noted that Claimant had complaints of pain in the left foot. (Cit.
Ex. 7, p. 361). The note from April 7, 2010 reflects that Claimant complained about hip soreness
after riding the bike. The chart note from April 19, 2010 reflects that Claimant presented with
complaints that his hip had been bothering him more and was waking him at night. The chart
note from April 27, 2010 reflects that Claimant's hip did better with a different type of exercise
bicycle. The note from May 25, 2010 reflects that Claimant told his doctor about his hip pain but
the doctor did not have an answer. Therefore, for the period March 25, 2010 tlu·ough June 11,
2010 there is reference to hip 1·discomfort
in four of the 31 chart notes. They do not reveal
,'
complaints of low back pain or lower e4tremity ~umbness. Between Januaiy 18, 20 I I and April
7, 2011 Claimant was seen at Moun1ain Home Physical Therapy on 21 occasions. These notes
make no reference to .complaints of hip or lower extremity discomfort. In all, the Mountain
Home Physical Therapy records lend little support to the proposition that Claimant complained
of persistent and unrelenting back and lower extremity discomfo1i at all times following the
industrial accident of October 5, 2009. However, these records do denigrate _Claimant's other
insistence that the medical records do not contain reference to low back complaints either
because (I) he only told physicians about his mo~t significant complaint; or (2) Dr. Reedy
counseled Claimant to withhold discussion of the low back until Claimant's neck/upper
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extremity complaints were dealt with. Nor do the PT notes suppmi the proposition that if
Claimant was seeing a particular provider for his neck or upper extremity complaints, he would
not discuss any other complaints he was having with such provider.
76.

As noted, Dr. Reedy has reported that Claimant told Dr. Reedy in December of

2011 that he (Dr. Reedy) had advised Claimant back in January of 20 IO that Dr. Reedy would
concentrate first on Claimant's neck problem, and after resolution of the same, attention would
be turned to the low back. Dr. Reedy has never endorsed this; he has only reported that this is
what Claimant has said. That the nanative proposed by Claimant to Dr. Reedy in December of
2011 does not accurately represent a discussion had between Dr. Reedy and Claimant in Januaty
of 2010 is perhaps best demonstrated by Dr. Reedy's letter of November 18, 2010 to PA
McCready. By that time, Claimant was thought to be medically stable following his cervical
spine fusion performed by Dr. Reedy. However, rather than take-up the next of Claimant's
complaints, i.e. his low back, which had been held in reserve pending resolution of Claimant's
cervical spine condition, Dr. Reedy released Claimant from his care. (Cit. Ex.'5, p. 164)
77.

Claimant saw Dr. Harris for the purposes of an IME. Dr. HatTis was not

designated to treat Claimant for his back, shoulder, or any other condition. Claimant was invited
to describe the nature and extent of the complaints he related to the work accident and low back
complaints were not among those described. Claimant treated with Dr. Clawson for his left
upper extremity, yet in November of 2011 shared with Dr. Clawson the low back complaints he
was having. In short, Claimant's explanation for the failure of the medical record to document
persistent and unrelenting complaints in the low back is not persuasive.
'

The record better

supports the proposition that Claimant suffered from periodic, but not unrelenting, low back and
lower extremity discomfort betw:een October 6, 2009. and the late fall of 2011, just as he had
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suffered from periodic bouts of low back pain in the years prior to October 6. 2009. The opinions
of Dr. Reedy, Dr. Hammond, and Dr. Hajjar are all premised on the assumption that Claimant's
low back symptomatology increased precipitously following the industrial accident. This
assumption is important because it provides support for the proposition that Claimant's objective
degenerative changes were more likely-than-not aggravated by the subject accident. Otherwise,
how is one to explain the sudden and precipitous worsening described by Claimant? Absent this
underlying assumption there is little-to-no support for the proposition that the objective changes
noted on radiology studies are, in some respect, referable to the subject accident. As described
by Drs. Hammond, Montalbano, and Reedy, Claiman fs lumbar spine films demonstrate
degenerative findings with no clear evidence of an acute injury which could be related to the
subject accident. For these reasons, Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition
is causally related to the subject accident.
Futther Findings and Discussion Relating to Neck, Left Upper Extremity, and Right Knee
78.

As initially explained, the parties are in agreement that Claimant's cervical spine,

left shoulder, left ulnar nerve, and right knee injuries are causally related to the accidents of 2009
and 2013.

There remains the issue of Claimant's disability referable to these compensable

conditions.
79.

Dr. Reedy released Claimant to return to work without restriction on May 20,

2010. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 161). He continued to follow Claimant during Claimant's treatment with
Dr. Clawson and Dr. Hessing. By June of 2011, Claimant presented with complaints of
experiencing acute cervical discomf01t after he tilted his head and felt a "pop" in his neck.
Follow-up MRI evaluation did not reveal anything untoward although Dr. Reedy did comment
on persistent foraminal encroachment at the C6-7 level.

On December 10, 2011, Claimant
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turning his neck, more so
presented to Dr. Reedy with continuing complaints of having difficulty
on could be improved
on the left than the right. Dr. Reedy did not believe that Claimant's situati
n. (Clt. Ex. 5, p. 166).
by further surgery, but recommended that Claimant obtain a second opinio
Claimant's recurrent
Dr. Reedy has not seen Claimant since December 5, 2011, and, despite
without restrictions, at
cervical spine complaints, did not ever revise his release to return to work
med by PT Wright. On
least not until he received a copy of the September 25, 2015 FCE perfor
Reedy expressed his full
November 2, 2015, nearly four years after he last saw Claimant, Dr.
appmiionment of those
agreement with the restrictions proposed by PT Wright and the
aints and his low back
restrictions between Claimant's ce_rvical spine/upper extremity compl
Claimant's cervical spine
condition. (Cit. Ex. 5, p. 182). Concerning the impairment referable to
Ex. 5, p. 173).
condition, Dr. Reedy deferred to the rating proposed by Dr. Harris. (Cit.
80.

aware of
Dr. Hessing, who perfmmed Claimant's left shoulder surgery, was

y, he gave Claimant a
Claimant's work as a farm laborer. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 415). Following surger
his preinjury job without
5% upper extremity rating and released Claimant to return to work at
restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 8, p. 445).
81.

d Claimant
Dr. Clawson, who performed Claimant's ulnar nerve surgery, release

al impairment, on January
to return to work without restrictions, and without reference to residu
11, 2011.
82.

right lmee,
Claimant was first seen by Miers Johnson, M.D., for treatment of his

ant described working
on September 11, 2013. Dr. Johnson's note of that date reflects that Claim
lower extremity and
as a farm laborer, without restrictions, although he did complain of some
by Dr. Johnson, he noted,
low back difficulties. Following the right knee atihroplasty performed
knee:
on July 14, 2014, that Claimant was doing quite well vis-a-vis the right

49
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDE R-

384

He seldom has trouble with the knee except maybe the next day after physical
therapy and if he tries to kneel on his kneecap. He is driving a tractor and
otherwise doing his job. He has trouble walking on uneven ground. He is able to
walk, but has trouble when he is on his feet for very long periods of time. Most of
this seems secondary to his back. ..
(Clt. Ex. 13, p. 522). On September 22, 2014 Claimant was released from care by Dr. Johnson
with these comments:
Patient can work full duty. I have no restrictions regarding his walking with his
total lmee. His biggest problem seems to be sciatica and should be re-evaluated
by the spine surgeon.
(Cit. Ex. 13, p. 524). Dr. Johnson did not offer impairment rating for Claimant's right knee
arthroplasty. In this regard, he defe1rnd to Dr. Shoemaker.
83.

Dr. Shoemaker saw Claimant for the purposes of evaluation on October 6, 2014.

Dr. Shoemaker noted Claimant's pre-existing right lmee surgeries, as well as the surgery
performed by Dr. Johnson. He gave Claimant a 21 % impairment rating of the lower extremity
based on Claimant's good surgical outcome and the fact that Dr. Johnson did not deem it
necessary to provide Claimant with any permanent restrictions. Dr. Shoemaker apportioned onehalf of the 21 % lower extremity rating to Claimant's documented pre-existing right lmee
problems. (See Cit. Ex. 14, pp. 539-540). In his report, Dr. Shoemaker referenced a separate
"activity status report" which he prepared, and which discussed work restrictions/precautions
applicable to Claimant. However, that document is not contained in the record.
84.

At the instance of Defendants, Claimant was evaluated by Dr. Han-is following

Claimant's release by Drs. Hessing, Clawson, and Reedy. To Dr. Han-is, Claimant described the
requirements of his job and indicated that as of August 15, 2011 he was performing this work
without physician-imposed restrictions. (Cit. Ex. 20, p. 614). Claimant complained of neck and
upper extremity discomfort, but no low back/lower extremity difficulties.
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Claimant a 6% whole person rating for his cervical spine, concuned with Dr. Hessing' s 5%
upper extremity rating for the left shoulder and awarded no impairment for the left ulnar nerve
transposition surgery performed by Dr. Clawson. (Clt. Ex. 20, pp. 617-618).

Concerning

permanent limitations/restrictions, Dr. Hanis offered the following:
At this point, Mr. Ayala has no work restrictions as noted by the treating
physicians in this case and I would agree that he shbuld use caution in overhead
activities and heavy lifting, although no permanent restrictions are given or
suggested.
(Cit. Ex. 20, p. 618).
85.

Claimant's counsel referred Claimant to Brian Wright, DPT, for the purpose of a
\

functional capacities evaluation. In his cover letter, Counsel cautioned PT Wright that because
Claimant's low back condition might ultimately be determined to be unrelated to the 2009
accident, it would be important for PT Wright to distinguish between limitations/restrictions
referable to Claimant's right knee/neck/left upper extremity injuries and his low back condition.
(See Cit. Ex. 23, pp. 656-659). PT Wright performed this functional capacity evaluation on
September 25, 2015. PT Wright noted that Claimant participated in the evaluation with "full
objective signs of maximum effort and cooperation." He also noted that "between similar
functional tests, client consistently performed as expected and these findings correlated well with
each other." PT Wright did not have access to the job site evaluation prepared by the ICRD. He
relied on Claimant to describe the functional components of his job, and this informed his
ultimate conclusion that the physical abilities demonstrated on exam constituted a significant
bmTier to Claimant's performance of his job.

Per PT Wright, the limitations referable to

Claimant's specific areas of injury are as follows:
1. Cervical spine/neck, status-post microdiskectomy and fusion by Dr. Reedy This pmiicular presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following
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·y,
functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-can
elevated activity and forward bend - stand activities.
r
2. Left upper extremity, status -post left ulnar nerve neurolysis, anterio
is
subcutaneoustransposition by Dr. Clawson. This particular presentment
to
Waist
ies:
responsible for the limitations in the following functional categor
floor lifting, waist to crown lifting, lift-ca1Ty and elevated activity.
3. Left shoulder, status-post arthroscopic subacromial decompression, distal
Dr.
claviculectomy, labral and joint debridement with rotator cuff repair by
the
Hessing. This particular presentment is responsible for the limitations in
liftfollowing functional categories: Waist to floor lifting, waist to crown lifting,
carry and elevated activity.

4. Right knee, status-post right TKA by Dr. Johnson. This particular presentment
g
is responsible for the limitations in the following functional categories: Walkin
(low
lift
floor
to
(low back is contributing 20-40% of this in my opinion), Waist
low
back is contributing 20-40% to this), lift-carry (10-20% contribution from
(60-80%
sitting
and
back), forward bend - stand (20-40% contribution)
contribution from the low back).
5. Low back/ lumbar spine, cmTently presenting as non-surgical. This particular
nal
presentment is responsible for the limitations in the following functio
),
opinion
my
in
categories: Walking (low back is contributing 20-40% of this
%
Waist to floor lift (low back is contributing 20-40% to this) lift-cany (10-20
and
ution)
contrib
(20-40%
contribution from low back), forward bend - stand
sitting (60-80% contribution from the low back).
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 647).
86.

not
Concerning his findings relating to Claimant's low back, PT Wright did

on should be
explain his conclusion that 20-40% of Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting limitati
since Claimant
attributed to Claimant's low back condition. For example, does this mean that
of 15 pounds,
was found to be capable of occasional waist-to-flool' lifting in the range
in increasing
subtracting out the low back condition's contribution to this limitation would result
were able to
Claimant's waist-to-floor lifting by 20-40%? Neither Mr. Jordan nor Dr. Collins
offer any insights on this question, and PT Wright was not deposed.
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87:

In summary, there is general agreement that Claimant has the following

left
impairments referable to his industrial injuries: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person;
lower
shoulder - 5%; upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%; right knee - 21 %;
t.
extremity -- 50% attributable to pre-existing condition, 50% referable to 2013 acciden
Claimant's low back condition is not deemed stable and ratable.
Vocational Testimony
88.

William Jordan conducted a forensic vocational evaluation of Claimant at the

a farm
instance of Defendants. His report reflects that Claimant has been employed primarily as
laborer/foreman since approximately 1990. Since 1999, Claimant has been employed by Meyers
1999,
Farms. Social Security earnings records reflect a steady annual increase in earnings since
work
the only exception being the years 2009, 2010, and 2013, when Claimant lost time from
referable to his work-related injuries.

In 2008, for example, the year preceding the 2009

. Mr.
accident, Claimant earned $24,170. In 2015, Claimant's earnings are reported at $42,911
l of
Jordan had the opportunity to interview both Claimant and Robert Meyers, the principa
as an
Meyers Farms. Per Mr. Meyers, Claimant is a good worker who Meyers expects to retain
work
employee, notwithstanding that Claimant has been forced to modify how he performs his
as farm foreman. From Mr. Meyers, Mr. Jordan recorded the following:
Mr. Meyers indicated that he was aware that the Claimant has modified his work
activities so that he does less lifting: he estimated that the Claimant probably lifts
a maximum of 50 pounds. He uses equipment for lifting, can get help with lifting
or he can del~gate heavier lifting to the other two employees. The Employer
stated that the Claimant still does about all of the same job tasks that he has
always done - he just goes about it a little differently.
Mr. Meyers indicated that the Claimant possesses knowledge that is helpful on the
farm. He gave the example of how they draw water out of the river using pumps.
The 14 pivots that they use for irrigating have to be balanced to manage the use of
the water. The Claimant is in charge of this task.
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Mr. Meyers reiterated that he is not planning on terminating the employment
relationship with the Claimant as he continues to be productive, although he noted
that he has heard through some of the chemical distributors that the Claimant has
been considering quitting. Mr. Meyers is aware that the Claimant is getting older,
and is approaching full Social Security Retirement age (approximately within the
next year).
(Def. Ex. 9, pp. 207-208). Mr. Jordan also elicited from Claimant, Claimant's sense of his
functional abilities. Per Mr. Jordan, Claimant's sense of what he can do from a functional
standpoint is somewhat more generous than the maximum functional capabilities outlined by PT
Wright. Mr. Jordan noted that Claimant has a fund of agricultural skills valuable to his current
employer, and to other similarly-situated employers. Mr. Jordan's repmi illustrates the
importance of understanding the extent and degree of Claimant's limitations/restrictions: absent
limitations/restrictions, as might be suggested by the work releases of Drs. Hessing, Clawson,
Harris, and Johnson, Claimant has suffered no disability as a consequence of the work injuries
since he has no functional limitations that would impede his ability to engage in gainful activity.
On the other hand, Mr. Jordan acknowledged that if one accepts the limitations/restrictions
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has suffered significant loss of his ability to
engage in gainful activity as compared to the labor market access he enjoyed prior to the 2009
accident. Based on Claimant's status as an able-bodied individual, and taking into account his
relevant non-medical factors, Mr. Jordan proposed that Claimant had access to approximately
17% of his labor market prior the 2009 accident. However, assuming the limitations/restrictions
identified in the September 2015 FCE, Claimant has lost 62% of his pre-injury labor market with
an anticipated wage loss of 32%. Employing a convention frequently utilized by vocational
rehabilitation experts, Mr. Jordan proposed that the limitations/restrictions outlined in the FCE,
coupled with Claimant's non-medical factors, yield disability in the range of 47%, inclusive of
PPL (62 + 32 = 94 + 2 = 47).
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89.

Nancy Collins, Ph.D., was engaged by Claimant's counsel to perform a forensic

vocational assessment of Claimant's residual employability following the subject accidents. Her
report appears at Claimant's. Exhibit 32. She reviewed medical records, interviewed Claimant,
and undertook an assessment of Claimant's employability. Her report reflects that the subjective
complaints described by Claimant have been consistent. Over time she noted that none of
Claimant's treating physicians, with the exception of Dr. Reedy, felt that Claimant required any
physician-imposed limitations/restrictions following his dates of medical stability. Even Dr.
Reedy initially proposed no limitations/restrictions. Dr. Collins did note that the FCE imposed
significant restrictions, and these were generally adopted by Dr. Reedy and Claimant's expert,
Dr. Hammond. Dr. Collins also took a detailed history from Claimant concerning his subjective
sense of what he can and cannot do. Claimant's subjective sense of his functional abilities is
much more consistent with the FCE than it is with the opinions of his treating physicians.
Generally speaking, Dr. Collins found that the FCE results are consistent with the ability of
Claimant to perform limited light-duty work. Per Dr, Collins, Claimant's skills are as a farm
laborer and foreman. He also has supervisory skills and some skills in operating/repairing fann
and irrigation equipment.

Although Dr. Collins did not perform an analysis of Claimant's

percentage access to his labor market on a pre-injury basis, she did conclude that based on
Claimant's age, education, work experience, and other non-medical factors, he was best suited to
working as a farming supervisor, agricultural equipment operator, farm worker/laborer, or
landscapedgrounds keeper.
90.

As did Mr. Jordan, Dr. Collins acknowledged that absent functional

limitations/restrictions, Claimant has suffered no loss of earning capacity as a consequence of the
subject accidents. However, considering the limitations/restrictions suggested by the FCE, led
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at present. Although Dr.
Dr. Collins to propose that Claimant is totally and pe1manently disabled
t's attempt to subtract
CoJlins acknowledged that she did not understand how to apply PT Wrigh
believes that even if
low back limitations from the totality of Claimant's limitations, she
and permanently disabled
Claimant's low back restrictions are not considered, Claimant is totally
s is of the opinion that
by virtue of his knee, neck, and left upper extremity limitations. Dr. Collin
modation offered by a
were it not for Claimant's "superhuman" effort, and the accom
and absent his current
"sympathetic employer," Claimant would not be employed at this time,
of the effort Claimant has
job, he is, essentially, totally and permanently disabled. On the matter
forced to delegate work
gone to in order to retain employment, Dr. Collins noted that he has been
in order to accomplish
he can no longer perform to his subordin~tes, and to work longer hours
Collins acknowledged
the things he can still do. At the time of her post-hearing deposition Dr.
er, Dr. Collins did
that if Claimant has no limitations/restrictions, he has no disability. Howev
remarks make it clear
not consider this assumption in formulating her opinion. Her concluding
one job he is currently
that it is her opinion that Claimant is 100% disabled but for the
performing for an accommodating and sympathetic employer.
Discussion and Further Findings Relating to Claim of Disability
91.

odd-lot
Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled under the

if he has, it is less than
doctrine. Defendants contend that Claimant has suffered no disability, but
less-than-permanent and
total and permanent. Moreover, Defendants contend that Claimant's
a pre-existing condition
total disability must be apportioned between the subject accident and
pursuant to the provisions ofidah o Code § 72-406.
92.

the actual
"Permanent Disability" or "under a pe1manent disability" results when.

because of pennanent
or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent
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impahment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected.
(See Idaho Code§ 72-423). The evaluation of permanent disability is an appraisal of the injured
worker's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the
medical factor of permanent impairment and by pe1manent non-medical factors as set fo1ih at
Idah.o Code § 72-430. (See Idaho Code § 72-425). The test for determining whether a claimant
has suffered a permanent disability greater than permanent impairment is whether the physical
impairment, taken in conjunction with non-medical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity
for gainful employment. Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 Idaho 293, 766 P.2d 763 (1988). The
focus of a determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage in gainful
activity. Sund v. Gambrell, 127 Idaho 3, 896 P.2d 329 (1995).
93.

The labor market to be considered in evaluating Claimant's disability is ordinarily

the labor market in which Claimant resides as of the date of hearing. Brown v. The Home Depot,
152 Idaho 605, 272 P.3d 577 (2012). Whether Claimant has a pe1manent disability is a question
of fact, and Claimant bears the burden of proving that he has suffered disability in excess of
impairment. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 989 P .2d 854
(1997). An odd-lot worker is one who is so injured that he is unable to perform services other
than those limited in quality, dependability or quantity, such that a reasonably stable market for
such services does not exist. Boley v. State Idaho Special Indemnity Fund, supra. An odd-lot
worker need not be physically unable to do anything worthy of compensation, but he does need
to demonstrate that he is so handicapped that he will not be employed regularly in any wellknown branch of the labor market absent the business boom, the sympathy of a particular
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or superhuman effort on his paii. Lyons v. Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977).
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94.

Claimant bears the burden of adducing proof sufficient to establish, on a prima

facie basis, his odd-lot status. A claimant may prove odd-lot status by showing that he has

unsuccessfully attempted other types of employment, that he, or a vocational expe1i on his
behalf, has searched for other work but other work is not available, or that any efforts to find
suitable employment would be futile. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra.
95.

Once a claimant has satisfied his burden of proving aprimafacie case of odd-lot

status by one of the three aforementioned methods, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
prove claimant's employability. Hoye v. Daw Forest Products, Inc., 125 Idaho 582, 873 P.2d
836 (1994). Employer cannot meet this burden merely by showing that claimant is able to
perform some type of work. Lyons v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. Rather,
Employer must show that there is an actual job within a reasonable distance from Claimant's
home which he is able to perform or for which he can be trained that he has a reasonable
oppotiunity to be employed at that job. Lyons, supra.
96.

Apportionment of disability, while not at issue in this case if Claimant is adjudged

totally and permanently disabled, is at issue in the event the Commission dete1mines that
Claimant is not totally and pennanently disabled. Idaho Code § 72-406(1) provides:
1n cases of permanent disability less than total, if the degree or duration of

disability resulting from an industrial injury or occupational disease is increased
or prolonged because of a preexisting physical impai1ment, the employer shall be
liable only for the additional disability from the industrial injury or occupational
disease.
Under this section, and Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P .3d 265 (2008), where
apportionment is at issue in a less-than-total case, a two step process must be employed. First,
claimant's disability must be evaluated in light of all physical impairments resulting from the
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industrial accident, and any pre-existing conditions.

Thereafter, the amount of permanent

tioned.
disability attributable to the industrial accident(s) must be appor
97.

in the first instance,
As noted above, evaluation of Claimant's disability depends,

e to which Claimant has permanent
on making some judgment about the extent and degre
se neither Drs. Reedy, Clawson,
limitations/restrictions. Here, Defendants argue that becau
ant at medical stability, and, in fact,
Hessing, or Harris initially imposed any restrictions on Claim
'
was fairly onerous, Claimant has no
released him to return to a job that they probably knew
disability in excess of impairment.

On the other hand, Claimant argues that the

functional capacities evaluation are a
limitations/restrictions identified in the September 2015
e in physical activities, and these
much more accurate portrayal of Claimant's ability to engag
totally and permanently disabled.
limitations/restrictions support a conclusion that Claimant is
98.

ant has no physical
There is evidence to support a finding that Claim

left shoulder, and ulnar nerve
limitations/restrictions relating to his right knee, neck,
Johnson have all rendered opinions
transposition. Drs. Clawson, Hessing, Reedy, Hanis, and
his mind, but his conclusion is subject
that support this conclusion. Only Dr. Reedy has changed
four years prior to his wholesale
to criticism because he had not seen Claimant for nearly
by Dr. Reedy on December 5, 2011,
adoption of the FCE findings. However, when last seen
spine surgery previously performed
Claimant was no longer enjoying good relief from cervical
d opinion in an effort to better
by Dr. Reedy. In fact, Dr. Reedy recommended a secon
understand Claimant's recunent cervical spine problems.

As well, by December 2011, Dr.

problems which would go on to be
Reedy was aware that Claimant was having low back
Reedy was updated on Claimant's
evaluated by Dr. Hajjar. Following December of 2011, Dr.
ant's progress with lumbar spine
status by Claimant's counsel, especially regarding Claim
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December 5, 2011, it
evaluation. Therefore, even though Dr. Reedy had not seen Claimant since
ce a set of restrictions
is possible that he was well enough apprised of Claimant's status to embra
without the need to see Claimant for confomation.

Regardless, Dr. Reedy' s enthusiastic

embrace of the FCE is the weakest evidence of its legitimacy.
Hammond
The FCE has also been explicitly endorsed by Dr. Hammond. Dr.

99.

even though neither did
testified to his general agreement with the recommendations of the FCE,
ions the way he did. In
he understand PT Wright's reasoning in apportioning low back limitat
ions relating to sitting and
fact, Dr. Hammond testified that probably more of Claimant's limitat
'

pp. 50:19-51:12). Even
walking are related to the lumbar spine condition. (Hammond Depo.,
Dr.. Hammond did not
though Claimant had been released by Dr. Reedy for his cervical spine,
to have significant neck
quarrel with the FCE results which sugg,ested that Claimant continued
In fact, Dr. Hammond
and upper extremity difficulties. (Hammond Depo., pp. 52:10-56:2).
he evaluated Claimant in
reported that Claimant still had complaints of cervical spine pain when
reflects the following
August of 2016. However, Dr. Hammond's August 1, 2016 office note
extremity: .
about the history he received from Claimant concerning his neck and upper
limitation
Dr. Reedy did surgery on his neck and he says he has some decreased
is stiff
but no other significant pain. His left shoulder feels well and occasionally
left
the
also
was
There.
but he can pretty much do everything he wants with this.
numbness
ulnar nerve difficulty. This was transposed and he has a little bit of
the left
using
or
grip
with
into his palm of his left hand, but there was no difficulty
arm or hand othe1wise.
from the GFHC entered
(Cit. Ex. 24, p. 569A). The record also contains medical records
Claimant was seen by
contemporaneous with the September 2015 FCE. On September 1, 2015,
ant related to work that
Dr. Ensminger at the GFHC, for complaints of left knee pain which Claim
bent over or kneeli
Claimant was doing during potato harvest which required him to work

ng. Dr.

well. Finally, it was
Ensminger noted that Claimant's artificial knee (on the right) was doing
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and low back were "stabl e." On
noted that Claimant's degenerative disc disease of his neck
. Spine range of motion was
physical exam, no spinal tender~ess or misalignment was noted
l limits. Concerning Claim ant's
normal. Paraspinal muscle strength and tone was within nmma
Claim ant's shoulder, elbow, and
left upper extremity, no tenderness was noted to palpation.
ut crepitus or pain in the left upper
wrist joint were stable. He had normal range of motion, witho
extremity.
100.

particularly, Mark
Dr. Hessi ng's note from August of 2016, and more

ly consistent with Claim ant's
Ensm inger' s, M.D., note from September 2015 are not entire
FCE. To PT Wright, Claim ant
presenting complaints on the occasion of the September 25, 2015
made the following pain report:
cervical spine was
Repo1ted discomfo1t in the lumbar spine, knee, shoulder and
elevated activity,
part of the reason . for limitations with lifting, carrying,
Objective signs
crouching or low level activity, walking, forward bending.
coincided with the Client's reports of discomfo1i.
decrease in neck and left shoul der
(Cit. Ex. 23, p. 646). On exam, Claimant was noted to have
gs by Dr. Ensminger.
range of motion, inconsistent with the September 1, 2015 findin
101.

be invalid becau se
On the other hand, to Defendants' criticism that the FCE must

ities, i.e. the right shoulder and the
greater problems are noted with Claimant's unaffected extrem
ally repaired, as was his right knee.
left knee, is nonsensical. Claimant's left shoulder was surgic
unsurprising if a manual labore r of
Claimant has documented left knee arthritis, and it would be
his age also did not have right shoulder arthritis.

That Claim ant's surgically-addressed

l extremities does not cause the
extremities exhibit less severe findings than his contralatera
if the surgeries were not intend ed
Commission to question PT Wrigh t's examination. After all,
be little purpose in doing them.
to improve Claim ant's function or reduc,e his pain, there would
ty testing, measured in what
Defendants also criticize PT Wrigh t's report because validi
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Wright's report. This criticism is
Defendants call the customary manner, is not identified in PT
that in performing Claim ant's
rejected because PT Wright has clearly expressed his conclusion
effort, and that the test results are
evaluation PT Wright was satisfied that Claimant gave full
consistent with this conclusion.

Nothing in PT Wrigh t's report suggests that it should be

discounted because Claimant was consciously manipulating the
102.

evaluation.

oyer is obviously
Finally, the Commission is impressed by the fact that Empl

he had prior to the 2009 accident.
aware that Claimant does not retain the same physical ability
restrictions and that he has found a
The Employer is aware that Claimant has physical limitations/
to his subordinates.
way to accommodate his limitations by assigning more tasks

There is

usion that Claimant is now just
nothing in the Employer's testimony that y.,ould support the concl
A.
as physically capable as he was prior to the October 6, 2009 MV
103.

released to full
Claimant continued to have cervical spine complaints after being

ulnar nerve transposition does not
duty by Dr. Reedy; Dr. Reed y's notes confirm it. C_laimant's
clear whether or not Claimant has
seem to have resulted in any limitations/restrictions. It is less
ng's surgery, and the dissonance
continued to have left shoulder complaints following Dr. Hessi
nearly contemporaneous FCE is
between Dr. Ensminger's September 1, 2015 office note and the
ant appears to be able to engage
troubling. Further, by his owµ statements to Mr. Jordan, Claim
bed in the FCE.
in physical activities somewhat more onerous than those descri
104.

aspects of the FCE,
In summary, while it is certainly possible to challenge certain

choice offered by Defendants'
it is a better prognosticator of Claimant's limitations than the
restrictions, and therefore no
suggestion that Claimant has no physician-imposed limitations/
disability.
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I 05.

Therefore, the FCE will be used as a guide to evaluating Claimant's disability

from all causes combined.
106.

Having determined that the September 2015 FCE provides the best snapshot of

e how those
Claimant's functional limitations/restrictions, it is next necessary to evaluat
affect his
limitations/restrictions, in conjunction with Claimant's relevant non-medical factors,
v. McCain
ability to engage in gainful activity. Per the two-step process envisioned by Page
from all causes.
Foods, supra, attention is first directed to understanding Claimant's disability
I 07.

As reflected in his testimony, and in the repotis and testimony of Dr. Collins and

al, has limited
Mr. Jordan, Claimant is an older worker of Hispanic extraction who, while bilingu
He has limited
education and limited ability to read and write in either English or Spanish.
current job, i.e,
computer skills, but is able to use a computer to perfonn some paiis of his
can weld, and
searching for replacement parts. He has some transferable vocational skills; he
He also has
has some abilities relating to repair and maintenance of farm and other equipment.
abilities in the ai·ea of heavy equipment operation.

As foreman at Meyers Faims, he has

work to two
necessarily acquired some skills as a supervisor; he supervises and delegates
tural field,
subordinates. Claimant's past relevant work experience has lai·gely been in the agricul
cturing environment. Based on
past in a manufa
although he has done some work in the remote
.
'
ibility for the
his job at Meyers Farms, Claimant has a demonstrated ability to assume respons
hat unique to
day-to-day operation of a relatively large farming operation. His skills are somew
which make
the Meyers Farm's operation; the Bruneau Farm has unique soil characteristics
irrigation challenging.
I 08.

Mr. Jordan proposed that on a pre-injury basis, Claimant had reasonable access to

nt's pre-injury
17% of the jobs in his geographic locale. Dr. Collins did not quantify Claima
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access to his local labor market, but proposed that based on Claimant's non-medical factors, he
would have access to agricultural and landscaping-type work absent physical limitations. These
assessments seem reasonable and not inconsistent.
109.

Mr. Jordan and Dr. Collins part ways, however, when it comes to the impact of

Claimant's cunent functional status on his employability. With no explanation other than his
reliance on OASYS software, Mr. Jordan opined that assuming the FCE recommendations, and
further assuming that Claimant loses his cutTent employment with Meyers Farms, Claimant has
suffered 62% loss of access to his pre-injury labor market. Mr. Jordan also calculated a 32%
wage loss based on his belief that even with the limitations/restrictions derived from the
September 2015 FCE, Claimant has access to work paying in the range of $8.00 per hour. An
$8.00 per hour hourly wage in the labor market at large seems reasonable for any job that
Claimant might obtain in light of his current limitations/restrictions.
110.

The real issue is whether there are in fact suitable jobs for Claimant within his

limitations/restrictions. In his report, Mr. Jordan did not articulate the types of employment that
Claimant could compete for, assuming the limitations/restrictions outlined in the FCE and in Dr.
Hammond's testimony. However, in the course of his deposition, Mr. Jordan did offer some
comments on the types of employment he believed Claimant could still compete for in his labor
market should he lose his job with Meyers Farms. Mr. Jordan thought that Claimant's light-duty
restrictions would enable him to perform the physical requirements of a greeter, car porter at a
car dealership, security work, shuttle bus driving, school bus driving, sandwich making, job
coach monitor, pizza deliveryman, and sorter. (Jordan Depa., pp. 53:24-54:6). Mr. Jordan was
uncertain with what frequency jobs of these types become available in Claimant's labor market.
On cross examination, Mr. Jordan admitted that some aspects of school driving, sorting, and
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security jobs might be in excess of what is contemplated by the FCE. (Jordan Depo., pp. 160:20168 :9). While it is probably true that Claimant can perform some, or even most, of the jobs
described by Mr. Jordan, there was little evidence about the number of jobs in the labor market
that remain for Claimant in his geographic area.
111.

Certainly, this was Dr. Collins' concern. She proposed that in view of the

limitations/restrictions identified in the FCE, and elaborated-on by Dr. Hammond, Claimant is
essentially unemployable in his geographic area, particularly when one takes into account the
fact that he is relatively unsophisticated, has minimal reading/writing sldlls, and was
as of the date of hearing. Dr. Collins acknowledged, of course, that Claimant has continued
to work for Employer since the subject accident, but she contends that he has required a great
deal of accommodation by his employer, that Claimant must make a "superhuman" effmi to
continue in his current job and that the Employer is a "sympathetic employer." These factors
lead Dr. Collins to conclude that even though Claimant is currently employed, this fact does not
denigrate her conclusion that he is nevertheless totally and permanently disabled. However, Dr.
Collins had a poor understanding of the actual physical requirements of Claimant's current job,
and an equally poor understanding of to what extent Claimant required the assistance of other
workers to perform. this work.

(Collins Depo., pp. 78:6-80:25; 84:20-92:5).

Dr. Collins'

uncertainty about the specific requirements of Claimant's current position, coupled with her
uncertainty of whether or how Claimant finds a way to perform this work, denigrates her
conclusion that Claimant is only able to continue working in his current job because of his
superhuman effort. Claimant has the ability, endorsed by his Employer, to delegate work to his
subordinates as necessary. Therefore, Claimant is not required to perform physical tasks which
are too difficult for him. While it's true that Claimant now takes longer to perform ce1iain work,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 65

400

and now performs some of his work with more difficulty than he once did, the record does not
support the conclusion that it is only by dint of superhuman effort that Claimant is able to
continue in his cunentjob.
112.

Relatedly, the record does not support the conclusion that Meyers Farms is a

"sympathetic" employer. Morgan Meyers' testimony is that Claimant is a valuable employee
who has a peculiar knowledge of Employer's operation such that his loss an almost untenable
proposition for Employer. This sentiment is perfectly expressed in Morgan Meyers' observation
that "we would be in a panic ifhe were gone." (Tr., pp. 189:24-190:1). The record supports the
conclusion that the job Claimant performs is real and that his service is valuable, perhaps
essential, to Employer's business. However, Claimant's ability to perform his current job and
his value to his cmTent employer is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that Claimant is
totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. In other words, in the presence of
proof that Claimant is not "regularly employable in any well know branch of the labor market,"
'

I

the conclusion that Claimant is totally and pe1manently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine via
.

.

'

the route of futility (his only available route) _would not be foreclosed by the fact that he is
demonstrably employable. After all, an odd-lot worker need not be unable to perfotm any work
at all. Gooby v. Lake Shore Management Co., 136 Idaho 74, 29 P.3d 390 (2001). However,
Claimant's current job is nevertheless relevant, because once Claimant establishes, by prima

facie evidence, that he is an odd-lot worker, the burden shifts to the Employer to demonstrate
employability. Employer must show that there is_ an .actual job within a reasonable distance from
Claimant's home which he is capable of perfo1ming, and which he has a reasonable opportunity
'

to obtain. Claimant's cmTent job more than satisfies .Employer's obligation to rebut a prima

facie case of total and permanent disability. There is no reason to believe that Claimant's job
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will not continue, or that he will be unable to perfmm the requirements of that job until he
decides to retire.
113.

Based on the foregoing, even if Claimant had met his burden of proving a prima

facie case of odd-lot status, Defendants have clearly met their burden of proving that Claimant is

capable of performing an actual job which is likely to continue. However, the evidence does
establish that

Claimant neve1theless

suffered

disability

as

a

consequence

of his

limitations/restrictions. Defendants' argument that Claimant's disability must be assessed at zero
because Claimant continues in his employment with Employer is rejected; this argument ignores
Claimant's significant limitations/restrictions and the consequences of those restrictions on his
ability to engage in gainful activity. However, the fact that Claimant has engaged in continuous
employment since 2009, with significant annual increases in earnings, must be taken into
acconnt. These facts set up the central conundrum of evaluating Claimant's disability: the fact
that in the labor market at large he has suffered a significant loss of access must be reconciled
with the seeming likelihood that Claimant will never suffer the financial impact of his disability.
I 14.

Claimant's age is, of course, one of the nonmedical factors which must be

considered when evaluating his disability under Idaho, Code § 72-430. In many cases, the fact
that a claimant is an older worker is a factor which tends to support higher disability; everything
else being equal, employers are less inclined to hire an older worker, particularly one with some
functional limitations. In this case, Claimant's status as an older worker has the opposite effect.
If Claimant was 20 years of age, the Commission would be much less impressed by the fact that

Claimant has a job for which he is well suited, and an Employer who values his service. A lot
could happen in the forty or fifty years remaining in such an employee's work life. Here, though,
Claimant is near the end of his work life and holds employment in which he is likely to remain
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until he retires. This makes the fact of Claimant's CutTent job much more significant in
evaluating his disability.
115.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that absent Claimant's current

employment, his disability, as of the date of hearing, would be profound, and possibly total and
permanent under the odd-lot doctrine. However, the fact that Claimant's current employment is
likely to continue at his current or higher wage must be taken into account. Based on these facts,
Claimant's proven disability is 40% of the whole person, inclusive of impairment. Even though
Claimant may never suffer a wage loss, there is no dispute that the accident has left him without
access to a large swath of his pre-injury labor market, thus constraining his employment options
now and in the future, should he, for whatever reason, lose his current job. However, it seems
likely that Claimant's current employment will continue. Nor does he seem inclined to change
his current situation.
Apportionment
116.

Since Claimant is less than totally and permanently disabled and since Claiman t's

low back condition is not related to his employment, apportionment of disability between
Claimant's accident-produced condition and his low back condition under Idaho Code § 72-406
must be considered.
I I 7.

Where a claim for disability less than total is before the Commission, so is the

issue of whether Employer bears full responsibility for Claimant's disability.

See Page v.

McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (2008). In keeping with Barton v. Seventh
Heaven Recreation,_ Inc., 2010 IIC 0379 (2010), Claimant bears the burden of persuasion on the

issue of whether he has suffered disability referable to the subject accident. However, once
Claimant makes a prima facie showing in this regard, the burden of going forward with evidence
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that some pmtion of Claimant's disability is, in fact, referable to a pre-existing condition, shifts
to Defendants. See Albright v. MGM Construction, Inc., 102 Idaho 269, 629 P.2d 665 (1981);
Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473 (1980) (Bistline, J., and Donaldson, J. specially

concurring).
118.

In the instant matter, it is asserted that some part of Claimant's disability is

referable to Claimant's non-work related and pre-existing low back condition, because both PT
Wright and Dr. Hammond have established that some part of Claimant's limitations against
sitting, walking, and perhaps other functions, are referable to his low back condition. No one,
including the two vocational experts who were quizzed about the matter, could decide how these
opinions, as couched, could be applied to apportion responsibility for Claimant's disability. Nor
will the Commission attempt to do so. Defendants have adduced insufficient evidence to allow
consideration of how or whether Claimant's 40% disability should be appmtioned to Claimant's
pre-existing low back condition.
Attorney Fees
119.

Claimant argues that because Defendants did not provide certain medical records

to Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan, the opinions of Dr. Montalbano and Mr. Jordan are faulty,
and it was therefore umeasonable for Defendants to rely on these opinions to defend the claim,
such that Defendants are liable for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 72-804. These
arguments are not persuasive. There may be several reasons Defendants chose to proceed the
way they did, and these reasons do not even include simple oversight. There is insufficient
evidence that Defendants had designs on obtaining unsuppmted opinions on which to rely in
defending the claim. The Commission declines to award attorney fees.

5

5

Moreover, we note that Claimant's counsel, too, chose what records to provide to the recipients of his several
letters.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LA

1.

,v AND ORDER

Claimant has failed to establish that his low back condition is causally related to

the 2009 accident. Claimant is not entitled to benefits for this condition.
2.

Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his neck, left shoulder, and

left upper extremity as a consequence of the accident of October 5, 2009.
3.

Claimant has established that he suffered injuries to his right lmee as a

consequenee of the aceident of August 28, 2013.
4.

As a eonsequenee of the October 5, 2009 accident Claimant has suffered

pennanent impairment as follows: cervical spine - 6% of the whole person; left shoulder - 5%
of the left upper extremity; ulnar nerve transposition - 0%.
5.

With respect to the accident of August 28, 2013, Claimant has suffered

impainnent as follows:

right knee - 21% lower extremity, 50% attributable to pre-existing

condition and 50% attributable to the 2013 accident.
6.

Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctiine, or if

he is, Defendauts have met their burden of proving that there is an actual job within a reasonable
distance from Claimant's home which he is capable of performing.
7.

Defendants have failed to come forward with evidence which would support

apportiomnent of disability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-406.
8.

Claimant has suffered disability of 40% of the whole person, inclusive of

impairment, referable to the 2009 and 2013 accidents.
9.

Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804.

10.

There is no basis for the Commission's retention of jurisdiction over this case.
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11.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

matters adjudicated.
DATEDthis1dayof

/J<pri' f

, 2018.

INDUSTRJAL COMMISSION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby ce1iify that on the ----2:!Jay of ~ , /
, 2018, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONLSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was
served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
L. CLYEL BERRY
PO BOX 302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303
PAUL J. AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 83701

es!
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Claimant's Name & Address
Mario Ayala
47456 St. Hwy 78
Mountain Home, ID 83647

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT
Claimant's Attorney's Name & Address
L. Clyel Berry
Attorney at Law
P.O.Box302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

Employer's Name & Address
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000

Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier's
(Not Adjustor's) Name & Address
Idaho State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 990004
Boise, ID 83799
Date oflnjury/Manifestation of Occupational Disease

10/14/01
When Injured, Claimant was Earning an Average
State & County in Which Injury Occurred
oursuant to LC. 672-419.
Weeklv Wa<>e of$
State ofidaho. Countv of Elmore
Describe How Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (What Happened)
Claimant fell from a ladder while installing insulation.
Nature of Medical Problems Alleged As a Result of Accident or Occupational Disease
Injury to neck together with thoracic and lumbar regions of the spine.

What Workers' Compensation Benefits are You Claiming at This Time?
--·

1. Reinstatement/continuation of medical benefits; and,

(

2. Fees, pursuant to LC. §72-804

Date on Which Notice oflnjury was Given to Employer

10/14/01

)

:]

To Whom You Gave Not\&
Robert Meyers

How Notice Was Given: (X) Oral (X) Subsequent Written ( ) Other, Please Specify
Issue or Issues Involved:

I. Whether Claimant's cut1'ent need for medical care, generally, and specifically involving Claimant's low
back, as recommended by Drs. Reedy and/or Hajjar, is causally related to or resultant of the October 14,
2001, accident and injury at issue herein, to any extent, such that responsibility for the same rests with or
upon Defendants herein.
2. Whether Defendants have unreasonably withheld authorization or otherwise denied responsibility for
medical benefits, such that Claimant is entitled to an award for fees, pursuant to I.C. § 72-804.

Do You Believe This Claim Presents a New Question of Law Or a Complicated Set of Facts? ( )Yes (X) No
If so Please state why.

Notice: Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be in accordance with Idaho Code § 72-334 and
filed on form LC. I 002
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Patient Name:

lNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

Mario Ayala
� -----�

Address: --------------
Phone Number:
(Provider Use Only)

Medical Record Number:----
( ) Pick Up Copies ( ) Fax Copies
( ) Mail Copies
ID Confirmed by; -------

AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby authorize--=:----c:-----c----- ---------,-----to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider
-To: .,,.---- .,,.-,---,-------------------:-----------------•
I
Jnsurance Company/Third
Party Administrator/SelfInsured Emplayer!ISJF, their attorneys or patient's attorney

Street Address
City

Zip (:ode

State

Purpose or need for data: :---::=c--:----------,-------------------------(e.g. Workers' Compensation Claim)
Information to be disclosed:
Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: ------------Discharge Summary
( )
History & Physical Exam
( )
Consultation Reports
{ )
Operative Reports
()
Lab
()
Pathology
( )
Radiology Reports
()
Entire
Record
()
he
Ot
r
: Specify -----------------=----==------------( )
1 understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):
AIDS or HIV
( )
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
( )
Drug/Alcohol
Abuse Information
( )
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the
information maTbe subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that
this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won't
apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment,
payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authorization will
expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians
are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and
authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information
specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider
specified above.

Date

Sig,qf�

Signal e ifLegal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date
Title

Date
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APP~IIOIX 111
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Send Original To: lndw,trlal Commls!,lon, Jud!clal Division, 700 S. Clearwater Lane, Boise, Idaho 8:3112

LC. NO . _-=20:.::.01.:...;•5=2=09=58::..-_

w0,

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
INJURY DATE._~10"'""/1~4=/2~00~1-~-

_lL The above-named (;Lmployer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by
_

stating:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Marlo Ayalla
47456 State Hwy 78
Mountain Home, ID 83647

L, Clyel Berry
Attorney at Law
Po Box 302
Twin F1:1lls. IP 83303•0302

EMPLOYER' S NAME AND ADDR!cSS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME
AND ADDRESS

Robert J, Meyers Farms, Inc,
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000

State Insurance Fund
P, 0, Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0044

ATTORNEY !\!;PRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME
ANO ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRE;SENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

Paul J, Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

1~.,

,,-_:::.>

,---.l

· "I "

'
-)

IT IS: (Check One)
Denied
Admitted

~- --

,,-11>

:;:cJ

J•

J>
0

co

1, That the accident alleged In the Complaint actually oc6¥rred 011nr about th<, time claimed.
2, That the employer/employee relationship i,xisted,
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

X
X
X

NA

X

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused by an accident arising out of
and in the course of Claimant' s employment.

NA

5. That, if an occupational disease Is alleged, manifestation of such disease Is or was due to
the nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment.
6, That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was
given to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60
days of the manifestation of such occupational disease,
7, That the rate of wages claimed Is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage
pursuant to Idaho Code,§ 72-419: under investigation,
8, That the alleged employer was Insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act.

X

X
X

12, What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
None,
Answer? Pngc 1 of 2
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,-11-.-S-ta-to_w_ll_h_s-pe_c_lfl-cl-ly_w_h_at_m_a_tt_er_s_a-re-ln_d_ls-p-ut_e_a-nd_y_o_u_rr-•-as_o_n-fo-r-d.-n-yi-ng-lls1=b-lilt_y_,1-og_e_lh_e_rw-1-lh-a-ny-·-aff-ir-m-at-lv_e_d-ef-e-ns-•1.
2.
3.

4.

Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specially admitted herein.
Defendants deny that claimant's lumbar symptoms or any Injury lo his lumbar spine was catrsed by his 10/04109 industrial accident.
Defendants deny that claimant Is anlllled to further me(llcal benefits.
Claimant Is not entitled to additional Impairment other than what has already been paid,

Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A
copy of your Answer must be malled to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by
regular U.S. mall or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay Immediately the
compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All
compensation which Is concededly due anc;l accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a
Complaint has been flied. Rule 3.D,, Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensallon
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be flied on Form I.C. 1002.

x YES

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

--.- NO

STATE.
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE
NO.
Datod

Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

$00.00

PLEASE COMPLETE

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE

,-.

I hereby cartlfy that on th

l {/'.
DecemboV, 2012

Medical
$398.00

TTD
$00.00

PPD

J(}f day of Dec.ember, 2012 I caused to be S81V(:ld a trut;1 and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER upon:

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S
NAME AND ADDRESS

Marlo Ayala
o/o L. Clyel Berry

State Insurance Fund

Po Sox 302

_

INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
(If appllc~ble)

1215 W. State Street

Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Via:

Signature of Defendant or Attqrney

personal se1vlce of proo0ss

y)

r regular U.S. Mall

Boise, ID 8372\)
Via:

----- ----- ----Via:

___ personal servk:e of proeoss
_

regular U.S. Mall

Answer-Page 2 of2
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Claimant's Name & Address
Mario Ayala
47456 St. Hwy 78
Mountai n Home, ID 83647
.

· ..

WORKE RS' COMPEN SATION
COMPLA INT
Claimant' s Attorney' s Name & Address
L. Clyel Berry
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 302
Twin.Fa lls, ID 83303-03 02

Employer's Name & Address
Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301-00 00

Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier's
(Not Adjustor's ) Name & Address
Idaho State Insuranc e Fund
P.O. Box 990004
Boise, ID 83799
Date of Injury/Manifestation of Occupational Disease

8/28/13
When Injured, Claimant was Earning an Average
State & County in Which Injury Occurred
Weeklv War,e of i507.70 nursuant to LC. 672-419.
State of Tdaho Countv of Elmore
Describe How Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (What Happened)
his
Claimant was involved in a fall, suffering injury/re- injury to his right knee, during the course of
employm ent.
Nature of Medical Problems Alleged As a Result of Accident or Occupational Disease
1. Right knee injury/re- injury,
What Workers' Compensation Benefits are You Claiming at This Time?

I. Continua tion/reins t~tement of medical benefits; and,
2. Tempora ry disability benefits
Date on Which Notice of Injmy was Given to Employer

To Whom You Gave Notice

8/28/13
How Notice Was Given: (X) Oral (X) Subseque nt Written ( ) Other, Please Specify
,
.
Issue or Issues Involved:
,.
'· l
I. Whether Claimant 's current need for medical care involving right lower ex1:r~wity/knie is causally related to
for the same
or resultant of the August 28, 2013, accident and injury at issue herein such that responsib ility
·
·
.
;;!
:
,
continues to rest with or upon Defendan ts;
2. Entitleme nt to temporar y disability benefits during period of medical recovery ;·,';
extent
3. Upon date Claimant achieves medical stability/ maximum medical improvem ent,,whet her and to what
·:
· ·
Claimant presents with permanen t impairme nt;
with permanen t
presents
Claft\:lant
4, Whether, at time of maximum medical improvem ent/clinic al stability,
as totally and
disability in excess of impairme nt, specifical ly to encompa ss whether Claiman f _presents
permanen tly disabled pursuant to theories of odd-lot, or otherwise ;
nt is by
5. Whether any of Claimant 's permanen t impairme nt and/or permanen t disability in excess of impairme
reason of causes or condition s pre-exist ing the August 28, 2013, injury at issue herein; and,
6. Whether, as of date of any hearing herein, Defendan ts have responsib ility pursuant to LC. § 72-804.

No
Do You Believe This Claim Presents a New Question of Law Or a Complicated Set of Facts? ( )Yes (X)
If so Please state why.
72-334 and
Notice: Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be ii] accordance wi.th Idaho Code§
filed on form J.C. 1002

Complaint - Page 1
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Physicians Who Treated Claimant (Name & Address)
Physicians associated with Terry Reilly Health Services, Nampa, Idaho;
Physicians associated with and/or at Nampa Medical, Nampa, Idaho;
Physicians associated with St. Alphonsus Medical Group, specifically being Dr. Miers C. Johnson, Ill, Nampa, Idaho;
What Medical Costs Have You Incurred To Date?
What Medical Costs Has Your Employer Paid? If any?$ _ _ _ What Medical Costs Have You Paid, If any? $_ __
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PAR'Ii
Date

) Yes ( ) No

f.;. f}_ 3-/i

Please answer the set of questions immediately below only if claim
Name and Social Security Number
Date of Death
of party filing Complaint

Relation to deceased Claimant

Was filing patty dependent on deceased?

Did filing patty live with deceased at time of accident?

( ) Yes ( ) No

{ \ Yes { ) No

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE. SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the$ day
conect copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:

<lt,.,,\

Employer's Name & Address
Robe1t J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301

Via:

,

2014, I caused to be served a true and

Surety's Name & Address
Idaho State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 990004
Boise, ID 83 799

( ) Personal Service of Process
Via: ( ) Personal Service of Process
(X) Regular U.S. Mail
(X) Regular U.S. Mail
( ) I have not served a copy of the Complaint °"'"'MLv

Signature
NOTICE! An employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form LC. 1003 with the
Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the cettificate of mailing to avoid default. If
no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!

Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 317 Main Street,
Boise, Idaho 83720-6000 (208) 334-6000.

Complaint - Page 2
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Patient Name: ~M=a,.,r"'io"-"A'-'y'-'a'-'la"--------_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Phone Number:

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0041

(Provider Use Only)
Medical Record Number: _ _ _ __

( ) Pick Up Copies ( ) Fax Copies
( ) Mail Copies
ID Confirmed by:
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby authorize _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ to disclose health information as specified:
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider
To:
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator!Se/f-Jnsured Emp/oyer!JSJF, their attorneys or patient's attorney

Street Address

Zip Code

State

City

Purpose or need for data: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (e.g. Workers' Compensation Claim)
Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:
Information to be disclosed:
( )
Discharge Summary
( )
History & Physical Exam
( )
Consultation Reports
( )
Operative Reports
( )
Lab
( )
Pathology
( )
Radiology Reports
( )
Entire Record
( )
Other: Specify
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable):
( )
AIDS or HIV
Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
( )
Drng/Alcohol Abuse Information
( )
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and that the
information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand that
this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization won't
apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition treatment,
payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this authoriwtion will
expire upon reso/11tio11 of wol'ker's compe11satio11 claim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor, and physicians
are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to the extent indicated and
authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information
specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider
specified. above. .

4(/4;;;;:;J

Signature of Patient

. ,

/.

lf<:1w~
i;J"

,,i,+'-,/is_,___~
---D"t;-1-1-IJ

1

Signature of Legal Representative & Rel"tio11ship to P"tie11t/A11thol'ity to Act Date

R)zg1:<2e0J?Jr ru~="£e=/tfN/"'-=-_·- - - - - - - - ~ il+f=B.,___/1=·. ~ ~ - - - ~

Sig1wt11re of Witness

Complaint - Page 3
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/
ORIGINAL
APPENDIX Ill
IC1003 (Rev. 11/91)

Send Original To: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, 700 S. Clearwater Lane, Boise, Idaho 83712

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
INJURY DATE._~oa=,2=a=,2-=-01=3

I.C. NO . _--=20._.1-=-3·-=02"-'4=07--=-5_ _

_L The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by
stating:
_
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Mario Ayala
4 7456 State Hwy 78
Mountain Home, ID 83647

L. Clyel Berry
Attorney at Law
PO Box 302
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302

EMPLOYER'S NAME ANO ADDRESS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME

Robert J. Meyers Farms, Inc.
3221 North 3300 East
Twin Falls, ID 83301-0000

AND ADDRESS

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME
AND ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

State Insurance Fund
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0044

Paul J. Augustine
Augustine Law Offices, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

r--•.,

c-.;::,,

_,:;·
•·,·1

_·_-,.

''''
,-,,..,

IT IS: (Check One)
Admitted

X
X
X

NA

f

1.

:.:.::)

'

_.n

That the accident alleged in the Complaint actually occurf~d
on pr-about the time claimed.
',_)

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

.,, . ...}

C

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

X

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused by an accident arising out of
and in the course of Claimant's employment.

NA

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to
the nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment.
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was
given to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60
days of the manifestation of such occupational disease.

X

X
X

' 1-~1

Denied

7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage
pursuant to Idaho Code, § 72-419: unknown.
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act.

12. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
None.
Answer? Page I of2
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11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses.
1.
2.

Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not specially admitted herein.
Defendants are not aware of claimant's current medical status and therefore reserve the right to assert affirmative defenses at a later date.

Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A
copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by
regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the
compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a
Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D., Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I.C. 1002.
- NO

-X-YES

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.
NO.

Dated

Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

,,,ft
/1
PPD

TTD

Medical

$00.00

$00.00

$3,085.33

FebruaJ12014

A

I! '
l

,1

PLEASE COMPLETE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

' .1-thereby certify that on the\'11 t:lay of February, 20141 caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER upon:
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Mario Ayala
c/o L. Clyel Berry

INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
(if applicable)

EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S
NAME AND ADDRESS

State Insurance Fund

PO Box 302
1215 W. State Street
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302
Via:

personal service of process

Boise, ID 83720
Via:

personal service of process

·r regular U.S. Mail

)

Via:

personal service of process
~

regular U.S. Mail

I

/'

Sig!11ature
Answer-Page 2 of2
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE (lFID'AHu· · .:·:... ..I
Of;.i\P/'i:Al ,,

I

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant/Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018

V.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.
Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants/Respondents

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission, Thomas E. Limbaugh
Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 2009-029533, 2001-520958, & 2013-024075

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
filed April 9, 2018 and the Order on Motion for
Reconsideration, Modification, and Consolidation,
filed June 22, 2018.

Attorney for Appellant:

L. Clyel Berry
PO BOX 83
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083

Attorney for Respondents:

Paul J. Augustine
PO BOX 1521
Boise, ID 83701

Appealed By:

Claimant/Appellant Mario Ayala

Appealed Against:

Defendants/Respondents Robert J. Meyers Farms,
Inc. and State Insurance Fund

Notice of Appeal Filed:

July 25, 2018

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - (MARIO AYALA) - 1
Filed:07/27/201814:58:23
By: Clerk - Grove, Kimber
416

Appellate Fee Paid:

$94.00 to Supreme Court and
$100.00 to Industrial Commission
Checks were received.

Name of Reporter:

M. Dean Willis
PO BOX 1241
Eagle, ID 83616

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
has been prepared and filed with the Commission.

Dated:

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - (MARIO AYALA) - 2
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CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL

I, Emma Landers, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing are true and correct
photocopies of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order; and
Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Modification and Consolidation, and the whole thereof,
in IC case number 2009-029533, 2001-520958, and 2013-024075 for Mario Ayala.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 26 th day of July, 2018.

CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL- (MARIO AYALA) -1
418

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Emma Landers, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and cmrect copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court
No. 46186-2018 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of
Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein.
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2018.

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (MARIO AYALA 46186-2018) -1
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant/Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018

v.

NOTICE OF COMPLETION

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.
Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants/Respondents

TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts;
for the Appellant; and
for the Respondents.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Attorney for Appellants:
Paul J. Augustine
PO BOX 1521
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Respondent:
L. Clyel Berry
POBOX83
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0083

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all

'
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.

NOTICE OF COMPLETION (MARIO AVALA 46186-2018 ) - 1
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In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Repotter's Transcript shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this 22ND day of August, 2018.

NOTICE OF COMPLETION (MARIO AYALA 46186-2018 ) - 2
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STEPHAN, KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB # 1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-3619
E-Mail: skst@idaho-law.com
Ayala/MOT-CORRECT-AR/mek
Attomey for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARIO AYALA,
Claimant/Appellant,

LC. No. 2001-520958
LC. No. 2009-029533
LC. No. 2013-024075

vs.

(SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018)

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'Sc'MOT.ICJN
FOR CORRECTIONS, AD~ITIO$
AND/OR AUGMENTATIOl!l;OF/:ffl)
THE AGENCY'S RECORIJ:Fii ··c,

Employer,

r--,C-)

oC!:!
o<

and

:crti

STATE INSURANCE FUND,

~

.::t::.

::i: 0

::r

U)

<;?

0,

Surety,
Defendants/Respondents.

-

0

"'"

Q
-...;

COMES NOW Claimant/Appellant herein by and through counsel of record and pursuant
to Rule 29(a) Idabo Appellant Rules and hereby objects to and/or requests corrections, additions
and/or augmentation of/to the same, as follows:

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR
AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD -1

422

Requests for Additions to and/or Augmentation of the Agency's Record:
1.

The January 3, 2018, correspondence from the Commission to counsel, inquiring
whether the parties were willing for the Commissioners to issue a decision on the
record adduced, to expedite the same in light of Referee Powers having a backlog
of cases.
a.

That January 11, 2018, correspondence to the Commission from Cly el Berry,
as counsel for Claimant/Appellant herein advising the Commission that in
light of the importance of Claimant's observational credibility as
consideration in the matter, that Claimant and his counsel preferred to wait
for Mr. Powers' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation.

b.

Any correspondence to the Commission from Mr. Augustine, counsel for
Defendants, responsive to the Commission's

January 3, 2018,

correspondence.
All as requested by and within paragraph 6(h) upon page 6 of the July 24, 2018,
Notice of Appeal.
Request for Corrections:
1.

Within Claimant's Exhibits within the Exhibits List portion of the Agency's Record,
Claimant's Exhibit 30a(l ), referencing "Defendants' Answers to Continued
Interrogatories," the Record has the date thereof as being January 5, 2014. Request
is made that the date be corrected to January 5, 2016.

2.

Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion for Clarification of Conclusions of Law
and Order, fax filed April 26, 2018, at page 183 of the Agency's Record and the

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR
AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 2

423

original of the same, filed upon April 27, 2018, are separated by Affidavit of
Claimant, Mario Ayala, in Support of Motion for Reconsideration; Motion to
Reopen; for Modification of Award upon Consideration of a Change in the Nature
or Extent of Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest Injustice; and, for
Consolidation, and are therefore out of order. Additionally, the fax cover sheet at
page 193 of the Agency's Record, is the fax cover sheet for the documents located at
pages 234 through 254 of the Agency's Record, and is therefore out of order.
3.

It is noted that the Record commencing at page 186 and continuing through page 211
of the Agency's Record are out-of-order. Logically, for continuity and to avoid the
potential for confusion, the correct and/or chronological order for said instruments
is as follows:
a.

Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration; Motion to Reopen; for Modification
of Award upon Consideration of a Change in the Nature or Extent of
Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest Injustice; and, for
Consolidation, filed April 30, 2018.

b.

Affidavit of Claimant, Mario Ayala, in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration; Motion to Reopen; for Modification of Award upon
Consideration of a Change in the Nature or ExtentofCl aimant's Disablement
and/or to Correct a Manifest Injustice; and, for Consolidation, filed April 30,
2018.

c.

Claimant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration; Motion
to Reopen; for Modification of Award upon Consideration of a Change in the

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR
AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 3

424

Nature or Extent of Claimant's Disablement and/or to Correct a Manifest
Injustice; and, for Consolidation, filed April 30, 2018.
DATED This

,a__ day of September, 2018.
G, STONE & TRAINOR

By_-=: ....=;;:p ,c.._-4~ -1------ --L. Clyel erry
Attorneys for Claimant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the
day of September, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true copy
thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:

_/s!_

Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS AND/OR
AUGMEN TATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD - 4
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,
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STEPHAN , KV ANVIG, STONE & TRAINOR
L. Clyel Berry - ISB #1897
P. 0. Box 83
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0083
Telephone: 208-733-2721
Facsimile: 208-733-36 19
E-Mail: skst@idaho -law.com
Ayala/REQ -AUGMEN T-AR/mek
Attorney for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRI AL COMMISS ION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant/Appellant,

LC. No. 2001-5209 58
LC. No. 2009-0295 33
LC. No. 2013-0240 75

vs.

(SUPREME COURT NO. 46186-2018)

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, INC.,

::;;
CLAIMAN T/APPEL LANT'j
OBJECTION TO AND R&\UES:O
'2 7 o C:iJ
ADDITIONS AND/OR
):;,.f'fl
AUGMENTATION OF/TO.Trli!E-;;:.
g:;=:
AGENCY'S RECORD
--{p·i

,....,.

•-I""

Employer,
and

:ro

STATE INSURAN CE FUND,

9
0
-J

Surety,
Defendants /Responden ts.

COMES NOW Claimant/Appellant herein by and through counsel of record and pursuant
to Rule 29(a) Idaho Appellant Rules and hereby objects to and/or requests additions and/or
augmentati on of/to the same, as follows:
Requests for Additions to and/or Augmentat ion of the Agency's Record:

CLAIMANT/APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS
AND/OR AUGMENTATION OF/TO THE AGENCY'S RECORD -1

426

1.

Claimant's Motion to Enforce Agreement to Settlement; Alternative Motion for
Immediate Re-Setting of Hearing; and, for Sanctions, Specifically to Encompass
Fees, dated April 21, 2016.

2.

Defendants' Opposition to Claimant's Motion to Enforce and for Sanctions, dated
May 3, 2016.

3.

That Order on Claimant's Motion to Enforce dated and filed June 7, 2016.
REQUEST FOR HEARING

Should the Commission require this matter be set for hearing, request is hereby made
that the Commission set this matter for a telephone conference. Claimant/Appellant's counsel's
UNAVAILABLE dates are as follows:

From the instant date through September 21, 2018;
October 4 through 9, 2018;
November 7 through 19, 2018;
November 23, 2018;
December 3 and December 10, 2018.
Should the Commission need unavailable dates following December 10, 2018, upon being so
advised counsel will immediately so provide.
DATED This~dayofSeptember, 2018.
STEPHAN,KV

By_,_.,'-"'-1""-"'---\------f------L. Clyel erry
Attorneys for Claimant/App Hant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and that on the
day of September, 2018, I served a copy of the foregoing document by depositing a true
copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:

1L

Paul J. Augustine
AUGUSTINE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
P.O. Box 1521
Boise, ID 83701

L.
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO

MARIO AYALA,
Claimant,

IC 2001-520958
2009-029533
2013-024075

ROBERT J. MEYERS FARMS, TNC.,

ORDER ON MOTION TO
CORRECT/AUGMENT THE RECORD
AND OBJECTION TO THE RECORD

v.

Employer,
and

FI LEO

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

On or about September

14'1\

Claimant filed his Objection to and Request Additions

and/or Augmentation of/to the Agency's Record. and his Motion for Conections, Additions
and/or Augmentation of/to the Agency's Record. Defendants filed no response.
Claimant requests the inclusion of:
1. The January 3, 2018 conespondence from Commission to Counsel.
a. Claimant's response to said conespondence.
b. Any correspondence received from Mr. Augustine in response to said
correspondence. 1
2. Claimant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, dated April 21, 2016.

2

3, Defendant's Opposition to Claimant's Motion to Enforce and For Sanctions, dated May
3, 2016.
4. The Order on Claimant's Motion to Enforce, dated and filed June 7, 2016.
1 111ere

is no correspondence ofrecord from Mr. Augustine in response to the Commission's letter.
did not request the inclusion of his affidavit accompanying this Motion, Defendant's affidavit
accompanying his Motion, Claimant's response to Defendant's Motion, or that accompanying affidavit.
2 Claimant
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Claimant also requests numerous corrections to the record, including a correction to a
date listed on the exhibit list and corrections to the pagination of certain motions and orders.
Having reviewed said Agency Record, and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28(c),
Claimant's Motions to Correct and Augment the record are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
-i m
f\\,J_ I~~ "
DATED this__,_L::l__..___day
of _ _,_u:mx=:""-'.
µ.,.,'-"-"-""")L.___, 2018.
\
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Thomas ~ i n , Commissimre~

A~@]
·~mmission -~lqi·e.:,
.,;,.p ,J\.
'\, o,..
/'
\)\) ,/'
"<"., ,J ?•'"'@mo:,\>_"'~ \\)

',, c OF\\l~\

,,...;/
"'°"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,,,,
~,,.,.it
I hereby certify that on the 1ltn day of
2018, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO CORRECT/AUGMENT THE RECORD
AND OBJECTION TO THE RECORD was served by regular United States Mail upon each
of the following:
1

' 009 nu~ ei

u~

L. CL YEL BERRY
POBOX302
TWIN FALLS ID 83303

Q):,\:da2.r

,

PAUL J. AUGUSTINE
PO BOX 1521
BOISE ID 8370 1

es!
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